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SUMMARY 
The key objectives for this research were to: 
() Provide a database in order to extend the knowledge and 
understanding of the management and use of overtime across the 
whole economy; 
ii) Review and test a range of research questions and hypotheses 
concerning specific problems and controversies surrounding the use 
of overtime. 
The research was structured within three main phases viz. desk-research, fieldwork and analysis. 
The Initial search for Improved U. K labour market management revealed overtime to be a key 
factor, equivalent to 1.5 million full time jobs, and apparently little understood. It had been 
forecast that overtime would fall In the late 1970s and 1980s and that this fall would result from the 
combined effects of: unemployment, uncompetitive unit labour costs and increasing management 
scrutiny. In the event overtime Increased considerably and continues to increase, confounding 
many of the soothsayers. In 1988-89, the cost of overtime to employers was £15,000 million, 
£5,000 million of which was the premium paid to secure the benefits which management must 
have considered the overtime would bring to their organisations. 
A research market gap was found regarding the use and management of overtime across the 
economy as a whole. Moreover, this knowledge would be needed since change remains an 
apparent inevitability. It was against this backdrop that overtime was investigated. Desk- 
research was directed at providing an unbounded literature review, addressing the key issues 
which surround the use of overtime. This review established that there is a high degree of 
controversy regarding the use of overtime and it facilitated the detailed design of the research 
questions and hypotheses. A multi-faceted methodology was developed to Investigate these 
questions and test the hypotheses. This Involved building on the desk-research, using two 
mutually supportive fieldwork techniques; firstly, a survey, using a mailed questionnaire, and 
secondly, a set of semi-ethnographic case studies. 
The Survey covered all economic sectors, sizes of establishment and regions of the U. K. It 
yielded 225 usable cases, representing over 40,000 employees and collected a wide range of 
statistical data regarding the use and management of overtime and structures and perceptions of 
working time. These results were analysed by reference to a number of structural variables, 
including: sector; regional location; size of establishment; type of worker and overtime levels. 
The resulting series formed a basis for standardised comparisons between the structural variables. 
A range of statistical data and significant associations and differences were established, providing 
a unique empirical database and thereby satisfying one of the key objectives of the research. 
Thus the survey produced a skeleton of statistical evidence, whereas the case studies built on this 
framework to give the detailed explanation and Interpretation needed for a better understanding of 
the processes involved. 
The results of both the desk-research and fieldwork were drawn together to help resolve the 
research questions and test the hypotheses. It was established that overtime detracts from 
operational flexibility, confounding the majority of managers who claimed flexibility-based reasons 
such as'unexpected demand' and 'emergency cover' as the prime explanations of their use of 
overtime. Indeed, about 75% of overtime was found to be systematic, insofar ash was 
predictable, and therefore operated either by management choice or default. The effects of 
overtime on employment were more significant than had been indicated in the literature. For 
example, the substitution of overtime for employment was found to be more widespread than 
most commentators had predicted, although managers did not readily yield to this fact. 
Conversely, worker dependency on overtime earnings was found to be much less common than 
previous research had allowed. 
In concert with the literature, however, dear and extensive evidence was found to associate 
overtime with ineffective management. A significant amount of overtime was simply unnecessary 
from an operational viewpoint, and the majority of the balance was ineffective In that it was less 
cost-effective than the alternatives. Such unnecessary and ineffective overtime was characterised 
by phenomena such as: mistaken management understanding of its application, effects and 
comparative costs; an inappropriate management decision process leading to its use; the 
improper and inadequate utilisation of management controls; employee control of the overtime 
and adverse employee welfare associated with its use. 
Notwithstanding the above conclusions, a minority of overtime was found to be an effective and 
rational means for management to satisfy demand and to meet corporate objectives. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1 THE INITIAL RATIONALE AND MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
The original objectives of an extended programme of research can appear somewhat remote and 
Irrelevant as the project develops. That was not the case for this thesis. The reasons and 
motivation for the project were reinforced during its progress and there remains solid conviction of 
its need and potential value. It may be of passing Interest to review, very briefly, the project 
genesis. 
In the early 1980s, an interest was developed in the management of the labour market, in 
response to damaging levels of unemployment. Substantial background research was 
conducted into unemployment alleviation measures. The fundamental thesis followed neo- 
classical lines, in that the labour market was viewed as a simple balancing equation of demand 
and supply, yielding a surplus or shortfall of labour. The equation had many potential inputs and 
outputs which remain the subject of constant debate and development. Certainly the resultant 
yield crucially affects individuals, organisations and the general 'health' of the nation and no one 
could deny the importance of achieving a 'better' balance, in terms of both social and economic 
consequences. 
In the light of this early analysis, in the mid 1980s, it was decided to look prospectively at the 
potential labour market management options, In order to Identify an area of detailed research for 
which this project could be the vehicle. This process led to the development of a taxonomy 
entitled: 'Unemployment Alleviation Measures'. In all, 63 separate measures were Identified. This 
computer-based taxonomy classified the relevant sources of Information and comment against 
each of the 63 measures and enabled these to be rationally ordered. The structure of this 'model' 
may help to explain the route which led to the eventual choice of topic. The adopted 
classifications are set out In Appendix 11, 'Unemployment Alleviation Taxonomy Classifications'. 
Other classifications and dimensions, which were considered but not developed, Included: 
international comparability; 'morality' and degrees of outcome certainty. It was hoped that, In the 
future, this taxonomy would promote a more structured, (and less political), approach to labour 
market management at all levels. Although it has remained somewhat undeveloped, the 
taxonomy certainly facilitated rational evaluation, and therefore the choice, of the detailed 
research topic. 
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1.2 RESEARCH PROJECT TOPIC SELECTION 
A number of criteria were adopted in order to guide the selection of an area of labour market 
management for this PhD research project. These criteria are summarised below: 
Importance: the topic should be important and substantial in terms of its potential 
impact on the labour market; 
2 Viability: the topic should offer pragmatic opportunity for change, rather than simply 
present an unlikely theoretical option; 
3 Originality: the topic must offer the opportunity to bring new evidence to bear, it 
should present a 'research gap'; 
4 Feasibility: the topic should be researchable, within the available resources, viz: 
monographic, offer pragmatic fieldworking opportunity at the micro-economic level 
and be a suitable match for the researcher's abilities and experience. 
The first two criteria were essentially product oriented and reflected the original raison-d'etre of 
the project. The last two were concerned more with the actual PhD process. On balance, the 
issue of the management of overtime working in the U. K recommended itself as the most 
appropriate of the 63 unemployment alleviation measures reviewed. The reasons for this choice 
are summarised below. 
The evidence on the first criterion was clear. Informed estimates of the potential worksharing 
impact of overtime reduction ranged from 100,000 jobs (DOE 1978), to 1,300,000 Jobs (Labour 
Research 1980). The conversion of overtime hours into new jobs Is reviewed in detail In Section 
3.4.6 herein. White (1984; 88) revealed that 'overtime was under-reported by official estimates' 
and that little was known of the extent and effects of unpaid overtime within the economy. The 
fundamental question appeared to be the extent to which overtime could be converted to jobs and 
the processes involved. In order to help find an answer to this question, more up-to-date and 
comprehensive information was needed regarding the use of overtime within the whole economy 
and, in particular, the mechanisms and processes of the plant-level management of overtime. 
Of course, one of the problems with overtime reduction as a worksharing measure is that it is far 
from irreversible, unlike most other worksharing measures (Metcalf 1982). This mitigated against 
overtime as an unemployment alleviation measure. In contrast, worksharing measures generally 
increase costs. The one exception is that of overtime reduction, which can offer savings In some 
circumstances (Best 1981; Bosworth 1983; White 1984). Also, as Hanagan (1982) pointed out, 
'overtime predominates among male manual workers as does unemployment'; the potential link to 
the control of unemployment cannot be ignored. 
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Moreover, 'better' overtime management may offer a 'Job creation' facet about which there is 
scant comment In the literature (Jallade 1981; White 1982; ILO 1985). This aspect of overtime 
management has since been defined and referred to as the 'second round effects', and is 
considered to be of as great a potential significance as that of the worksharing implications of 
overtime reduction (Spink and Brewster 1989). 
The evidence on the second test, 'viability', was more ambiguous In that change had long been 
predicted, but had not materialised. Nevertheless, it was clear that other competitor nations 
generally operated with lower levels of overtime than the UX and, unlike the U. K., applied 
statutory controls to working hours (Holdsworth 1988). This suggested that viable alternatives to 
the U. K. system of overtime working may exist. Indeed, White (1984) stated, 'during the post-war 
period. while other competitor nations have found ways of achieving much higher levels of output 
per worker, and In many Industries better delivery performance, without recourse to overtime, In 
British Industry it appears that both management and workers have become dependent upon the 
practice of overtime'. 
It was also plain that the worksharing debate would continue and pressure would remain for a 
shorter working lifetime, through a shorter working week and many other mechanisms. The 
Implications of overtime within that debate were uncertain, but there was no doubt that these 
would be significant (DOE 1978; Evans and Palmer 1985). Indeed, all worksharing measures 
could be rendered ineffective, or even counter productive, if they resulted in Increased overtime, 
paid at premium rates (ETUI 1979; Leslie and Wise 1980; Rathkey 1984). These matters are 
covered in detail in Section 3.4.7 of this thesis. The acid test on the 'viability' question lay In 
consideration of the likely future organisation of working time and In this respect a degree of 
Judgement was necessary. it seemed highly unlikely that, over the next 25 years, overtime would 
remain at the current levels. As with the length of the working lifetime, change seemed the more 
likely outcome. There was, therefore, a case for improving and up-dating knowledge of the use of 
overtime In the U. K. so that any change could progress on a more sound footing. 
The third criterion was that of originality and the Identification of a research gap. A vast body of 
evidence Identified a need for more research, both detailed and general, on the use of overtime 
(eg. Hollman 1979 and 1980; Smith and Palmer 1981; Council of Europe 1983; Hill 1984 and 1987; 
White 1984; Blyton 1985; Lee 1985; BIM 1985; Zackmann 1986; Curson 1986). The current 
position generally espoused by commentators world wide, was perhaps summed up by Dilts 
(1983) who stated: 'Much of the research to date is piecemeal, focusing on only one aspect of the 
problem, or indirectly, focusing on issues and measures thought to be related to overtime. The 
purpose of this paper was to suggest a systematic analysis of the use of overtime and its Impact 
on managerial decision making'. Dilts' suggestion was unequivocal and led to this research 
adopting few arbitrary boundaries to the review of overtime in the U. K. 
A search of the research registers revealed a variety of current projects reviewing the structure 
and organisation of working time. For instance, there were several research projects into the use 
of work sharing schemes and annual hours schemes. None, however, were reported in the area 
of overtime working. Perhaps this was not surprising since overtime tended to be viewed as 
somewhat old-hat and drawing back to time-honoured industrial traditions and culture, thought to 
be centred in the manufacturing sector and having little in common with a modern progressive 
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economy. This common perception is well removed from the truth. White (1988) stated that 
overtime in the rapidly expanding service sector'is equivalent to more than 800,000 jobs', more 
than double that in the retrenching manufacturing sector and 'is now both roaring back and under- 
estimated by official figures'. Clearly, there was a need for firm and up-to-date data and evidence 
on the management and use of overtime across the whole of the U. K. economy. Thus, data 
collection and presentation became an important facet of the research project. 
The fourth criterion was that of feasibility. This was the least Important test but overtime rated 
very highly. There was no lack of opportunity for the study of overtime at the general or the 
specific micro-economic level. The few overtime projects reported over the last decade, were 
found to be based essentially on a review of the published statistics, or surveys, exclusively 
conducted in the production sectors (a detailed analysis is developed in Sections 3 and 5 herein). 
A wide range of opportunities were offered for generally increasing the knowledge of the use of 
overtime across the whole economy. In addition, it was clearly possible to investigate a number 
of overtime phenomena and processes, and particularly the actual plant level management of 
overtime about which little appeared to be set out in the literature, (see Section 3.3.1). 
The researcher had a wide range of relevant experience: as, successively, a shop-floor worker 
'using' overtime, a manager scheduling overtime, a consultant advising employers on productivity, 
working time and payment systems and, eventually, as an employer again 'using' overtime, but 
from quite a different perspective. 
1.3 THE BROAD RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In the light of the early literature review and research it was decided, in general terms, that the 
project should Involve two supporting processes: 
i) A general review covering the whole economy and providing a broad range of 
Information on the use of overtime; 
Ii) A detailed review of the management of overtime and a number of selected overtime 
Issues for which there appeared to be a high degree of controversy. 
The first area of research was intended to meet the perceived needs of the 'market'. while the 
second utilised the skills of the researcher in a behavioural study, In order to reveal more detail of 
the actual management and processes involved in the use of overtime. The rationale by which 
these general objectives were translated into a detailed set of research questions is developed 
through Sections 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
It was, idealistically perhaps, hoped that this project could add to the development of the national 
debate on working time issues. To this end it was always the Intention that this thesis should be a 
spring-board for future action and publications. 
The plan did not lack in ambition: the complexity and magnitude of the problems were realised at 
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the outset. However, this acted as a spur rather than a damper to the research. It was 
recognised from the start that the overtime issue had been somewhat neglected in both the 
'macro-economic' and 'human resource management' debates in the literature. There appeared 
to be an element of avoidance of what was perceived as a difficult and perplexing issue. For 
example: BIM (1985) and Brewster and Connock (1986) identified overtime as a key issue but did 
not attempt to tackle it, choosing to deal with more 'fashionable' working time issues. Lynch 
(1985) stated: 'Overtime is, in my view, both a neglected area for management and an avoidable 
cost in most organisations. But it is one which is so embedded in the British Industrial system 
that it is hard to break. The best approach may be to undertake a complete review and 
reorganisation of working time'. A full and up-to-date knowledge of overtime, and understanding 
of its uses, would clearly assist such a review. 
1.4 MANAGEMENT OF THE RESEARCH ACTIVITY 
A formal research management system was adopted In order that the objectives of this project 
could be achieved within a three year period from the establishment of the broad research 
specification. This system comprised the following key elements: 
Planning; 
Direction and control; 
Database management. 
The planning process was established on three levels: strategic, tactical and operational. The 
strategic level covered the basic research phases which followed the initial work described above, 
viz: 
A Literature review and desk research; 
B Specific research objectives development; 
C Methodology design; 
D Fieldwork, data collection and investigation; 
E Analysis; 
F Presentation of data, results and conclusions. 
Each of these phases was controlled using detailed operational plans, structured within tactical 
and strategic plans which identified and programmed the various activities required to complete 
that phase. Database management was one of the key research processes and was achieved 
using a set of six inter-active databases and taxonomies. These systems were specifically 
developed for this research and were themselves innovative. They facilitated the efficient storage, 
sorting, collation and retrieval of information and were based on the PCPR database management 
programme. 
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2 CHARACTERISTICS OF OVERTIME 
2.1 INTRODUCTION AND KEY SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
Having explained In the previous section how overtime became the focus of the project, it might 
be helpful to commence by summarising the available data regarding the use of overtime In the 
U. K This section has, however, been kept relatively brief for two reasons. First, Professor 
Michael White, who's work Is extensively quoted throughout this thesis, produced a monograph 
entitled 'Overtime Working In The UK' (1984), which presents the overtime working statistics and 
trends In the U. K very fully. Indeed, this section draws extensively on that work. The second is 
that the Information Is readily available from the established published sources, where it is 
regularly up-dated. Therefore any analysis given herein could easily be reproduced, and in any 
event, would soon be superseded. 
There is a problem, of course, of relying too heavily on statistics, which are useful only to a point, 
and then only with care and understanding. Nevertheless, it would not be prudent to ignore the 
available definitive statistics. In 1984 White found the Employment Gazette, which is restricted to 
the manufacturing industries only, to be the primary source. However, the'New Earnings 
Survey', (NES), is increasing in importance and is now possibly the key source of overtime 
information. 
The NES Is based on an annual sample survey, conducted by the Department of Employment, in 
which employers are statutorily obliged to cooperate. The survey covers Individual employees, 
selected by their NI code numbers to give a random sample of one per cent of the employed 
population. The survey instrument is a questionnaire, administered by mail, and completed by 
the establishment, not the Individual. The substantive data is drawn from the pay records of the 
establishment. There are two principle advantages of the NES over other sources of information. 
Firstly the coverage of the statistics includes the whole economy. Secondly the detail of the 
analyses is monumental and contrasts the total lack of any detail offered by the Gazette. The 
major disadvantage is that the data Is collected only once each year and Is somewhat out of date 
even when first published. 
The NES analyses are broken down by a pyramid of groupings and sub-groupings. These relate 
to the key structural variables, for example: Industry, region and national wage agreement. The 
sub-groupings are structured In Interchangeable layers which include: occupation, male and 
female employees, manual and non-manual. In addition, particular factors are Included, such as 
full and part-time workers, shift-working, Incentive pay schemes, etc. The NES can exclude those 
absent from work during the survey week and as a result suggests a higher level of overtime In 
manufacturing than the Gazette. 
Notwithstanding the above comments, the most widely used source remains, possibly for 
historical reasons, the Department of Employment's 'Employment Gazette'. This publishes a 
monthly series showing overtime working for manufacturing only and covering the following 
statistics: 
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The number and percentage of operatives working overtime; 
The average hours of overtime, per operative; 
Iii The aggregate hours of overtime worked. 
These statistics are based on a sample postal inquiry of employers who are statutorily obliged to 
give the required information. The sample is extended to a national estimate using the numbers 
of the economically active in employment, obtained from the National Census. White(1984)used 
this source to show two important facts; i) that the aggregate overtime hours was correlated with 
total economic output; and ii) in any week, a minority of employees work high levels of overtime, a 
fact that is easily disguised within an average. 
It will be shown in Section 5.3.2 of this thesis that the restriction of the sample to manufacturing 
gives an Increasing limitation In view of the reducing relative levels of employment In that sector. 
A number of further difficulties arise with this series, the most important of which Is that there Is no 
differentiation between the structural variables such as workforce groupings or regions. Thus the 
series tends to disguise the true picture of overtime by averaging across structural variables such 
as sex and type of workers. A number of minor changes have taken place over the years which 
have affected this series, for Instance establishments of less than 10 staff were excluded, as were 
the important maintenance workers, up to 1974. Moreover, the Census of Employment was 
conducted annually from 1971-78, but has since been less frequent and this has rendered the 
Interpolation between census points less safe. The census also counts jobs rather than people 
and therefore accounts twice for dual job holders (White 1984). 
A third source of information is the General Household Survey. This is a continuous sample 
survey of private households in Great Britain, conducted by the Office of Population Census and 
Surveys, (OPCS). Its subject matters are wide-ranging and include various employment related 
issues. Response rates are about 80% and about 15,000 households, all occupants above 15 
years old, are surveyed annually. Overtime has, however, only been covered In one year, 1980. 
The findings of the 1980 survey give some interesting evidence on the use of overtime, which were 
not be available from any other source. Most Importantly, as White (1984) pointed out, this 
survey revealed a key technical problem in the measurement of overtime, viz. many respondents 
reported long hours of work but not overtime; others reported considerable amounts of unpaid 
overtime. The other sources only report paid overtime. White (1984) felt that this point of 
definition particularly affected the Interpretation of overtime among non-manual workers, but did 
not give any evidence In support of this. It would be of Interest, therefore, to review these Issues 
and provide such evidence during the course of this research. 
2.2 OVERTIME WORK IN CONTEXT 
This is possibly a good point to Introduce a definition of overtime. ILO recommendation No. 116 
(1962) adopts a simple definition of overtime as: 'all hours worked in excess of normal hours, 
unless they are taken Into account in fixing remuneration in accordance with custom' (TaqI 1982; 
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ILO 1986C). Steele (1986), however, did not see the definition as quite so straight-foreward. He 
suggested that a definition based on hours in excess of a'standard work-week' was without 
substance and, further, that a definition based on those hours for which a premium payment was 
made was even less attractive. Steele preferred a definition based on'that contribution of hours 
over which they (the employee) can exercise discretion'. He dismissed mandatory overtime as 
infrequent and gives Ehrenburg and Schuman (1982) as evidence that, in any event, workers 
must, by statute, give their consent for additional hours. This is, however, not the case in the U. K, 
(Section 3.4.4 qv), and the use of mandatory overtime was, in fact, found by this research to be 
significantly higher in the U. K than had been anticipated (Section 9.2.1 qv). Given all the 
qualifications, including that overtime may even be unpaid, this thesis opts for a very simple 
definition viz: 
All hours worked in excess of contractual or normal hours. 
The DoE and NES both adopt a utilitarian approach to the definition of overtime, neither of which 
adequately meet the needs of this research. These definitions are: DoE 'Work outside normal 
hours for which a premium rate Is paid'; and NES 'Overtime hours - Hours for which an employee 
received overtime pay: they may include hours not actually worked, but paid for under guarantied 
minimum overtime schemes. Although rates of pay are usually higher for overtime hours than for 
basic hours, the number of overtime hours is not dependent on the relationship between overtime 
and the basic rates of pay; for example, if hours are paid at "time and a quarter", the number of 
overtime hours Is four not five'. As will be shown in Section 3.3.4, overtime may be paid at a 
negative premium, or be unpaid, in some circumstances. 
The official sources of information mentioned above, exclude Northern Ireland from the statistics, 
although this Is not a major problem since Northern Ireland constitutes only 2% of the U. K. labour 
force. A summary of current overtime statistics, for the British economy as a whole, are set out in 
Appendix 2-1. This summary reveals that two of the key structural variables, regarding the use of 
overtime and the workforce, were sex and type, (manual or non-manual), of employee. These 
variables are therefore controlled as far as possible within this thesis. 
In 1988,2,700 million hours paid overtime were worked in Britain at a cost of £14,200 million. This 
cost represented 8.1 °% of the total national basic wage bill and 23% of the pay of those individuals 
who actually worked the overtime (NES 1989). The cost to employers of the premium element 
alone was £4,900 million. This thesis seeks to establish what, if any, real advantages are secured 
by employers in return for this massive cost. These costs have not discouraged the use of 
overtime, or even engendered any general critical review of its use. Quite the contrary, the trend 
In the use of overtime, across the whole economy, remains firmly upwards. For instance, in 
manufacturing, about 10% more overtime per employee was worked in 1988 than 1987, and 63% 
more than in 1980, when overtime was predicted to be falling, (see Section 3.2.2). 
Regression analysis indicates that annual overtime levels in manufacturing, over the 1980s, 
extrapolated to 1995, will reach 16.9 million hours per week. This represents an increase along 
the regression line from the level of 9.62 million hours per week in the early 1980s, through current 
levels of 13.5 million hours per week. Multiple regression analysis, using data from the 
Employment Gazette 1980-89, yielded R2 0.95 for increasing operator overtime levels and R2 0.75 
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for increasing total overtime hours, in the manufacturing industries. This reflects the current trend 
of employing fewer people, working longer hours. If this trend was to remain unabated it would 
be likely to exacerbate a number of problems for the U. K economy and industrial relations which 
have come to be accept as endemic, including: unemployment and unit productivity; international 
competitiveness. 
2.3 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF OVERTIME IN THE U. K. 
For an analysis of the characteristics of overtime working we must turn to the NES. From this and 
the literature base generally, we can see that the main characteristics have not changed 
fundamentally since the Second World War. In brief, Appendix 2-1 reveals that men work 4.2 
times more paid overtime than women: manual workers 3.8 times more than their non-manual 
counterparts. Married men and employees in the 25 to 50 age group, also show an increased 
propensity to work overtime (NES 1989). 
It Is Important to note that more male manual workers are employed in the non-manufacturing 
sector, and that the proportion outside manufacturing has been increasing each year over the last 
decade. The NES reveals that much more overtime is worked in the non-manufacturing sector 
than In the manufacturing. However, as White (1984; 1988) reveals that very little is known about 
the use of overtime In the non-manufacturing sector. These facts were to weigh heavily in the 
design of the fieldwork phase of this project. 
The NES (1989) revealed that manual-men overtime was a little higher on average in the non- 
manufaturing industries than in the manufacturing industries. For each of the other sub groups, 
(male, female, manual, non-manual), there was little difference in the average overtime worked 
between the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing sectors. It followed, therefore, that after 
the sex and type of worker distinctions had been controlled, the difference In average overtime 
hours between manufacturing and non-manufacturing, on a per worker basis, was small and 
wholly attributable to the male manual group. Moreover, the lower average overtime hours per 
worker In non-manufacturing is a compositional effect, viz. it results from the high proportions of 
non-manual and female workers. 
As shown above, the greatest difference was between men and women as a whole, followed by 
type of worker. It was possible to review the combined sub groups separately. For instance, 
men manual workers took 3.4 times as much overtime as female manual workers and 4.4 times as 
much as men non-manuals; while male non-manual workers took 2.1 times as much as their 
female counterparts. To complete the picture, female manual workers took 2.7 times as much as 
female non-manual workers. White (1984), completed a similar analysis with similar results and 
conclusion. He established that It was important to set the average overtime hours, as a 
proportion of normal hours, of about seven per cent for the economy as a whole, against the 
extremes of 12% for men manual workers and 0.5% for female non-manual workers. Of course, it 
is Important to understand that non-manual workers were thought by many commentators to work 
more unpaid overtime hours than their manual colleagues and this would distort the above 
analysis by reducing the gap between types of worker, but Increasing the gap between male and 
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female overtime averages. It is stressed, however, that this Is only conjecture. The General 
Household Survey of 1980 asked men about unpaid overtime but, regrettably, did not ask women 
this question. 
Whybrew (1968) based a key part of his Interpretation of overtime working on industrial, (SIC), 
differences. It is therefore appropriate to consider the Standard Industrial Classification as one of 
the major structural variables in any analysis of overtime. NES presents the statistics within such 
a structure, from which it is clear that there is an association, (spurious or otherwise), between 
levels of overtime and industry. The NES series uses the SIC (1980) which Is quite different from 
that used by Whybrew. However, it is clear that the patterns were similar, still exists, showing that 
high overtime users have remained: ship building; transport and communications; bricks and food 
drink and tobacco. While low overtime users Included clothing and footwear, and vehicles. 
It was difficult to find any common structural characteristics regarding the industrial analysis of 
overtime working, it seemed that the differences were reducible to the composition of the 
workforces. The Industries were diverse in terms of technology, tertiary sectors and levels of pay. 
It may well be more revealing to review the use of overtime by major economic sector rather than 
by industry grouping. 
An Interesting argument was developed by White (1984), who rejected the long standing premise 
that overtime was a function of the low paid industries. He found that, of the eight highest users 
of overtime, only two were among the group with below average basic pay rates and two were at 
the highest rates of basic pay, similarly, the lowest paid Industry was the lowest user of overtime. 
Moreover, White found that there was a weak correlation between overtime levels and low pay, 
based on hourly rates, but the sign of the slope was positive indicating the opposite relationship to 
that generally presumed. White went on to conduct a series of tests, each of which found a 
similar relationship between overtime level and rates of pay. White's analysis conflicts with that of 
Leslie (1977), which established a weak but statistically significant correlation between low pay 
and long hours. This serves to establish the need for research to challenge common wisdom 
which Leslie supports. In particular, it would be Interesting to look behind the macro-economic 
statistical tests, to seek out the perceptions and motivations of individual workers, In order to give 
body to the debate. 
The next variable for consideration was that of occupation and again the NES gives a very detailed 
analysis, by 200 different categories, which for reasons of sample size, are brought together as 18 
main occupational groupings. The occupations associated with transport, including railmen and 
HGV drivers, had by far the highest levels of overtime. Other high levels were found among 
security services, food processing and postmen. Notably the highest levels of overtime were 
found generally In service sector occupations and this ran against the stereotyped expectations. 
The lowest levels of overtime were found In clerical occupations. 
Whybrew (1968) suggested that Regional location was one of the key structural variables. He 
found that the regional pattern of overtime working could not be reduced to differences in 
industrial structure, since, even for selected industries, regional differences tended to persist. 
However, White (1984) found the differences to be'rather small' and not reflecting any particular 
economic or other rationale. Again the NES (1989) gives the necessary analysis. The regions 
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with the highest levels of overtime were East Anglia, the South East and Scotland, while those with 
the lowest levels were Wales and the North. White (1984) stated that, in the absence of detailed 
information regarding the regional distribution of overtime phenomena: 'it is probably most 
prudent to draw no inferences about the real importance of regional influence on overtime'. 
Again it appeared that a research gap existed in the provision of a broader set of regional 
groupings to establish differences at the macro-economic level. 
Having to some extent'set the scene' regarding the dry statistics of overtime working, it Is 
necessary to now establish the facts, such as are available, of its development and use. The 
intention was to establish a 'definitive' review of the overtime literature base. The results of this 
process are given In the following section where the reader will see that few boundaries were 
accepted. Any precluslons or limitations adopted at the outset would clearly have carried the risk 
of being arbitrary and restrictive. 
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3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The sections which follow In this chapter are Intended to give an outline of the literature on 
overtime working. They are not claimed to be exhaustive, but are Intended to give a fully rounded 
view of the use of overtime. International boundaries have been crossed where broader 
explanations or policy Issues were of interest and where a reference relates particularly to other 
nations, this Is clearly Indicated In the text. 
There has been no specialised and comprehensive recent Inquiry Into overtime working (White 
1984; Caulkin 1976), other than general reviews, such as the Incomes Data Services study (1988), 
which rely greatly on the published secondary information sources. It Is generally accepted that 
the definitive research into overtime working was that of Whybrew, undertaken In 1962-3, which 
adopted the dual approach of reviewing secondary Information sources and case studies, 
restricted to only a few sectors of the economy. Subsequently the National Board for Prices and 
Incomes produced a report entitled 'Hours of Work, Overtime and Shiftworking' (NBPI 1970), 
which still remains the first and only official attempt to quantify and explain the overtime 
phenomena, (Caulkin 1976). 
3.2 THE CONTEMPORARY OVERTIME PRESS AND 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
3.2.1 The Contemporary Overtime Press 
Dr. McCarthy stated, by way of the introduction to Whybrew's research Into overtime working: 
'there has been growing criticism about the use and extent of overtime in British Industry In recent 
years' (Whybrew 1968). There Is no doubt that a 'popular-movement' against overtime, by those 
who study It and write about It, has continued to develop. This Is colourfully Illustrated by 
pejorative titles such as: 'The Strange Scandal Of Overtime' (Caulkin 1976); 'Overtime, The 
Institution That Will Not Die' (Leslie 1977); 'Overtime: Prop And Curse Of The Male Manual Worker' 
(Taylor 1978); 'Overtime Working -A Matter For Public Concern' (Fishwick 1979); 'Overtime, The 
British Industrial Disease' (Labour Research 1980); 'The Overtime Dilemma' (Carby and Edwards- 
Stuart 1981); 'The Abuse Of Overtime' (Lynch 1985); and many others. 
Indeed the hostile commentary has far outweighed that which would promote or condone the use 
of overtime and, not surprisingly, managers, employers and union officials tend to be defensive 
about the issue. A review of the historical position of overtime may help to set the context and to 
explain the flood of pejorative articles which has characterised the contemporary overtime press. 
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3.2.2 Historical Perspective 
Criticism of overtime is not a new phenomenon. In 1850, at the turn of the industrial revolution, 
the Amalgamated Society of Engineering Workers, (A. S. E. ), adopted a number of resolutions 
repudiating overtime with the prime objective of eradicating unemployment (TAHP 1850). 
Following this, the A. S. E., in 1852, introduced a national overtime ban in support of their demands 
for the 'abolition of systematic overtime and piecework'; the employers responded by locking out 
3000 members and eventually won the day (Burgess 1975; Benson and Uoyd 1983). 
Little has changed, overtime working Is still thought to depress employment (EIRR 1980). 
Overtime remains, now as then, both the cause of industrial disputes and a prime sanction used by 
organised labour in Industrial action. Thus, even as industry was born, so was the controversy 
which still surrounds overtime working. 
The use of overtime Increased over the period following the early A. S. E. action, up to the 1900s. 
This was not only so In the years of good trade, but was because employers preferred to work 'a 
more compact body of men' for longer periods, and overtime was perceived as helping to spread 
rising capital overheads at that time (Royal Commission on Labour 1893). Indeed, the use of 
overtime was widespread throughout the nineteenth century (Bienefeld 1972), even with the 
relatively long basic hours which then endured. In the decade following the First World War and 
during the time of the great depression, overtime levels fell-off somewhat, in line with the fall of 
basic hours, giving much shorter actual hours (White 1984). Whybrew (1968) stated that the 
difference between actual and basic hours worked by men throughout the economy during this 
period was only about 0.5 hours on average, (basic hours 47.2; actual hours 47.7). 
As the Second World War approached, the situation began to revert back to the traditional regime. 
Katin (1937) stated: 'overtime... as a result of speeding-up in arms manufacture... brings forward an 
old and vexed problem. Overtime, as a system, has of late taken on political importance... Trades 
unions as a rule are opposed to the consistent application of overtime. Their main ground of 
objection Is the uneven distribution of work under which some men work too long while others 
have no work at all. ' This 'between the wars' commentary echoed that of the previous century. 
Overtime, as a post-war development, Is comprehensively covered by White (1984), who 
established that overtime gradually increased as basic hours fell and thus actual hours remained 
fairly stable and even Increased slightly at times of favourable market demand. By the mid sixties, 
male manual workers were averaging more than 6 hours overtime per week. White concluded 
that a high level of overtime working has not always formed part of the operating practices of 
British industry, but was created as a result of the 'failure of British industry to adapt to 
progressively shorter contractual hours in the post-war period'. 
In the early and mid 1970s aggregate overtime levels remained little changed apart from a small 
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down-turn reflecting the economic situation in 1975. However, by the late 1970s-early 1980s, 
levels appeared to be falling somewhat, although this was a function of a fall in the number of 
operatives working overtime, (reflecting the 'shake-out' in manufacturing industry employment), 
rather than the average amount of overtime worked per'operative-working-overtime' (Employment 
Gazette 1980). 
Many commentators were predicting in the late 1970s and early 1980s that levels of overtime 
would fall. Whiting (1985), for Instance, stated: 'one would think that overtime would reduce as the 
number of unemployed Increased'. The chief Influences which caused this general prediction 
were the deceptive fall in aggregate overtime, which was In fact largely the result of the reduction In 
employment In the traditional Industries, and the presumption that pressure to reduce overtime 
levels would flow from: new technology; Increased productivity; more enlightened structuring of 
working time and new forms of employment contract (Spink and Brewster 1989). Most important 
of all, however, was the presumed effect of the rising levels of unemployment In many sectors of 
the economy, and particularly the manufacturing sector where overtime was rife. Fishwick (1979) 
predicted: 'In theory one might expect overtime to fall in periods of high unemployment', and 
Carby and Edwards-Stuart (1981) stated: 'Overtime seems to be declining in response to the 
overall employment situation'. 
Yet following a slight pause in the early 1980s, overtime has rapidly and consistently increased and 
the trend is continuing higher. Interestingly, none of the commentators who predicted that 
overtime would fall, made specific recommendations or suggestions as to how the reduction might 
be achieved, at either the macro or micro-economic level, or the alternatives and management 
processes Involved. 
3.3 KEY PLANT LEVEL OVERTIME ISSUES 
The sections which follow In this chapter give an outline of the literature on overtime working 
Issues most directly concerning the plant level, they are not claimed to be exhaustive. The 
following Issues are structured rationally in order to prospectively Investigate, and therefore reveal, 
research gaps and questions. The subsequent development of the research questions and 
hypotheses, and the detailed methodologies, flowed from this section. 
3.3.1 The Management and Control of Overtime 
It is widely accepted that overtime has a legitimate use, particularly in affording Increased flexibility 
and worker motivation (Katin 1937; ETUI 1979; Brennan et al 1982; Kats and Goldberg 1982; 
European Commission 1983; BIM 1985). Atkinson and Meager (1986), for example, observed that 
properly managed, overtime has a part to play in dealing with demand fluctuations and an 
increasing need for flexibility in the management of working time in the 1980s. To seek 
simplistically to eradicate overtime would therefore be unhelpful. It is, however, necessary to 
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ensure that, when overtime is used, it is properly managed, for the mutual benefit of the 
organisation and the worker. 
The emphasis in this section is the efficient and effective management of that overtime which is 
worked, rather than the 'management-of-reduction' of overtime per se; although the two processes 
are closely connected. Section 3.3.5, 'Quality of Management', reviews the extent to which 
overtime is associated with poor management and is clearly related to this section. 
The term 'management of overtime' means the system by which the processes of: policy and 
decision making; planning; scheduling and controlling are achieved with respect to overtime in the 
organisation. The lack of substantive review of overtime management systems in this thesis 
reflects the lack of analysis and comment In the literature regarding these, which begs the question 
about the extent of such systems at plant level. (This definition of the management of overtime Is 
somewhat restricted since the motivational aspects are not covered, these being addressed 
elsewhere In Section 3. Furthermore, some of the specific control instruments are not covered In 
this section. For example, the management tool of 'mandatory overtime' Is discussed in detail In 
Section 3.3.10, because the removal of the 'right-to-say-no' denies workers' a basic freedom and 
therefore this Issue is of special significance. ) 
Traditionally, overtime In the U. K. Is thought to be controlled at the first-line management level 
(Carby and Edwards-Stuart 1981; White 1982). Indeed, the Donovan commission stated: 'it Is not 
unusual for directors and senior managers to have little knowledge concerning the detailed 
distribution of overtime and the purposes which It actually serves' (NBPI 1970). Carby and 
Edwards-Stuart (1981) stated: 'it has been widely believed that overtime is badly controlled by 
management and the NBPI (1970) report suggested that In most companies It was not even 
possible to tell whether or not an overtime problem existed because of the lack of monitoring and 
Inadequacy In record keeping'. Carby et al go on to suggest that, based on questionnaire returns 
from 50 organisations, they believe this situation had Improved and that overtime was now coming 
under 'greater control' and was consequently falling. There has not, however, been the fall In 
overtime which they anticipated and this brings Into question their conclusion that the 
management of overtime was improving, although not that they thought that it should Improve. 
White (1982) reported the results of a survey which indicated that firms were moving towards a 
more formal understanding with unions for the control of overtime. Moreover, White attached 
considerable importance to company and plant bargaining for the control or reduction of overtime. 
Similarly, Evans and Palmer (1985) found that unions 'were almost unanimous' In considering that 
overtime is best controlled at local or branch level, although they acknowledged that the 
accomplishment of this had been poor, so far as the reduction of overtime was concerned. 
There are a wide range of management and control 'options' available and the specific plant-level 
circumstances dictate the degree to which these would be appropriate. There does not, however, 
appear in the literature, any definitive account of the use of these management techniques and 
instruments. For example, the key studies of Whybrew (1968) and the NBPI (1970), surprisingly, 
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do not comprehensively address the systems for overtime management. Nevertheless, the 
management of overtime Is touched upon in many texts, and a number of arising points of interest 
are discussed below. 
The first step in any management process is to adopt a policy which should give the framework 
within which the overtime decision, planning and control should take place. Such a policy would 
take account of the Organisation's objectives and strategies in the broadest sense. There is little 
or no reference to this 'policy' phase of the process In the literature. A number of decisions need 
to be taken including the decision between overtime and its alternatives, for instance, between 
overtime and hiring additional employees. This process is dealt with in detail in Section 3.3.3 
'Local Financial implications'. 
The use of overtime budgets, as a planning and control tool, was addressed by the NBPI (1970) 
and it is thought useful to quote extensively from this work: 'Some budgets based on 
measurements by hours failed to distinguish between hours paid for at normal rates and premium 
rates; thus costs per unit output were not properly identified. But the main source of weaknesses 
arose from the fact that many budgetary systems were set by the finance department primarily for 
its own use. Accountants tended to draw them up on the basis of past performance as an 
instrument for forecasting cash flows, and the figures carried the Implicit assumption that 
productivity would be the same as In the past and that overtime would be used for the same 
purpose and to the same extent as before... In some budgets an allowance was given for the use 
of overtime up to a certain level for purposes not clearly specified, and it was only above this level 
that overtime was seriously questioned. Many production managers faced with this felt they had a 
positive incentive to use their allowance to the full In case it should be cut back in the next 
budgeting period. The weakness of such arrangements was that finance budgets were used as a 
substitute for, rather than as a framework for, soundly based and regularly monitored work 
standards governing all work, whether overtime or not'. This quotation provokes a number of 
questions and reveals a need for further research to establish its validity. Carby and Edwards- 
Stuart (1981) also found that budgets were often prepared by the financial rather than the 
operations director. 
The management process involves a planning stage. White (1980) stated: 'there are also points in 
the evidence about the possibility of reductions in overtime through more management emphasis 
on planning and scheduling'. Collons (1981) found that techniques were available which permit 
managers to forecast variations In demand and therefore to plan work schedules and staffing to 
minimise the need for overtime. Moreover, Collons advocated the use of statistical techniques in 
order to find a'least-cost' approach to building inventory In slack periods, thereby to smoothing 
demand variations and avoiding overtime. 
As regards monitoring overtime work, Lynch (1985) advocated the use of computerised time and 
attendance recording systems to give accurate information in the form of regular, low level, 
reports. He stated: 'the ability to use the system for control purposes may well justify the cost'. 
The IRRR (1987) concurred with Lynch In concluding that overtime was best monitored and 
17 
controlled using time clocks. However, the IRRR found that 'staff-status' employees were typically 
not covered by such devices, being more usually controlled through a system of: 'prior 
authorisation ... and, before claims 
for compensation are accepted, endorsement by the supervisor 
or manager concerned' 
One means of controlling overtime would appear to be the imposition of limits. The IDS (1979) 
found two of 29 firms surveyed had imposed limits on overtime working. These were Alcan, with 
20 hours per month overtime limit for staff, and Tucker Fasteners, with 30 hours per month limit for 
manual employees. The use of arbitrary limits raises interesting questions which challenge the 
perceived purpose of the overtime. This issue does not appear to have been addressed in the 
literature. 
Another means of managing overtime is through its remuneration, using salary cut-offs. The IDS 
(1979) survey revealed that most firms paid non-manual workers for overtime working, but that the 
salary cut-off point for overtime payment varied widely, from very low, to relatively high salary 
levels. This was supported by the IDS (1988) findings. Miller (1978) discusses the extent to which 
supervisors are paid for overtime. It appears that while there is some variability, over 50% of 
supervisors do receive overtime pay, particularly as a means of maintaining differentials. Miller 
also discusses the use of overtime corridors which involve the stipulation that a certain number of 
overtime hours should be worked before overtime payments are made. The IDS (1988) give 
examples of the use of minimum qualifying periods for overtime pay, for example, 15 or 30 
minutes. 
The manager needs to consider which individuals will be offered the opportunity to work overtime, 
(or made to stay late), and this process is known as 'allocation'. According to the IDS (1979), the 
most common form of allocation is by volunteer, although they state that departmental 
management or supervisors often introduce a rota to ensure an equal distribution of overtime; this 
reflects the general demand from workers for overtime. Four of the thirty or so firms In the IDS 
survey allocated overtime in consultation with the unions. The NBPI (1970) found, in an extensive 
survey, that allocation was 75% by management or management and unions combined, 23% by 
volunteer and 1.5% leaving the matter entirely to the workers' representatives. Carby et al (1981) 
conducted a survey of 50 organisations of which Indicated that more than half the organisations 
allocated overtime by management selection, 25% by volunteer and 10% using a collectively 
agreed rota system. This survey also revealed that the authorisation of overtime working mostly 
takes place at departmental manager or supervisor level. 
Reid (1985) found that about half the Canadian collective agreements contained some provision 
regarding the equitable distribution of overtime, either by giving preference to workers with 
seniority, or by spreading available overtime across the plant or department. Similarly, In the U. S., 
some collective agreements call for'parity overtime' which is basically a system which gives the 
first option to work overtime to employees with higher levels of seniority (Effective Manager 1982). 
A common clause in collective agreements is that of equal opportunity for overtime work. 
However, this is in practice difficult to enforce because the workforce often have different skills and 
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job knowledge (Koernigsberg and Loya 1978). 
The device of a'call week' is defined by Rhodes (1983), in the U. S. and this deals effectively with 
the question of employee notice as well as scheduling and allocation. Lee (1985) reviewed the 
existence of 'on-call' rotas within the U. K economy, but he found these to be rather uncommon. 
From the workers' view point, Katin (1937) strongly advocated the adoption of formal 'notice-to- 
work-overtime' periods, stating: a too frequent sin of foremen, and one responsible for widespread 
resentment among the factory hands, is the failure to give adequate notice of overtime. Although 
Katin made his pronouncement many years ago, it is interesting to see how much has changed 
and ff today's supervisors are more sensitive to this issue. The IDS (1979) found that only two, 
from 29 firms surveyed, 'gave notice when overtime working was required'. In the light of Katin's 
observations, this is quite remarkable. 
The ILO are proponents of the improvement of aspects of work affecting 'quality of life'. The ILO 
Medium Term Plan (ILO 1988a) addresses the issue of 'notice' from this stand-point and gives, as a 
specific objective for the period up to 1995, the question: 'If work schedules vary, what advance 
notice (of overtime working, to the worker) should be given? '. 
It is difficult to rationalise the use of 'guaranteed overtime' with the reasons for overtime which are 
most often claimed, such as emergency cover or unexpected demand. Guaranteed minimum 
overtime pay is however, more understandable. The IDS (1979) considered that guaranteed 
overtime was most common among drivers. Indeed, two of the 29 firms surveyed by the IDS 
guaranteed their drivers a specific amount of overtime. Moreover, two firms in the IDS (1979) 
survey guaranteed minimum overtime payments. Guaranteed overtime is not, however, restricted 
solely to the haulage Industry (IRRR 1984). 
Perhaps the most difficult overtime problems to recognise and manage are those with a 
psychological basis. To some extent this issue has been covered in Section 3.3.9'Employees 
Attitudes, Motivations and Manipulation', where it is established that very few actual facts are 
available, although there is no shortage of Innuendo. Collons (1981) recognised the need for 
managers, In addressing psychologically based problems, to make a dual approach. Firstly, to 
develop correct incentives and productivity strategies, for example, payment policies, particularly 
to deal with the problem of work-group depression of productivity to maintain overtime, and 
secondly to use behavioural sciences. In support of Collon's proposition, Kopelman and 
Schneller (1981) also advocated 'behavioural intervention' as a valid mechanism within a broad 
and effective management strategy. 
There are a wide number of extraneous factors which have some influence on overtime working; 
for example, absenteeism. The eradication or management of the reasons for overtime is not the 
central theme of this section. However, it is considered of interest to mention the approach of 
Kopelman and Schneller (1981) as an exemplar of management systems. They promote a 
powerful 'mixed-consequences' system which: 'incorporates both reinforcers and punishers to 
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control the incidence of overtime and, (in this instance), unscheduled absences'. 
Capital Investment Is another example of an extraneous factor requiring management decisions 
which appear to be outside the realms of overtime, but which potentially could significantly affect 
overtime. For Instance, according to White (1980): `there Is little room for doubt that there Is 
scope for overtime reduction through technical Improvements... The evidence suggests that levels 
of investment In plant and equipment may affect the ability of Industry to reduce overtime'. White 
further argued that overtime Is to some extent a function of low capital Investment and aging 
capital stock which encourage high maintenance requirements and low productivity. Similarly, 
Caulkin (1976) and Collons (1981) concluded that technological progress and capital investment 
can give management the opportunity to remove the physical causes of overtime. Shift systems 
can also have an important Impact on overtime. For Instance, arrangements such as five-crew 
shift working can substantially reduce the amount of overtime (TUC 1981; IRRR 1984). There is no 
specific research data available regarding these issues. 
Finally, an interesting paradox is apparent in the literature In that It is generally asserted that the 
specific technical management of overtime In the U. K. is 'sloppy'; e. g. Caulkin (1976) states: 
'managements often lack proper procedures for controlling overtime, nor do they study the 
implications for costs and profitability of decisions on hours of work'. Yet the literature clearly 
lacks information or details on the management of that overtime which the organisation consider it 
is prudent to work. Indeed, there does not appear to be a comprehensive review of the various 
overtime-management decision and control techniques which are available, or of the use of these 
within different organisations and circumstances, and their distribution across the U. K. economy. 
Furthermore, Lee (1985), in reviewing the general control of hours of work, highlighted the lack of 
attention paid to this 'major feature' of employee control. He stated: 'hours systems have the 
most intrusive effect on the employee's total life pattern, their neglect as a field of study is all the 
more disconcerting'. It Is thought appropriate to attempt to fill this gap in the knowledge of the 
management of working time. 
3.3.2 The Functions of Overtime 
The literature suggests some confusion on the important question of why managers schedule 
overtime. Indeed, there Is not even agreement on a common title for the 'functions' which 
overtime provides. Some commentators refer to the 'causes' and 'justifications' of overtime, 
which in itself is somewhat revealing. Others refer to overtime: 'reasons'. 'sources', 'categories' 
and 'types'. 
Caution is needed in interpreting the reasons given for overtime. It is explained in Section 6.3, 
'Reasons for the Use of Overtime', that the functions of overtime, given by respondents may not 
reveal the true mechanisms at work. In any event, some of the sources quoted below appear to 
have based their views on this topic on supposition rather than on researched evidence. 
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A number of functions of overtime are covered in other sections of this chapter. For instance, the 
extent to which overtime may provide relief for poor management, is covered in Section 3.3.5, 
where a deep concern within the literature is clearly demonstrated. Similarly, absenteeism is 
covered in section 3.3.6 and many commentators subscribe to this as one of the functions of 
overtime, although few would claim this as a major factor (Lynch 1985). The relationship between 
overtime and worksharing is discussed in Section 3.4.4. According to a majority of the literature, 
for instance, Curson ed. (1986), overtime has tended to increase as a result of reductions in normal 
working hours, the so-called 'leeching' effect which is also covered In Section 3.4.4. Overtime 
created in this way would tend to be 'systematic' but may well be defined by management in some 
other way. 
Moving to the general classification of overtime working, Whybrew (1964 and 1968), In reviewing 
the functions of overtime observed that the arguments used by managers to justify overtime 
working can be divided into three classes: 
1) Emergency situations; 
ii) Technical questions of job organisations: 
viz. nature of the job, (e. g. maintenance), indivisibility of tasks, (e. g. transport 
schedules); shift system; 
iii) Social or economic: 
viz. to increase production... but avoiding socially undesirable hiring and firing 
or short-time working. 
This attempt to establish a generic classification structure for the functions of overtime did not, in 
the event, receive much support in the literature. 
The 'social or economic' classification Is of interest in that It suggests an overtime function which 
can be called 'corporate flexibility'. This expression is Intended to encompass the use of overtime 
in situations where demand may be present in the short term, but it is uncertain if that demand 
would hold-up over the longer term. The organisation, therefore, may choose to meet the short- 
term demand by scheduling overtime rather than incurring the risk of making what Is perceived to 
be a more permanent increase in capacity, (e. g., hiring new staff, introducing additional shifts, 
changing payment policies, Investing in additional capital equipment, etc. ). 
Lynch (1985) makes the point that any policy which Is intended to control overtime would need 
Information on the categories of overtime and the extent to which overtime arises under these 
categories. He goes on to promote the specific approach by categorisation advocated by the 
British Paper Board Industry, viz: 
i) Contractual, (Built into the working week e. g., shift cycle overtime); 
ii) Production, (Normal production or Maintenance); 
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iii) Casual, (All other reasons e. g., rush orders, emergencies, absences, etc). 
This approach was not found to be of universally value, and remains unadopted generally. 
It Is plain that there will be many establishments where the functions of overtime are multi-faceted 
and where the reasons for that overtime will vary from time to time. Nevertheless, a number of 
commentators have attempted to prepare a listing of reasons which can be held to some degree 
as representative of the manufacturing sector. An analysis was offered by Smith and Palmer 
(1981) based on a study conducted by Carby et al (1981) which consisted of a survey covering 50 
respondents, and yielded the following listing of 'reasons' for overtime by frequency of response. 
FIGURE 3-1 
REASONS FOR OVERTIME 
Reason 
Importance of reason for overtime working 
Very Little Not 
Important Important importance applicable 
Non- 
response 
Fluctuations In demand 19 25 4 2 0 
Bottle-neck removal 9 20 12 8 1 
Custom and practice 1 11 10 27 1 
Maintenance 13 21 6 9 1 
Maintain differentials 0 0 9 41 0 
Facilitate shift working 6 8 5 30 1 
Normal demand 4 15 13 17 1 
Increase pay 1 6 12 31 0 
Skill shortages 4 7 22 16 1 
Other 7 2 1 39 
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It may be useful to review the literature on individual overtime functions, although the Indivisibility 
of overtime functions, not just within a sector, but within a single establishment, must again be 
stressed. 
It is commonly held that overtime Is mainly a function of operational flexibility. The nature of this 
relationship Is, however, subject to conjecture with proponents believing that overtime enhances 
day-to-say flexibility and others believing that it Inhibits flexibility. Curson ed. (1986) explained that 
'demand fluctuations are sometimes predictable but can be very unpredictable'. He explained 
that overtime Is one of the key means by which employers can achieve a level of what he termed 
'numerical flexibility', viz. variable capacity, although not the only means. Overtime to meet 
'unexpected demand' Is seen by many employers as a valid and efficient means of achieving 
'operational flexibility' and there Is a strong body of opinion supporting the use of overtime as a 
means of enhancing operational flexibility Mabry (1976); Willatt (1980); White (1980); Smith and 
Palmer (1981); ILO (1984); Zachmann (1986). Nevertheless, the opposite view is held with equal 
verve. 
Clegg (1962) took a jaundiced view of the flexibility claims for overtime stating: 'it is not the 
demands of production which determine the volume of overtime'. Likewise, the ETUI 1982 were 
uncompromising: 'a fraction of overtime, even if relatively small, can probably be justified for 
reasons of flexibility. It is, however, quite clear that a large part of the overtime worked cannot be 
justified In terms of flexibility'. These commentators by no means stand alone In their analysis, 
many others would lend support e. g., Fishwick (1979); Brewster and Connock (1985). Moreover, 
it Is obvious that 'systematic' overtime can actually Inhibit day-to-day flexibility. For example, if 
overtime is worked every Saturday morning, there would be no opportunity for management to use 
Saturday morning overtime to fulfil unexpected demand. This argument Is reviewed in Section 
3.3.7'Systematic Overtime'. 
One of the irreproachable or felt-fair functions of overtime is 'emergency cover'. Production 
schedules or service levels can be disrupted through a wide variety of events e. g., equipment 
failures, material shortages, quality problems, etc. These are sometimes referred to as 'bottle- 
necks'. There is a wide basis of support for the use of overtime to prevent such events from 
resulting in a chain reaction of disruption throughout the organisation, e. g., Mabry (1976); Caulkin 
(1976); Willatt (1980); Whiting (1985); Blyton (1985). 
On the other hand, overtime used for'normal demand' could plainly be classified as 'systematic'. 
This function of overtime is widely proffered within the literature Fishwick (1979); Whiting (1985). 
The IDS (1988), for example, stated: 'the major reason why more overtime is being worked is the 
strong economic growth over the last few years... demand was outstripping production capacity 
but skill shortages made recruitment of extra workers difficult'. More pointedly, the European 
Regional Organisation, (ERO), (1982) believed that: 'the vast majority of overtime work... Is quite 
stable and worked by only a minority of workers. The main reasons for such 'systematic' overtime 
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are that overtime is cheaper to the employer than employing new workers... and overtime pay 
is 
considered by many workers as an indispensable part of their weekly income'. This reveals a 
need for research to establish the extent of such processes and types of overtime 
in the U. K 
economy. 
Section 3.3.3 reviews the Implications of the financially based decision between overtime and 
hiring additional employees. The ERO comment, above, Is a clear exemplar that normal demand 
and cost effectiveness are In fact one and the same function of overtime. One explanation 
for the 
semantic difference may be that some commentators feel the need to express the'normal 
demand' function In the guise of an excuse. Hence use Is often made of 'cost effectiveness' as a 
function of overtime, since this Is perceived as acceptable, although supporting financial analysis Is 
conspicuous by its absence from the literature. There is certainly evidence of stigma attached to 
the use of overtime for normal production, (see section 3.3.7, 'Systematic Overtime'). This is, 
however, not the unanimous feeling of the literature. Indeed the 'normal demand' use of overtime 
Is taken by a number of commentators to be a valid and professional response to scheduling 
needs; e. g., CBI (1980); PA International Management Consultants (1982); Whiting (1985); Blyton 
(1985); Curson ed. (1986); Zachmann (1986). In particular, Dawkins (1983) considered, In 
Australia, that spreading the fixed costs of labour was a'sound economic reason for using 
overtime'. 
The NBPI (1970) Report concluded that much overtime was used by employers to meet the normal 
level of demand. They explained: 'clearly, labour shortages have had a great deal to do with this 
situation. There can be no doubt that the continuing pressures of generally high demand for 
labour in the post-war period have been a powerful factor in pushing up overtime levels'. This 
raised the issue of 'labour shortages' which are frequently cited as a reason for overtime; e. g., 
Willatt(1980); Jallade ed. (1981); Blyton (1985). The 'labour shortage' function is often taken to be 
synonymous with that of'skill shortages' which Is also often quoted as a reason for overtime 
working EIRR (1981); PA International Management Consultants (1982); European Regional 
Organisation (1982); Whiting (1985); Zachmann (1986); IDS (1988). It would be of interest to 
study the extent and distribution of these two factors separately. 
It is commonly believed that 'regular maintenance' is one of the key functions of overtime. 
However. White (1980) takes this theory a stage further, he explains: 'Maintenance is likely to 
cause overtime both because it may disrupt normal production, and because some types of 
repairs on plant and services can only be carried out after production has ceased'. Of course, 
emergency maintenance, due to equipment failure, would be most accurately classified as 
'emergency cover' overtime, rather than 'regular maintenance', but these separate functions would 
appear to sometimes be confused in the literature. There Is a considerable level of support for 
White's analysis. A number of commentators agree that the lack of proper maintenance can 
actually create emergency overtime to cover for production losses during breakdowns, e. g., Willatt 
(1980); Whiting (1985); Blyton (1985). 
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Maintenance raises the question of capital stock. Although at first sight the relationship between 
overtime and 'capital Investment' may appear somewhat obscure, it is nonetheless real. Indeed, 
there are two distinct facets to this relationship. The first can be explained as an Inadequate or 
sub-optimum capital stock, In terms of either quality or availability, which Is redeemed by overtime 
working. The alternative process sees overtime scheduled in order to give more Intensive 
utilisation of that capital stock which exists. The first theory is not often quoted in the literature, 
possibly because it appears difficult to recognise at plant level. However, the use of overtime to 
achieve higher plant utilisation Is widely quoted and generally perceived as a valid, if systematic, 
use of overtime, particularly when little account Is taken of the alternative ways to increase plant 
utilisation, see, for Instance, Caulkin (1976); Bosworth ed. (1983); Dawkins 1983; ILO (1984). 
The TUC (1981) identified shift work as a source of regular overtime, built into the shift pattern to 
maintain proper cover within the rota. This would be necessary, for instance, where the shift time- 
block covered 42 or 48 hours per week and the normal time available to the shift was only 39 hours 
per week. This 'systematic' use of overtime Is very widely recognised, e. g., White (1980); Lynch 
(1985); Brewster and Connock (1985); Blyton (1985); Curson ed. (1986). 
There are many other uses made of overtime, for instance 'Seasonal demand' and 'temporary 
demand' are mentioned in a number of texts but not extensively so ETUI (1982); Whiting (1985). 
Similarly, 'outlook uncertainty', (corporate flexibility), is often cited Whiting (1985), but is usually 
defined by general reference to the more generic titles of 'normal demand' or'cost effectiveness'. 
A number of researchers have quoted 'nature of the job' or 'indivisibility of task' as reasons for 
overtime scheduling and it would be interesting to establish in the fieldwork phase of this project if 
such reasons were found to be as widespread as implied by these commentators. In fact these 
are often generic expressions, representing specific functions, for example, 'maintenance' and 
'shift cover' respectively Carby et al (1981); Evans and Palmer (1985). It is, therefore, difficult to 
link these somewhat equivocal expressions to specific circumstances at the work place. Such 
expressions are therefore not very helpful for classifying overtime precisely, unless they are 
specifically defined by the user. 
This Section has concentrated on a review of overtime functions within the U. K. economy. These 
are, however, not substantially different from those suggested for other nations. A summaryof 
typical reports covering other countries is set out in Appendix 3-1, and is intended as a general 
guide only. 
It Is both difficult and dangerous to attach value judgements to the various functions of overtime, 
per se. Clearly, many of the proffered reasons may in some circumstances represent a sub- 
optimised management decision, (or lack of decision), in that there were 'better' micro or macro 
level alternatives available which were not considered or chosen. Of course, each case has a 
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unique set of circumstances and it may often be easier, and politically more appropriate, for the 
manager to pay more attention to the short term, rather than the longer term considerations. We 
therefore see overtime used in circumstances where a more enlightened management might take 
the longer view. 
3.3.3 Local Financial Implications 
The financial analysis of overtime and the results of that analysis are riddled with ambiguity. The 
engine which drives this research is the question: 'why do employers schedule overtime? '. The 
answer should be clear from this section of the review, but it is not. Carr (1986) found that some 
employers schedule overtime 'on a regular basis, rather than hire additional workers, even when 
workers are readily available and product demand is fairly constant'. He went onto explain that 
employers use this approach when they 'perceive the costs of overtime premium to compare 
favourably with the quasi-fixed employee-related expenses'. The word 'perceive', rather than 
calculate, is telling. 
The key decision to be addressed is that between overtime and recruitment. This is the question 
normally considered both at plant level and within the literature (e. g Hollman 1980; Best 1981; 
Whiting 1985). The research and commentary reviewed here covers the complete range of 
opinion, from those who believe that overtime is the cheapest solution, to those who hold the 
opposite view, that overtime Is more expensive. The reader may note that there Is apparently 
considerable variability In the existence and extent of cost factors between organisations and it 
would be interesting to gauge the extent of these factors. However, this variability would not in 
Itself explain the wide spread of opinion on the balance between the costs of overtime and hiring. 
Indeed, 'perception' will be seen to be a key factor in this debate. 
An even more fundamental item of speculation should be mooted to give further context. Perhaps 
the key mis-perception is that of the choice of the decision to be considered, rather than the quality 
of the eventual decision. The reduction of overtime would appear generally to involve 
consideration of only one alternative, that of hiring new workers on standard contracts. Clearly 
this Is not necessarily the only, or indeed the primary alternative, yet this is not always made clear 
from the literature base. 
However, Riso and Kendig (1987), quite exceptionally, did not take for granted the perception of 
managers and organisations. In reviewing the extensive overtime worked in the U. S. Department 
of the Interior In 1986, they asked the following illuminating question: 'when was the last time you 
really analysed overtime costs on a total organisational basis? ' The answer was 'never'. Riso and 
Kendig subsequently concluded that'there is money to be saved... overtime is one of those costs 
that may come to be taken for granted and may sometimes be managed by default'. Similarly, 
Whiting (1985) found that the relative cost of overtime to recruitment 'should be highly relevant to 
employment decisions, but it maybe Ignored' by employers. Whiting also points out the difficulty 
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of computing the true cost of a new employee, in view of the incompatibility and wide range of 
variables that would need to be considered. 
In fact it would be possible to conduct, within a single establishment, a formal calculation to 
indicate the balance of the costs equation, ceteris paribus, (Best 1981). The problem is that there 
would be great difficulty in establishing the validity of the ceteris paribus condition with respect to 
a number of variables, for instance: that'all hours' productivity levels are not affected, or only 
affected, to a measured degree. 
It would be prudent for an employer to determine at what point it would be more cost efficient to 
hire additional employees and thereby reduce overtime (Hollman 1980; Best 1981; Greis 1984). 
The major competing variables In this decision are the comparative levels of overtime premium and 
non-wage labour costs, (NWLCs), Ehrenberg (1971). There are, however, a number of other cost 
variables which potentially demand review. For Instance, the overall level of productivity per hour 
under differing lengths of the working week (Hollman 1980; Reid 1985). Rathkey similarly stated: 
'it has been argued that the cost of overtime Is relatively small compared to that of employing 
additional labour. However, this assumes that overtime working is as economically efficient as 
adequate cover and manning'. 
It Is found that the most usual financial analysis considers the difference between the 'marginal' 
costs of overtime and employing additional staff (Malcomson 1980). This raises the additional 
contention that the decision between new staff and overtime Is often considered at a simplistic 
level, in that only the primary analysis of comparison of overtime premium and NWLCs is used; for 
instance, see Hedges and Taylor (1980) or Best (1981). 
A number of financial models have been constructed in order to clarify the decision between hiring 
and scheduling overtime. These models vary greatly In their levels of complexity and they often 
approach the decision on a macro-economic plane. Moreover, as Indicated above, there Is great 
difficulty In handling the significant ceteris paribus assumption with reference to productivity, as 
well as some of the more esoteric exogenous variables such as: labour market Implications and 
social benefit costs; and many possible endogenous variables such as benefits which may accrue 
to Increased plant utilisation and low pay support. Moreover, no easily used and widely applicable 
model has been made available to the plant-level manager to aid the pragmatic decision process. 
(See, for Instance, the essentially academically based models of: Gabarino 1964; Macdonald 1966; 
Ehrenberg 1971; Gibbons and Rivlin 1976; Clarke 1977; Hart 1984; DOE 1978; Calmfors and Hoel 
1988). 
A model which considers only a limited area of the possible variables was developed by Garbarino 
(1964), and became known as the 'Fringe Barrier Hypothesis'. This model has been reviewed and 
developed over the years and is still used by U. S. academics to explain the decision between 
overtime and adding employees, but not by managers to aid their decision process. The'Fringe 
Barrier Hypothesis' states that overtime levels will be positively associated with the ratio of NWLCs 
to wage costs. 
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Turning now to the actual decisions taken on this vexed question, Ehrenberg and Schuman (1982) 
reviewed a number of independent formal studies and research works undertaken essentially in the 
U. S. They found that all these works confirmed that: 'a strong positive relationship exists between 
the use of overtime hours and the ratio of weekly non-wage labour costs per employee to the 
overtime wage rate'. This gave support to the Fringe Barrier Hypothesis as far as it went. 
Nevertheless, in contradiction, White (1984) found 'much confusion' arising from the fringe barrier 
argument. He maintained that NWLCs had risen relative to overtime premia In recent years, and 
according to the 'theory' overtime should have been increasing in sympathy. However, overtime 
had been falling. White concluded that while'fixed costs of labour may well inhibit recruitment, 
variation in those costs does not seem to affect overtime directly'. This suggested that managers 
did not conduct any financial analysis as part of their overtime decision process. 
The question of the definition of the cost variables therefore arises. Simplistic as it may seem, 
there is a widely held view among managers that the'marginal costs' of overtime comprise only 
the premium element of wages (Whiting 1985). One reason for this over-simplification maybe that 
the only overtime 'cost' which modern accounting convention requires organisations to record in 
their accounts Is that of the premium element (Glendinning 1986). It would be difficult, and 
possibly arbitrary, to reckon more extensively than this In company accounts. Glendinning 
concluded that the 'actual' costs must be regarded as artificial to an extent, since they would be 
merely the result of 'manipulated figures and would not possess any inherent reality'. 
It is, therefore, important to be clear about the wide range of potential cost variables. Those 
associated with hiring an additional employee can be categorised as the NWLCs, and the 
'Turnover Costs' (Rose 1984). These employee-related costs, (which are sometimes referred to 
loosely as fringe benefits), have been defined in a number of ways (Rose 1984; Zachmann 1987), 
some of them conflicting. Hart (1984) has perhaps given the definitive definition, viz: 
Fixed Per-worker costs, which would include recruitment 
and training expenditure; 
Variable Per-manhour, which would include employer's NIC. 
NWLCs may include: holidays, sickness and absence; pensions and insurance; staff facilities and 
welfare arrangements; machine, plant and equipment set-up costs; fixed daily allowances, (FDAs, 
e. g paid pre-shift preparation and post-shift washing times, paid tea breaks, etc. ); privately 
negotiated and statutory severance and redundancy payments; etc. (Hughes 1980; Best 1981; 
Rose 1984; Hart 1984; Whiting 1985). One means of making a direct financial comparison 
between overtime and additional employees, would be to convert the initial costs into annualised 
charges. The simplest way to achieve this, according to Whiting (1985) Is to amortise the initial 
costs over the probable term of service of the employee. As Whiting points out, this 'term' would 
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be a function of staff turn-over rates which could generally be estimated. In Britain, NWLCs have 
been rising over the last two decades. The DOE (1980) found that they amounted to 33.1% for 
manufacturing industries in 1978 compared to 26.4% In 1975. 
Hart (1984) gave the trend in NWLCs, for the U. K. across the whole economy, as a percentage of 
total labour cost thus: 
Date 1973 1975 1978 1981 
NWLCs % 19.4 22.9 26.8 29.3 
Moreover, Hughes (1980) Identified a difference between types of worker in that labour costs, other 
than wages for time worked, added 24.3% to the wages bill for manual workers and 30.7% for non- 
manual workers, for manufacturing industry as a whole, in 1975. This difference, identified by 
Hughes as some 26% of the manual worker's NWLCs, would plainly be very significant in the 
financial analysis. Most paid overtime is worked by manual employees who generally enjoy 
somewhat less than the average level of fringe benefits as a percentage of their 'labour cost'. This 
tends to exacerbate the difference in levels of overtime worked, which if based on an analysis of 
costs, would come under more pressure, not less, for non-manual overtime in comparison to 
manual overtime. This adds weight to the thesis that managers may not conduct a financial 
analysis and it would be interesting to examine in this project the use of such analysis. 
In contrast to NWLCs, there Is remarkably scant reference in the literature base to the specific 
overtime costs other than the premium element and there Is little data available about levels of 
premla, a deficiency which should be addressed. The questions of productivity per hour; quality; 
industrial relations; reduced flexibility (such as may be associated with systematic overtime); health 
and safety; quality of life; etc are not generally addressed to the same degree as NWLCs (Gabarino 
1964; Ehrenberg 1971; Gibbons et al 1976; Clarke 1977; DOE 1978; Hart 1984 and Calmfors et al 
1988). 
Turning now to the comparative costs between overtime and additional employment. There is 
clear polarisation of opinion In the literature over this question. Proponents of the two opposite 
propositions are unequally split. It is argued by a majority that overtime is cheaper than hiring 
new workers. On the other hand, a minority claim that hiring is the cheaper alternative, and this 
view Is better supported with evidence and analysis. The minority group also enjoy the support of 
the findings of all the financial models reviewed except that of Calmfors and Hoel (1988). Adding 
yet further uncertainty, there Is a third view taken by some commentators who either appear 
indecisive on the issue or who stress the high degree of variability between organisations which is 
said to preclude any common aggregated analysis. There is also great variability between 
countries, which often apply quite different levels and forms of social benefit charges, etc. 
Confusion is clearly apparent in the literature. For Instance, Best (1981) found evidence in favour of 
both of the opposite propositions and rightly, therefore, remained Indecisive on the fundamental 
question which is reviewed below. 
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In support of the proposition that overtime Is the cheaper option, Fishwick (1977) calculated that 
the comparative cost of overtime to employing additional labour was, effectively, 22% as 
compared to 26-30% respectively. Thus overtime appeared to be the cheapest option at that time. 
A number of research reports have given support to Fishwick's findings, some firmly, some less so 
(e. g. Allen 1980; PA International Management Consultants 1982; Greis 1984; Evans and Palmer 
1985; Calmfors and Hoel 1988). For Instance, Rose (1984) speculated that: 'in many Instances 
overtime costs may be less than or equal to the costs of hiring additional staff'. This general 
conclusion Is drawn by other researchers, for Instance, Industry Week (1979). These 'speculative' 
conclusions are generally unsupported by formal financial analysis. 
The cost equation has been subject to change over time. For Instance, the BIM (1985) asserted: 
'the real cost of overtime relative to wage levels has fallen throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, 
whilst the real cost of recruitment has increased'; (see also section 3.3.4 'Compensation for 
Overtime', for a discussion of this phenomenon). The BIM appear to suggest that overtime is the 
cheapest option for meeting demand, although little evidence is offered by them in support of their 
assertion. 
Given that many NWLCs are a function of employment rather than hours worked, these costs act 
to reduce the relative cost of overtime among the existing workforce, compared to that of hiring 
additional employees. This was the view taken by Blyton (1985), who went onto explain that 
Employment Protection legislation has both constrained the employer In reducing manpower, and 
Increased the costs of making redundancies. Both those effects would mitigate in favour of 
overtime and against employment, particularly In times of uncertainty. 
Smith and Palmer (1981) found 'evidence to support the view that overtime is cheaper than 
providing extra employment'. This conclusion essentially relied on the assumption that, since 
managers choose overtime, it must be cheaper and no financial analysis, even at the primary level, 
was quoted in support of their assertion. Similarly, Mabry (1976) found marginal evidence to 
support the 'overtime Is cheaper' proposition. He specifically found: 'fringe benefits, given 
premium pay and training costs, have some influence on the scheduling of overtime; i. e. as the 
overtime premium to fringe differential narrows... training costs become sufficiently large to 
discourage new hires'. 
Simple mathematical computations, according to Best (1981), show that hourly costs per 
employee fall as hours Increase, due to the spreading of fixed employment costs. Of course, this 
would mitigate In favour of the maximum possible hours of work for each Individual employee. 
Others, (e. g Greis 1984; Calmfors and Hoel 1988), have given similar arguments for the use of 
overtime as a means of spreading the fixed costs of employment. Moreover, it can be argued 
that, as the working week shortens, the motivation to spread the fixed employment costs over 
more hours will Increase (Best 1981). 
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Taking now the alternative proposition: that overtime is more expensive than hiring. Whiting 
(1985) showed that, in the U. K, recruitment of new workers was cheaper than scheduling overtime 
for the existing workforce: 'the premium of 50% Is sufficient by a wide margin to make overtime too 
dear'. It was not clear how Whiting arrived at the 'average' premium of 50%. It would be 
interesting to establish such an 'average' for the economy as a whole. Again, it will be noted that 
the key cost variable was taken as the overtime premium. Some time ago, in the U. S., Ehrenberg 
(1971) found, in contrast to Whiting, that'a premium of 50% was an insufficient penalty to deter 
employers from using overtime'. The difference in the analyses was that, unlike Ehrenberg, 
Whiting based his view on the formal financial calculation and paid little attention to what managers 
actually feel and do. 
Glendinning (1986) found that productivity was depressed by overtime working. This issue is 
explored in section 3.3.6 'Overtime and Operational Performance' where the evidence would 
suggest that there Is a sound basis for GIendinning's view. This factor would clearly mitigate in 
favour of recruitment and against the use of overtime. 
Garbarino (1964), In the U. S., constructed a model to formally demonstrate the comparison 
between the costs of scheduling overtime and adding employees. Garbarino was not able to 
come to unequivocal conclusions due to the lack of precision which was inherent in his model. 
He did, however, suggest that 'there appears to be an accepted feeling that the cost of adding 
employees... Is greater than the cost of paying overtime', and this was 'probably not the case' 
(Macdonald 1966). The actual words used in this statement are themselves important and reveal 
the common perception or mis-perception as may be the case. 
Best (1981) found, from a review of much of the research In the U. S., that there was considerable 
variability from firm-to-firm. Notwithstanding this finding, he was able to conclude but, as with 
Garbarino, only marginally, that: 'it can only be speculated that the relative costs of new 
employment are generally only slightly less than commensurate overtime'. The use of the word 
'Speculated', however, offers little certainty in this inconclusive debate. 
Other aspects which Impact on the costs issue include the growth in earnings over the post war 
period which have, according to Ashenfelter (1976), been 'the upward movement in wages and the 
upward movement in the excess of actual hours worked over normal hours of work and the 
attendant growth in the fraction of total hours paid at premium rates'. A number of researchers 
subscribe to this analysis, often called 'the multiplier effect', which sees wage drift resulting in part 
from overtime (Lynch 1985; Hill 1987). This situation is exacerbated by the trend for the working 
week to become shorter, while overtime either stays constant or increases, thus, it follows, an 
increased proportion of hours are paid at premium rates, giving a 'ratchet effect'. A quite different 
issue is the extent to which overtime is associated with absenteeism and this matter is addressed 
In section 3.3.6. Clearly, the higher the absenteeism, the 'cheaper overtime becomes compared 
to ordinary time' (Whiting 1985). This phenomenon has the propensity to be self fulfilling since 
overtime Is said to be a function of absenteeism, (see Section 3.3.6). 
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As far back as 1964 Garbarino made reference to the 'assumption' that overtime was less costly 
than adding employees (Macdonald 1966). This raises the question of common perception. As 
will no doubt have become clear to the reader, there is evidence of a build-up of a particular 
'common-wisdom' that overtime is a cost-effective option. Moreover, Rose (1984) touched on 
this problem stating that for years supervisors have cried: 'overtime is too expensive'. Of course, 
it is notoriously difficult to change folklore. 
There has been a significant increase In both U. K. premium rates and NWLCs over the last two 
decades (Section 3.3.4 'Compensation for Overtime') and much of the literature has been 
overtaken by these changes. As for the future, it maybe of Interest to chart, in some detail, the 
perception of the manager on this issue and the specific plant level financial equations conducted 
by management In order to support their decisions regarding the use of overtime. It would also 
be Interesting to compare the actual comparative costs with management perception of these and 
this could be achieved through a case study phase of this research. 
Finally, a point not covered to any degree in the literature, is the extent to which overtime is 
actually needed to meet demand, rather than used for some other reason, or manipulated by 
employees. There Is a clear need to examine the extent of such phenomenon and Its Impact on 
cost-effectiveness. 
3.3.4 Compensation for Overtime 
There are two types of compensation for overtime working: 
i) Payment, where the basic hourly rate is supplemented by a premium; 
ii) Time Off In Lieu, (TOIL), where the worker has the right to take paid holiday based on 
the number of overtime hours worked, either as straight time or augmented by a 
premium as above. 
In addition, there is the possibility of combining these two types of compensation (ETUI 1982) and 
that of the overtime being unpaid. This section looks at each of these In turn, starting with 
overtime premla. 
Premia are fixed In the U. K. by collective agreement. ILO Conventions Nos. 1 and 30 provide that 
overtime premla shall not be less than 25% (Tagi 1982). These conventions were adopted, 
respectively, In 1919, for Industry, and 1930, for commerce and offices and, In regard to premia, 
have remained unaltered to date. In addition, many countries employ legal minimum limits, 
although these are frequently exceeded by collective agreements. 
The compensation for overtime working serves a number of potential functions, as Dawkins 
(1985), Australia, stated '1 Motivate the worker to work extra hours; 2 Compensate the worker 
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for the extra effort and for unsocial hours; 3 Deter employers from using overtime and thus help 
to create additional jobs'. However, many authors have alluded to another, less formal, but 
believed by some to be important use of premia or of overtime itself viz: to support otherwise 
inadequate pay structures. The European Regional Organisation stated that 'employers 
sometimes acquiesce in paying overtime premia, because it enables them to keep the basic rate 
of pay low' (ERO 1982). 
The rationale for the use of premia is based on a neo-classical economic theory known as the 
marginal dis-utility of labour. It is now generally accepted that the worker's motivation to work an 
additional hour, following 36 or 39 hours, would be unlikely to change by 50% and little actual 
pragmatic use Is made of this theory (Carby 1981). 
Irrespective of these 'assertions', premia are clearly one of the most important factors in 
determining overtime working practices. Yet there is remarkably little evidence available about 
the extent and distribution or size and patterns of premia across the U. K economy (Whybrew 
1968; White 1984). Moreover, there is an apparent conflict in the different uses made of premla 
between different countries. For instance, premia are generally used in the U. K. as a reward and 
motivator for the worker (ILO 1986), while in the USA, Australia, Canada and across Continental 
Europe, premia are primarily used as a deterrent to employers, against the use of long or 
abnormal hours (Leonard 1983; Dawkins 1985; Reid 1985; Best 1981; ETUI 1982). 
A second difference which is found in the use of overtime premia is the perceived effect of the 
premium on the level of overtime which is worked. High premia are seen by some to deter 
overtime working (Ehrenberg 1971; Kading 1986; Carr 1986); and by others to encourage 
overtime (Brittan 1979; James 1981; Leonard 1983; Dawkins 1985). The difference in philosophy 
Is that between the management of the demand and supply of overtime. (Throughout this thesis 
the standard convention of 'employer-demand' and 'employee-supply' is adopted for overtime 
working. ) 
Overtime premla are generally applied to the 'basic' or 'normal' rate. However, Whybrew found 
'difficulties' In determining the'ordinary rate' to which these premia are applied, and could only 
state that the practice in the late 1950s and 1960s was split between including and excluding 
bonuses and supplemental payments (Whybrew 1968). Current practice now establishes premia 
as a percentage of the basic or normal rate, without the addition of other bonuses, allowances or 
shift premla (Fishwick 1979). Many organisations apply a minimum qualifying period of 15 or 30 
minutes overtime, before which premium is not paid (IDS 1988). In addition, the payment of 
overtime premium Is often related to the total number of hours worked in a period, (the qualifying 
hours), rather than to a specific time of the day (IDS 1988). 
Finally, in considering some of the technicalities of the use of overtime premia, it Is important to 
establish the common accounting conventions which now appertain In the U. K. Glendinning 
(1986), a past President of the Institute of Management Accounting, stated that it is usual practice 
to regard the normal pay element, excluding the premium, as a direct cost to the product or 
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service and the premium element as an overhead. The exception to this is where overtime is 
planned into a job in order to meet some specific contractual requirement. In this case it Is 
normal to treat the premium as a specific cost of the product or service to be recovered from the 
customer. Glendinning found cases where the conventions were not properly applied and the 
premia were incorrectly attributed to the actual cost of the product or service. 
Whiting (1985), in comparing the costs of working overtime and hiring new workers, (le. the 
control of 'employer-demand' for overtime), used 50% as a 'fairly typical' premium level. It was, 
however, acknowledged that the premium level was 'crucial' to the equation and that there was no 
factual evidence of what the actual premium level would be in any particular set of overtime 
patterns, type of worker, Industry, regional location, size of establishment, etc. Moreover, the 
level of overtime premia, varies considerably from country to country (ILO 1986). 
Whybrew (1968), in his milestone work on overtime, concluded that it was 'impossible to 
generalise on the extent and patterns of overtime premia' and, consequently gave very little 
evidence in this area apart from to suggest that the most common rate was time-and-a-quarter for 
the first two hours and time-and-a-half thereafter, in any day. The Important NBPI report similarly 
did not present evidence of specific plant based levels or patterns of premia. However, an 
Industry wide calculation of the gross pay enhancements for overtime working was presented. 
This analysis showed that the average overtime premium rate, for manual men only, was on 
average 43% of their basic hourly rate (NBPI 1970), this will be referred to as the equivalent 
premium figure. 
Premiums fell as a proportion of basic pay during the mid 1970s, particularly during the period of 
the'social contract' and the Incomes policies of 1976 and 1977 (Smith and Palmer 1981). The 
reason for this fall was essentially that pay Increases and additions to pay during that period were 
not consolidated for the purposes of overtime premium calculation (Smith and Palmer 1981; TUC 
1981). Fishwick (1979) stated that the 'effective premium' for overtime had fallen over the period 
up to 1978. In 1979, the equivalent premium figure was calculated by the Trade Union Research 
Unit (TUC 1981) to be 34%. Smith and Palmer (1981) produced a table, (updated by Evans and 
Palmer 1985) from analysis of NES statistics, showing that the premium rates for full time manual 
men were: 
YEAR 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
PREMIUM 1.38 1.36 1.31 1.25 1.27 1.31 1.33 1.39 1.36 1.38 
Interestingly, even the otherwise comprehensive monograph 'Overtime Working in the UK' by 
White (1984) does not give any evidence on levels and patterns of overtime premia other than to 
state that the following are now common In Industry agreements: 50% Weekdays and Saturday 
until 4pm; 100% after the first 3 hours on weekdays, after 4pm Saturdays, on Sundays and on 
public holidays. This broad review of U. K. premia is generally supported throughout the more 
recent literature base (IRRR 1978; IDS 1979 and 1988; Carby and Edwards-stuart 1981; Hart 1984; 
ILO 1986). There Is little detail to be found on the question of plant-based overtime premla levels 
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and patterns across the U. K. There is, however, considerable passing reference which generally 
flows from an econometric analysis of the published wage statistics. Plant level premia are 
generally embodied in either Industry agreements (White 1984), or in custom and practice. 
On an historical note, before the Second World War, Katin (1937) stated that the chief safeguard 
against too many additional hours was the considerable higher rates of pay, forced on the 
employers as a result of overtime premia. Katin gave the levels which then existed as, typically: 
'25% for the first 2 hours; 50% for the next 3 hours and double time (100%) thereafter. 100% for 
Sunday and Bank Holiday working'. This gives an insight into the perception of the use of premia 
and the levels and patterns of premia which were in operation before the Second World War. 
It Is interesting and may be instructive to note that there has been no fundamental change for 
many years. A report of the IRRR survey of overtime arrangements In Britain, reveals that there 
had been little change In premla over the 1970s, but that when changes had occurred, they were 
largely to Increase manual staff premia to 50% for all weekday overtime. The IRRR (1978) found 
evidence that the general provisions of schedule 11 had been used by unions, (during the period 
of the pay policy/social contract), to achieve this increase in premia. 
A question arises about differences in the use of premia in the U. K., between types of worker. 
Evidence in the literature (Whybrew 1968; TUC 1981; IDS 1979 and 1988; White 1984) clearly 
points to there being a long established and significant difference, between manual and non- 
manual workers, with commentators consistently reporting that non-manual workers receive, on 
average, lower levels of premia. There appears, however, to be little quantification of the extent 
or distribution of this alleged difference. 
Whybrew, although not offering any direct evidence on premia, presented the findings of a survey 
of 'overtime allowances' for salaried or staff workers. The survey had been conducted by the 
Institute of Management, and consisted of 45 companies over a wide range of industries, 
(Whybrew 1968). This evidence gives an interesting insight into non-manual overtime premia at 
that time, (early 1960s). Of the 45 establishments, one gave no payment for the overtime, 25 paid 
flat rate, 11 paid an enhanced rate (the level was not given) and 4 gave time-off-in-lieu. These 
rules did not apply to all the non-manual workers in an establishment. For example, it was 
suggested that, within some establishments, clerical staff may be paid a premium, while sales staff 
seldom are. 
The NBPI (1970) suggested that non-manual workers tended to receive a lower and more varied 
premium rate than manual workers, although only 10 agreements had been investigated. His 
uniformly reported within the literature base that premia levels are more variable for non-manual 
than for manual workers. For Instance, the IRRR (1978) found that, In contrast to manual workers, 
there was no predominant pattern of premium payments to non-manual workers, with 
arrangements varying considerably and Including unpaid overtime, TOIL, a combination of TOIL 
and premium payments, and a wide range of premium payments; but generally at a lower level 
than premiums paid to manual workers. This phenomenon was explained by the presumed lower 
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propensity of non-manual staff to work overtime and the existence of a particular ideology 
encompassing the white collar employee, viz: the career commitment to the organisation, 
incompatibility with'clock watching' and the definition of 'non-manual' staff including management 
grades (IRRR 1978). 
The Trade Union Research Unit presented similar evidence in finding that non-manual men who 
worked overtime, received only about half of the overtime premium obtained by their manual 
counterparts (TUC 1981) although evidence was not presented to support this conclusion. There 
are a number of different systems in operation, around the world, for remunerating or controlling 
overtime. The most common factor between these is that they are designed to discourage 
excessive use of overtime, In order to promote employment and to protect the quality of working 
life. 
The statutory level of overtime premia in Ireland is set at 25% (ILO 1986), but in practice levels are 
generally set higher by collective agreement, the mode levels being 50% for weekdays and 
Saturdays with a higher rate, of 100%, for time worked in excess of between 4 to 7 hours and for 
Saturday overtime, In excess of 4 hours (Brennan and Kelly 1985). In Italy, the minimum statutory 
level of premium Is 10%. However, levels are generally set by collective agreement and vary 
considerably between Industries. Typical premia are: the metal-working Industries: 25% weekdays 
and 75% Sundays and holidays; commercial sector: 15% for the first 8 hours; 20% thereafter; 30% 
public holidays and 50% at night (ILO 1986). The Japanese Labour Standards Law sets the 
minimum premium at 25% of the normal wage (ILO 1986). However, the larger the organisation, 
the more likely that the minimum rate will be exceeded. Yamada (1985) found that 38.5% of large 
enterprises pay a rate above the statutory minimum, as compared with 16.2% of medium-sized 
enterprises and 6.1 % of small companies. It would be interesting to establish If such an effect is 
present In the U. K. Premia In France are set at 25% for the first 8 hours and 50% thereafter and 
demand is controlled by strict limits on working hours (ILO 1986). In Norway a single minimum 
40% premium rate Is set, by statute, for all circumstances. 
The above systems which utilise 'lower' levels of premla (viz. below 50%) are fundamentally 
different to those which adopt the employer-demand restriction controls of high premla. 
Finland use such a high premia approach, often linked to legal limits on the amount of hours 
which can be worked. In Finland the first two hours are paid at 50%, and thereafter the rate 
increases to 100% during weekdays, while the unusually high rate of 150% (double-time-and-a- 
half) Is paid for Sundays and public holidays (ILO 1986). There is no comprehensive premia data 
base, for Australia (Dawkins 1985) and this shortfall is quite typical of many countries, Including 
the U. K. Jones (1981) quoted evidence dating back to 1909 referring to Australian agreements for 
a premium of 50% for seventh day and holiday working. The position reported in 1985 by the 
Department of Industrial Relations (Dawkins 1985) was of stable premia generally in the region of: 
20% or'variable' premia for casual weekday overtime; 50% (time-and-a-half) for Saturdays; 100% 
(double-time) for Sundays and 100% or 150% for public holidays. The overall average overtime 
rate for Australia was calculated to be 52.6% in 1980 (ILO 1985). The ILO (1985) reported that 
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only one employee in fifteen received an overtime premium of less than 20%. Minimum overtime 
premium rates in Canada are set by legislation for each separate provincial jurisdiction. A 
complex set of different premium rates therefore exist but the mode levels are 50% followed by 
100% for weekdays or Saturdays and 100% for Sundays (Reid 1985). 
Premia are controlled in the U. S. through the Fair Labour Standards Act, (FLSA), which was 
introduced in 1938 to restrict overtime (among other purposes) and thereby to promote 
employment opportunities (Costello 1982; Carr 1986). Greis (1985) found that 96% of overtime 
was remunerated at a 50% premium and the balance attracted a premium of 100%. Carr (1986), 
however, gave evidence that, on balance, 92% of overtime was remunerated at a 50% premium 
and the level of premium did not generally vary significantly between workers grouped by 
characteristics of age, sex, marital status and race. The exception to this was the case of Black 
Women only 86% of whom received an overtime rate of 50%, no further details being presented. 
Overtime rates in New Zealand are prescribed by relevant awards, typically 50% for weekdays and 
Saturday mornings, (first 3 hours), and 100% for Saturday afternoons, Sundays and public 
holidays (I1-0 1986). However, the central trade union organisation policy recommends a 
premium of 100% for all times, although this is as not yet commonly adopted. 
Overtime In eastern block countries Is regulated in much the same manner as In Continental 
Europe. In the USSR, Romania and Hungary, premia are set at 50% for the first 2 hours and 
100% thereafter and for Sundays and holidays (ILO 1986). Similarly, premium rates are set in 
Poland, by statute, at 50% for the first 2 hours and 100% thereafter (ILO 1986). A complex system 
operates In Bulgaria where premia are set at 25% for the first 6 hours and 50% thereafter. 
Moreover, premia are 50% for overtime on the eve of days off and 100% for holidays, with an 
additional 25% premium if up to 30 hours overtime Is worked in a month and an additional 50% 
premium if more than 30 hours overtime Is worked (ILO 1986). In Hungary overtime premia are 
set at 25% for the first 2 hours per day and 50% thereafter (ILO 1986) Within the German 
Democratic Republic levels of premia are controlled at a maximum of 25% by consent of the local 
trade union committee (Kading 1986; ILO 1986). 
Turning to the question of time-off-in-lieu, (TOIL). This has not yet been used in any country as 
the sole compensation system for overtime, although various moves towards this end have been 
made, for instance, in Denmark (ETUI 1982). There are, however, a number of examples of 
Individual agreements for compensation exclusively by TOIL, for Instance, in the U. K. the British 
Printing and CPC(UK) Ltd. agreement (IDS 1979) and, in Italy, the oil Industry agreement (ILO 
1986). Moreover, there area number of agreements which allow the individual worker to choose 
between payment or TOIL for overtime compensation, for instance, the Police Federation 
agreement (Department of the Environment Audit Inspectorate 1983). 
In France there Is a legally established system providing for a combination of both TOIL (at 12 
paid minutes off per hour In excess of 42 hours per week, taken as full days leave at the rate of 1 
day per 40 hours overtime) and a 25% premium for all overtime hours up to 48 hours per week 
and 50% premium thereafter (ETUI 1982; EIRR 1986). In addition, where overtime exceeds the 
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annual limit, (130 hours per year), there is a compulsory rest period equal to half the hours of 
overtime and, in addition, overtime pay may, through an extended collective agreement, be 
replaced by TOIL at the normal premium rate (ILO 1986). 
The rules governing the use of TOIL can be complex and there is a wide variation In the use of 
TOIL between countries. Indeed, there is a contradiction In the perceived effect of TOIL on 
employment, with some believing that It would promote job creation and others believing it would 
inhibit employment. The proponents of TOIL for job creation Include many members of the 
European Community where TOIL is seen, not just as desirable, but as the'most effective' way to 
reduce overtime, particularly systematic overtime, and therefore to help to create jobs (ERO 
1982). However, In the U. S. the opposite view is taken, TOIL being generally prohibited. The Fair 
Labour Standards Act, (FLSA), makes compensatory time off in lieu of premium payments, 'comp 
time', unlawful, unless the time off Is taken In the same work-week or the same pay period In which 
it was earned (Leonard 1983). Where TOIL Is awarded, the FLSA sets the rate at not less than 
one hour and one-half for each hour of work for which premium would normally be paid. The 
FLSA rules which set out to restrict'comp time' are aimed at increasing employment. 
TOIL Is quite rare In Australia, with very few awards making provision for this option thus, In effect, 
forbidding the possibility (ILO 1985). Similarly, in New Zealand TOIL is uncommon, although 
there have been a number of demands for its use from unions, primarily to promote employment 
(Sinclair 1985). The claims from unions have generally been for TOIL at the equivalent 'penalty 
rate' of time-and-a-half. Sinclair (1985), however, concludes that TOIL 'looks to be a long way off 
In New Zealand. Little use Is made of TOIL in Ireland, other than by managerial staff, although it Is 
thought to have a 'potentially positive effect' on employment (Brennan and Kelly 1985). In 
Sweden, however, as in France, the use of TOIL Is Increasing. Axling (1983) states that the high 
rates of marginal taxation are one of the reasons for the Increase In use in Sweden. Similarly, 
TOIL Is now becoming common in Japan (Yamada 1985). While In West Germany, TOIL has also 
been positively promoted for job creation (EIRR 1984; Kading 1986). 
In Belgium (Kading 1986; ILO 1986), Romania (ILO 1986) and Czechoslovakia (IL01986), paid 
compensatory time off Is normally Imposed and, as Is often the case with TOIL, this must be taken 
within a fixed time period. A dual system of remuneration and TOIL operates In Portugal where 
the overtime premla are 50% for the first hour and 75% thereafter, and compensatory rest 
corresponding to 25% of overtime hours is provided when the number of overtime hours equals 
the period of normal daily hours. These rest days must be taken with the following 30 days. 
Additionally, when overtime falls on a weekly rest day, a remunerated compensatory rest day must 
be taken in the following 3 days (ILO 1986). 
The position with regard to TOIL In the U. K. Is un-clear. As with overtime premia, there is very 
little published data, although there are many 'passing' references to TOIL in the literature. In 
particular, there is little reference to TOIL In either of the milestone works by Whybrew (1968) or 
the NBPI (1970). Nor do White (1980; 1982; 1984) or the IDS (1979; 1988) review the extent, 
distribution or Issues of the use of TOIL In any detail. One of the problems appears to be the lack 
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of a common standard for reporting TOIL within national statistics or at plant level. For instance, 
in some U. K. police forces statistics are kept on paid overtime but TOIL, which is believed for 
some staff to comprise the greatest proportion of overtime compensation, records are often 
unavailable (Department of the Environment Audit Inspectorate 1983). It would be interesting to 
review the Police Force as a major user of TOIL In the U. K. 
Rathkey (1984) pointed to the gap in the level of knowledge about this issue, which he believed 
the trade union movement had 'largely neglected'. Indeed, the TUC have called for TOIL 
arrangements to tackle the'overtime problem' (TUC 1981; EIRR 1981) but this suggestion, as 
Rathkey hints, was not formally pursued. Notwithstanding this, the use of TOIL in the U. K has 
been steadily increasing over the last few decades (ETUI 1982). 
There is evidence that TOIL, as an optional alternative to premium pay, In the U. K, is more often 
used In non-manual than In manual employment (Katin 1937; IRRR 1978; IDS 1979). As with 
premla, however, there appears to be no quantification or details of this difference. 
The question of unpaid overtime Is Important for many workers and organisations, though It is not 
surprising that there has been very little research into the phenomenon. Certainly, the key works 
of Whybrew (1964; 1968) and the NBPI (1970) did not address the issue. Indeed, the NBPI (1970) 
concluded that there was no great gap between non-manual workers' normal and actual hours of 
work'. In view of the tendency for non-manual workers to work unpaid overtime, that conclusion 
appears to have been Incorrect (OPCS 1980; White 1984; Carby and Edwards-Stuart 1981; TUC 
1981 and 1988). Unpaid overtime is also particularly important with respect to worksharing 
issues. 
The only formal research evidence relating to this issue was provided by the OPCS (1980), 
through the General Household Survey, which established that considerable unpaid overtime was 
worked within the economy by male workers, although no detailed analysis was possible from this 
statistic, and female workers were unfortunately not asked the question White (1984). Men often 
reported that they had worked no overtime even though, paradoxically, information from other 
areas of the questionnaire showed that they had indeed worked long hours, thus implying a 
semantic problem. About 10% of the total sample reported working unpaid overtime; another 
10% stated they had worked no overtime and yet they appeared to have exceeded normal 
working hours. White was led to conclude: 'a large proportion of all supplementary hours were 
unpaid or unrecognised as overtime, and these would not be detected by the questions used in 
the official enquiries concerning overtime, which use payment for excess hours as the overtime 
criteria'. 
Furthermore, White (1984), In reviewing the GHS (1980), stated'it seems reasonable to assume 
that unpaid or unrecognised overtime may be particularly concentrated among non-manual 
workers, especially those in managerial or higher administrative positions'. White (1984,1988) Is 
one of the few researchers to have drawn attention to the problem of under-estimation of the 
amount of overtime worked by non-manual staff, which may well lead to an over-estimation of the 
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difference between manual and non-manual employee overtime levels. Carby and Edwards- 
Stuart (1981) also linked unpaid overtime specifically to non-manual workers stating 'some non- 
manual workers frequently work substantial overtime, mostly unpaid and therefore unrecorded' 
and that non-payment to managers was a 'well established tradition'. 
A key problem, Inhibiting the compilation of statistics would appear to be the lack of a definition 
for unpaid overtime, with many workers and organisations not classifying 'staying late' on an 
informal and unpaid basis, as overtime. Indeed the definitive sources of the DOE and NES do not 
Include'unpaid overtime' as overtime in their definitions, (see Section 2.2), and their statistics do 
not attempt to measure or estimate unpaid overtime in any way. In addition, there is the further 
definitional or semantic problem with extra hours which are paid at flat rate. Many organisations 
do not classify these as overtime hours. The National Economic Development Council, (NEDO 
1986), found in a survey of trade unionists in 72 large firms in four sectors, that overtime working 
among part-time workers in retailing had grown considerably, but It was not classed as overtime 
by the respondents because it did not attract a premium. 
The Trade Union Research Unit (TUC 1981) found that there was no indication of the 'extent of 
unpaid overtime among higher grade non-manual staff'. The TUC (1988) went onto state: 'there 
is also the fact that much of the overtime worked by non-manual workers goes unrecorded'. 
They explain that this is because the overtime Is unpaid because of the annual salary payment 
system, but again no evidence Is provided to indicate the extent or distribution of the 
phenomenon. This brings into focus the issue that overtime remuneration systems (not, as 
sometimes assumed, just for higher grade staff) may include an element of pay for a formally or 
informally agreed number of overtime hours, to be worked as required on an ah-hoc basis (Carby 
and Edwards-Stuart 1981). This payment Is Intended to be made for overtime working, but is not 
directly linked to, or Indeed, specifically dependent upon, the actual overtime hours which may be 
worked. 
Although there Is little reference to research Into this phenomenon, specific examples of unpaid 
overtime are mentioned In the literature. For Instance, the case of nurses is reviewed by the IDS 
(1988D) who found that unpaid overtime had reached 'very high levels'. In its evidence to the 
Review Body of the Fifth Report on Nursing Staff, Midwifes and Health Visitors (1988), the Royal 
College of Nurses presented some of the findings of a survey carried out by the Institute of 
Manpower Studies In 1987. These findings revealed that 45% of the NHS nurses who were 
surveyed, claimed to have worked unpaid overtime during the previous week for an average of 3 
hours. The most likely categories of nurse to work unpaid overtime were teaching and 
management grades and senior nursing grades. Of those who worked unpaid overtime, 30% did 
not expect to take TOIL and 45% lost 1.65 hours on average each week working through meal 
breaks. No recommendations were made by the Review Body for the reduction of high levels of 
overtime or to close the gap between paid and unpaid overtime. The Royal College of Midwifes 
stated that 'very few reliable records are kept and so it Is difficult to tell how much overtime Is 
being worked'. The Royal College of Nurses policy Is that, where overtime Is worked, it should be 
paid, or remunerated by TOIL (IDS 1988). 
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3.3.5 Quality Of Management 
A recent survey by Market and Opinion Research International found that the British public believe 
that 'bad management' Is the key to Britain's economic ills, with six out of ten reporting bad 
management was more to blame than the unions for the country's economic problems (Grice 
1989). Grice explains that the TUC agree with this finding whereas the CBI disagree! Of course, 
it would be difficult to link cause to effect on the macro-economic scale as this survey attempts to 
do. It Is of interest, however, to consider this general backcloth of public perception before 
reviewing the more objective, analysis of the role of management in the British overtime 
phenomena. 
Rathkey (1984) captures the general feeling of the literature with the unequivocal statement: 
'systematic overtime exemplifies both weak management and weak trade unionism and results in 
inefficient production'. Rathkey's view Is based on a long line of argument that a major part of the 
problem of excessive overtime levels lies in 'poor' management practices and he sums up this 
view in typical uncompromising style: 'excessive overtime is indicative of bad management' 
(Rathkey 1984). 
Even before the Second World War, Katin (1937) stated that overtime was 'too often due to bad 
management... unnecessary overtime occurs and particularly so in badly managed factories 
where time is wasted during the day'. Lynch (1985) echoed this theme, reporting that he found 
overtime to be generally very difficult to control, stating that a subtle, informal system prevailed 
which effectively maintained overtime, 'the essence of the system is an innocent conspiracy 
between workers and managers operating under very strong social and cultural pressures'. 
Managements, according to Caulkin (1976) and White (1982), are often found to lack proper 
procedures for controlling overtime and do not adequately study the Implication for costs and 
profitability of their decisions on hours of work. The NBPI (1970) found that, In most companies, 
it was not even possible to tell whether or not an overtime problem existed because of the lack of 
monitoring or records, and this would clearly be associated with poor management practice. The 
TUC, in their consultative document on'Working Time and Jobs', associated overtime with low 
productivity, Inefficient management and low pay (EIRR 1981a and 1981b). While Davies and 
Caves (1987), go much further In their review of Britain's productivity, they assert that British 
management Is Inefficient and the bargain struck between management and labour is degenerate. 
Moreover, Sawers' analysis of British competitiveness suggests that poor competitiveness Is due 
to some extent to managerial factors (Sawers 1986). 
Landveter (1984) stated that although overtime appeared to give a 'quick solution' to a problem, 
those companies that often resort to overtime are the'poorest at planning'; and that employees 
often lose their confidence in managements that are unable to determine future capacity needs. 
Other researchers have found overtime to be the result of inadequate forecasting (Buck & 
Shimmin, 1959, Gibbons & RMin 1976) or simply a problem of poor management resulting In low 
labour productivity (Sykes 1976; Baird and Beccia 1980; Hanagan 1982). Some have been even 
more scathing in their comments, McMahon (1980), for instance, reported that 'the fabrication of 
unlimited overtime is often contrived by management and shop stewards as a panacea for 
industrial ailments, i. e. low wages, low productivity, inadequate planning, incompetent supervision 
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and even as a sweetener for sour industrial relations. ' 
The CBI (1980) stated that 'the prime responsibility for improving productivity rests with 
management'. They further reveal that 'unfortunately, ' the managers responsible for work 
organisation and production 'do no enjoy a particularly high status in Britain'. It is tempting to 
seek to unravel cause and effect and is perhaps telling that the CBI go onto 'confess' that ' there 
is no doubt that some overtime that is worked could be avoided... it is often the result of low basic 
rates, poor work scheduling or control, or of restrictive practices'. 
As for managers themselves, research has found that generally they want to reduce or abolish 
overtime (Curson 1986; Evans and Bell 1986; CBI 1989). Yet the evidence clearly shows that 
overtime continues to rise. It seems that managers are either unable or unwilling to control the 
phenomenon and this fact would appear to support the 'poor management' hypothesis. Clearly 
the answer to the paradox is central to the understanding of overtime in the U. K. 
In conclusion, Leslie (1977) considered the arguments for and against the use of overtime 
generally, and was able to quote sound evidence against overtime as an efficient Institution but 
failed to find evidence In support of overtime, except for some econometric statistics which he 
'distrusted' These statistics reviewed only the productivity of overtime hours and did not consider 
the productivity of total hours worked. On balance, Leslie (1977) concurred with the view of Lord 
McCarthy (1977) that 'much of British overtime now seems to arise out of a desire to waste time at 
work'. Thus casting doubt on the efficacy of British management In this respect. 
It would be of Interest to review the quality of management and to establish sound evidence on 
this issue; but firm definitions of 'good' and 'bad' management would be a prerequisite to any 
such analysis. If Leslie's (1977) conclusions are found to be valid, then clearly a 'poor 
management' hypothesis would test positive in the analysis of the feildwork. 
3.3.6 Overtime and Operational Performance 
There are a number of dimensions to this issue and three will be dealt with in detail in this section: 
i) productivity of hours; ii) quality of work and iii) absenteeism. 
To start on an historical note, even before World War II, Vernon (1921,1936) presented evidence 
supporting the relationship between overtime and reduced production. Following this, in 1942, it 
was suggested that productivity was Inversely proportional to hours worked and that workers tend 
to become 'listless and stale' after long hours of work (Industrial Health Research Board 1942), 
and Kossoris and Kohler (1947) reported research results which showed that the efficiency of 
overtime hours was considerably lower than that of regular hours. 
Rose (1984) suggested that the gift of overtime can reward substandard performance and can 
therefore perpetuate such performance and the very need for overtime. A number of researchers 
have found that overtime has the propensity to become self perpetuating, particularly when built 
Into an organisation's operating systems (Caulkin 1976; Baird and Beccia 1980; Nedzynskl 1984; 
Rathkey 1984; Brewster and Connock 1986; Buckles 1988). In his definitive study of overtime, 
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Whybrew (1968) concluded: 'All the evidence supports those who have criticised systematic 
overtime as a major cause of inefficiency'. Even the TUC associated overtime with low 
productivity, although they also associated it with inefficient management and low pay (EIRR 
1981). 
Thus It is suspected that the systematisation of overtime is linked with the overall efficiency of an 
organisation and overtime is associated with low productivity (Collons 1981; Baird and Beccia 
1980; Greis 1984; Perlman 1966). For instance, Rathkey (1984) stated quite simply: 'systematic 
overtime results in inefficient production'. It is therefore important to establish a measure for the 
extent of systematic overtime in the U. K. economy. 
Whybrew (1968) stated that in over half of the studies that had been made, overtime hours cuts 
were not accompanied by falls in output. Nadzynskl (1984) also found that productivity in 
overtime hours was lower than that in normal hours. It has been argued that 'people are usually 
fresher at the beginning of the working day and their productivity is likely to be higher'. This 
analysis led Glendinning (1986) to conclude that'the probability is that productivity is lower during 
overtime working'. However, the concern is not the productivity over just the overtime hours, but 
the overall productivity which results from the general levels of overtime over a period. 
The investigation of a number of case studies led the IRRR (1984) and IDS (1988) to conclude that 
overtime is a disincentive to productivity In normal hours. Jevons (1965) suggested that the 
reliance on overtime as a way of making up work, might encourage deliberate poor productivity in 
order to stretch out the work, thus giving the workers their overtime with the associated rewards, 
(suggesting a degree of manipulation). White (1980) revealed that experiences of major 
reductions in working time have often been accompanied by'unexpectedly large gains in 
productivity'. In further support of these findings White (1984) reported that workers who have 
the opportunity to Increase their earnings through payment-by-results schemes work, on average, 
30% less overtime, again suggesting a degree of worker control of the productivity of hours. 
Similarly, other research has found that a reduction in hours can lead to a relative increase in 
productivity. Metcalf (1982) gives evidence that a 10% cut in hours was associated with only a 
6.4% fall In output per man. Hanagan (1982) argued that 'inefficiencies are built into overtime 
and, In some circumstances, reduced overtime Is a form of productivity improvement'. Hill (1987) 
stated 'there are strong reasons for believing that a reduction in hours would lead to a rise in 
productivity per hour'. Hollman (1979 and 1980) and Bromberge (1988) found that after a certain 
number of overtime hours had been worked, the total output achieved over the total hours actually 
fell. In support of this, Caul kin (1976) suggested that it is possible to actually increase total output 
by cutting overtime. 
In contrast to the majority of research in this area, Best (1981) showed that employers seek to 
maximise their resources by working existing employees for longer hours, since these employees 
are presumed to have an 'accumulative advantage' over potential new employees. It has also 
been suggested (Brewster and Connock 1986) that overtime may well, in the first instance, be a 
rational management response to demand variability and not necessarily associated with low 
productivity. A pragmatic exemplar of the perceived efficacy of overtime is found In New Zealand 
where the government gave an incentive, based on a tax rebate, to encourage workers to work 
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overtime in order to help productivity and to maximise the use of previously under-utilised plant 
(Sinclair 1983). This additional 'bonus' was introduced in 1973 and removed in 1982. 
The NBPI (1970) suggested that overtime was desirable 'since it results in hours being worked 
which would not otherwise be worked and In people working who might otherwise not be in the 
market; it is also desirable socially since it enables workers to raise their earnings'. The NBPI 
went on to report that one third of managers stated that productivity during regular hours was 
sometimes adversely affected by the presence of overtime opportunities. Interestingly, the NBPI 
were somewhat ambiguous in their analysis. For instance, in reviewing the reduction of hours of 
work to 48 hours per week which had been achieved by collective agreement by the end of 1918 
stated: 'Many employers in this period found that a reduction in hours when they were very long 
could lead to an increase in total output, so benefiting them as well as the workers'. Moreover, 
they noted the practice of worker manipulation, particularly in the road haulage industry where 
they stated there was'clear evidence of a close link between high overtime and low productivity'. 
Leslie (1977) sets out a brief comparative analysis of the conflicting views of the productivity of 
overtime, stating that clear differences of opinion exist between those who believe that overtime is 
very efficient and those who believe the contrary. He concluded that the true answer lies some 
where between the two extremes but was more disposed towards the view that overtime is 
inefficient. There is little indication from the literature as to where this balance lies. 
Those analyses which suggest that overtime may be efficient in an overall sense, represent a small 
minority of the literature. Of course, there will be some organisations, and within an organisation, 
some circumstances, when overtime is efficient and prudent, (for example, see: Katin 1937; ETUI 
1979; Brennan et a11982; Kats and Goldberg 1982; European Commission 1983; BIM 1985). 
However, the balance of opinion in the literature unequivocally finds overtime to be associated 
with low productivity. 
Moving on to the Issue of quality of work, this appears rarely to have been raised as a possible 
function of overtime working within the literature. Intuitive logic Indicates that there could bean 
association between long or excessive hours of work and the quality of work; irrespective of 
whether the work is concerned with manufacturing a product or giving a service. This being the 
case, there is a need to establish firm evidence regarding this matter. 
Fishwick (1979) stated: 'it Is not obvious that this situation (overtime) benefits anyone - the 
employees, who have to work long hours... the employers who fail to 'monitor the Implications of 
those long hours for quality of work'. Similarly, White (1987) stated that shorter hours of work can 
result In 'better motivated workers who produce more and give customers higher standards of 
service'. Only Hollmann (1979) directly addressed the issue stating that the overtime decision 
may be reflected In'less than anticipated output, poor quality, increased waste and even damage, 
and deteriorating morale'. However, none of the major dedicated studies into overtime working 
have addressed the possibility that a problem might exist, even though it is easy to find examples 
of the adverse effects of long hours on quality of work. 
An extreme, but legitimate, example of the association of quality of work and long hours is that of 
the Bournemouth-Clapham rail disaster (Bournemouth Evening Echo 1989; Guardian 15th March 
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1989): 'the trend of soaring overtime was highlighted'. The inquiry found evidence linking long 
hours of work with this accident: 'there are worries that overtime can mean overtiredness for 
manual workers doing safety-related jobs... the senior signals engineer who left a loose wire which 
caused the tragedy had worked every Saturday and Sunday in the two months before the crash 
and nearly every weekend for six months before that'. 
The literature tends only to address the associated concerns of accident rates, health and safety, 
welfare of the worker and low productivity. Nevertheless, perhaps an equally felicitous concern is 
not the productivity level, but the quality of product or service achieved, during the overtime 
hours. There Is also a possibility that any fall-off in quality would not necessarily be restricted to, 
or focused on, the actual hours of the overtime. This secondary hypothesis is that a fall in quality 
is associated with worker fatigue during normal hours, as a consequence of the overtime hours 
previously worked. A third possibility Is that quality could be used manipulatively by the worker in 
order to establish the need for overtime. This may enable the worker to gain what Is, In some 
cases, an essential element of take home pay (Whybrew 1968; NBPI 1970; Fishwick 1979). 
The third aspect of operational performance Is absenteeism which has been increasingly Identified 
as an Important factor, contributing to low productivity and, in some instances, high overtime 
(Kopeiman and Schneller 1981; ILO 1985). Kopelman and Schneller (1981) reviewed research 
Into absenteeism and various control strategies, both as a variable in relation to overtime, and in 
isolation from overtime. There is no clear evidence in the literature about the relationship between 
absence and overtime. Indeed, there is a dichotomy relating to the following alternative 
propositions: 
Absenteeism causes, (is a reason for), overtime working; 
ii) That overtime working causes absenteeism. 
These contradictory views are quite Irreconcilable in terms of cause and effect, although they both 
represent a positive correlation between overtime and absenteeism. There Is a further dimension 
which Is exemplified by Carby et al (1981) who pointed out: 'It has been clearly established that 
there is a strong relationship between frequent overtime and high absence, but the precise nature 
of this relationship is notoriously difficult to demonstrate, In some cases, absence decreases as 
overtime increases and In others absence Increases with overtime opportunities'. 
As regards the first proposition, absenteeism causes overtime, or is a reason for overtime. It is 
often suggested that overtime is used to cover for absence. This is seen by some managers as a 
valid and appropriate use of overtime; providing cover for a circumstance which is perceived as 
being outside management control. It would be wise, therefore, to bear in mind the possibility 
that this reason may be used in a defensive or exaggerated way. 
Brennan and Kelly (1985) found, In a survey of the Irish economy, that absence was regularly 
quoted as a reason for the use of overtime, with some differences between sectors. In the 
production sector, it ranked top, accounting for almost a third of the total reasons given for 
overtime. While In the service sector, absenteeism accounted for only 2% of the total, ranking last 
out of 8 reasons. It Is quite common for absenteeism to be taken as one of a number of reasons 
for overtime (e. g. Rathkey 1984; Sinclair 1985; ILO 1985; Carr 1986). Ehrenberg (1971), in the 
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U. S., took a neutral stand-point in the debate, concluding there was no relationship between 
overtime and absenteeism. 
Clearly, absenteeism is thought by some researchers to be an important reason for the use of 
overtime. Nevertheless, the proponents of proposition ii): that overtime causes absenteeism, are 
equally insistent in their argument and this body of opinion is briefly examined below. 
At the end of World War II the Medical Research Council (1942) conducted investigations into the 
issues of working time and absence. They found that, in most factories, the consequence of an 
appeal for more production was longer hours of work which resulted In an'initial spurt' In output, 
which was usually followed by a fall in both the hourly and weekly output, until the hours of work 
were reduced again. The chief cause of this decrease in output was concluded to be the 
additional fatigue and strain Induced by the long hours of work, and the time lost through 
Increased sickness and absence, which 'rapidly increased' during the long hours. 
Buck and Shimmin (1959) (Industrial Psychology Research Group of the Medical Research 
Council), stated: 'there are many opinions about the supposed effects of overtime on, for example, 
attendance at work during normal working hours, but few systematic studies appear to have been 
made of these problems'. There were thought at that time to be two key ways in which overtime 
and absence were Inter-related, these being: i) 'When a man has worked long hours on overtime 
he may take time off, knowing that he has covered the financial loss... because he needs rest to 
overcome the fatigue caused by his longer hours... ii) Alternatively, having taken time off for 
some other reason, the operative may work extra hours to compensate for his potential loss of 
earnings'. 
The first rationale Is a function of the proposition that overtime causes absenteeism. The second 
is associated, but only loosely, with the proposition that absenteeism causes overtime. Therefore, 
this analysis, while not quite parallel to the two propositions given at the start of this section, 
shows that, even In the post World War II era, some confusion was recognised over the precise 
relationship between overtime and absence. Overtime was cited as both the cause and the effect 
In different circumstances. It was, however, firmly established in the Buck and Shimmin (1959) 
study that the two variables, absence and overtime, were positively correlated. 
Between World War II and the early 1960s, the view was held that the 40 hour week'resulted in 
highest worker efficiency and least amount of time lost because of absenteeism' (Greenbaum 
1963; Whybrew 1964). It was Implied by Fishwick (1979) that the relationship between overtime 
and absence was one of overtime causing absence. While Jamal and Crawford (1981), reviewing 
Canadian official statistics, stated: 'there had been no prior systematic studies of the human or 
corporate outcomes or consequences of extended working hours in present day industry'. Their 
survey of six companies from the manufacturing and service sectors in the Canadian metropolitan 
area revealed that 'Absenteeism was highest among overtimers, second highest among 
moonlighters and lowest among modal employees'. These differences were found to be 
statistically significant. (Although experience suggests that the difference may be reducible to a 
single or group of different independent variables; for Instance: type of worker, manual or non- 
manual, or type of occupation). 
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Kopelman and Schneller (1981) undertook extensive longtitudinal research, (U. S. ), into the 
potential control mechanisms for reducing overtime and absenteeism. Following the application 
of various controls, the previously rising trend in absence was turned around and overtime fell by 
54%. These results were claimed to'clearly Indicate the value of... decreasing unplanned 
absence' and also indicated the positive correlation between overtime and absence. However, 
this research did not offer any means of establishing the causal relationship between overtime and 
absenteeism. 
The link between 'extra work hours... and an increase in absenteeism' was recognised in Israel by 
Kats and Goldberg (1982) who also found long hours to cause some degree of worker alienation. 
Similarly, Greis (1984), In the U. S. found that the breakdown in industrial relations, caused by 
worker discontent with long hours of overtime, would eventually create absenteeism. Greis went 
on to state that'Unions call for an end to mandatory overtime... because they claim it is 
exhausting for current employees and is one of the major causes of the high absenteeism'. 
Similar results were found In Canada, (Worklife Report 1987) and in Ireland (Carby et a/ 1981). 
While Nadzynski (1984) found, in Western Europe, that systematically high overtime gave, 
'aggravated absenteeism' In addition to production inflexibility. Unions in the U. K. have long held 
fears that overtime and absenteeism are related. In 1981 the TUC issued a consultative document 
to guide 'negotiators' In the examination of the characteristics of working time issues such as the 
use of overtime 'in the face of high levels of sickness, absenteeism or turnover' (EIRR 1981 b). 
They went on to call for action to improve health and safety, 'where these are affected by overtime 
used as a cover for sickness and absenteeism'. 
An alternative but supporting view of the relationship is offered by White and Ghobadian (1984) 
who found that, in one U. K. organisation, overtime had been cut back, as a result of union 
pressure at a time of redundancies. In the event, the organisation found it could operate 
effectively without the overtime. This was believed to be due to a partially compensating 'marked 
reduction in absence rates at the factory'. Clearly, overtime Is thought by many researchers to be 
an important cause of absenteeism throughout industrialised nations. 
In apparent contradiction to the majority of the literature, Caulkin (1976) reported that workers 'on 
high overtime are quite dramatically less sick and absent than those who do none'. Caulkin's 
analysis was supported by statistics from the NBPI survey of 1968 which found that almost a 
quarter of male manual workers who did not work overtime, lost pay through sickness or absence; 
reducing to only 4% of those who worked 20 or more hours overtime. This finding does not 
necessarily deny the positive correlation between overtime and absence, it does, however, 
suggest that the relationship Is not as straight forward as sometimes appears to have been 
assumed. 
Another factor was suggested by Brennan and Kelly (1985) who found that, in several case 
studies, absenteeism was a major problem actually caused by overtime, but the causal process 
was given as: 'high overtime earnings leading to employees being able to then afford to go absent 
at other, normal times of the week'. This finding was supported by Buck and Shimmin (1959) and 
Leonard (1986), in the U. S. Another novel finding is offered by Fishwick who revealed that, in 
Belgium, absenteeism during Saturday overtime became so serious that the Saturday overtime 
had to be abandoned at various plants (Fishwick 1974). 
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There is probably no single explanation for the phenomenon, each of the different views being 
correct to a degree, depending on the circumstances. There is clearly a lack of information 
regarding the distribution and perceptions of the phenomenon in the U. K, and of the causal 
relationship between absenteeism and overtime. 
3.3.7 `Systematic' Overtime 
The concept of 'systematic' overtime is central to the traditions and use of overtime in the U. K. but 
it is by no means unique to the U. K. The extent to which overtime is used consistently, to meet 
normal demand, because it is believed to be less expensive than hiring new employees, has been 
the subject of debate In: Canada (Reid 1986); Ireland (Brennan and Kelly 1985); Australia 
(International Labour Office 1985); Sweden (Axling 1983); New Zealand (Sinclair 1983). Even 
countries with centrally planned economies, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, recognise the 
ubiquitous problem of 'regular built-in overtime' (Karnakov 1984). In the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the use of systematic overtime has been widely decried: 'the systematic use of overtime 
should In principle and in the opinion of all social actors, be reduced to the lowest level possible' 
(Kading 1986). Moreover, in Italy 'systematic' overtime is generally unlawful in industrial 
enterprises (ILO 1986). 
In 1850, with industry still In it's infancy, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, (ASE), passed a 
resolution repudiating overtime working. In addition, specific opposition to 'systematic overtime' 
was written into the ASE rule book (Burgess 1975). A prime ASE objective was to eradicate 
unemployment in the developing industry by controlling overtime. Almost 100 years later, 
between the wars, Katin (1937) reflected pre-war worries about the 'consistent application of 
overtime', and the'uneven distribution of work under which some men work too long, while others 
have no work at all'. 
More recently, Whybrew (1968) continued the reproach of systematic overtime, asking what could 
be done to control overtime which is 'systematic, inefficient but not inevitable'. He stated 
'legislation Is not part of the tradition of industrial relations in Britain; systematic overtime certainly 
is... both traditions should be broken. All the evidence supports those who have criticised 
systematic overtime as a major cause of inefficiency in Britain'. 
Despite the continuous flow of criticism which has followed in support of Whybrew's unequivocal 
conclusion, no answer has emerged, and no fundamental change has occurred. Clearly, the lack 
of definition of the term 'systematic' overtime is one of the ingredients of the propensity of this 
ubiquitous and universally denounced phenomenon: 'like an elephant it's difficult to describe but 
easy to recognise when encountered and hard to stop when in progress! ' (Spink and Brewster 
1989). Calls from businesses, government ministers and trade unions, for the reduction or 
abolition of 'systematic' overtime (EIRR 1980), can be of little pragmatic value without such a 
definition. The European Commission (1983) declared that 'systematic overtime does not have a 
place in economies with high and rising unemployment and where it still exists it should be more 
strictly limited and if possible, phased out'. This declaration is clearly more applicable to the U. K. 
government than to others in the EC, which already apply controls on overtime working. Even the 
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normally reticent CBI (1980) denounced systematic overtime, stating: 'systematic overtime should 
be limited by law or actively discouraged... there is ample room for some reduction of overtime'. 
The term 'systematic' overtime is commonly used to imply a number of overtime working 
phenomena and has come to represent a syndrome covering a variety of situations. It is often 
described by it's characteristics such as: 'self perpetuating' (Caulkin 1976; Nedzynski 1984; 
Brennan 1985); 'institutionalised and little related to fluctuations in market demand' (Evans 1979); 
'regularly scheduled' (Clegg 1962; Ehrenberg and Schumann 1982); 'regular and has persisted for 
a long time' (NBPI 1970); 'invariable' (Palmer and Kitchen-Smith 1970); 'in excess of 20 hours per 
month' (IRRR 1978); 'accepted as part of the working week whether needed or not' (IRRR 1982); 
'stable' (ERO 1982); 'customary' (White 1984); 'used to smooth peaks in demand' (Sinclair 1984); 
'unnecessarily habitual' (Desmonds and Vidal Hall 1987); 'policy overtime' (Davies and Caves 
1987). Terms such as: long time, regular, customary, scheduled, Institutionalised, self- 
perpetuating and stable, are descriptive to a point, but they lack any precision or common 
understanding. 
Systematic overtime Is also often described by it's supposed functions, for example: to support 
pay systems and to Increase low pay (Leslie 1976; Labour Research 1980; Sinclair 1984; Axiing 
1983; Rathkey 1984; Sherman 1986); to support shift systems (White 1982; PA 1982); for normal 
operating requirements (NBPI 1970; Fishwick 1979; European Regional Organisation 1982; 
Brennan and Kelly 1985; Reid 1986). These various descriptions both illustrate a lack of common 
definition of the syndrome, and show an acceptance of it's existence and importance. 
Nevertheless, given that there Is no common understanding of systematic overtime, it is of little 
value for a government minister to consider legislation to: 'restrict systematic overtime working 
and thereby contribute to the creation of additional jobs' (EIRR, Ireland, 1980; ); or for the TUC to 
urge: 'get to grips with excessive, unnecessary and systematic overtime' (EIRR 1981). 
Management often claim that overtime is preferred to recruitment, capital investment or other 
means of meeting demand, In order to obtain a more rapid response to that demand, and it is 
perceived that overtime can easily be cut back if demand falls-off. In these circumstances, one 
would expect there to be a clear relationship between overtime per worker and managements' 
own assessment of output. However, many researchers have found that much overtime is 
unrelated to output. For instance, analysis of the evidence collected by NBPI (1970) revealed that 
overtime was used for normal levels of demand by more than half of the organisations surveyed. 
Moreover, White (1980) found that overtime was very similar between those manufacturing 
companies with fluctuating, rising and stable demand, yielding 4.9,4.9 and 4.8 average overtime 
hours per worker per week respectively. This result clearly indicates that overtime was not used 
to achieve demand adaptability and suggests that overtime may in fact have been largely 
systematic. 
Fishwick (1979) found that, In the motor Industry, managers claimed flexibility as a reason for 
overtime. Notwithstanding this evidence, a study of the circumstances showed -overtime to be 
remarkably Invariable In relation to output. The conventional wisdom on the problem with 
systematic overtime Is objectively summed up by Brewster and Connock (1986): 'once introduced 
to handle variability in the supply of work, overtime may not subsequently revert to previous levels. 
Instead It can become institutionalised, and the flexibility to use overtime again to meet peak 
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demands is reduced'. In short, systematic overtime is thought to reduce operational (day to day) 
flexibility. 
3.3.8 Industrial Relations 
It is not possible to consider overtime without reviewing the time honoured industrial relations 
context which goes back to the Industrial Revolution. The Amalgamated Society of Engineering 
Workers Introduced a national overtime ban in support of their demands for the abolition of 
'systematic overtime and piecework' (Burgess 1975; Benson and Lloyd 1983). This early example 
of formal industrial action Is particularly interesting In that it exhibits the two ways In which 
overtime and Industrial relations are inter-linked. These quite separate issues are: 
i) Overtime bans/restrictions used by workers as a weapon, lever or 
sanction against the employer; 
ii) The use, restriction or withdrawal of overtime by employers such 
that industrial relations problems are caused. 
This relationship Is not restricted to the U. K. In Australia it is exemplified by the Industrial Award 
System which seeks to regulate overtime working with the objective of creating a better climate for 
Industrial relations. One report (ILO 1985a) found that a quarter of these 'Awards' contained a 
clause providing that unions must not in any way be a party to any ban, limitation or restriction on 
the working of overtime. 
In reviewing the extent In the U. K. to which overtime bans or restrictions are used by workers, it 
maybe useful to consider a few topical examples. For example, the miners dispute (Telegraph 
and Argus 1988), the rail workers dispute (Whitfield 1989b) and the ambulance staff (Whitfield 
1989c), all used the overtime ban as the key sanction and were all of national importance. A 
national overtime ban, together with a series of one day strikes, was used in 1979-80 to secure a 
reduction from a 40 to a 39 hour week, In the engineering industry (Huges 1980). There was a 
certain amount of Irony In this use of overtime, In that a number of researchers have linked 
increasing overtime to the shortening of the working week. 
The Donovan commission found that an overtime ban was a more common form of sanction than 
unofficial strikes, and the IDS (1988) found that overtime bans are a common, and often the most 
effective, form of Industrial action. The use of overtime bans or restrictions as a weapon against 
employers was reviewed In two important surveys of industrial relations in Britain. The CBI 
supported Marsh In a survey of manufacturing industries, from which it was found that overtime 
bans represented 55% of all the non-strike industrial action in multi-establishment companies and 
62% within single establishment companies (Marsh 1982). 
More recently, Millward and Stevens (1986) conducted a survey of all sectors In all regions of 
Britain, sponsored jointly by the DE, ESRC and Policy Studies Institute. This survey revealed that 
overtime bans or restrictions accounted for 43% and In 1984,55% of all non-strike Industrial action 
by manual workers In 1980. The equivalent figure for non-manual workers was 38% for both 1980 
and 1984. The equivalent figures for all workers were 40% In 1980 and 46% in 1984 (Millward and 
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Stevens 1986). This data reveals that overtime bans, among both the manual and non-manual 
workforce, were as widespread as strikes of one day or more, in both 1980 and 1984, with around 
one in ten workplaces being affected by such action. Two important facts clearly emerge from 
these statistics: 
i) Overtime bans or restrictions form the greatest proportion of non-strike industrial action; 
ii) The use of overtime as a proportion of industrial disputes Increased over the period 1980- 
84, for manual workers and remained steady for non-manual workers. 
Employees run some risk, In restricting overtime, of dismissal or restraint by a court injunction 
(IDS 1988). The Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act (1978) establishes an employer's 
right, in certain circumstances, to dismiss all, but not selective individuals, of those taking part in 
an overtime ban, with no recourse to an unfair dismissal claim. The court of appeal has held, 
(BBC v. Hearn 1978 and Faust v. Power Packing Casemakers Ltd 1983), that dismissal can apply 
even if there was no breach of contract involved in the overtime ban. The terms and conditions of 
employment can include those which are understood or implied by custom and practice, in 
addition to those which are specifically contractual. Moreover, industrial law now enables an 
employer to seek a court Injunction restraining an overtime ban unless the action is in 
contemplation or furtherance of a bona fide trade dispute, has received majority approval In a 
properly constituted secret ballot and does not represent unlawful secondary action (IDS 1988). 
The second association between overtime and industrial relations is the propensity of overtime to 
be the actual cause of a dispute. As with overtime bans, this phenomenon Is not restricted to the 
U. K. A review of overtime working In Australia found that regular or customary overtime working 
can create an industrial dispute (ILO 1985a): 'workers come to regard overtime as a right and the 
reduction of overtime in these circumstances can create industrial relations problems'. In the US, 
a prolific source of industrial grievances and arbitration was found to be complaints from unions 
that employers have not offered employees suitable opportunities to work overtime (Greis 1984). 
Also, the use of mandatory overtime has been the source of a great number of disputes in the 
United States (Greis 1984; Landvater 1985) 
There are many examples of Industrial disputes caused by the use, restriction or withdrawal of 
overtime in the U. K. The London Transport strike in 1978 which saw workers protesting against 
the curtailment of their rest-day working (Carby and Edwards-Stuart 1981), or the Times 
Newspaper dispute of 1979 which resulted in a settlement giving improved overtime premium 
rates (ILO 1982). More recently, the Post Office dispute in 1988 which saw strike action to secure 
the right to work overtime handling a postal backlog (Chittenden and Beresford 1988). This was a 
particularly Ironic dispute since the work backlog had been caused by the earlier strike action of 
those very workers. Moreover, management's solution to the backlog problem was in sympathy 
with TUC policy: to bring in temporary workers, from the unemployment register; this was bitterly 
resisted at local union level (Chittenden and Beresford 1988). 
The Television industry, according to Jones and Thynne, (1988) had long relied heavily on 
overtime. In 1988 there was a concerted management effort to change working practices to 
reduce the use of overtime and work demarcations (Bassett 1988; Bassett and Gapper 1988), but 
this was strongly resisted by unions and resulted in strike action. For example, the TV-am strike 
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over manning and overtime levels (Jones and Thynne 1988) and the ACTT, TV-am strike to resist 
the reduction of overtime, which accounted for £10,000 of technicians' take-home pay (Daily 
Telegraph 5th December 1988). Another important strike was that caused, allegedly, by the 
government's attempt, through the'Fresh Start' programme, to reduce the amount of overtime 
worked by prison officers. This eventually led to a riot at Risley remand centre (Johnson 1989). 
The corollary to the phenomenon of overtime, as a cause of industrial relations problems, is that of 
the use of overtime to motivate or reward workers which is seen by some managers as an 
industrial relations booster. There is little reported in the literature base regarding the use of 
overtime in this way, other than as a support for low pay. Although Smith (1989) identified one 
use of ineffective payment systems to: 'indulge peaceful inefficiency on the shop floor'. it is 
widely believed that overtime can help the firm to recruit, retain and motivate staff, even when the 
pay levels can not be classified as 'low'. Moreover, it is believed on the shop floor that the gift, or 
the withholding, of overtime are sometimes used by supervisors or managers in their dealings with 
particular employees. as a reward or a punishment. 
3.3.9 Employee Attitudes, Motivations and Manipulation 
Each individual employee exhibits a unique set of motivations and responses. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that there is a high degree of variability and controversy in the literature on the 
issue of employee attitudes to overtime. Those employees who work overtime tend to do so 
habitually and the overtime pay which they receive is, on average, a substantial proportion of their 
pay, (see Section 2). Some workers can double their pay through overtime working (Richards 
1988). In fact the choice for the average overtime worker is not so much one of: 'should I work 
overtime', as 'can I stop working overtime'. This is a subtle, but crucial, difference especially for 
those workers who have come to depend on overtime pay to meet their fixed financial 
commitments (White 1984). 
The pivotal question: why do employees work overtime?, seems, in view of the levels of earnings, 
to be superfluous. The 'simple, obvious and unassailable' explanation of workers' readiness to 
work overtime is, according to White (1984), the additional income provided. White concludes 
that the'evidence as a whole leaves little doubt that for many workers overtime pay is part of the 
regular earnings on which they rely'. Indeed, much of the literature admits of no contributing 
motivation for the Individual to work overtime, other than the cliched financial theory (e. g. Sinclair 
1983; ILO 1985). 
Of course, there are other supporting or alternative reasons which help to explain employee 
willingness to work overtime. The NBPI (1970), for example, concluded that workers were willing 
to work high levels of overtime, 'clearly to raise their earnings', but that other factors could enter 
into the motivation equation. De Lange (1986) found that employees In France judged working 
time Issues mainly in terms of 'quality-of-work' and leisure aspects. He went onto explain that the 
worker's 'private situation, especially family life, plays a leading role but there are other 
considerations, such as transportation problems'. 
A number of studies undertaken In the 1970s, in the U. S., all of which support the NBPI's premise, 
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were reviewed by Jamal and Crawford (1981) who concluded that people do not work extra hours 
entirely for financial reasons. They suggested that factors such as: 'change of pace, developing 
new skills, being one's own boss and doing work which is enjoyable' entered the equation. White 
(1984) quotes the lack of overtime on Fridays as an exemplar of the move by workers to enhance 
quality of life by choosing to avoid inconvenient overtime. Buck and Shimmin (1959) explained 
the balance of potential on the overtime decision for the worker, stating: 'overtime can mean 
greater fatigue, disruption of domestic and social life, and the uncertainty of fluctuating earnings, 
but against these disadvantages can be set increased earnings at a higher hourly rate of pay'. 
They concluded that, in a free situation where the overtime was not compulsory, individual 
inclination to work overtime is determined in part by individual financial responsibility, 'a factor 
which lies outside the control of the factory'. 
Whybrew (1968) revealed that employee willingness to work overtime was affected by financial 
and family responsibilities. However, he found that in all groups: 'there are usually variations in 
attitudes... some dislike overtime, and some wish to get as much of it as they can'. Similarly, the 
ILO (1985), which reviewed Australian workers' preferences for overtime, and White (1984) 
acknowledge the high degree of variability between groups of employees, for instance, manual 
and non-manual workers, occupations and industries, but stresses the limitation of some analyses 
because greater proportions of non-manual workers in some sectors can cloud the issue. 
It Is obvious that there will be considerable variation between individuals, the question is: 'to what 
extent is this variability a function of some independent variable such as characteristic or type of 
worker, industry or geographical region? ' There is considerable research into the extent of actual 
overtime hours, analysed by these variables, but there is relatively little analysis of actual worker 
attitudes. 
In considering the supply side Issue of employee desire for overtime, most studies have found a 
high level of employee pressure for substantial overtime (Taylor 1978; Carby and Edwards-Stuart 
1981; PA International Management Consultants 1982; White 1984; ILO 1985). NBPI (1970), for 
example, reported 'considerable shop-floor pressure' for overtime and adopted the view that was 
a key driving force In the overtime phenomenon. The desire for overtime and the extent to which 
some workers will go In order to 'manufacture' overtime opportunities are connected issues. 
Perhaps two examples will suffice here to demonstrate the dimensions of the phenomenon and 
establish the pressures which are sometimes present. 
An example of the Insatiability of demand for overtime is found in the circumstances of the 
Clapham rail disaster which Is used elsewhere in this thesis as a powerful exemplar. The engineer 
responsible for the wiring error stated to the inquiry that he 'had worked every Saturday and 
Sunday In the two months before the crash and nearly every weekend for six months before that'. 
It emerged that this was by his own decision which was based on financial reasons. Of equal 
interest is an example of the extreme lengths to which workers are sometimes prepared to go in 
order to secure overtime. This example Is found In a number of reports about the Sellafield 
nuclear power plant. British Nuclear Fuels, (BNF), were accused of 'deliberately falsifying worker 
radiation badges of men exposed to high levels of radiation' (Independent 24th May 1988). BNF 
said 'the Incident was minor'. However, it was reported on News Night (BBC2 23rd May 1988) 
that overtime was so highly prized and sought by the workers, that they falsified their own photo- 
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radiation badges by putting them in their pockets and switching them off, or covered their 
personal air samplers with tissue paper in order to falsify the readings so that they could continue 
to work overtime. 
There is, however, a body of research which suggests that workers generally resist overtime. 
Best (1978) concluded that'workers, (US), may be willing to exchange earnings for more free 
time'. He found that the distribution of work over extended periods had 'important implications 
for many major social issues' and went on to explain: 'a large proportion of 791 non-randomly 
selected workers say that they would exchange income for time if the options for more free time 
match personal needs'. White (1981) found similarly evidence, at a pharmaceutical plant. 
Management had wished to increase overtime following a move to shorter hours but the workers 
successfully resisted this, for quality of life reasons. Harting (1974) noted that some workers 
would prefer to work less overtime, 'even if this meant sacrificing earnings'. 
Irrespective of the ability of the individual to make a choice on overtime working, which may be 
severely constrained by financial circumstances, there Is the question of the consequences of the 
overtime on the individual. It Is therefore considered appropriate to review the positive or 
negative effects of overtime with regard to individuals' job satisfaction and morale, of which 
'attitude' must be a function. 
There Is considerable conflict in the literature which arises from the Interpretation of the degree 
and nature of the effects of overtime. It Is difficult to generalise with any certitude over these 
Issues, which will clearly be influenced by the circumstances. Nevertheless, a number of studies 
give some guidance. In support of the premise that: 'overtime improves job satisfaction and 
morale'. Hollmann's (1979) survey found a direct correlation between employees' willingness to 
work overtime and 'job satisfaction, their Identification with the organisation and their perception 
of the fairness of the rewards for overtime work'. Kats and Goldberg (1982), In Israel, and 
Leonard (1983), In the U. S., found some employees indicated that 'job satisfaction' was the main 
reason that they worked overtime. 
On the other hand, the majority of evidence would seem to support the opposite proposition, that: 
'overtime Is associated with poor job satisfaction and low morale'. Baird and Beccia (1980) 
concluded that overtime was'negatively related to satisfaction with job and pay... overtime was 
neither productive nor motivational'. This conclusion has generally been supported by a wide 
range of research across the world (e. g. Fottler and Schaller (1975); Ailing 1983; ETUI 1984). 
Katin (1937), much earlier, established that the effect of overtime was 'generally' to depress 
employee morale and job satisfaction: 'overtime in the long run makes him, (the employee), stale 
and irritable... the brain becomes stagnant'. Nevertheless, Katin was equivocal, he acknowledged 
that there were some circumstances where the individual could derive a 'sense of unity, of 
pleasure in co-ordinated effort, that working late (in moderation) gives one'. He also mooted, as 
was mentioned by Jamal and Crawford (1981), the desire, among some employees, for self- 
Improvement at work, which may lead them, as individuals, to the choice of longer hours, 
irrespective of financial considerations. 
Lynch (1985) concluded that overtime in the U. K. should be reduced, which in his view would 
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bring considerable benefits to the individual worker, in terms of both morale and job satisfaction. 
While Fishwick and Harling (1974) found evidence that employees dislike fluctuations in overtime 
opportunities. This is sometimes recognised as a negative factor on employee motivation (Buck 
and Shimmin 1959). 
Cultural questions are difficult, if not dangerous, to approach in management research. However, 
the so called 'protestant ethic' has been raised within the literature and there Is clearly a valid 
association with overtime. Superficially, it could be presumed that there would be a positive 
correlation between work ethic and overtime, but the opposite might be argued In so far as 
overtime is 'manipulated' by the worker. Traditionally, In western culture, the concept of work 
ethic gives work, for the male species, a higher degree of esteem than leisure. According to Kats 
and Goldberg (1982), In Israel, forecast that the work ethic may well decline or be abandoned in 
'post-industrial society', they found no evidence of this change as yet. They found In some 
circumstances that work remained 'central to the self-image of the individual, with a resultant 
desire for maximum time at the workplace'. Blyton (1985) argued that a long term shift in work 
values, 'away from the work ethic', would increase the perceived desirability of a 'work and 
Income-leisure trade-off . However, Blyton also found that there was little sign of such a shift at 
present. Galbraith (1972) went somewhat further stating: 'those who wish may, by working 
overtime or moonlighting, work more, none may work less'. Tennant (1978) conducted research 
into the work ethic In Canada using the provocative proposition: 'only losers work late'. He found 
that the work ethic was still a significant driving force and that long hours are still perceived, in 
some quarters, as the price that more senior staff 'have to pay to get ahead'. 
Employee attitude may be Influenced by taxation, not least because of the U. K. system of 
Increasing marginal tax rates, which can have a disproportionate effect on the net overtime 
earnings yield. However, Whybrew (1968) pointed out that 'there Is little or no evidence that 
levels of taxation affect the willingness of workers to agree to overtime'. White (1984) supported 
this conclusion, stating: 'there Is no clear evidence of personal taxation having a strong Influence 
on individuals' propensity to work overtime in the U. K. ' It Is not surprising that different countries 
exhibit different attitudes on this Issue. For Instance, in Israel, Kats and Goldberg (1982) 
concluded that'in this study only 8% of workers felt that taxes made working overtime not 
worthwhile'. While In Ireland, Brennan and Kelly (1985) found that high taxation of overtime 
earnings generally discouraged overtime working by employees. 
Finally, a somewhat novel discovery is that of the 'income effect' which Fottler and Schaller (1975) 
articulated. They found an unexpected distortion in the overtime hours supply curve in that those 
groups consistently associated with a lower propensity to work overtime, in the U. S., included 
both low-wage and high-wage employees: 'the finding of lower overtime acceptance among both 
high and low-wage employees and higher overtime acceptance among medium-wage employees 
Implies a forward sloping supply curve for overtime hours which reaches a maximum in the 
medium-pay category, and then bends backwards as wages rise further'. The extent to which this 
phenomenon is replicated in the U. K. Is un clear. 
Turning now to the vexed question of employees manipulation of overtime, which is the improper 
creation, by employees, of circumstances which will create or maintain overtime. This 
uncomfortable question is shrouded in uncertainty, there being little information in the literature, 
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but no lack of conjecture. The discussion of this phenomenon in the literature is by no means a 
balanced review, since little evidence would be presented that such practice specifically does not 
exist. Moreover, there is little 'employer' pressure to review worker manipulation. Few 
establishments would want to embrace the very real risk of aggravating industrial relations by 
raising such a sensitive matter which in any event, may well reproach the management more than 
the workers. Even if manipulation were present, it may well be perceived as offering the 
organisation an effective means of achieving 'give-and-take'. In any event, the manipulation of 
overtime would be unlikely to present in the form of a critical situation which demanded specific 
management action. Nevertheless, there are many instances known to supervisors and 
managers, where the practice is suspected and the anecdotal evidence is indeed substantial. 
Firstly, the unusual 'denial' of manipulation must be mentioned. Leslie and Wise (1980), 
somewhat tentatively, refuted the existence of manipulation. They based their analysis on an 
NBPI (1970) large-scale survey into overtime, covering over 2000 firms. One of the questions 
related to the comparative productivity between normal and overtime hours. Only 25% of 
respondents made the comparison, of which 69.2% stated levels were the same, only 2.6% felt 
overtime productivity was higher, and the balance that it was lower. This result, obtained by 
survey, Is unremarkable In that managers would be unlikely to state that their control was 
Ineffective. There must, therefore be some concern over the reasons for the 75% non-response 
on this particular issue only. Nevertheless, the NBPI survey was used by Leslie and Wise (1980) 
to suggest that there Is: 'little support to the idea that workers deliberately waste time at work 
during normal hours in order to guarantee overtime to supplement their earnings'. This is the only 
reference found to denounce the manipulation theory and it Is interesting that Leslie and Wise felt 
compelled to raise the matter In the first place. In fact Leslie (1977) had previously taken the 
position of tending to defend a degree of manipulation, or at least, in shifting the blame to poor 
management and Inadequate payment policies, he stated: 'the hard-pressed low-paid worker 
spins out the work week to ensure overtime to guarantee a minimal level of earnings'. 
Leslie's assessment was sound and it is easy to understand his somewhat sympathetic 
Interpretation. However, such measured terms on this Issue are not usually found in the literature. 
Caulkin (1976), for example, critically questioned the role of overtime, asking whether'its the 
Inefficiency which gives rise to the overtime or the other way around', going on to quote the 
uncompromising Alan Flanders: 'I do not know a single case where systematic overtime is not 
associated with deliberate time-wasting to keep it in being'. 
Katin (1937) was equally forthright when, many years earlier, he identified the trait of the overtime- 
hungry worker and his 'wheedling of overtime from the foreman or employer'. Similarly, Rathkey 
(1984) does not prevaricate, he denounced overtime as being generally: 'habitual, detrimental to 
job creation and indicative of economic inefficiency... Contrary to popular belief, overtime is often 
a consequence of over-manning rather that under-manning. Making work for the weekend in 
order to get time-and-a-half and double-time does not represent efficient production'. In 
categorising managers' fears about overtime, Jamal and Crawford (1981) stated: 'overtime is 
frequently used to compensate for low productivity during regular hours, which could reflect 
mismanagement, technical (e. g., maintenance) problems, or conscious manipulation of output'. 
Similarly, White (1984), suggested worker manipulation of the'pace of work' In order to make 
overtime necessary. In common with the vast majority of the literature, White did not elaborate 
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further, neither indicating the possible extent and degree of such activity, nor the source of his 
evidence, and this represents another gap in the knowledge of overtime in the U. K. White 
subsequently explains the meaning of the vernacular: 'soldiering', which has now entered the 
language in both the U. K. thus: 'Soldiering means to systematically pretend to be working 
intensively, while in reality restricting output'. 
On the question of proof, a search of the literature for firm evidence on this Issue reveals little of 
value. However, one quotation from the Inquiry Into the Clapham rail disaster would seem 
appropriate: 'he told me "there's no need to rush because there isn't much to be done" so I took 
my time' (Guardian 15th March 1989). These were the words of the Engineer who tragically left 
the loose wire, after enduring months of excessive overtime working, and presumably anticipating 
more of the same, spinning-out the work. Fishwick and Harling (1974) provide further specific 
examples of manipulation: 'managers... (at various U. K. plants), alleged that some maintenance 
employees "paced" their work in order to ensure an even rate of overtime earnings... At another 
U. K. components plant, management expressed concern at the growing volume of weekend 
overtime. It was alleged that, because of the overtime premium, the pace of work was slowed 
down'. Carby et al (1981) reported on a questionnaire based survey of 50 establishments stating: 
'another widely held belief about the control of overtime concerns the extent to which managers or 
supervisors collude in creating overtime to aid relations'. It Is interesting to note that, since 
'several' of the 50 respondents thought collusion occurred, and yet this represented a 'substantial' 
reduction on previous years, the collusion must have previously been rife. 
It is Interesting to note that the NBPI (1970) study, cited above refuted claims of manipulation, In 
fact itself quoted evidence of worker manipulation stating: 'it was generally agreed that there was 
spinning out of work in order to raise earnings'. This practice was noted In particular In the road 
haulage Industry where the NBPI stated there was 'clear evidence of a close link between high 
overtime and low productivity'. 
The manipulation of work to secure overtime Is not unique to the U. K Greis (1984) in the U. S. 
discussed the loss of efficiency which was brought about by the tendency for workers to 'pace 
themselves for the longer day'. Likewise. Baird and Beccia (1980), also in the U. S., demonstrated 
that low-producing groups are associated with high overtime. Interestingly, the corollary to this 
discovery, that high-overtime groups provide a good starting point for the investigation of 
productivity, has been further developed as a result of Baird and Beccia's original work (Collons 
1981). According to Collons, the need for overtime is caused by the work group operating below 
its capacity, and management's authorisation of overtime, rewards the work group for holding 
back production. When this occurs, the low-producing work group experiences a benefit from 
working below its capacity and the practice continues'. Furthermore, supervisory and lower 
management levels are, according to White (1982; 1984), most usually responsible for the day-to- 
day control of overtime. If these lower management levels are themselves rewarded for overtime 
at premium rates, this may create adverse pressures. It is surprising that this particular feature 
does not appear to be addressed in the literature. Other commentators who have developed 
similar themes include: Jevons (1965), U. S.; Sinclair (1983), New Zealand and Reid (1986), 
Canada. They all refer to the loss of efficiency due to manipulation. 
There is clearly concern in the literature regarding the possibility of worker manipulation. This 
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issue has been addressed by a number of researchers, but only as an adjunct to their work on the 
use of overtime. There is little indication of the extent or degree to which manipulation may take 
place, or indeed, may be endemic. 
3.3.10 Employee Welfare 
Again, this section Is divided into three areas: quality of life; health, safety and accidents and, 
finally, mandatory overtime. The question of quality of life is summed-up by Katin (1937) who 
argued that: 'if overtime is heavy and frequent, the worker gets home too late and too tired either 
to enjoy the advantages of his extra money or to Increase his chance of promotion by self 
education'. This uncompromising view was expounded between the World Wars and has not 
been substantially modified by subsequent research. Indeed, there are few'overtime Issues' 
which lack controversy. However, the association of long hours of work with lower quality of life 
for the worker, ceteris paribus, (particularly take-home pay), is almost without challenge in the 
literature. 
s 
There is, of course, an exception to this generalisation. Fishwick (1979) suggested that workers 
obtain some reward for their overtime work in addition to obvious financial one. Fishwick raises 
the interesting question: 'why do employees not demand reductions in overtime? '. No answer to 
this question Is offered by Fishwick but he goes on to state: 'the apparent absence of any 
widespread demand for more leisure time remains remarkable'. Fishwick is interested in the 
possibility that overtime may provide a desirable outlet for some workers who, in the absence of 
better alternatives, derive a higher'quality of life' through the ability to work late and achieve 
fulfilment of'higher-level' motivators such as job satisfaction. Certainly there is believed to be a 
substantial body of non-manual workers who choose to stay late to work unpaid overtime (Carby 
and Edwards-Stuart 1981; White 1984; IDS 1988d) and although there may be Indirect financial 
and career motivations involved, the 'Fishwick' theory can not be discounted. 
Over this century, the ILO have been the leading proponents of the Improvement of conditions of 
work (fagi 1982). One of their key means of pursuing this objective has been the adoption of 
International Labour Conventions and Recommendations aimed at setting standards and 
providing guidance to governments, trade unions and employers. The term 'conditions of work' 
can have different meanings but, In this context, it is intended to be used In the narrow sense to 
embrace'working time, workers' welfare and special conditions' (Tagi 1981). 
The ILO see working hours as a main concern and have accordingly adopted a number of 
conventions (ILO 1982b) which limit working hours but these have not been ratified by U. K. 
governments. Even so, they have exerted an enormous and world-wide influence on national law 
and practice (Tagi 1981). 
The ILO Report of the Committee of Experts (ILO 1984) re-affirms the ILO's commitment to the 
reduction of long hours: 'the committee has always attached great importance to the limitation of 
additional hours'. The ILO Medium Term Plan 1990-95 (ILO 1988a) gives the objectives of the ILO 
as: 'social progress and social justice'. In this plan the ILO target improved working conditions 
as a major future challenge. A principle objective within this more general aim was given as the 
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'protection of workers against excessive hours'. 
Turning now to the historical literature on the issue of workers' welfare Thompson (1968) showed 
that there has been concern, from the early period of industrialisation, about the 'damage to both 
health and way of life' resulting from long hours of work. It is convenient to separate the issues of 
'health', which attach to the individual worker, and 'way of life' which perhaps concerns more the 
wider context of the worker, his family and the community in which he lives. 
So far as the Individual worker Is concerned, Katin (1937) stated: 'the continuance of overtime in 
the long run makes the average worker stale and irritable'. The working of extra hours is criticised 
in this context, not just In the U. K., but world-wide. For Instance, in Israel, Kats and Goldberg 
(1982) criticised overtime for its 'negative consequences such as stress, fatigue, accidents and 
low work commitment'. Long hours are universally associated with the intensification of negative 
influences on the Individual such as: fatigue, boredom and stress (NBPI 1970; Fottler and Schaller 
1975; ETUI 1979; Rathkey 1984; Blyton 1985; Leonard 1986; Greis 1984; White 1987). 
In the U. K, the TUC proposed a strategy on working time, the essence of which was to create 
jobs, but which also embodied the secondary objective of improving working conditions by 
reducing working time (EIRR 1981). With fundamentally the same intentions, the ETUI have 
established the principle that overtime should be compensated by time-off-in-lieu, (TOIL) (ETUC 
1982). This was promoted essentially by two arguments: `the refusal of workers to trade-off bad 
working conditions; working hours being taken as an essential part of working conditions. 
As regards the 'way of life' of the individual worker, Kats and Goldberg (1982) summed-up the 
general feeling of the literature base stating simply that overtime can cause the 'ruining of family 
life'. Katin (1937), In more colourful terms, denounced overtime as'a work beast', stating: 'not 
only the brain becomes stagnant, but all that one acquires of culture, of interest in society, goes 
by the board. Good music, good reading, good talk - all these are as fleeting shadows after a 
long spell of day-and-night labour. Domestic relationships themselves become strained and 
unreal'. Perhaps more soberly, the Federation of Labour in New Zealand have pointed to the 
'disruptive effect of overtime on family and community life', as well as on the adverse'fatigue of 
workers... during overtime periods' (Sinclair 1983). In consideration of the positive side of the 
argument, the European Commission (1983) stated: 'the reduction and reorganisation of working 
time can make a continuing contribution to the improvement of living and working conditions'. 
There Is considerable evidence that overtime denigrates the social life of the worker, 
notwithstanding the worker's need to fund a social life, as well as, possibly, to meet essential 
financial commitments, by earning the extra cash that Is offered through overtime (Katin 1937; 
Buzzard 1973; Sinclair 1983; ILO 1985c; Blyton 1985). 
White (1987) addressed the question of 'Shorter Hours as a Contribution to Health and Quality of 
Life' in the U. K He stated that the 'first, and perhaps most basic, argument of the advocates of 
shorter working hours has been its important contribution to the health of workers and, more 
generally, to their quality of life'. Furthermore, White argued, very reasonably, that health can be 
regarded as one aspect of overall quality of life, and that health is adversely affected by excessive 
hours of work. Thus White established a fundamental link between hours of work and quality of 
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life. 
It is perhaps interesting to consider In a little more detail some of the factors which comprise 
'quality of life'. We turn again to White (1987), who revealed that advocates of shorter working 
hours have claimed that these would result in 'wide improvements in quality of life for both 
workers, their families and for the community'. White (1987) found that shorter hours of work can 
result in'better motivated workers who produce more and give customers higher standards of 
service, and reduced hours are likely to do so if they form part of a general policy of improving the 
quality of working life'. More particularly, he concluded that the benefits to accrue from the 
reduction of excessive hours were: 'i) Improvement in the quality of life for workers - including 
improved standards of health, avoidance of accidents due to fatigue, and provision of adequate 
time for relaxation and domestic activities; and ii) Adoption of more efficient working practices 
appropriate to modern types of Industry and service. ' Zachman (1987) summarises the literature, 
stating: 'obviously, a decline in working time can be considered to be an improvement In quality of 
life', no doubt this would be particularly so were the working time to at a relatively high level to 
start with, as is the case for many workers in the U. K, where 36% of the male workforce work more 
. than 49 
hours per week, (see Appendix 2-1). Clearly, therefore, the issue of welfare is relevant to 
the overtime debate. 
Two slightly more obscure notes may be of interest. Firstly, it is a common assertion that there is 
an association between unemployment and poor quality of life. Furthermore, many researchers 
have pondered the extent to which overtime reduction might redistribute working time and 
therefore reduce unemployment (Nussbaum and Wise 1977; ETUC 1982; Leonard 1983; ILO 1985; 
Carr 1986; White 1987). Thus the link is indirectly established between the worksharing aspect of 
overtime reduction and improved quality of life, although this is not specifically addressed in these 
terms in the literature. 
Secondly, from the workers' point of view, overtime has an additional disadvantage of being an 
Insecure source of income, in theory if not In practice (NBPI 1970). Although this 'insecurity' may 
have only a marginal effect on the welfare of the worker, this would certainly be, in essence, 
another depressive factor. However, this factor Is also not addressed in the literature. 
Turning now to a different factor in the issue of welfare, that of health and safety and accidents. A 
rail worker, killed by an express train, was ending a 22 hour shift. The worker 'failed to hear 
shouted warnings from his work-mates... as he worked on the track'. The inquest recorded a 
verdict of accidental death (Daily Telegraph 4th July 1989). 
It is generally believed that overtime work leads to fatigue, which, in turn, increases the likelihood 
of accidents (Schuster and Rhodes 1985). There is a considerable body of research, across 
many Industrialised nations, and extending well into the history of British industrial relations 
(Thompson 1968), which associates long working hours with an increased propensity for 
accidents. The question arises regarding the precise causal relationship between long hours and 
accidents and little evidence appears to exist regarding the degree of positive correlation between 
these variables. 
In Canada, a Task Force was appointed to enquire into hours of work and overtime. This inquiry 
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found evidence (Worklife Report 1987) of an association between overtime hours and accident 
rates. However, the Task Force went onto state: 'it is not known... whether this occurs because 
of the overtime per se or because of other changes that are occurring when overtime Increases, 
such as an increase In the pace of work or a reduction in supervision or safety maintenance. 
Determining the underlying causal relationship is Important if we are to know whether the 
appropriate policy response is to reduce overtime or to enforce health and safety standards more 
strictly'. 
In fact there is considerable evidence, originating in the U. K, associating accidents and poor health 
and safety with overtime working (Rathkey 1984). White (1987) recounted the documentation, 
during the First World War, by the British Industrial Fatigue Board, which identified 'a heightened 
level accidents' as a probable repercussion of long hours. Vernon (1918,1921,1936) has 
provided a key work linking overtime, fatigue and accidents. In essence, it was found that, when 
longer hours were worked, there was an increase in the accident rate per hour (Vernon 1936). 
This finding is supported by research reviewed by Whybrew (1964), Greenbaum (1963). and the 
NBPI (1970) who linked long hours with 'factors such as fatigue and boredom'. 
The TUC, in 1981, voiced their concern stating that the basic conditions of employment should be 
improved by eliminating all systematic overtime in order to Improve health and safety factors 
(EIRR 1981). More recently, White (1987), in reviewing the effects of long hours on health and 
safety, found that the literature generally accepted a positive correlation between long hours and 
poor health factors. White, however, suggested an alternative argument, that the process of 
shortening working hours could lead to intensification of work, and hence to more rather than less 
fatigue and stress. No evidence was offered in support of this alternative hypotheses, but White 
concluded that the expected benefits of reductions of hours would Include 'improved standards of 
health and avoidance of accidents due to fatigue', which would appear to be In support of the 
substantive hypothesis: that overtime is positively correlated with poor health and safety factors. 
In the US, Schuster and Rhodes (1985) conducted a systematic study which established that 
overtime work was related to the incidence and severity of accidents. While a Canadian Task 
Force found 'evidence that overtime hours are associated with higher injury and accident rates' 
(Worklife Report 1987). Kats and Goldberg (1982), concluded that there was an association 
between working extra hours and accidents. While overtime in Nordic countries, tends to be 
controlled by health and safety committees, thus establishing a link between those factors (ETUI 
1982). Sinclair (1983), in New Zealand, reported that the Federation of Labour were concerned 
about the effects of overtime on accidents and Sinclair, ILO (1979) and the Canadian task force 
(Work Life Report 1987), were concerned about the occupational health threshold limits, which 
could be adversely affected by longer exposures to hazardous substances during overtime. 
One study which gives a different view is that by Jamal and Crawford (1981). This systematically 
reviewed 'Mental Health' among a number of variables with respect to overtime. No statistically 
significant difference was found between 'overtimers' and modal employees. Nevertheless, it was 
interesting to note that absenteeism, which is connected with welfare, was significantly higher 
among 'overtlmers'. 
A corollary to the relationship between overtime and poor health is the propensity of long hours to 
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result in a reduction in quality of work, (see Section 3.3.6). This would clearly put at risk third 
parties, who either rely on the quality of service or product, or who are simply unfortunate enough 
to be coincidentally involved, when a system, product or service fails. An example of this lies in 
the 1988 Clapham rail disaster, previously mentioned. British Rail, (BR), accepted responsibility 
for'bad working practices' (including excessive working hours), which caused the accident 
(Guardian 15th March 1989). The trend of 'soaring overtime giving excessive hours of work' was 
highlighted at the subsequent inquiry, which found this to be the case in this instance. Worries 
were expressed at the inquiry that'overtime can mean overtiredness for manual workers doing 
safety related jobs'. The engineer involved stated in evidence that he had worked 'every Saturday 
and Sunday In the two months before the crash and nearly every weekend for six months before 
that', this was on top of his 39 hour basic week (Bournemouth Evening Echo 30th October 1989; 
Daily Telegraph 8th November 1989). 
Hindsight is, of course, the perfect science, but this incident had in fact been foreshadowed 
although this has, surprisingly, not yet been articulated publicly. The Transport Salaried Staffs' 
Association, (7SSA), in 1988, six months prior to the Clapham disaster, revealed that BR staff are 
able to'Double wages by doing excessive overtime'. BR advised that average overtime was 
about 10 hours per week and TSSA claimed that, during one mid-January week in 1988,15,022 
staff earned between 200% and 400% of basic pay and some earned over 400%. Against this 
backdrop, the TSSA called for BR to fill 'up to 20,000 staff vacancies'. Moreover, overtime was 
confirmed as being common for all grades of staff at BR. Mr. Lyons, General Secretary of the 
TSSA, condemned excessive hours of working and called for an'urgent inquiry and it should 
cover the important aspect of health and safety' (Richards 1988). 
In the event, the final report of the disaster inquiry was uncompromising, it labelled working 
practices as 'positively dangerous'. criticised BR for maintaining, among other things, 'excessively 
long hours' and stated that management had 'failed abysmally'. The report identified fault in the 
'historic character' of the running of the railways which are characterised by exceptionally long 
hours of overtime. Among its recommendations the report called for: 'an end to excessive levels 
of overtime'. This would suggest an association between overtime and bad management. 
The potential 'third-party' consequences of long hours of work Is not as obscure as might be 
assumed from the lack of comment within the literature. White (1987) quoted the graphic 
example of a survey of truck drivers in France, among whom long hours were common. It was 
found that'the incidence of accidents rose sharply towards the end of long spells of driving, 
particularly at night, despite the lower density of traffic' (Organisme National de Securite Routiere 
1977). Such Issues raise questions of safety for both the general public and the worker. 
It would be naive to assume that there is a simple direct relationship between accidents and long 
hours of work. Clearly the overwhelming body of research indicates that there is a positive 
correlation between the two. However, this is likely to be due to multi-factorial and complex 
reasons, Involving the characteristics of the Individual and the environmental circumstances, as 
well as the fatigue factor (Schuster and Rhodes 1985). 
Mandatory overtime: the workers' 'right-to-say-no', is clearly linked to employee welfare. This is 
not an issue in many European countries where legislation restricts or completely outlaws any 
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overtime, other than In carefully prescribed circumstances (ILO 1986). However, mandatory 
overtime has proved a problem In other areas of the world. The ILO Medium Term Plan 1990-95 
identifies that Improved working conditions remain an important area of concern and under this 
heading the 'fundamental' question: 'under what circumstances could a worker refuse to work 
overtime? ' Is listed for investigation (ILO 1988a). 
In Canada, Reid (1985) found that only 15% of major collective agreements In Canada, define 
overtime as voluntary, 23% give the worker a qualified right to refuse overtime for 'sufficient 
reason', the balance of agreements presume the employer to have the right to enforce overtime. 
A Task Force, established by the Ontario Ministry of Labour to enquire into hours of work and 
overtime, recommended that overtime should, by law, be voluntary after a 40 hour week of 8 hour 
days (Worklife Report 1987). The law previously stipulated that overtime became voluntary only 
after 48 hours of work In the week. 
A similar situation exists in New Zealand, where the employer Is presumed to have, in common 
law, the right to require the working of overtime when necessary (Sinclair 1983). While in 
Australia, some groups of worker are required to work compulsory overtime, (ILO 1985) in which 
case the only element of choice for the worker lies in their selection of occupation and job. There 
is also a group of Australian workers which feel compelled to work overtime when requested, In 
order not to jeopardise their job security, although the ILO, could adduce no evidence that this 
was a widespread problem (ILO 1985). However, in common with many countries with 
unemployment problems, Sinclair (1983) found that in New Zealand, the issue is not so much one 
of resisting mandatory overtime, but more one of job security. People are generally happy to 
accept either overtime, or the lack of overtime if this is crucial to retaining their job. 
As regards the U. K., there Is very little evidence concerning the use, distribution or the extent of 
mandatary overtime, the major contemporary reviews of overtime and hours of employment do 
not cover this Issue in any detail. There is also little passing comment regarding mandatory 
overtime even though one would expect this to be a valid area of concern. The exception to this 
is the existence of notes regarding the findings of the courts in respect of the worker's right to 
withdraw overtime during a number of industrial disputes. For Instance, the IDS (1988) reported a 
court ruling that overtime had been found to be 'not voluntary'. 
The IDS (1979) survey of overtime listed seven firms, apparently from 29 surveyed, which had a 
'contractual obligation to work overtime'. There would appear to be questions about the 
accuracy and representativeness of the sample before drawing conclusions. 
The ILO is concerned that workers, particularly in industrially developing nations, should have the 
'right-to-say-no' to working additional hours. Long or excessive hours are seen, in developing 
countries, as a major and unacceptable aff ront on of workers' conditions of employment 
(Conversation between the author and J Thurman, ILO 1988, Geneva). 
Nevertheless, the major debate over the use and legislation of mandatary overtime has taken 
place in the U. S. Fottler and Schaller (1975) suggested that compulsory overtime had been 'one 
of the major industrial relations controversies In the United States during the seventies'. A brief 
review of this debate may help to give context to the issues as they affect the U. K. Within the US 
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the employer has the right to require an employee to work overtime unless that right has been 
modified by an employment contract (Dilts and Paul 1983). Most union contracts, in varying 
degrees, limit this employer prerogative, and unions are strongly opposed to mandatory overtime 
(Greis 1984). However, employers who retain this right may be able to operate more flexibly and 
continue operations which otherwise may have been curtailed (Levitan and Belous 1977). 
According to some commentators the free acceptance of the contract of employment, makes the 
employee a volunteer for overtime and in these circumstances (Steele 1986). 
Ehrenberg and Schumann (1982) presented both sides of the debate for legislation to prohibit 
mandatary overtime. The proponents' case was, In essence, restoring freedom of choice to the 
worker, while the opponents' argue that such legislation would restrict employers' flexibility in 
scheduling production, Increase costs and reduce the international competitiveness of American 
industry. Considerable doubt was expressed about the ability to enforce such legislation and 
Ehrenberg and Schumann concluded that the cases for and against legislation remained un-clear. 
It Is claimed by many commentators that mandatary overtime can exert an adverse effect on 
employee motivation and job satisfaction, and can manifest itself In lower productivity and higher 
levels of absenteeism and labour turnover (Schwab and Cummings 1970; Lawler 1973; Fottler and 
Schaller 1975; Mahoney 1979; Greis 1984). Furthermore, Best (1981) stated that there was a 
'notable incidence of human hardship' resulting from mandatory overtime. Indeed, unions, 
representing the workers' viewpoint, called for an end to mandatary overtime on the grounds that 
It reduces employment opportunities and is exhausting to workers, being one of the major causes 
of high absenteeism and thus indirectly, of firings (Greis 1984). In sympathy with this proposition, 
Landvater (1985) Implied that mandatory overtime was a function of bad management In that it 
would not be needed If it were not for management's poor planning. 
From the employers' viewpoint, the ability to mandate overtime work is very Important In keeping 
costs down and maintaining flexibility according to (Greis 1984). The importance of these 
arguments to the opposing groups is exemplified by the United Automobile Workers' strike against 
International Harvester In 1979-80 which focused on a rule change to allow the company to 
schedule mandatory overtime; the strike lasted five months (Greis 1984; Landvater 1985). 
Hollman (1980) revealed that there were a number of reasons for the worker's reluctance to work 
overtime, some of which are not Immediately obvious. For instance, the avoidance of higher 
marginal taxation rates. Holtman went on to state that organisations should only give overtime to 
those employees who are'readily willing to work overtime' and in this way they would maximise 
the productivity during overtime hours. Similarly, Dilts and Paul (1983) concluded that voluntary 
overtime was 'probably' more productive than mandatory overtime. 
The implication of this conclusion flows from the use of the word 'probably'. There is throughout 
the literature a great deal of conjecture but no unequivocal answers. This research identifies a 
gap in the knowledge of the extent, distribution and use of mandatory overtime in the U. K. 
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3.4 MACRO-ECONOMIC OVERTIME ISSUES 
3.4.1 The TUC Dichotomy 
It was stated by Leslie (1977) that 'whilst trade unions and others do from time to time make 
pompous and pious statements about their exploited members, (and lately about work sharing 
among the unemployed), they do not In practice oppose overtime'. Most union leaders, 
according to Taylor (1978), agree publicly that'overtime is a social and economic evil that should 
be abolished'. Yet the TUC find themselves In a difficult position with regard to this policy (White 
1984). A series of disputes in 1988-89 has again raised the issue of the industrial relations 
implications of overtime. Such difficulties are not restricted to the U. K. The Australian trade 
unions (ILO 1985) and the Canadian trade unions (Benimadhu 1986) are committed to reducing 
overtime, but find that their members resist any such moves. Within the U. K., local level 
resistance to the reduction of overtime Is frequently reported (Fishwick 1979; Dawkins 1983). 
Carby et al (1981) found, in their survey of overtime working practices, that a number of 
companies complained of artificially high manning agreements which necessitated more people 
working overtime than was justified, and one company were unable to fill a vacancy because'the 
union' insisted on retaining overtime. 
The TUC's'overtime dichotomy', viz. official resistance, but grass-roots demand, represents an 
enigma of British industrial relations. The leader of the TUC, Norman Willis, explained that the 
public generally hold 'mistaken beliefs' about the TUC (Grice 1989) but the Economics Secretary 
to the TUC stated it was 'hypocrisy for unions to call for the reduction of overtime but resist this at 
the local level' (Callaghan 1989). This view concurred with that of Basnett (1979) who called, at 
the TUC, for the reduction of overtime in order to reduce unemployment, stating: 'if we continue to 
allow unlimited overtime.... we will stand accused of hypocrisy; we will show that our real priority is 
self Interest... this time we mean business'. A similar motion was debated again at the 1989 TUC 
Conference (Whitfield 1989a), a decade on, but overtime as a proportion of basic hours has 
increased to half again as much as the previous 'unacceptable' levels. Union membership has 
fallen over the late 1970s and early 1980s and this has weakened their influence on management 
decisions (Whitfield 1989a). There is, however, no evidence that this development has had any 
effect on overtime working practices over this decade. That is not to say there would not bean 
effect If this trend continued. 
Indeed, overtime has been called the enemy of the working classes (Robins et al 1982); and 
unions around the world have fought to reduce its levels. Unions decry it as a major cause of bad 
working conditions (ETUI 1982; BIM 1985), and a contributing factor in the uneven distribution of 
work where some work very long hours, whilst others are unemployed (Katlin 1937; DOE 1978; 
Basnett 1978; ILO 1982; TUC 1983 and 1987; Richards 1988). Even though this Is anathema to 
U. K. unions, frequently act, at the local level, as the vehicle for the promotion and control of 
overtime (NBPI 1970; White 1980 and Curson 1986). 
The question of the attitude of individual unions to overtime is raised, and Taylor (1978) gives 
several examples. For Instance, the National Union of Mine Workers made a hard push for 
reduced working hours in 1977-78, but without success. 'The main trouble is the members' one 
senior officer stated... the lads are not supporting it'. Ken Thomas, of the Civil and Public Services 
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Association, at the 1977 TUC stated: 'thousands of our members are working overtime which, if 
we cancelled it and banned it, would create jobs'. The General and Municipal Workers Union 
argued that'overtime reduction could provide thousands of jobs, but no action was taken'. 
Indeed the inability of unions to act decisively on overtime is well illustrated by the attempt by 
unions in the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions to try to reduce overtime in 
the late 1970s. Posters and leaflets were distributed to the members to explain the evils of 
overtime and the national committee of the then AUEW made a special eff ort to drive the message 
home, but the campaign was a failure. As Taylor explained, district committees hold the real 
shopfloor power on overtime. 
As long ago as 1972, the TUC began the 'target 35' campaign for a 35 hour week although this 
campaign did not gather momentum until the late 1970s. This policy requires the 'eradication of 
systematic overtime' (TUC 1980; ILO 1982). In 1987 the Trade Union Congress carried two 
resolutions calling for: reduced working time through, among other things, 'the reduction and 
control of overtime, and the elimination of overtime other than that required for safety and 
maintenance or emergencies'. Although they hold as a proviso, the protection of those on low 
wages who rely on overtime pay (IDS 1988). 
While the TUC recognise that some overtime results from fluctuating production levels, they 
believe that a large amount of overtime is due to employers avoiding the costs of taking on extra 
workers, and that many workers are forced to work overtime to supplement Inadequate basic 
earnings (IDS 1979), although there was no analysis of such costs and this highlights a major 
research gap. The TUC had Issued a list of areas for action on overtime reduction. That general 
list was superseded in 1981 by a new three point strategy on working time and jobs (TUC 1981): 
1 Negotiations on working time and jobs; 
2 Immediate action to cut overtime; 
3 Possible legislation on working time. 
The first strategy was given top priority. Negotiators were advised to particularly question 
whether overtime has become 'systematic' or 'institutionalise', although these terms were not 
defined other than to contrast these types of overtime from those genuinely used to adjust for 
demand fluctuations. Systematic or unnecessary elements of overtime were singled out for 
special attention and other areas for consideration were: limits on overtime; Increased premium 
rates; phased overtime reduction with hourly rate increases to protect pay; use of time-off-in-lieu, 
TOIL and new shift staffing arrangements. 
The second strategy Involved immediate action to cut overtime, particularly where workers faced 
redundancies, as a means of saving jobs. It was accepted that such action would not be effective 
In situations where there was a shortage of skills. In addition, the TUC were at pains to stress that 
no action should be taken where the effect of an overtime ban would give an unacceptable 
reduction In wages, particularly where the worker was already 'low-paid', although no definition of 
'low-paid' was suggested (TUC 1981; El RR 1981). 
The third strategy was the investigation of possible legislation on working time. In this respect 
three course of action were mooted for discussion (TUC 1981): i) Immediate legal limits on 
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working hours; ii) immediate phased approach, bringing in legal limits on working hours which 
diminish progressively each year and iii) maintaining the status quo with no legal limits but an 
intensified effort to voluntarily'get to grips with excessive, unnecessary and systematic overtime'. 
There is no evidence that this TUC Initiative met with any success in reducing overtime (EIRR 
1981). The TUC and CBI had earlier joined together to find ways to reduce overtime working. In 
1979 the joint TUC and CBI working party called for the reduction of 'systematic' overtime, (which 
remains undefined), in conjunction with the introduction of new technology. The text of the 
statement was agreed in July 1980 by both sides at NEDC and was endorsed by the 1980 Trade 
Union Congress. However, the statement was subsequently rejected by the CBI's Grand Council 
(Benson and Lloyd 1983). This laissez-faire attitude highlights another great enigma of British 
industrial relations, the difficulty of identifying common goals for the benefit of all within the 
system, thus perpetuating the low wage, low productivity, poor working conditions economy 
(S pink and Brewster 1989). Subsequently, a special TUC conference, held in February 1984, 
revealed a high degree of frustration among delegates (White 1984). Basnett stated that 'unions 
still had to tackle some major problems, for example high overtime hours at a time of high 
unemployment' (TUC 1984). 
Overtime Is now regulated by Industry agreements which do not, In practice, offer effective 
controls (White 1984). At the European level, the general resolution of the General Congress of 
the ETUC reaffirmed the position they have adopted previously viz. 'reduction and eventual 
elimination of regular overtime... compensation of exceptional overtime by time off' (ETUC 1982). 
In view of the single market Initiative and the anticipated social and socio-economic reforms which 
are now mooted for the EC, (the so-called Workers' Charter), the pressure for working hours 
reforms and a more Interventionist approach from the U. K. government Is likely to grow. The TUC 
have a positive role to play In facilitating this innovation. White (1984) summed up the current 
effectiveness of the TUC's Involvement In working time issues stating 'the TUC's Initiative has so 
far failed to stimulate a national debate about the continuing problem of high overtime'. The need 
for such a debate to be promoted remains even today. While the problem for the U. K. unions 
remains that few shop stewards who value their position will deny their members the'right' to work 
overtime. 
3.4.2 Legislation of Working Hours 
This issue id subdivided into three areas: government responsibility; the European dimension and 
a resume of international regulations of working hours. These are addressed in turn. 
British governments have held an extraordinary position on the world stage since, in contrast to 
many other countries, there is little political consensus on the way the economy should be run 
(Brewster and Summers 1986). It is generally accepted that the labour market is an important 
system within the economy and that the government are responsible for the economy. It must, 
therefore, follow that the government have a role in the management of the labour market and 
therefore In setting a framework for regulation and control. Nevertheless, as Sherman (1986) 
points out, 'all European countries, with the exception of Ireland and the U. K, have statutory limits 
on the amount of overtime'. The system which operates In Britain has been referred to as 
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'voluntarism' (Evans 1979). Both employers and trade unions prefer the voluntary approach 
according to White (1984), who points out that the post-war trend in voluntarism has been towards 
an increasing degree of decentralisation. White rationalises the avoidance of legislation in this 
area as a 'matter of choice rather than of negligence by successive governments' and expresses 
the opinion that the voluntary system has actually promoted overtime working. (White 1984). 
Overtime restrictions are not generally found in the U. K, and where they are established, 
(essentially through collective agreements), they are not commonly applied in practice (White 
1984; Steele 1986). Many other countries use collective agreements to control overtime working 
and remuneration, but they do so generally within a framework of statutory legislation (ILO 1986c). 
A prominent labour lawyer in Britain, Khan-Freund, wrote: 'there is , perhaps, no major country in 
the world In which the law has played a less significant role in the shaping of (industrial) relations 
than in Great Britain' (quoted in Clegg 1976). Not only is the U. K. system informal, but as Bell 
(1983) points out, it is disposed to be unstable to some degree: 'legislative intervention has tended 
to be increasingly partisan towards the interests of either the employers or trade unions since the 
1960s, and successive governments have consequently tended to repeal their predecessors' 
labour laws and Institutions'. This is the backdrop against which governments need to consider 
legislation to limit hours of work. 
The success of the voluntary system is central to the debate and uncompromising evidence is 
provided by Rathkey (1984), who states: 'in Britain the voluntary approach to overtime reduction 
has proved to be totally unsuccessful... the TUC has struggled for years with overtime reduction, 
but has failed... the question of excessive overtime working and the implications of its reduction on 
employment creation are matters for serious investigation'. Clearly there is dissatisfaction with 
the current system, but there is no unequivocal acknowledgement of the legislative alternative, for 
the U. K., where proponents of legislation are overwhelmed by those who denigrate the 
proposition. 
It may be Interesting to review the most recent parliamentary development in the area working 
time. A Bill to cut the working week to 35 hours was raised In the Commons on May 17 1988 
(Daily Telegraph 18th May 1988). The Bill did not receive the approval of the house but the 
sponsor, Labour MP Mr Grocott, stated: 'it might surprise the House to hear that the average 
working week has Increased since 1983, because of the Increasing tendency of employers to 
require more and more overtime from people who are at work, rather than take on additional 
workers. I look to a substantial reduction in overtime as well'. 
What then is the policy of the Government? and what should be their role? The government 
themselves, through the DE argued (Employment Gazette 1978) that overtime represented a 
substantial number of full time jobs and that overtime reduction may, in spite of some difficulties, 
offer a way to 'open up more jobs for the unemployed'. They went on, ambiguously, to say: 'a 
legislative approach would be too rigid, and any action would be best obtained through voluntary 
negotiation at workplace level'. Since that time, unemployment more than trebled and is now 
double the 1978 level, while overtime has continued to rise and now stands, remarkably, 66% 
above the levels which endured when the DE made their pronouncement (see Section 2.2). 
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There was no such vacillation from the National Board for Prices and Incomes, (NBPI 1970), an 
arm of government. They were completely in opposition to the introduction of legislation for the 
control of working hours. They drew this conclusion primarily to prevent the restriction of man- 
hours available for production, and gave secondary reasons as the absence of support for 
legislation, the extension of moonlighting (dual job-holding) and the rigidity of external controls. 
As for employers, the CBI (1980) pointed out that: 'in Britain, governments, unions and employers 
have paid lip service to the need to reduce overtime but little has happened'. This analysis would 
suggest that the CBI were unhappy with the achievement under the voluntary regime and would, 
perhaps, be amenable to more formal controls. However, in a paradoxical turn of the analysis, 
the CBI set themselves firmly against any action to legislate for the control of working hours. 
They argued: 'it Is doubtful whether legislation would be effective', and concluded, deja vu, that 
what was needed was more of the'failed"joint voluntary approach by employers and unions' (CBI 
1980); notwithstanding their inability to accept the joint CBI/TUC working party initiative, (see 
Section 3.4.1). 
Surprisingly, the position of the trade unions has been remarkably similar to that of the employers, 
although there Is evidence that this position may now be changing with the current drive for a 35 
hour week. Traditionally, the U. K. unions have been reluctant to bring legislation into the sphere 
of industrial relations. However, the TUC draw a clear distinction between 'protective' legislation, 
such as for young workers, which they would promote, and 'legislation designed to inhibit trade 
union activity' which they do not support (El RR 1981; TUC 1981). In the light of the success of 
the former classification of legislation in other countries (eg France, Italy, West Germany, etc EIRR 
1978), the TUC suggested that 'legislation of this kind should be considered as a possible means 
of restricting working time and curbing overtime in the U. K. ' (EIRR 1981). 
Whybrew (1964) found 'good evidence for the effectiveness of the legislation in regulating actual 
hours of work'. He found that the Dutch were able to obtain an effective reduction of working 
hours and that the legal restrictions on hours was 'undoubtedly' an important feature of their 
success. Nevertheless, ambiguously, he formed the conclusion that such external regulation of 
hours of work would be 'quite unacceptable for Britain'. Whybrew (1968) later returned to the- 
question of legislation and again exercised the difficulties that legislation could bring. This time, 
however, he seemed to move, by inference, towards a different conclusion, although he proposed 
no formal recommendations. He gave sketch details of how a scheme of statutory regulation 
might operate and suggested a scheme whereby overtime might be progressively reduced, from 
an initial limit of 8 hours per week, to 2 hours per week, over a number of years. In conclusion, 
and rather enigmatically, he stated: 'legislation is not part of the tradition of industrial relations in 
Britain; systematic overtime certainly is... it is not often possible to legislate for efficiency but some 
form of control on overtime might involve just that'. 
Leslie (1977) stated that 'Labour markets in this country may be woefully inefficient and ineffective' 
and he advanced a rationale for restrictive legislation for systematic overtime which is used for low 
pay protection. However, he concluded that the labour market inefficiency would not necessarily 
be improved by 'interference' and he viewed with 'scepticism' the efficiency of legislation in 
general. Hanagan (1982) was less diffident, he concluded: 'in summary the government should 
make statutory provision for a ceiling on overtime of 2 hours a week for workers in production 
industries'. Curiously, White (1987), in his investigation: Working Hours, Assessing the Potential 
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for Reduction', pays careful attention to the positions of the trade unions and the employers, but 
does not directly address the role of the third of the tripartite players, the government. 
The National Economic Development Office, (NEDO), together with the DE, commissioned the 
Institute of Manpower Studies to carry out a 'major study' of changing work patterns. The 
research aims were extremely wide-ranging and reviewed working time regimes in detail. This 
study was effectively commissioned by the Government. It is therefore telling that no 
consideration was given to the interesting dynamics of the European labour market, or to the 
possibility or viability of legislative controls of any kind. This seems to offer some evidence in 
support of the claim that there appears to be a tacit tripartite alliance, between the TUC, CBI and 
Government departments, to resist the reduction of overtime (Spink and Brewster 1989). 
Similarly, Rathkey (1984) suggested that barriers to the removal of overtime are the 'conservatism 
of governments, employers and trade unions'. 
Bassett and Gapper (1988) further pointed out that 'the Thatcher Government had paid little 
attention to how people work'. They explained: 'working practices comprise one of the few areas 
of trade union and employee activity which the Government has not touched in its extensive 
labour legislation. It prefers change to be governed by company requirements in response to 
market pressures'. It may indeed be the case that non-interventionism is an appropriate policy to 
pursue. The Inference which is evident from the analysis of the literature is, however, that 
alternatives to this policy have not been properly considered, or even may have been tacitly 
suppressed. 
What then of the prospects for legislative controls, if these were shown to be helpful? There is 
mooted (IR-RR 1982) the possibility that future governments may look more favourably at 
statutory controls on working hours; but this is by no means certain even if the political 
complexion of government were to change. One might think that a socialist government would 
be more sympathetic to working time legislation. However, this was not so during the last period 
of Labour rule. Worksharing and the control of working hours was not mentioned in any of the 
TUC-Labour Party liaison committee documents from 1974, nor in Labour's Programme (1976). 
As far as working time arrangements are concerned, the fact is that, Irrespective of whether or not 
governments should Intervene, they have not. Government has largely eschewed responsibility 
for intervention in the labour market (Rathkey 1986). The general belief Is that the Thatcher 
Government would not countenance Intervention; they would resist any pressure to legislate for 
overtime limits; but as the IR-RR (1982) predict 'future Governments may not'. 
This raises the Increasingly Important dimension of European-wide legislation. In 1978, the 
European Commission instituted consultation with the Social Partners on the possibility of a 
Community instrument with regard to the restriction of overtime (ETUI 1979). The ETUC 
Secretariat subsequently asked the ETUI to compile Information concerning overtime and to 
submit an opinion on the proposals put forward by the Commission. The conclusions 
subsequently reported by the ETUI are important, particularly in view of the single market, and 
cover: overtime limits; low pay protection, overtime premia and TOIL (ETUI 1979). 
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The Council of Europe (1983) took a balanced position with regard to these findings. On one 
hand they supported the need for legislative controls to regulate the labour market and to restrict 
daily and weekly overtime within a general legal framework. On the other hand they advocated 
the strengths of decentralised negotiations. It was however, stressed that collective agreements 
could only operate effectively within a legal regulatory framework that would both prevent 
individual abuses, such as excessive hours, and promote social policies, such as unemployment 
alleviation (Council of Europe 1983). 
The European Commission (1983) promoted the view that governments have a positive rather 
than a passive role to play in the control of working time. They argued: 'although there is a 
responsibility with the social partners in this area, this does not obviate the need for governments 
to adopt a clear and positive approach to the reduction and reorganisation of working time within 
a Community framework". Indeed. a principle role of governments was seen by the EC (1983) as: 
'reviewing and where necessary changing legislative and administrative provisions' and 
particularly in the public sector, where an effective example can be set, (and, incidentally, where 
much overtime is worked In the U. K. ). This was opposed by the British Government on the 
ground that It constituted unwarranted interference In national policies. Moreover, the U. K. 
employers' organisations have also opposed the proposals (Evans and Palmer 1985). It appears 
that, of U. K. Institutions, only the TUC supported the Draft Recommendation and this clearly 
leaves the U. K. somewhat exposed, as the only member nation not to centrally control overtime. 
In the event, the Draft was not adopted (Kading 1986). 
Finally, the Council of Europe (1983) promoted a European-wide approach to legislation on 
employment matters such as the regulation of working time and the restriction of overtime 
working. This supra-national legislation concept has a wide basis of support (Sherman 1986). 
Indeed Nedzynski (1984) calls for the involvement of all Europe, not just the EC nations. 
Moving now to the third area for this Section, the regulation of overtime hours. The U. K. stands 
alone among European Industrial nations in having no statutory basis for their limitation, there 
being only a few minor exceptions (White 1984b; IDS 1988) and these are under review. The 
leading proponent of restrictions of working time over this century has been the International 
Labour Office, (ILO), (Taqi 1982) who have adopted International Labour Conventions and 
Recommendations in order to set standards and provide guidance to governments, trade unions 
and employers. The U. K. government have been reluctant to ratify these conventions; these 
have, however, exerted an important world-wide influence on national law and practice (Taqi 
1981). 
The U. K. relies almost entirely on voluntary collective agreements to regulate the length of the 
working week and the extent and remuneration of overtime. The two exceptions to this rule are: 
Wages Council orders and protective legislation. Collective agreements generally seek to control 
only basic hours and overtime premium rates, and do not usually regulate total hours. Moreover, 
when such agreements do seek to control total hours, or otherwise to limit overtime, these 
controls are not commonly applied in practice (White 1984; ILO 1986). General protective 
legislation, until recently, restrained the basic hours of work for women and young people under 
18 years old. However, the Sex Discrimination Act (1986) amended the legislation to exclude 
women from the controls. The regulations are established under the Factories Act 1961: 
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Statutory limitations, for overtime hours, covering young people aged 16 and over, are: 
10 hours maximum in any day, with an annual limit of 50 hours per year. In addition, young 
people under 18 years old can work overtime to deal with 'pressure of work' in any factory, but 
not for more than an aggregate 100 hours per year or 6 hours per week, in not more than 25 
weeks per year. 
Exemptions can be granted by the Secretary of State. Employers must notify the Factory 
inspectorate of the intention to require young people to work overtime, and obtain special 
permission (Factories Act 1961). In addition to the general legislation, there are a great number of 
specific regulations for particular Industries, relating to the hours of work of young people. 
The current British Conservative government have proposed the repeal of most of the limitations 
on the hours of work of young people (IDS 1988). 
Appendix 3-2 sets out a general outline of the working time arrangements, for various 
industrialised nations. Special provisions apply, in most countries, to give protection to 
vulnerable groups such as young workers and women. In addition, there are many exceptions to 
these general guide-lines, and the statutory maximum limits are often over-ruled by collective 
agreements. The 'Statutory Normal Weekly Hours' indicates the statutory maximum limits, the 
actual 'Normal Weekly Hours' are often much lower than these statutory maximums. 
3.4.3 The Use of Premla As a Worksharing Instrument 
Overtime premia were originally adopted purely as a compensation mechanism. However, there 
was a shift in emphasis at the turn of the century. In 1910, Higgins declared that 'there is no 
doubt that a little foresight on the part of employers prevents the necessity for much overtime, and 
the fact that they have to pay (high premia) for overtime will tend to induce such foresight' (Jones 
1981). The evolutionary development of more sophisticated and compound objectives for 
overtime premia continued until the great depression of the 1930's. At that time, premia began to 
emerge as an instrument for restricting overtime, In order to promote employment. In the U. S., 
the FLSA, fixed an overtime premium of 50% which was then a relatively high rate. The Intention 
was to discourage overtime which would, it was believed, 'encourage the hiring of more workers 
and therefore reduce unemployment' (Carr 1986). 
There is conflicting evidence as to the effectiveness of high premia as a job creation measure. In 
essence, the debate is between the alternative and irreconcilable controls of overtime 'demand' or 
'supply'. The restriction of employer 'demand', is achieved by imposing high premia, and is 
aimed at increasing the cost of overtime to the employer. This would have the side-effect of 
increasing employee 'supply-side' pressures, because it would make overtime more attractive to 
workers who, some would say, enjoy a great deal of control over how much overtime is actually 
worked,. The diametrically opposite control is that of imposing low premia which would restrict 
the 'supply-side', by making overtime less attractive to the worker. This would, however, have the 
side effect of putting greater pressures on the 'demand-side' of the equation by reducing the 
relative cost of overtime to the employer. 
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There is considerable support for the 'supply-side', (low premia), arguments, particularly as they 
relate to the worksharing theory. For example, the IR-RR (1978) concluded that increasing the 
level of premia would not itself lead to reductions in overtime working. Moreover, Hart (1984a), 
Ehrenberg (1971), and Ehrenberg and Schumann (1982), give evidence showing that higher 
premiums have at best only had a limited employment creation effect. Similarly, Hart (1987) 
concludes, from an extensive review of studies conducted in Europe and the U. S., and a review of 
the theoretical and economic considerations, that 'increasing the costs of overtime is unlikely to 
lead to employment creation'. 
This debate has long exercised academics in the U. S., where one study, by Nussbaum and Wise 
(1977), confirmed the hypotheses that an increase in overtime premia would cause a reduction in 
average annual overtime hours worked. However, a second hypotheses, that this reduction 
would result in a commensurate increase in employment, was not supported. Best (1981) reviews 
many of the American studies at length but draws no firm conclusions except to say that a 
minimum premium of 150%, (double-time-and-a-half), would be necessary to foster significant 
reduction of overtime in favour of hiring. 
Taking the supply controls (lower premia) arguments to the limit, it has been argued in the U. K. 
that one solution to the'problem of overtime' would be to abolish premium payments altogether 
(Brittan 1979). Jones (1981), also questioned the value of premium rates, particularly in the 
Australian hospitality, tourist and retail industries. It was asserted by Jones that premia have an 
adverse effect on costs. He argues that the evidence is 'conclusive' that viability is threatened by 
the payment of high premium rates and, far from creating jobs, these have harmful effects on 
employment levels. 
An even more radical suggestion (Small Business Report 1981), is that workers should be paid 
only half the normal rate during overtime hours. The Small Business Report (1988) gave evidence 
of the use of a system of negative overtime premia, giving as an example the case of a worker 
earning only 50% of the normal rate during overtime hours. The object was to discourage 
excessive overtime. Moreover, the 'rate' was calculated in a novel way, viz. the total hours, 
including overtime, were divided into the salary and 50% of this is paid for every hour of overtime 
work. Thus, over a period, the worker would earn an increasingly reduced rate, every time he 
worked an additional hour in an overtime period. This'negative premium' was designed to 
promote job creation. 
As a final example of the `supply-side' argument, a review of the job-creation potential of overtime 
reduction, was undertaken in Canada by the Ontario Ministry of Labour (Worklife Report 1987). 
This review found that job creation by increasing overtime premia was 'severely limited'. It was 
suggested that Increasing premium from 50% to 100% would actually result in the reduction of 
demand for labour due to the higher unit labour costs. 
The alternative argument, viz. 'demand-control' through higher premia, is put with equal strength. 
Garbarino (1964), in the U. S., summarised the results of a high premium policy as: 'a combination 
of more pay for those workers whose overtime is really unavoidable, a reduction of total overtime 
worked and some increase in employment'. In the U. K., the TUC favour increasing premia to 
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encourage employers to create jobs rather than use overtime (EIRR 1981; IDS 1988). However, 
this is by no means a new initiative, Whybrew (1968) reported that trade unions at the national 
level have traditionally put forward a number of proposals for reducing overtime, the most popular 
ones being an increase in all premia to double-time accompanied by an increase in basic wage 
rates. 
The ETUC (1982) agree that high premium rates are a valuable mechanism for employment 
creation. Indeed, many countries have used premia in this way, including: U. S. (Leonard 1983; 
Carr 1986); Australia (Dawkins 1985); Finland and Spain (ETUI 1982); Greece (Hart 1987) and 
Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany (Kading 1986). An analysis by the Australian 
Treasury, suggested that increases In overtime penalty rates had been an Inducement to the 
substitution of part-time labour for overtime during the period 1966 to 1979 (ILO 1985). There are 
many examples of the consideration of so called 'penalty rates'. For example, in the FRG, a 
Regional Labour Minister attempted to introduce a statutory increase of overtime premium to 
100% (Kading 1986). In the U. S., the 1964 'Economic Report of the President' again supported 
the FLSA in linking the heavy use of overtime with curtailed job opportunities. This report 
proposed legislation to Increase premia from 50%io 100%; In the event, the move was defeated 
(Carr 1986). More recently, Leonard (1983) concluded that 'double-time premium in some labour 
contracts Is doubtless a deterrent to overtime use', although this Is somewhat in contradiction of 
much of the America work on the employment eff ects of premia which Is summarised by Best 
(1981). 
Another Interesting development is the use of premia as a fund building device, on a national 
scale, In order to provide programmes for unemployment alleviation. This mechanism is used in 
Italy, where the premium rate Is set by law at 10% of basic wages and, in addition, the employer 
must pay 15% of the overtime wage into an 'employment fund' (ILO 1986). A similar system for 
overtime premla fund building was advocated in the U. S., in 1979, as an amendment to the FLSA, 
known as Conyers bill (Leonard 1983). The result of this proposal, which in the event was not 
adopted, would have been to establish a statutory overtime premium of 100%, (double-time), paid 
by the employer in the proportions of: 50% to the worker and 50% to a'Special Unemployment 
Insurance Fund'. 
Clearly, there is a fundamental dichotomy, both in the literature and reflected in practice, regarding 
the effect of overtime premla on employment. This suggests that considerable further research 
into this topic would be required in order to establish the validity of the opposing arguments. 
3.4.4 Macro-Economic Employment Implications of Overtime 
This section will deal with overtime reduction in two parts, firstly the job creation potential and 
secondly the so called leeching effect. The DE (1978) suggested that overtime reduction was one 
of the key potential areas for creating jobs through worksharing. Overtime is often represented as 
an equivalent number of full-time jobs, but there is no simple means of estimating the proportion 
of full-time-job-equivalents, (FTJEs), which would convert into new job White (1984). 
In order to set the scene for job creation it is necessary to determine the extent of overtime 
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working in the economy, viz the theoretical maximum potential FTJEs of overtime. Research 
across the world has considered this equation, including: EIRR (1980) 40,000 jobs in Ireland; Best 
(1981) 1.4 million production workers' jobs in the U. S.; Kading (1986) 1.0 million jobs in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
The three main structural bodies in the U. K. economy are the Government, TUC and CBI. The DE 
(1978) calculated: 'If all the overtime hours worked in manufacturing could be converted into full- 
time jobs this would provide enough work for all the registered unemployed in manufacturing... If 
half all hours at present worked by manual men in excess of 48 per week were instead worked by 
additional full-time workers, the unemployment register could be reduced by over 100,000'. This 
analysis revealed that manual men alone were working in excess of 1.0 million FTJEs. If overtime 
throughout the rest of the workforce were added, the overall figure would approach 1.5 million. At 
the TUC Basnett (1979) stated that: 'If we halved the amount of overtime... we could create 
250,000 jobs'; (although Basnett's interpretation of 'British Industry' appears to be limited to male 
manual workers In the manufacturing sector). The TUC were more comprehensive in their 
analysis, reporting (Labour Research 1980): 'if overtime working were eliminated... 1,300,000 new 
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jobs could be created'. For their part, the CBI (1980) calculated: 'if only half the hours of overtime 
worked by male manual workers were turned into full time jobs, theoretically half a million jobs 
could be created'. 
A clear and intriguing pattern emerges from the above analyses. Quite typical of the literature, the 
preoccupation is with male manual overtime in the manufacturing sector; thus leaving 
enigmatically out of focus, female and non-manual overtime, and the service sectors, where the 
majority of employment and employment growth pertains. Nevertheless, each claimed that 
overtime represented a significant number of FTJEs. Each, tantalisingly, suggested the possibility 
of a trade-off between overtime reduction and new jobs. Yet, each body proffered its reasons or 
excuses and took no action. For example, the DE (1978) stated that overtime reduction could 
create jobs, but as White (1984) observed: 'it (DE) did not, however, suggest steps by which 
overtime reduction is to be pursued'. More recently, White (1988) stated that: I) overtime in 
manufacturing is the equivalent of 400,000 full-time workers; ii) overtime in the service industries is 
the equivalent of more then 800,000 workers and iii) total overtime worked is equivalent to around 
1.25 million full-time jobs. He also stated that overtime 'is now both roaring back and under- 
estimated by official figures'. 
Section 2.2 supports White's observation, showing that overtime across the whole economy has 
grown to a staggering 1.5 million FTJEs. If only 15% of paid overtime hours were converted, the 
first-round worksharing effect would yield 240,000 new jobs. 
The potential implications of overtime reduction on the creation of new jobs has often been 
contemplated, but remains a question to which few answers emerge. As stated above, there is no 
simple means of converting FTJEs into new job opportunities (DE 1978; Leslie and Wise 1980; CBI 
1980). Quite the contrary, there are a number of obstacles to such a process which the DE 
(1978) Identified as: indivisibility of task; loss of flexibility; low pay protection and skill shortages. 
This analysis of 'problems' has been reviewed extensively in the literature, (e. g., IR-RR 1978; Carby 
et a/ 1981; Hanagan 1982), and appears to have been taken as definitive, but it should be more 
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critically examined. The extent to which overtime, in reality, is used for the somewhat idealistic 
purposes indicated above is a key question and has not yet been satisfactorily addressed by 
formal research. The extent to which some of these problems of overtime reduction could be 
circumnavigated by effective management at plant level or on a macro-economic scale also begs 
further investigation. 
The CBI (1980) stressed the problem that: 'getting even a limited degree of consensus (on 
worksharing) will be far from easy'; and then, with supreme irony, if not ignominity, they 
proceeded to make their prediction self full-filling (Benson and Uoyd 1983), by refusing to agree to 
their own representative's recommended joint CBI/TUC approach on the reduction of overtime 
(see Section 3.4.1). 
Labour Research (1980), on behalf of the TUC, were only slightly less ambivalent in their 
approach, suggesting overtime reduction problems such as'occupational and geographical 
mobility' and 'short-term problems of redeployment'. However, by far the most important issue 
for the TUC was, and still remains, that of overtime 'systematically worked to provide a reasonable 
income in the face of low basic wage rates' (Labour Research 1980). Unlike some within the TUC, 
Basnett (1979) was quite uncompromising, he stated: 'in 1975, Congress called for a reduction in 
overtime working. Since that date it has risen... That doesn't impress the trade unionists who 
have no job at all... If we continue to allow unlimited overtime... we will stand accused of 
hypocrisy; we will show that our real priority is self interest... Unemployment breeds misery. It 
robs people of their self respect; It fosters racialism, vandalism and violence'. 
Interestingly, many other countries have not perceived the same level of difficulties as the U. K. 
For example, the Irish Government sponsored extensive research into the scope for increasing 
employment through overtime reduction (EIRR 1980). The conclusion of the project was that up 
to 30% of overtime hours could be replaced with additional full-time jobs. Asa result, the Irish 
Government commenced legislation to restrict working time, which was considered to be the most 
effective means of achieving a reduction in overtime. 
White (1980) stated: 'to the extent that overtime is highly regular and habitual-reflecting the 
customary make-up of working time and the pay packet-the notion that it could be partly 
converted into more full-time jobs is likely to be valid. To the extent that it is variable-used for 
balancing other uncertain factors in demand and in the manufacturing process-then it may be 
more costly to reduce overtime than to reduce other forms of working time'. White goes onto 
state that overtime working is: 'doubtless a mixture of the purely customary and the truly variable' 
but he does not estimate the proportions. Clearly, the evaluation of the distribution of overtime 
across the whole economy, grouped by appropriate classification of function or type, would be a 
valuable further step in the conundrum of worksharing potential. If a significant proportion of the 
total overtime was found to be 'systematic', this would be of considerable importance to the 
debate. 
The question of worksharing generally, and overtime reduction In particular, are difficult to 
separate, as Leslie and Wise (1980) have explained. When working time is reduced by means 
such as a shorter normal working week or increased holidays, etc, there is a need to balance a 
number of possible consequential changes; for instance, hourly productivity, output demand and 
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the levels of overtime working The increase in overtime as a consequence of worksharing has 
been called the 'Leeching' Effect by the author. 
Clegg (1962), in summing up the precedents established in the late 1950s to the early 1960s, 
declared: 'we must expect as the probable result of a further reduction in working hours a further 
addition to the already monstrous problem of overtime, at least, so far as adult male workers are 
concerned'. The economy has undergone considerable change since Clegg made his prophesy, 
but it still rings true. 
It was shown above that the potential for overtime reduction to increase job opportunities is a 
question to which there is no simple answer. However, overtime is certainly one of the key issues 
of the worksharing philosophy (DE 1978; White 1980; Metcalf 1982; Calmfors and Hoel 1988). A 
major criticism of worksharing has been that it would result in 'leeching', viz. higher overtime 
rather than greater employment opportunities (CBI 1980; Blyton 1985). 
The concept of 'first' and 'second round' effects of overtime reduction was established by Spink 
and Brewster (1989). The first round effects consists of the net worksharing job gains which 
could be represented by the mathematical extrapolation of hours of overtime reduction, at as 
particular conversion rate depending on the circumstances. 
The second round effects involve more esoteric, but equally important, new-work creation, rather 
than simple worksharing aspects. These second round effects are of crucial Importance to the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the Individual business as well as the economy as a whole and 
were defined, on the macro-economic scale, as: 'reduced unit costs and Improved productivity 
and quality. Improved competitiveness and resource allocation... in turn stimulating demand for 
U. K. products and services both at home and abroad, thus giving economic growth. 
Employment prospects would consequently improve, as would the balance of payments. In so 
far as employment would Increase by both the first and second round effects of overtime 
reduction, the burden on the Exchequer would be lessened. This would give scope for further tax 
reductions (e. g., Employers' NIC) or investment which could further Improve demand and 
employment'. This second round effect, 'positive-spiral' analysis finds some support in the 
literature (Metcalf 1982; Bosworth 1983; Zachmann 1987). 
However, a contra-argument also exists, predicting that worksharing would Increase labour cost 
per unit of output, and firms would raise prices In response. This would lead to a fall in the real 
value of money wages, Involving some transfer of real Income from those at present employed to 
those at present unemployed. It would also damage British firms' competitiveness in international 
markets and could therefore harm long-term job prospects (DE 1978). This argument appears, 
curiously, to be made equally for all forms of worksharing, including that of overtime reduction, 
notwithstanding the unique premium and other cost saving. Moreover, the analyses do not take 
account of the very likely increase in hourly productivity which would result from the reduction of 
long hours (see Section 3.3.6'Overtime and Operational Performance'). 
Greis (1984) explained the Impact of worksharing on overtime thus: 'the decline In annual hours 
reduces productivity, and thereby has serious consequences for the demand for labour. Another 
disincentive to employment Is the fact that most fringe-benefits are employee based not hourly- 
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based. Thus the reduction in standard hours to an extent Induces increased overtime'. Whilst 
Greis's arguments are rational, they go only part of the way to explaining the total worksharing 
effect. It can clearly be seen from the previous section that overtime reduction itself Is an 
important worksharing mechanism. Yet overtime is doubly Important in that any other 
worksharing measure could be rendered ineffective, or worse, counter productive, if it were offset 
by overtime hours paid at premium rates. 
The proclivity for working hours reductions of any type to induce overtime working, could both rob 
the worker of the benefits of a shorter working week, and saddle the employer with an intransigent 
block of systematic overtime hours, remunerated at premium rates and embracing any 
consequential negative effects of such overtime. This analysis is by no means novel, it has long 
been recognised that increases in overtime have the potential to undermine attempts to secure the 
benefits of worksharing, (e. g., ETUI 1979; Leslie and Wise 1980; Rathkey 1984; Evans and Palmer 
1985; Bodo and Giannini 1985). 
Hanagan (1982) stated that the idea of worksharing, had been 'poorly received' In the U. K. Yet 
this is not the case In other nations where worksharing has been positively pursued by 
governments, unions and employers' alike (Ehrenberg 1971; ETUI 1979; Ginneken 1984; Kading 
1986). The European Commission and the ETUC have long considered pragmatic ways to 
promote worksharing on an international scale, thereby avoiding one of its claimed local 
difficulties, viz. the denigration of International competitiveness (ETUI 1979; Nedzynski 1984). 
Moreover, the ILO (1983) have promoted measures to prevent leeching, such as premium 
payments and hours of work restrictions. Leslie and Wise (1980) argued that the effect of an 
increase In overtime, In response to a cut In the normal working hours, could have a dramatic 
impact on the'worksharing' effectiveness of the hours cut. Indeed, the literature is almost 
unanimous on this point, the only question lies in the extent to which worksharing measures would 
leech into Increased overtime (White 1980; Calmfors and Hoel 1988). 
Many commentators argue that the reductions In normal working time in the U. K. have neither 
resulted In a reduction In the actual hours of the workers nor Increased employment; they have 
simply added to the overtime (Allen 1980; IR-RR 1982; Metcalf 1982; Rathkey 1984; Sherman 
1986). Clegg (1962) observed that the reduction in hours since the war has been used 'merely to 
increase overtime', and Fishwick (1979), in analysing the NBPI (1970) evidence on the evolution of 
working time, found that: 'for men In manual occupations most of the reduction In basic hours had 
been transferred to overtime'. More recently, the IDS (1988) stated: 'the cuts in basic working 
hours negotiated over the last ten years have been largely offset by increased overtime working'. 
A somewhat alternative view was given by Hughes (1980) who found: 'reductions in normal or 
basic hours of work do result in reductions In actual hours, and not simply in a substitution of 
overtime hours for normal hours'. The Treasury tend to support Hughes, suggesting that about 
40% of the potential loss In output following a cut in hours would be made up by additional 
overtime (Allen 1980). White (1980) conducted a survey of 400 establishments to investigate the 
potential and actual effects of reducing working time. He found that those establishments which 
had reduced working hours enjoyed 10% lower overtime levels although there is a great step 
between acknowledging an association and establishing cause and effect! Nevertheless, this 
suggested that leeching may not be the norm, and organisations which introduce lower hours find 
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ways to improve the effectiveness of working time across the board (Hill 1984). 
Finally, it is clear that some overtime has been used to substitute for the reduction in hours. The 
extent and distribution of that overtime is uncertain, but it is likely to fall within the 'systematic' 
category of overtime classification. 
3.4.5 Low Paid Worker's Earning Dependency Syndrome 
It has long been claimed that overtime is positively correlated with low pay and there is extensive 
coverage of this issue in the literature but this issue is not without controversy. A significant 
minority of commentators doubt that the association is valid, but first the evidence in support of 
the common perception will be reviewed. 
Clegg (1962) stated 'overtime working is used by workers and their employers to produce a 
weekly wage packet which is regarded as tolerable by both sides'. This was echoed by the NBPI 
(1970) who found that overtime tended to be worked more in those industries where rates of pay 
were low, stating 'low pay and the consequent low hourly earnings have been frequently cited as a 
major cause of high overtime working'. This conclusion was also reached by Buck and Shimmin 
(1959) and the Donovan Commission. More recently, Sherman (1986) agreed with the positive 
correlation, but turned cause and effect on its head, stating that'overtime is used to raise weekly 
earnings to acceptable levels... management and unions have often colluded in this, resulting in 
low basic rates'. 
The TUC, and others, unequivocally argue the case for the low-pay link. They have stated that 
many industries and individuals rely on overtime earnings (Whybrew 1968; Basnett 1978; EIRR 
1981; Hanagan 1982; TUC 1981 and 1983; IDS 1988). In the opinion of Labour Research (1980), 
the prevalence of overtime working among the lowest paid is best shown in the public sector. 
Indeed, In analysing overtime by occupation, Labour Research found that, of 56 manual worker 
agreements, half of the ten occupations where most overtime was worked, fell within the bottom 
fifth of the wage rate league, and they used this fact to support the overtime/low-pay association. 
A more detailed review of this data, however, reveals that some of the higher wage occupations, 
for Instance: electrical contractors (ninth highest wage rate) and mechanical construction (second 
highest wage rate), also worked the second and fifth highest levels of overtime respectively. 
Remarkably, this evidence was not given by Labour Research. 
Specific examples of the phenomenon are common. Fishwick and Harting (1974) found that 
maintenance workers In the motor industry had relatively low hourly rates of pay compared to 
production workers and overtime was used 'as a means of increasing earnings to an acceptable 
level'. While Blyton (1985) theorised that the link between overtime and low pay in the U. K. may 
have explanatory power in both facilitating the maintenance of low rates by employers and in the 
more general operation of the British economy, which he described as'low-wage, low 
productivity, high-overtime'. A more recent example is found in the case of a rail worker who told 
the inquiry Into the Clapham rail disaster that overtime was essential for'a reasonable standard of 
living' (Bournemouth Evening Echo 1989). 
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Considering now the alternative view, that overtime is not associated with low pay. White (1987) 
referred to the association of overtime with low-paid work in explaining one of the difficulties 
involved in overtime reduction. However, in an earlier work, White (1984) found thereto be a 
weak but positive relationship, (r= +0.23 full time male manual workers), between wages and 
overtime hours; viz. the higher the pay the higher the overtime hours. Smith and Palmer (1981), in 
reviewing the use of substantial and regular overtime to boost earnings, found no statistical 
evidence to support this hypothesis. Similarly, Carby et al (1981) found the relationship between 
overtime and low-pay to be 'un clear'. 
In fact, there Is only a superficial conflict in the literature on this issue. The apparent difficulty is in 
the use of averages for widely different groups of occupations and Industries. It is necessaryto 
disaggregate the various groups in order to establish the true and complex relationships, and it is 
important to review the motivations of both the Individual worker and organisation in order to 
avoid averaging problems. 
Although the low pay dependency syndrome is an important factor in the U. K., it is by no means 
unique to the U. K. The ETUI (1982), stated that overtime was an 'integral part of the wages of a 
considerable number of workers, notably in the U. K. and in Italy, but also in other countries'. It Is 
interesting to note that much of the literature regarding other countries denies the positive 
relationship between low-pay and overtime. However, as in the U. K, the evidence is ambiguous. 
Van Atta (1967) found in the U. S. that there was no statistically significant relationship and Fottler 
and Schaller (1975), (US), concluded: 'the finding of lower overtime acceptance among both high 
and low-wage employees and higher overtime acceptance among medium-wage employees 
Implies a forward sloping supply curve for overtime hours which reaches a maximum in the 
medium-pay category and then bends backwards as wages rise further'. Ehrenberg and 
Schumann (1982) supported this conclusion, finding that increasing premia in the US benefited 
middle and upper Income families most. Sinclair (1983) found no statistical evidence that 
overtime was associated with low pay in New Zealand. Indeed, his analysis revealed that the 
'third and fifth highest paid groups showed the second and first highest numbers of overtime 
hours worked respectively'. Similarly, in Australia (ILO 1985) higher levels of overtime were found 
to be associated with both high and low basic average earnings. 
In summing-up, there is sufficient evidence to show that overtime is positively associated with low 
pay for certain individuals and industries and for some types of occupation. The question which 
remains to be answered is the extent and distribution of this phenomenon within the economy. 
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q FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
4.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
in this section it is briefly explained how the detailed rationale of the fieldwork phase of the 
research was developed. The original research goals, discussed in Section 1, were two fold: 
>) Provide a database regarding the use and management of 
overtime across the whole U. K. economy; 
Investigate the management of overtime working and perceived 
problems regarding the Increasing use of overtime. 
Analysis of the literature confirmed these as the principal goals. In particular, the literature 
Identified a clear need to provide a comprehensive database and plainly indicated a wide degree 
of controversy and specific perceived problems. A number of research hypotheses flowed from 
the review of these problems. This led to the development of two disparate levels of approach: 
i) The general `Economy' level; 
(In order to establish the general statistical evidence) 
Ii) The Individual organisational level. 
(in order to discover the detailed nature of the processes Involved) 
These two levels clearly demanded different research paradigms. Therefore, as will be seen In 
the following section, two quite separate fieldwork methodologies were developed and the study 
became bifurcated, to merge again at the analysis stage. The above principal goals were 
developed, and three more detailed objectives emerged. These were to: 
A) Extend the general understanding and knowledge of the use of overtime, and 
specifically about the management and control of that overtime which is worked, 
covering all sizes of organisation and all sectors and regions of the economy, and to 
achieve this by means of providing a comprehensive database; 
B) Obtain answers and statistical Information regarding a range of general research 
questions, flowing from the literature review, regarding the management and use of 
overtime and its implications for the employer and the worker; 
C) Test a number of specific hypotheses, flowing from the analysis of the research 
questions, regarding the use and management of overtime. 
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These objectives are reviewed below, in turn, starting with the first and most general aim of 
establishing a database. 
4.2 DATABASE 
A number of research projects into overtime working were conducted in the manufacturing and 
production sectors following Whybrew's definitive study of 1962-63; although these have not 
comprehensively covered the Issues. There are no recent accounts of research into the use of 
overtime across the economy as a whole, or specifically in the service industries, this issue is 
addressed more fully in Section 5.3.2. The latest overtime research which was Intended to 
cover the whole economy, appears to be the NBPI (1970) survey, 'Hours of Work, Overtime and 
Shift Working'. although this work was in fact biased towards the manufacturing sector and did 
not comprehensively cover the range of overtime Issues. Also, In common with similar projects, 
the NBPI project did not provide a database on overtime and did not reveal the distribution of 
data on overtime Issues, between the major structural variables within the economy. 
White has touched on overtime In the service sector en-passant in various of his research 
projects for the Policy Studies Institute, but not specifically so. Indeed, White (1980), regarding 
his research work into shorter working time, in which overtime was a significant Issue, stated: 
'the restriction to manufacturing industry is undoubtedly the main limitation of the sample'. 
Similarly, Zachmann (1986) stated: 'It is plain that not enough statistical information and 
research are at present available on many working time and employment-related Issues, 
particularly for small enterprises and in the service sector. ' There is clearly a lack of data 
regarding the use of overtime across the whole economy and Its distribution between the major 
structural variables. 
There is plainly a need to provide comprehensive, accurate and detailed information regarding 
the use of overtime and certain overtime associated Issues, and to analyse this data by the 
structural variables. White (1984), for example, stated: 'a great deal has been made In the past 
about the differences In overtime between industries. Moreover, Whybrew (1964) based a key 
part of his Interpretation on industrial differences'. The independent variables to be adopted are 
defined in Section 5.2.2, and consist of the primary segmentation control of SIC group, and 
secondary controls of regional location and size of establishment. In addition, a substantial 
level of analysis was considered necessary in order to reveal any influences flowing from the 
amount of overtime actually worked in the establishment, the type of employee, (manual or non- 
manual), and the reasons given for the use of overtime. 
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4.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
A number of specific differences of in opinion and shortfalls in the availability of information were 
highlighted in Section 3, `Literature Review'. Analysis revealed a remarkable level of controversy 
In the literature, even allowing for the fact that the issues relate to the management sciences and 
economics, where controversy is common. Much of the conflict appears to arise from the 
interpretation of special circumstances for which generalisations are inappropriate, even though 
they may superficially seem to be valid. 
The controversy is associated with perceived problem areas for which the broadest common 
denominator appears to be the management of overtime. This confirmed the view taken from 
the outset: that the management of overtime is of central importance. Nevertheless, the range 
of problems and conflicts reveal clear gaps in the knowledge and understanding of the use of 
overtime throughout the economy. This lack of information was absolute in certain areas. For 
example, there is much assumed but almost nothing known about the use of mandatory 
overtime and overtime limits, as management control techniques, or the application of overtime 
premia across particular sectors or types of employee. 
Although broad assumptions appeared often to be made by both managers and commentators, 
these frequently reflected only common perception, and were, typically, not found in the 
literature review to be formally supported by evidence, (see Section 3). The controversies and 
research gaps, Identified in the literature review, led to the formulation of a great number of 
specific and detailed questions. (These are covered In detail in the 'Questionnaire', Appendix 5- 
1, which was used for the general survey. The 'Case Study Programme', Appendix 8-1, was 
designed to reveal the more detailed evidence of attitudes, interpretations, actual processes of 
control and consequences, which a questionnaire would not effectively reveal. ) 
These problems and research gaps were highlighted as they arose in the literature review. It 
may be helpful to group them at this point, in order to illustrate the development of the research 
questions and, flowing from these, the genesis of the hypotheses. The major areas of concern, 
viz. those areas where a need for further targeted or prospective research was required, are 
listed below In the order they arose in Section 3, Uterature Review. The major gaps in 
knowledge were Identified as: 
a) Overtime Management 
Details of systems adopted for the management and control of overtime, at both the 
corporate and plant levels and, in aggregate, for all areas of the economy; 
The use made of financial budgets for controlling overtime at plant level; 
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The use made of overtime limits, guaranteed overtime, mandatory overtime, and 
other such instruments; 
The notice given to employees of the need to work overtime; 
The corporate and plant level decision processes leading to the use of overtime. 
b) Functions of Overtime 
The reasons for overtime working at plant level and aggregated for the various 
structural variables eg. the establishment's size, sector, region, etc; 
The validity and accuracy of the reasons given by managers and the extent to which 
the commonly perceived reasons fairly represent the use made of overtime at plant 
level; 
The extent and distribution of specific functions and types of overtime such as labour 
shortages as opposed to skill shortages, etc; 
The extent to which overtime Is 'legitimate', (viz is actually needed at all for demand 
satisfaction), rather that being used by management or workers for some extraneous 
function. 
c) Local Financial Implications 
The extent and distribution of the major cost factors, within the balancing equation, 
between overtime and the alternatives; 
The character and level of financial analysis of management's overtime decision, at 
the corporate and plant levels; 
The general overall effectiveness of overtime as a means of meeting corporate 
objectives. 
d) Overtime Pay 
The levels and patterns of overtime premia, both in detail and aggregated for the 
economy as a whole; 
The effect of overtime premia on levels of overtime and on employment and job 
creation at plant level; 
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The relationship between overtime premia paid and independent variables such as 
type of worker, (manual or non-manual), size of organisation, etc. 
e) Quality of Management 
The association between the use of overtime and the 'quality of management as 
defined by the classical management model. 
0 Operational Performance 
The Impact of overtime on the productivity and quality of work, both during overtime 
and In normal hours, and particularly In the more ephemeral service Industries, where 
output measurement can be problematic; 
The level of association between overtime and absenteeism and, particularly, the 
cause and effect relationship. 
g) Systematic Overtime 
The definition, extent and distribution of systematic overtime and its significance in 
the management of overtime. 
h) Industrial Relations 
The perceptions, attitudes and actions of plant level union representatives' regarding 
the use of overtime within their organisations; 
The need to promote a more vigorous and critical debate on the place of overtime In 
the changing U. K. economy, and the effects of overtime on the U. K. labour market. 
i) Employee Attitudes, Motivations and Manipulation 
Actual workers' attitudes and motivations; 
The extent and degree to which worker manipulation, to secure or maintain overtime 
opportunities, takes place. 
j) Employee Welfare 
The Impact of overtime on workers' quality of working life, general quality of life and 
health and safety factors. 
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k) The impact of overtime on the individual worker's financial position and the 
association of overtime with low pay at the level of the individual worker. 
Thus the literature review led to the development of a range of specific, though to a considerable 
degree inter-related, research questions which offered the opportunity for research. These 
questions are given below: 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What overall strategies are adopted for the management of overtime and 
what are the pragmatic consequences of overtime working in terms of 
corporate objective achievement and employment? 
2 What types of management and control techniques are applied to the use of 
overtime, and what are their distributions across the economy? 
3 Are managers aware of the range of alternatives to overtime working and are 
these fully and properly considered? 
4 Why do employers schedule overtime, and are the reasons for overtime as 
suggested by managers in the questionnaires and initial interviews, 
accurate? 
5 Is overtime a more cost-effective option? 
6 What are the patterns and levels of overtime premia and their effects on 
levels of overtime? 
7 What use is made of Time Off In Ueu? 
8 How extensive Is unpaid overtime, what perceptions are held about it and 
why Is lt worked? 
9 Does absenteeism cause overtime, or is it the other way around? 
10 To what extent is overtime systematic, and what are the patterns of overtime 
working? 
11 What are the effects of paying overtime rates to supervisors and managers? 
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12 What attitudes are generally held about overtime by the workforce? 
13 Do the workforce exercise any control or manipulation of overtime working, 
or is overtime totally in the control of managers? 
14 is employee welfare affected by overtime working? 
15 What are the unions doing about overtime at the local level? 
16 Is overtime associated with good or poor management? 
17 Is overtime associated with low pay at the level of the individual worker. 
The methods of resolution of these questions is a matter for the methodology section of this 
thesis. However, a general survey approach is clearly necessary. There would also be great 
value In pursuing a case study technique, in order to obtain the more detailed evidence which 
would be needed to provide explanations for the various phenomena. These questions, which 
were developed from the literature review, themselves led to the development of a set of 
research hypotheses. 
4.3 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Consideration has been given above to the collection of a wide range of data and the analysis of 
that data, in'order to reveal distribution patterns and to investigate the specific research 
questions. It was also considered helpful to attempt to test a number of specific hypotheses, 
which relate generally to the research questions, these are set out below: 
Ht The use of overtime is a function of the following variables: 
a) SIC group; 
b) Regional location; 
c) Size of establishment; 
d) Amount of overtime worked by the organisation; 
e) Type of employee, manual or non-manual; 
H2 The management of overtime is a function of the following variables: 
a) SIC group; 
b) Regional location; 
c) Size of establishment; 
d) Amount of overtime worked by the organisation; 
e) Type of employee, manual or non-manual; 
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H3 The use of overtime promotes 'operational flexibility; 
'Operational flexibility' Is defined, for the purposes of this thesis 
as: the ability to respond effectively to satisfy short-term and un- 
anticipated, day-to-day needs; 
H4 The use of overtime promotes 'corporate flexibility'; 
'Corporate flexibility': the ability of an organisation to respond 
efficiently to medium and longer term changes in the demand for 
labour, about which there is uncertainty in the short term. 
H5 Overtime working is a more cost-effective means of meeting demand 
than the potential alternatives; 
H6 The use of overtime is not associated with poor management practice; 
H7 Workers depend on overtime pay to meet their fixed financial 
commitments. 
The alms of this project were thought to be ambitious given the circumstances. The attempt to 
review the literature, without the limitations of national barriers or particular Issues, and the 
intention to cover, for the first time, the whole of the U. K. economy with the survey, were both 
examples of the risk-strategy which was consciously adopted. However, It Is commonly 
understood that research must take risks; in this project the risks were understood and 
controlled so far as was possible. The justification for this strategy, therefore, does not lie in the 
results, or in the'perfection' of hindsight, but in weighing the judgement in the context of the 
development stage. 
The relationship between the specific questions and the hypotheses Is not at all straight forward, 
some hypotheses being associated with many of the questions, others being more specifically 
targeted. These relationships are defined in Section 9, 'Further Analyses' since they developed 
and became clearer as the research progressed and it would have been unduely restrictive to 
define arbitrary linkages before the feildwork was undertaken. It was plain from the outset that 
there would be no definitive, simple test of the hypotheses, and that those conclusions which did 
emerge, would flow from a complex analysis of many variables. 
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5 METHODOLOGY 
5.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
It Is the use of scientific method which confers legitimacy on management research and hence a 
central question over every research project concerns the methodology which has been adopted. 
In particular, the methodology must be appropriate with regard to the epistemological issues and 
the research objectives. 
One of the original motivations for this particular research project, and one of the key research 
objectives, was to re-establish and further the debate on the potential employment effects of 
overtime reduction within the U. K. labour market. In order to achieve this objective, the study 
would clearly need to embrace the whole of the economy, a daunting but nevertheless 
unavoidable requirement. This was the starting point for consideration of the project design. 
It was equally clear that, In order to properly test the hypotheses, it would be necessary to gather 
empirical Information on a number of levels. First, it was necessary to review the general working 
time trends, both within the economy as a whole, and by specific sectors and areas (White 1984). 
Secondly, it was important to establish, across the whole economy, fundamental, detailed and 
contemporary, Information about the use, characteristics and nature of overtime In general. The 
only effective means of doing this was, In the circumstances, the mailed questionnaire (Cragg 
1987). Finally, there was a requirement to establish the underlying reasons for, and 
circumstances of, the various working time issues. This Involved a study of the behaviour of 
managers and workers at plant level and was best conducted through a series of case studies 
(C. Smith 1988) which would, obviously, be limited In scope by the resources and time available. 
The strategy adopted for this research was, therefore, that of using more than one methodology in 
order to resolve the research problems, collect empirical data and test the hypotheses. This 
involved the powerful blend of all the three basic methodologies which traditionally have been 
adopted for research Into working time Issues, viz: 
Analysis of the available statistical evidence and literature; 
Survey data collection and analysis; 
Case studies conducted at plant level. 
This study was therefore structured to cover different levels of the whole economy using this three- 
part methodology and it appeared novel in two fundamental respects, viz: I) the use of all three 
methodologies in the one study of overtime working; and ii) the survey section was designed to 
precede the case studies rather than to follow them. 
The justification and design of each of the methodologies Is presented later In this Section. 
However, the strength of adopting all three methodologies for this project lies in each one 
supporting and taking further the findings of the preceding research, thus giving an additional 
Input Into understanding the overtime phenomena. It is the validity, comprehensiveness and 
conduct of each which is drawn upon but the analysis uses the power and synergy of all three 
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levels together. 
The rationale for timing the survey phase to precede the case studies rested primarily on four 
factors: 
The detailed and extensive experience of the researcher regarding the use of overtime 
within the U. K economy, to a great extent reduced the need for the usual plant level 
familiarisation, during the Initial stages of the research; 
There was a need to validate the use, at face value, of the survey responses in this 
particular area of research, where there is a substantial risk that the response to questions 
could be defensive rather than objective (see, for instance, Fishwick 1979); 
it was considered that the general survey would reveal specific areas of concern for more 
detailed checking and research, therefore the earlier survey could be used to aid the 
design and conduct of the case study phase of the research; 
There was a need to identify suitable target organisations for the case study phase. 
It was thus hoped that the adopted tripartite methodology would lead to a powerful analysis 
supporting strong conclusions and, at a later stage, recommendations. 
5.2 QUESTIONNAIRE BASED SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
5.2.1 Selection of the Questionnaire Based Survey 
Approach as a Research Method 
industrial relations research has traditionally been conducted through the use of the Inductive 
case study (Beaumont 1987). However, from the 1970s, increasing use has been made of the 
survey Instrument In this particular field of study (Brown 1981; Marsh 1982; Daniel and Millward 
1983; Millward and Stevens 1986). Industrial researchers and academics now extensively use the 
mailed survey as an efficient data collection instrument (Jobber et at 1986) which, according to 
Brudvold and Comer (1988), continues to be an important primary field work technique. 
Research In the area of human resource management is particularly suited to the use of surveys 
according to Gallup (1988), although the predictability of Gallup's comment and their vested 
Interest are obvious. A survey conducted by Gallup (1988) found that 93% of the 429 responding 
human resources directors, believed employee research to be useful. Indeed, the use of the 
questionnaire as a survey Instrument for strategic human resource audit, Is growing rapidly. 
Examples of the use of questionnaire based surveys Into specific working time Issues Include the 
government sponsored study of 'Hours of Work, Overtime and Shiftworking' (NBPI 1970); various 
surveys Into working time In the manufacturing industries conducted by the Policy Studies 
Institute (11Vhite 1980,1981,1982; White and Ghobadian 1984); the study of employee willingness 
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to work overtime In the U. S. A. (Holtman 1980); the University College Galway study into the job 
creation potential of overtime reduction in Ireland (EIRR 1980) and the study of annual hours 
agreements (Desmonds and Vidal-Hall 1987). 
An assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the mailed questionnaire based survey 
technique is given by Kane (1984) who concluded that this methodology was wholly appropriate 
for research problems such as the collection of data on, and study of, working time issues. It was 
therefore decided that the survey method, based upon a questionnaire administered by mail, was 
the most effective means of collecting the bulk factual empirical data regarding the use and 
characteristics of overtime, across the whole economy. 
5.2.2 The Sample Frame and Sampling Procedure 
The main object of the survey phase of the research was to be able to generalise to the entire 
population. Sampling is the systematic means of choosing a group that is small enough to be 
convenient for data collection and yet large enough to be representative of the population (Nelson 
1988). There Is no set of rules that will cover every sampling problem and the researcher must be 
prepared to use his or her ingenuity In devising procedures that will provide reasonably unbiased 
data from a reasonable expenditure of time and effort (Hammond and McCullagh 1980). 
It was decided, as explained earlier, that the population to be surveyed should comprise of all 
establishments in all sectors of the economy with the exception of certain areas of public 
administration and defence, viz: SIC 0 to 9 1980: sectors 91-3 and 96. These areas were 
specifically excluded primarily because the concept of overtime was, within these areas, 
inconsistent with that which generally endured within the rest of the economy. 
The choice of sampling frame database to be used presented the difficult problem of achieving 
both pragmatic and technical utility. In the event the database adopted was the commercially 
available Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) database of active operating establishments which comprised 
415,000 establishments drawn from the 1.8 million records within the main D&B database. This 
database was the largest, most comprehensive and up-to-date, found to be available. Moreover, 
the database's profile exhibited the closest fit to that of the actual population segmentation 
controls which were chosen, see below. In addition, the D&B database enabled the necessary 
sampling procedures and selection criteria to be adopted. 
The theoretical survey sample size was taken as 1000. This represented a large sample relative to 
those which have been undertaken by other researchers in the Investigation of working time 
issues. For example, the 'Hours Of Work' surveys of 1000 and 2000 (NBPI 1970); the 
Department Of Employment 'Working Time' survey yielding 281 responses (White 1982); the 
'Extra Hours' survey of 232 (Kats and Goldberg 1982) and the 'Overtime' survey of 131 firms 
(Brennan et a/ 1982). Nevertheless, the Intention was to cover a weighted distribution of the 
whole economy, based primarily on SIC groupings, some of which are very small relative to 
others. This sample size was, therefore, In pure statistical terms, rather small and thus could 
represent a theoretical limitation on the study. The sample size was however pragmatically 
limited by resource and cost Implications on this piece of individual research. Moreover, the 
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effect of the small size of the sample was predicted to have little practical effect other than to 
reduce the statistical significance of some of the findings. The philosophy of 'quantity versus 
quality recognises that a large sample size does not necessarily yield more information (Madut 
1985). 
Having decided upon the sampling frame and the sample size, it was necessary to ensure that an 
appropriate sampling procedure was adopted in order to eliminate bias and to facilitate the 
subsequent control and analysis of the response. This was particularly important since it was 
decided, as a matter of policy, that the sample would not be weighted towards any particular 
levels or characteristics of overtime as determined by previous research or published statistics. 
Thus the survey was designed to yield a comprehensive and unbiased review of the whole 
economy with respect to the increasingly important overtime working issues. 
A stratified sampling procedure was adopted in order to tightly control the sample, and therefore 
the response, using the overall population shape. This was achieved by detailing as the primary 
sample fraction control, a key independent variable and, in addition, a number of secondary 
independent variables. This key variable was that of the sector of the establishment by primary 
SIC group. This structural variable is widely accepted as the most important with respect to 
overtime working practices (Whybrew 1964; White 1984). 
The secondary independent variables were taken as the geographical region within which the 
establishment was located and the size of the establishment, defined as the total number of 
people employed at, or directly controlled from, the particular site being surveyed. The regions 
were taken as the 11 administrative geographical areas Into which the country is divided for 
research of this nature (White 1984). It was found by Whybrew (1968) that the regional patterns 
of overtime working could not be reduced to differences in their industrial structure viz. the 
number of female or part-time workers or the occupations of workers. There was no specific 
evidence to support the assertion that size of establishment would be a factor in determining 
overtime phenomenon. It was the researcher's own experience which suggested that it would be 
prudent to include this elemental control. The researcher, in particular, suspected that the 
Important management and control systems for overtime might be to some degree a function of 
size of establishment. Thus it was one of the objectives of the research to discover the 
relationships if any between size and the use of overtime, by particular industries. The definition 
of size of establishment was problematic with apparently no definitive option available. In the 
circumstances, the researcher's Intuition and the classifications used in the Census of 
Employment units: Size Analysis (Department of Employment, Statistics Division 1985), were 
combined as the basis for the size classifications. 
Other independent variables were considered for use in the sample segmentation controls, 
Including: occupation of worker, gender of worker, ethnic groupings, type of worker: manual or 
non-manual, degree of unionisation, etc. These were, in the event, all disregarded due to the 
practical difficulty involved In controlling a national sample based on these. 
Thus the population was divided into sub-sets of SIC groupings and, effectively, separate samples 
were drawn from each. This was an important facet of the overall methodological strategy, since 
the population is clearly made up of distinct sub-populations of different sizes and characteristics. 
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For this reason it was decided that no data weighting techniques would be applied subsequent to 
sampling and any significant mismatch in the response from the various sub-populations would be 
controlled by additional and selective application of follow-up response inducement techniques or 
additional sampling. Thus the integrity of the data could be maintained across a very large 
population of distinct sub-groups. The segmentation control characteristics, for both the 
population and the response, are given as Table 6.1 in Section 6, Analysis of Survey Response. 
The sampling procedure adopted was that of random sampling as defined by Alder and Roessler 
(1964). This procedure was applied within the pre-specified percentage sample fraction controls 
of SIC groupings, geographical area and size of establishment. 
5.2.3 Questionnaire Design 
industrial relations and management surveys generally have two major features In common. First 
the questions have been essentially factual in nature and, secondly, they have sought to obtain the 
relevant Information from a single respondent In each organisation (Beaumont 1986). This was 
the starting point for the design of the questionnaire for the collection of empirical data on the use 
and characteristics of overtime working across the U. K. economy. The specific objectives of the 
questionnaire were, across the whole U. K. economy, to: 
Assist in testing the research hypotheses; 
Collect the most comprehensive set of data possible on the use and characteristics of 
overtime working and, in so doing, to support, update and develop the literature in this 
area; 
Discover the extent and methods of plant level controls and management systems for 
overtime working; 
Investigate the potential employment effects of current and anticipated overtime levels; 
Investigate worker's and manager's attitudes and perceptions with respect to a number of 
overtime related issues; 
Identify specific organisations or areas for the case study phase of this research project. 
The target respondent for the questionnaire was defined as the person In the establishment who 
was closest to the overall direct management and control of overtime working. The questionnaire 
layout and content design was based essentially upon the Dillman Total Design Method (Cragg 
1987) and the work by Tull and Hawkins (1980). The meaning of 'don't know responses have 
potentially Important ramifications in conducting data analysis and interpreting results (Durand 
and Lambert 1988). Particular emphasis was therefore placed on the item phrasing and the 
sampling plan for the questionnaire, thereby minimising the possibility of such responses (Francis 
and Busch 1975; Faulkenberry and Mason 1978; Presser and Schuman 1980). 
93 
A'Questionnaire Logic Flow Chart' was developed in order to ensure that the questions were 
correctly structured, and that they covered, without omission or overlap, the necessary areas to 
test the hypotheses, achieve the questionnaire objectives and to secure the 'Perceived Research 
Outcomes'. Six basic sections comprised the questionnaire, these being: 
1 General Information; 
2 Human Resource Management Details; 
3 Overtime Statistics; 
4 Overtime Management Systems; 
5 Overtime and Employment; 
6 Attitude and Perception on Broad Overtime Related Issues. 
The questionnaire, which is exhibited as Appendix 5-1, was extensively pre-piloted at all levels and 
within the key sectors of it's application. Maximum use was made of closed - multiple choice 
questions, both for ease of completion by the respondents and for ease of the researcher's data 
capture and analysis. The majority of responses were designed using 'Likert' scales, being firmly 
anchored at each end of their range and Including a neutral position. All questions were pre- 
coded for analysis using the SPSSx (Statistical Package For Social Scientists) systems. 
5.2.4 Survey Procedure and Response Control 
A number of experimental studies have revealed factors which can be used to Increase both the 
quality and volume of responses and these works were reviewed and synthesised by Jobber et al 
(1986) and further developed by Andrews (1987). In addition, Yu and Cooper (1983) conducted 
research Into Identifying significant response facilitators and Bruvold and Comer (1988) published 
a comprehensive review of research Into response Inducement techniques. The adopted design 
and follow-up procedures took full account of the research Into these techniques and Included: 
Pre-notification where possible; 
Personalisation of address and covering letters; 
An altruistic appeal; 
Guarantied anonymity and confidentiality; 
Piloting; 
Closed question design and questionnaire structuring; 
Incentives for those returning the questionnaire; 
Careful control of the physical design of all the media; 
Follow-up telephone calls and letters; 
Careful control of the actual postal activity; etc. 
It was necessary to check for the reliability of results and the key instrument which was adopted 
for this purpose was the use of previous research and published statistics as a check on the 
results following the Initial analysis stage. In particular, both temporal and situational stability 
were to be established. The predictive and internal validity of the instrument were also Intended 
to be established using the comparison with previous research findings. 
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Checking the predictive validity was of particular importance in view of the a-priori knowledge 
concerning the possibility of defensive survey responses. Rosenberg (1969) Identified 'evaluation 
apprehension' as a possible source of bias, the most potent effect of such bias being towards the 
socially or professionally acceptable response. The tendency to present oneself in a perceived 
favourable light when answering evaluative questions, as was necessarily the case with this 
questionnaire, clearly exists. Moreover, a number, albeit small, of the survey questions 
unavoidably involved subjective or perceptual based concepts such as employee attitudes to 
overtime. Accordingly, it was recognised from the outset that these measures were not amenable 
to scientific measurement and that substantial controls would be needed to ensure that selective 
perception by individuals did not bring undue bias Into the results (Stagner and Rosen 1965). It 
was therefore decide that the predictive validity, (accuracy and lack of bias), of the sample would 
be further checked by Including a number of the surveyed establishments within the case study 
programme, and reporting In the analysis of the case studies, on the validity of the earlier 
questionnaire responses. 
6,3 CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
5.3.1 Selection of the Case Study Approach as a Research Method 
The case study has been the research Instrument which has traditionally characterised Industrial 
relations research in Britain (Cappelli 1985; Beaumont 1987). The aim of the case study phase of V 
the research was to discover more detailed Information in support or explanation of the survey 
results and In support of the specific research questions and hypotheses. The methodology 
adopted for this phase of the research needed to be systematic and rigorous, but not so restrictive 
as to obscure or distort the Investigation of the real processes of overtime working. Therefore a 
pragmatic and flexible approach was adopted using a case study programme within a semi- 
structured regime. 
The research questions and hypotheses which this research project set out to test were 
essentially focused on the behaviour of managers and employees to that the key decisions with 
regard to overtime working are largely judgementally rather than quantitatively based. Indeed, 
culture is seen to play a significant role in the use of overtime (Riso 1987). It is therefore wholly 
appropriate that the detailed investigation of these behavioural phenomena is based on a 
qualitative case study approach. The basic premise which was adopted was that of 
behaviourism, viz. that all human actions admit of analysis into stimulus and response and, given 
adequate knowledge, such actions can be understood, predicted and influenced. 
An assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the case study method, which highlights ft's 
potential in the vital role of theory building, led Smit (1988) to conclude that this method has 
much to commend it to management researchers. There is, however, some debate about the use 
of qualitative methods in the study of management science (Dainty 1983). Science creates order S 
makes sense of facts and finds patterns or regularities; the use of qualitative methods in the 
scientific process is not universally held to be 'necessarily' valid. Indeed, the -principle criticism of 
the case study approach in research is that it is unrepresentative (McClintock et al 1979; Jauch et 
al 1980). Qualitative research is accepted for exploratory studies but, according to Bonoma 
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(1985), quantification is felt necessary in order to establish the validity of any findings. 
Science enables theories to be built through a process of systematic observation, description, 
explanation and prediction (Smith 1988). This begs the question: what place does the case study 
method hold in the scientific research process? Concern about the representativeness of case 
studies is readily acknowledged in this thesis. However, as Smith stated: 'representativeness is 
irrelevant for many research purposes, particularly when the distinction is made between logical 
and statistical inference. The validity of explanations or theory derived from case studies depends 
on the logic of the analysis and acknowledgement of ceteris paribus conditions, not on how 
typical the cases may be. ' 
Mitchell (1983) also presents powerful arguments in favour of the use of the case study method for 
sociological analysis such as the investigation of overtime phenomena. He states: 'The validity of 
the extrapolation depends not on the typicality or representativeness of the case, but upon the 
cogency of the theoretical reasoning'. Moreover, Worsley et al (1970) stated: 'The general 
validity of the analysis does not depend on whether the case being analysed is representative of 
other cases of this kind, but rather upon the plausibility of the logic of the analysis. ' 
Particular care was therefore taken in this research project to ensure that the detailed case study 
methodology enabled cause and effect to be properly distinguished thus enabling the theory 
building to be structured rigorously. 
The National Board For Prices and Incomes Report (1970) made it clear that decisions about 
actual hours of work are normally taken in Individual plants. Therefore any examination of hours 
of work, in greater depth, would need to be conducted at workplace level by Interview of the 
actual decision making Individuals and the workers themselves, particularly where they can 
directly Influence their hours of work, as appears to be the case with overtime. Riso (1987) found 
that the case study approach was the most effective way to Investigate overtime working within 
the U. S. Department of Interior. Specifically, he found that'on-site managers know how to reduce 
overtime costs better than anyone at the departmental level' even though it Is at the department 
level that policy decisions regarding working time issues are most often taken. 
it Is plain from a review of research In the area of human resource management, both specifically 
into overtime working and more generally, that the case study method is widely accepted. Case .l 
studies are often supplemented by analysis of either published statistics or surveys, administer 
by questionnaire, or as in this research project, by both of these. Whybrew (1968), for Instance, 
used case studies as the key methodological tool for his definitive work on overtime. Moreover, 
the Institute of Manpower Studies (1988) in their research into employer attitudes on job-sharing 
and job-splitting, used case studies as did Marchington (1988) in his review of management issues 
on working time. 
Other researchers In the management sciences and in the Investigation of working time issues 
who have adopted the case study method Include: Katlin (1937); IDS (1979); White (1980), 
(1984a) and (1984c); The Industrial Society (1981); Brennan et al (1985); BIM (1985); Curson 
(1986) and Summers et al (1987). Accepted management research practice, is thus seen to 
support the use of the case study approach. 
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Finally, in support of the case study method, it cannot be denied that the qualitative approach in 
management research brings the researcher closer to the phenomena under investigation. The 
ethnographic approach was felt essential for the discovery of the actual overtime decision process 
keys and the motivations of the key subjects who are involved in the use of overtime. 
One of the a priori conditions was thought to be the possibility of defensiveness on the part of the 
managers responsible for the scheduling of overtime. In addition, there was a possibility that 
overtime workers may feel they could endanger that overtime which they currently enjoyed, by 
exposing it to the researcher as in some way inappropriate for the organisation. These risks were 
carefully controlled by design of a semi-structured interview regime and by the sensitive 
application of ethnographic research techniques. 
Notwithstanding the above critique, the detailed case study methodology was designed to ensure 
that the researcher did not get too close to the subject and thus lose objectivity. The 
achievement of this difficult balance was carefully addressed. 
5.3.2 The Rationale For Selection of a Specific Sector 
For Case Study Based Research 
It was clear from the analysis of the survey data, section 6, that further research would help to 
deepen the understanding of specific overtime working phenomena. In order to secure the best 
research result, with the available resources, it was essential to target a particular sector. It would 
have been too great a task, within this research project, to attempt to conduct the detailed case 
studies across the whole economy, although this restriction Is readily acknowledged as a 
limitation on the value of research. The question which therefore needed to be answered was: 
'Which sector and which particularly types of organisation should be addressed? ' This question 
was pivotal to the case study element of the research. 
It is widely accepted that Whybrew's monograph (1968), 'Overtime Working In Britain', Is the 
definitive contribution to the understanding of overtime working in Britain. Whybrew based a key 
part of his Interpretation of overtime working on industrial (sectoral) differences and this analysis 
has to some extent been supported and developed by subsequent research. For Instance, White 
(1982) stated: 'the differences between the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors in 
overtime working are almost wholly compositional: they result from the differing proportions of the 
sexes and of the manual and non-manual occupations in the two sectors. ' Although White (1984) 
qualified this stating: 'Among manual men, overtime was actually slightly higher on average In the 
non-manufacturing industries than the manufacturing Industries'. 
White (1984), whose work for the Policy Studies Institute has done much in recent years to 
advance the understanding of working time Issues, stated: 'We have pointed on several 
occasions to a relative lack of detailed Information concerning the service sector.... it certainly 
seems that too little attention has been paid to the question of overtime In service industries In the 
past. The importance of giving greater attention to services is Increased by consideration of the 
growing importance of this sector in the make-up of total employment... There is also the need for 
detailed examination of the use of overtime In service industries, to examine the scope for 
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alternative patterns of working. ' 
White made these unequivocal observations in the light of an increase in service sector 
employment from 12.2 million in 1975, representing 55% of total employment, to 13.1 million In 
1983. Thus when he made these observations, service sector employment represented 64% of 
total employment. In fact, service sector employment has continued to increase and now stands 
at 15.4 million, representing over 69% of total employment which stands at 22,233 million (DOE 
1989C). In the light of these developments it is submitted that the importance of the service 
sector Is now even greater than when White made his comments. 
It is clear that recent employment trends have seen service industry employment increasing while 
employment in the manufacturing and production industries continues to decline (DOE 1988A). 
Furthermore, this trend is likely to continue under the influence of the increased substitution of 
capital for labour in the non-service industries and this is happening on an international scale. 
Freedman (1983), for instance, stated: 'there is little or no question that... Industrial societies are 
experiencing a continuing decline in the share of employment accounted for by manufacturing. ' 
Moreover, In at least some of the service industries, there Is every likelihood that employment will 
remain buoyant (Freedman 1983). A specific example of this is the British tourist industry which is 
rapidly expanding as a provider of wealth and jobs (DOE 1989A). An overall estimate of the 
anticipated growth in the civilian labour force in Great Britain Is given by the Department of 
Employment as an Increase from 27.2 to 28.1 million from 1987 to 1995 (DOE 1988A). The 
greatest proportion of this Increase, It Is predicted, will occur in the female work force, within the 
service sector. The labour market share taken by females workers has risen steadily from 37% in 
1971 to 42% In 1987, and Is predicted to rise further to 44% in 1995, (DOE 1988). These additional 
female workers will predominantly take employment in the service industries. 
White (1988) stated: 'Overtime... Is now both roaring back and under-estimated by official figures 
which measure only manufacturing and ignore what is happening in the service Industries ...... We 
calculate: Overtime In manufacturing is the equivalent of 400,000 full time workers; Overtime In 
the service industries Is the equivalent of more than 800,000 workers. ' This supports White's 
previous findings, (1984) where he stated: 'It seems highly probable that actual overtime working 
by non-manual workers is under-estimated by the formal forms of overtime working and that the 
difference In overtime working between male manual and non-manual employees in this respect Is 
accordingly overstated. ' 
From the survey of the UK economy as a whole, reported in section 6 of this thesis, it is clear that 
there is a greater proportion of non-manual workers in the service industries than in other sectors. 
The New Earnings Survey (1988) (tables 86 & 87, Analysis By Occupation) support this 
conclusion. It has also been reported (White 1984) that the incidence of unpaid overtime Is by far 
the greatest among non-manual workers who tend to be employed in the service sector. 
Therefore the incidence of unpaid overtime in the service industries is likely to be different from 
that found in other sectors. There are also compositional differences between the sectors in that 
there are greater proportions of female workers in the service sectors (White 1984; DOE 1988A; 
New Earnings Survey 1988). 
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Clearly the changing working patterns within the service sector will, potentially, have an important 
impact upon the structure of working time, including overtime practices. It is equally clear that the 
service sector will have an important role to play in the U. K. 's future labour market, probably the 
key role. 
Following Whybrew's definitive study of 1962-63, a number of overtime working research projects 
have been conducted in the manufacturing and production sectors. There are, However, few 
recent accounts of research overtime activity specifically in the service industries, or indeed, for 
the economy as a whole (Section 4.1, q. v. ). The latest major research work covering overtime in 
the service sector appears to have been the NBPI Report (1970): 'Hours Of Work, Overtime and 
Shift working', which was intended to cover the whole economy. However, even this work was 
somewhat biased towards manufacturing and did not attempt to embrace overtime working in a 
comprehensive manner. 
It was clear, therefore, that It would be of Interest to conduct detailed research specifically aimed 
to discover more information about overtime within the service sector, and, particularly, to Include 
the very small organisations within this analysis. The decision was taken, therefore, to focus 
detailed research In areas of the service Industries, SIC (1980) 6 to 9; and to conduct this 
research by means of a series of separate case studies. 
In summary, the key reasons for selecting areas of the service industries for detailed research 
were: 
i) An apparent lack of previous research in this area; 
ii) The growing relative Importance of this area in the employment of people within the UK 
labour market; 
Iii) The opportunity to test the research questions and hypotheses specifically In this 
previously neglected area; 
iv) The opportunity to address and discover new information on a number of potentially 
interesting overtime issues which may Involve specific issues in the service sector; eg. 
unpaid overtime; the use of overtime to support otherwise inadequate payment 
policies and structures. 
5.3.3 Objectives of the Case Study Programme 
The general objective of the case studies was to investigate overtime working within certain areas 
of the service sector, viz. SIC (1980) 6 to 9, and therefore to increase the knowledge and 
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understanding of overtime, particularly with respect to it's use, remuneration, controls, 
employment effects and the attitudes which are held towards it. 
In particular, the case study phase of the research was designed to: 
* Test the research questions and hypotheses; 
* Provide a detailed interpretation of specific areas of the survey results; 
* Discover up-to-date and detailed information regarding overtime working within 
specific areas of the service industries. 
The key practical question was: 'What now maintains the use of overtime in the service sector 
from the employer's viewpoint? ' 
In order to provide answers to these questions, and therefore to meet the objectives of the case 
study phase of the research, it was necessary to investigate the potential and actual effects of 
changes in the structure of working time in the economy and, in particular, change in overtime 
working practices. Care was taken, therefore, to investigate and understand the present context 
of the overtime, or the alternatives to overtime which had been adopted, and the rationale for the 
pre-existing working time arrangements, both formal and informal, within those organisations 
under investigation. 
For each of the hypotheses and research questions there was a predetermined set of perceived 
possible outcomes and these helped to guide the investigations without establishing barriers to 
the discovery of the real process and motivations. In addition, a more obvious and pragmatic 
review was necessary in order to cover the following Issues: the 'real' reasons for the overtime; the 
analysis of potential alternatives; a review of historical working time and pay statistics; a demand 
analysis; etc. It was clear that this would involve the field worker In actual point of decision, real 
time Investigation into, for instance: Why and how is 'this manager' making this particular decision 
at this juncture? How will this decision affect the worker and the organisation? How is the 
decision Implemented and controlled? Does the decision actually deliver the required result? 
5.3.4 The Overtime Management Process Model 
Any study of the management of working time must take account of the broader context within 
which working time structures operate, (Pettigrew 1985A). A model was developed to illustrate 
the process for the organisation of working time and, In particular, overtime, within the context of 
the whole organisation. This model, which is given as Appendix 5-2, represents a synthesis of the 
literature on the process of corporate strategy with regard to working time (Pettigrew 1988). A 
number of extra-organisational features represent the exogenous context of change. These 
Include the social and economic climate; technological development; the local labour market; 
external employer and employee organisation policies and the competitive environment or, for a 
public body, the need to perform to certain targets. These factors influence the demand and 
supply Issues for the structure of working time. 
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These external forces are mediated by a second, endogenous context which comprises the 
structure of the firm, its culture, politics, strategy, performance requirements, operational 
technology and its reward systems. Within this 'internal context' the rules for the overtime 
decision at the macro level may be set out and the macro level policy decision Is referenced to a 
number of detailed analyses. Where the policy decision is taken to allow or promote overtime at 
a certain level, then this must be properly translated into action through both formal and, equally 
powerful and legitimate, informal systems of control (Brewster 1983). Finally, the model illustrates 
a decision review stage which is a vital yet frequently neglected ingredient of the formal system of 
control. 
Thus overtime, where adopted by an organisation, should exist within both formal and Informal, 
but rational, decision and control structures. The case study programme has been designed to 
discover the actual control mechanisms which exist and the decision process and motivational 
forces which lead to the use of overtime or the use of alternatives to overtime, where these can be 
seen to have been specifically adopted. 
5.3.5 Case Study Schedule 
Care was taken in designing the process of selecting and gaining access to research sites, 
although the process, in the event, can best be described as 'planned opportunism', which is quite 
typical in the circumstances and was essentially pragmatic (Pettigrew 1988). The strategy 
adopted was to find cases which would demonstrate: change; extreme situations and critical 
incidents and social dramas with respect to the use of overtime. In particular, the specific cases 
were chosen to ensure that a variety of organisations were covered in terms of size, type, method 
of working time structure, unionisation, the amount of overtime used and the methods for control 
of that overtime. Particular care was taken to find organisations where overtime had been 
successfully reduced, to find how this had been achieved and the consequences of the change. 
On the question of the number of cases which should be reviewed, again the research design 
philosophy was essentially pragmatic and it is readily agreed that the availability of time and 
resources were major limiting factors, as often must be so in such projects. Nevertheless, those 
cases which were undertaken were relatively generic in each instance and thus allowed 
reasonable and cogent Inductive logic to be developed. 
5.3.6 Methodology Strategies 
Yin (1984) and others have reviewed the Ideal skills profile for case study field workers which, 
briefly, they found to include characteristics such as the ability to ask and interpret apposite 
questions, to listen, to be adaptive and flexible, to be knowingly unbiased, to be politically and 
socially adept, and to have a firm grip of the Issues or phenomena under Investigation. These 
needs were considered and an attempt was made to identify and cover shortfalls In the 
fieldworker's experience and skills. Works such as Smith and Dainty (1988), Van Maanen (1983), 
Madut (1986) and Pennett (1986) were used in this respect. 
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In order to achieve the research objectives, it was necessary to conduct investigations using a 
number of approaches best suited to the epistemological issues which prevailed. Essentially the 
case studies involved the following: 
Documentary and archive data: 
Time series analysis of the historical working 
time Human Resource Management and pay data; 
In-depth Interviews: 
Semi-structured interviews covering managers, 
supervisory staff, workers, trade union 
representatives and executive board members; 
Semi-ethnographic research: 
Observations and investigation of the circumstances 
surrounding the overtime working both internal and 
external to the organisation; 
Systematic decision analysis: 
Financial analysis of the overtime decision from 
both the organisation's and the worker's 
viewpoint; analysis of the alternatives to 
overtime available to the organisation and the 
worker. 
Itfa-I skeleton programme (case studyinvestigation design guide) was adopted In order to guide the 
structure oýtýe 
case dies this is given as Appendix 5-3. In particular, this structure 
was used as a tool to facilitate the Initial access and planning strategies but was by no means 
followed slavishly at the expense of rational research methodology. The skeleton programme 
covers: the endogenous phase preliminary and preparatory study activities and the main study 
formal and ethnographic activities. In further support of an efficient and orderly research process, 
use was made of a number of 'Guides To Research Structure' and 'Semi-Structured 
Questionnaires'. The skeleton programme, indicates each of the detailed areas of research 
where, typically, specific use was made of these tools. 
At plant level, use was made of the single, non-comparative, case study technique involving both 
formal and informal ethnographic elements. Historical records and documentation of working 
time and remuneration were reviewed as were all the related overtime issues at each 
establishment. Use was made of computer based statistical and time series analyses of the 
available data and this was used to reveal patterns in the processes of change in the use of 
overtime as a proportion of basic working hours. 
This analysis gave a quantitative basis on which to build the research processes. These were 
based around a number of semi-structured questionnaires. Once access had been achieved, via 
senior management, the process started with interviews of the managers most directly responsible 
for the overtime decision. Those managers and supervisors who were responsible for the 
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subsequent planning and control of the overtime were also interviewed. Numerous interviews 
covering other managers, workers and worker's representatives, were held. These interviews 
were informal, but controlled within the framework of the questionnaire structure. By this means it 
was hoped to reduce bias (Pettigrew 1987) and maintain, as far as possible, a common structure 
during these investigations to facilitate some level of cross comparison between establishments 
and industries. The structure of these interviews and observations allowed the research to take 
account of the contextural implications and interplays regarding the use of overtime. 
Detailed investigation of the establishment's working time needs and structure was undertaken 
and the research investigated the implications of these as regards the research hypotheses in 
areas such as: operational flexibility; profitability; quality of life for the overtime worker and also the 
context of the local labour market. These investigations included, where possible, board level 
interviews in order to ascertain the corporate policy, perceptions and opinion, regarding the use of 
overtime within the organisation. 
The fieldwork for each case involved between 1 and 12 days on site at each establishment, spread 
over an extended period which in some cases covered 3 months. There was, in each case, 
intermittent contact both before the main on-site investigations, and thereafter. The attendance 
on-site, where possible, covered the full range of overtime working hours as well normal hours. 
Extended elapsed time was needed to establish relationships and achieve a perspective that 
would enable a real level of ethnographic understanding and to allow the true reasons and 
processes to reveal themselves, bearing in mind the potentially defensive stance of management 
and workers on the issue in question. The subsequent analysis of the fieldwork took between 3 
and 10 days for each individual case. 
Pettigrew (1985A; 1985B) stressed the Importance of contextualism in the practical day to day 
conduct of management research and the process of empirical Inquiries. Greiner (1985) also 
offered support to contextualism which Is used here In Its simplest form; that of drawing upon the 
temporal, organisational, processual, social and behavioural Interdependences of the overtime 
phenomena. 
103 
6 PRIMARY ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY RESULTS 
6.1 ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESPONSE 
The overall aggregated results of the survey are presented and reviewed in this section. In 
addition, the initial analysis, concerning the survey results in isolation, are presented. Section 7, 
which follows, breaks down the data to give detailed analyses based on their distribution by the 
key Independent variables. 
The evidence is rationally structured and presented in this and the following sections, mirroring the 
structure of the questionnaire. The intention is to provide a database regarding the use and 
management of overtime across the whole economy, and thus to satisfy one of the two principal 
aims of the research. Those research questions and hypotheses which are not directly related to 
the establishment of the database, are specifically addressed in Section 9, 'Further Analyses'. In 
that Section, the evidence gathered from the application of the different methodologies is drawn 
together to give a balanced appraisal by each specific issue. 
6.1.1 The Survey Yield 
A sample of 1000 establishments was surveyed yielding 225 usable cases representing a 22.5% 
response rate. This response was obtained only after the careful application of considerable 
response control and enhancement procedures which are described in Section 5.3.4. In the 
circumstances, this response was considered satisfactory. Response rates reflect, to a large 
degree, the very careful balance struck at the questionnaire design stage between the quality of 
information and the ease of response. The decision was taken to aim for a rigorous survey in 
terms of quality, depth and range of information, rather than to use a more superficial instrument 
that would yield a higher response. 
When considered at the sectoral level the response was relatively low for the following sectors 
(SIC 0-9; 1980): SIC 0, Agriculture, Forestry& Fishing and SIC 1, Energy & Water Supply. This 
reflected the relatively small size of these sectors within the economy. An analysis of the sample 
by sector Is set out in Figure 6-1 'Sample Segmentation Control Analysis'. 
The response represented over 40,000 employees and In this respect was a relatively large sample 
In overall terms. Other research projects in this area have used samples of the same order of 
magnitude or smaller. For example, the IRRR's survey of overtime arrangements in Britain 
covered only 30 organisations (IRRR 1978); the'Overtime Working Attitudes Survey' (Hollman 
1980) used 126 responses; the Department of Employment's survey Into 'Working Time' (White, 
Policy Studies Institute 1982) was based on 281 responses; the CBI survey covered 156 
manufacturing companies, comprising 29,000 employees (Marsh 1982) and the National 
Economic Development Council survey (NEDC 1986) covered only 72 organisations. 
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6.1.2 Analysis Of Sample Fraction Controls 
The survey collected data across the whole range of sectors of the U. K. economy, all regions of 
the U. K. and the whole range of sizes of establishment. The only areas not to be addressed were 
those sub-sectors of public administration and defence covered by SIC (0 to 9,1980) 
classifications 91-3 and 96. Those sectors are covered by the case study programme, (Section 8 
qv) 
A stratified sampling procedure (Hammond & McCullagh 1980; Jolliffe 1986) was adopted, using 
fully randomised samples based on the 'equal probability of selection' method, (Section 5.3 qv. ), 
and controlled to the key population sub-set of: 'Standard Industrial Classification' (SIC). The 
sample was further checked against secondary population sub-sets of: 'Administrative Region' 
and 'Size of Establishment'. This gave a means of rigorously evaluating the true 
representativeness of the sample in terms of these key variables. Figure 6-1 sets out the sample 
fractions, by percentage of employment within the economy as a whole, thus giving a precise 
population profile. The response was analysed in terms of the primary segmentation control and 
the secondary segmentation checks, for direct comparison with the known population profiles. 
It was decided, after very careful consideration of all the factors and particularly in the light of the 
original sample design basis of 'equal probability of selection', not to make any constructive and 
selective adjustments to what was considered to be a representative sample. The rationale for 
this decision is set out below. 
The un-adjusted response was a reasonable approximation to the population, in terms of its 
macro-economic profile, for the primary control of SIC grouping. There was one exception to 
this, viz. that of the public administration returns which were low, reflecting, in part, the decision to 
exclude areas of this sector, as explained above. Consequently the relative weightings achieved 
within the responses for the other sectors were proportionally higher than the equivalent 
population statistic. This was particularly noticeable In the analysis of generic types of sector, eg. 
service and non-service industries, as a result of the large size of sector 9 which alone accounts 
for about 30% of total employment in the economy, much of which was excluded from the survey. 
Following the initial mailed questionnaire and letter, there was an unacceptable level of non- 
responses, about 85%. There were, however, very few item non-responses In the returned 
questionnaires which were of a remarkably high quality. The pattern of returns was typical of that 
modelled by Vigderhous (1977) and it was clear that follow-up mail-shots and telephone 
investigations would be necessary. Subsequent contact of the non-responding organisations 
revealed that a major cause of the non-response was the mistaken assumption that if no overtime 
was being worked, or overtime was little used, the response would be of little value. The 
subsequent re-mail of all non-respondents targeted this problem in order to maximise the number 
of responses. This alleviated the original problem to some degree and explains why the 
manufacturing sector yielded a proportionlly greater response than some others. 
Figure 6-1 also sets out the adjusted SIC sample profile which has been augmented by pro-rata 
weighting to compensate for those areas of the public sector which were excluded. The adjusted 
sample profile appears visually to be a good fit to the population profile. The chi-square test of 
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FIGURE 6-1 







AS A% OF THE 
WHOLE ECONOMY 
STANDARD INDUSTRIAL 
CLASSIFICATION (1980) 1 
0 Agriculture, forestry & fishing 7 3.2 1.5 
1 Energy & water supply 3 1.4 2.1 
2 Mineral & ore extraction 12 5.4 3.5 
3 Metal goods, engineering & vehicles 40 18.0 10.1 
4 Other manufacturing industries 44 19.8 9.5 
5 Construction 10 4.5 4.6 
6 Distribution, hotels, catering, repairs 58 26.1 20.8 
7 Transport & communications 16 7.2 6.3 
8 Banking, finance, Insurance, etc 20 9.0 11.5 
9 Public administration & other services 12 5.4 30.1 
Unclassified 3 - - 
RECLASSIFICATIONS 
1-4 Index of production Industries 99 44.6 25.2 
2-4 Index of manufacturing industries 96 43.2 23.1 
0-5 Index of non-service industries 116 52.3 31.3 
6-9 Index of service Industries 106 47.7 68.7 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 2 
1 Greater London 22 9.8 15.8 
2 Remainder of South East 30 13.3 18.5 
3 East Anglia 5 2.2 3.8 
4 South West 18 8.0 7.3 
5 East Midlands 9 4.0 7.0 
6 Yorkshire & Humberside 9 4.0 8.2 
7 North 13 5.8 5.0 
8 Scotland 48 21.3 8.5 
9 Northern Ireland 26 11.6 2.3 
10 North West 14 6.2 10.2 
11 Wales 18 8.0 3.9 
12 West Midlands 13 5.8 9.5 
RECLASSIFICATIONS 
1-4 Defined South 75 33.3 45.4 
5-12 Defined North 150 66.7 54.6 
Continued over... 
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FIGURE 6-1 (Continued) 







UNITS AS A 
% OF THE 
ECONOMY 
COMPANY SIZE 
1-10 47 20.9 69.7 
11-24 46 20.4 16.7 
25-49 44 19.6 7.1 
50-99 34 15.1 3.4 
100-199 23 10.2 1.8 
200-499 15 6.7 1.0 
500-999 7 3.1 0.3 
low + 9 4.0 0.1 
RECLASSIFICATIONS 
1-49 137 60.9 93.4 
50-199 57 25.3 5.2 
200-999 22 9.8 1.3 
1000+ 9 4.0 0.1 








AS % OF THE 
ECONOMY 
COMPANY SIZE 
1-10 47 1 16.1 
11-24 46 3 13.1 
25-49 44 5 11.7 
50-99 34 8 11.1 
100-199 23 9 11.6 
200-499 15 11 13.7 
500-999 7 13 8.7 
1000+ 9 50 14.0 
RECLASSIFICATIONS 
1-49 137 10 40.9 
50-199 57 14 22.7 
200-9W 22 25 22.4 
1000+ 9 50 14.0 
NOTES 
Employment Gazette February table 1.4 (1989). 
Employment Gazette February table 1.5 (1989) (adjusted for Northern Ireland). 
Department of Employment Statistics Divlslon (1988) & Marketing Pocket Book (1989). 
Excluding Order I of the Standard Industrial Classification. 
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goodness of fit was applied to the adjusted sample and a null hypothesis was constructed, viz. 
that there was no difference between the adjusted sample and the population profile for the SIC 
groupings. This test determines whether the discrepancies between the sampled frequencies 
and those which are known to exist in the economy as a whole, are due to the process of random 
selection or indicate a bias within the sample. The 0.05 significance level which is usual for this 
test (Freud and Williams 1975) was adopted. Chi-square was found to be lower than the critical 
number and therefore the null hypothesis was accepted. Therefore, the sample was found to be 
representative of the population within the significance level p <0.05. 
The secondary sampling check of region was, in terms of overall shape, a reasonable 
approximation to the population profile. The tendency for the sample to be weighted towards the 
'regions', which are herein defined 'North', was found, on investigation, to be a function of the 
programmed bias of the database selection procedure. This was not considered to be a 
fundamental flaw since the selection was randomised and, overall, the sample and population 
profiles were similar in shape if not exactly so in degree. 
Moreover, the primary analysis was conducted by use of crosstabulation techniques which are 
able to deal with the Inequality of samples well within that of the sample obtained. More 
importantly, any subsequent manipulation of the sample, to adjust the profile towards the 
secondary segmentation checking profile, would involve the risk of disturbing the primary 
segmentation control and would need to be highly selective. This would challenge the random 
objectivity of the sample obtained (Jolliffe 1986) and was felt to be Inappropriate in view of the 
relatively close fit between sample and population. 
As regards'Size of Establishment', based on number of employees, the response, in the event, 
was biased towards the larger organisations by the Inclusion, through random chance, of two very 
large organisations. In addition, there was certainly some difficulty experienced in obtaining 
responses from small establishments. Considerable effort was therefore put Into encouraging 
very small organisations to respond. A second mail-shot was specifically targeted to these and a 
number of follow-up telephone calls were made. However, this difficulty, which Is typical for this 
type of research (Smith and Dainty 1988), was not totally overcome, although this was not 
considered to present a major problem. 
It Is Interesting to note that other research has met with similar problems. For example, the 
Important 1984 Industrial relations survey, sponsored jointly by the DOE, ESRC and PSI, over- 
sampled large establishments. Methodological work on the equivalent 1980 industrial relations 
survey had suggested that the accuracy of the employee based estimates could be obtained 
without 'noticeably sacrificing the accuracy of establishment-based estimates' (Millward and 
Stevens 1986). It was, however, accepted that the weighting of the sample gave greater sampling 
errors than would have been the case if simple random sampling alone had been used (Miliward 
and Stevens 1986) as was the case In this survey, and this fact Is used as justification for not 
arbitrarily weighting the survey response obtained In this research. 
The sample response analysis for'Size of Organisation' (Figure 6-1) has been conducted In terms 
of both the number of units employing certain class intervals of employee numbers, and also by 
the absolute number of employees employed in those units. Two further problems were 
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encountered in this respect. The first was the lack of any definitive classification of class intervals 
In dealing with company size and the lack of a standardised method of classifying size viz. by 
absolute number of employees or by number of units employing certain class intervals of 
employee numbers. The second was the lack of statistical information regarding the distribution 
of different sizes of company, by employee numbers, across the whole economy. It was 
therefore decided to present the analyses by size of company, with a clear statement of the 
limitations which, whilst Important to understand, do not over-ride the value of the size analyses. 
Notwithstanding the above limitations, the survey covered 93 establishments employing 1 to 24 
staff and 137 establishments employing fewer than 50 staff. This was intended to break new 
ground In capturing information on overtime working from small establishments. In the 
circumstances, the variance between the sample profile and the population profile was not 
considered to be of over-riding significance. Any subsequent weighting to correct the 'size' 
profile misfit could have been counter productive, in that it could create arbitrary bias in the other 
more important segmentation controls. Selective re-sampling would risk disturbance of the 
primary segmentation control and would compromise the established objectivity of the random 
sample that had been obtained from the original survey and follow-up measures (Jolliffe 1986). 
This research is believed to represent the only survey, within the field of overtime working, which 
has taken responses from the complete size range of organisations across all sectors and regions 
of the economy, (with the exception of SIC 91-3 and 96). As such this project was ambitiously 
designed to push forward the knowledge in this area. Perhaps, In view of the difficulties 
experienced, it is understandable that others have not carried out such a wide-ranging survey 
(White 1984; NEDC 1986). Most research Into working time has applied cut-offs, removing 
smaller organisations, and often whole areas of the economy, by region or by sector. For 
Instance, White (1984) reported on two connected surveys sponsored by the Department of 
Employment and carried out by the Policy Studies Institute. These Investigated working time 
Issues and establishments with less than 100 employees were excluded. Such a sampling policy 
could well be considered to give a more fundamental limitation on representativeness than those 
inherent in this survey. 
Finally, the sample size which would be required to obtain a'good' fit to the'organisation size' 
population distribution would have been unreasonably large, particularly in view of the substantial 
bias that could be established by simply randomly selecting just one very large company of 
several thousand employees which would distort the whole sample. Perhaps most importantly, 
as In the analysis of the regional secondary segmentation check, any subsequent manipulation of 
the sample to adjust the profile towards that thought to represent of the whole economy, would 
certainly involve the risk of disturbing the primary segmentation control and would need to be 
highly selective. Again this would further challenge the random objectivity of the sample obtained 
(Jolliffe 1986) and it was therefore decided to accept the lesser'organisation size' limitations of the 
sample obtained. 
It is therefore suggested that the sample used In the analysis was, within acceptable limitations, 
properly controlled and as representative of the economy as a whole, as could reasonably be 
expected. 
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6.1.3 Respondent Profile 
The questionnaire was intended to be completed by a single individual in an organisation, as is 
usual in this type of survey (Smith and Dainty 1988), (Section 5.3.3, qv). A small number of 
questionnaires appear to have been 'passed-around' for selective completion, presumably at the 
most appropriate position within the establishment. This was particularly prevalent In the larger 
organisations, although it did not significantly affect the results. The respondent profile was: 
FIGURE 6-2 
RESPONDENT PROFILE 
JOB TITLE FREQUENCY VALID PERCENT 
Owner/Partner 19 9.0 
M. D. /Chief Executive 38 17.9 
Personnel Director 5 2.4 
Finance Director 19 9.0 
Director (Unspecified) 44 20.8 
General Manager 13 6.1 
Personnel Manager 31 14.6 
Manager 18 8.5 
Supervisor/P. A. /Etc. 11 5.2 
Secretary 14 6.6 
Undeclared 13 - 
The primary target respondent for the questionnaire was, in the first instance, the 'Personnel 
Manager or the senior person at the establishment responsible for the management of overtime 
working. This target seems largely to have been achieved. Some 60% were completed at 
director or owner level and 30% at personnel or general manager level. Obviously, smaller 
organisations, which form by far the largest grouping in the economy in terms of numbers of 
establishments, tended not to have dedicated personnel staff and this explains the inclination 
towards the apparently more senior job titles in the respondent listing. Overall, the respondent 
profile was considered to be a reasonable mix within the limits of the study and therefore, 
substantially, to avoid the risk of bias from that source. 
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6.1.4 Respondent Organisation Profile 
and Human Resource Management Statistics 
Respondent organisations employed, on average, 178 people of whom 80 were non-manual and 
98 were manual employees. The CBI survey (Marsh 1982) found that, on average, single 
establishment companies, which comprised by far the greatest proportion of this sample, 
employed 188 people. This lends credibility to the sample obtained in this survey. 
Analysis of the'Respondent Organisation Profile' and the'Human Resource Management 
Statistics' are set out in Figure 6-3. More detailed tabulations of the statistics obtained are set out 
in the appendices supporting Section 7 of this thesis, under the appropriate sub-groupings of SIC 
Group, Regional Location or Size of Organisation. 
Notably, only 19% of organisations had a formal manpower plan even though many of the 
respondent organisations were sensitive to employment issues and the majority relied on'people' 
as a major asset. Employment trends for respondent organisations revealed that, over the 
previous five years, 60% had Increased employment, 26% remained stable and 13% had shed 
employees. The expectation of future employee numbers showed that, over the coming year, 
45% would increase, 49% would remain stable and 6% would shed employees. This reflected the 
buoyancy at the time of the survey, late 1988, early 1989, which had moderated by the time this 
thesis was presented in 1990. 
The current market demand for respondent organisations' products or services was perceived by 
61% as increasing, 34% stable and only 5% as decreasing. it was interesting to note that 
employee numbers were predicted to 'increase over the coming year', in only 45% of 
organisations. The 61 % Increasing demand, It seemed, would be met by either increased 
productivity or by increased working hours. This directly challenged the CBI's (1989) statement 
that 'companies plan to cut overtime'. This was a very important finding In that it supported one 
of the phenomena of overtime working in the U. K. which is Identified elsewhere In this report; viz. 
that clear and soundly based intentions to reduce overtime do not appear to result in any 
pragmatic change. In addition, this phenomenon will be shown to be applicable to four of the 
major communities within the economy viz. the TUC, CBI, Government and the individual 
employers themselves. 
Therefore, even at this early stage of the analysis of overtime working, there were Indications that 
the overtime phenomena in the U. K was a function of more than rationally based management or 
corporate objectives and decisions. There was evidence of substantial tradition-based factors in 
the process which could not be reduced to any operational rationale. It followed, therefore, that 
the solution to the 'problem' of change in overtime practices, If change was thought appropriate, 
would need to be based on more than just rational management analysis. Indeed, it would need 
to Involve a sea change In attitude and 'culture'. A major emphasis of the case study stage of this 
research was therefore placed on the behavioural aspects of the overtime phenomena. In 
particular, regard was paid to the Implementation strategies of corporate level objectives and 
decisions on overtime working and the factors governing the success of those strategies. 
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FIGURE 6-3 
RESPONDENT ORGANISATIONS' PROFILE AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
STATISTICS 
RANGE Mean Mode S. D. 
STATISTICS Low High 
Number Of Employees 
Non-Manual 0 3000 80.4 3 309 
Manual 0 4000 98.1 0 367 
Total 7000 178.5 15 628 
Degree of Unionisation (%) 
Manual 0 100 22.1 0 38 
Non-manual 0 100 9.2 0 24 
Formal Manpower Plan Vali d Percentage of Establishments 
Plan Exists 19.4% 
No Plan Exists 80.6% 
TRENDS (%) INCREASING STABLE FALLING 
Demand For Products Or Services 61.2 33.5 5.4 
Total Number Of Employees 
Past (Previous 5 yrs) 60.5 26.5 13.0 
Current (Next I yr) 45.4 49.1 5.6 
Degree of Unionisation (%) 
Manual Employees 1 95 5 
Non-manual Employees 0 96 4 




Mean Mode S. D. Current Trend 
Increasing Stable Falling 
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6.2 ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURE AND USE OF OVERTIME 
6.2.1 Overtime Levels and Trends 
Only 20% of the organisations which took part in the survey did not work overtime. This is felt to 
be non-representative of the U. K. economy, bias having occurred due to some potential 
respondents choosing not to return the questionnaire because they worked no overtime. In these 
circumstances it was felt appropriate to refer to the published overtime statistics (NES 1989 and 
Employment Gazette 1989) and these are analysed in Section 2. Overtime was worked in 181 of 
the respondent companies; 160 companies reported manual employee overtime while only 121 
companies reported overtime working by non-manual employees. A summarised analysis of the 
overtime levels and trends for these companies is given in Figure 6-4 'Overtime Levels and 
Trends', (more detailed tabulations are set out in the appendices supporting Section 7). These 
results are consistent with the published national statistics and show that manual employees are 
more likely both to work overtime, and when they do, to work longer overtime hours, than their 
non-manual colleagues. 
FIGURE 6-4 
OVERTIME LEVELS AND TRENDS 
Weekly overtime (Hours) 
Employee Range Mean Mode S. D. 
Types 
Low High 
Manual 1 30 7.8 10 5.5 
Non-manual 1 40 6.0 2 5.5 
Overtime Trends (per cent) 
Employee Past 5 years Next 12 months 
Types 
increasing stable falling increasing stable falling 
Manual 41 41 18 19 69 13 
Non-manual 23 63 14 10 83 8 
The data exhibited a high level of variability and the maximum reported overtime was forty hours 
per week, worked in this case by non-manual employees. This particular company, (denoted 'X') 
was based in Aberdeen and offered a technical agency type service to the oil extraction industry. 
Company X had shed employees over the previous 5 years due to the oil price collapse. The 
company held no overtime policy and relied on custom and practice. Most overtime being 
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worked during week days. No change was anticipated In either the future overtime levels or the 
future levels of employment. However, demand was thought to be now increasing and the impact 
of this on the currently excessive overtime levels had apparently not been considered. The key 
reasons for the overtime at Company X were given as: local skill shortages; normal demand; more 
cost effective use of resources and unexpected demand, (in view of the stability of the overtime, 
the latter reason would probably be difficult to sustain). Curiously, the respondent, a Finance 
Director, agreed with the proposition that: `systematic overtime should be eliminated', but thought 
that overtime reduction in his organisation would not create employment, presumably because the 
skilled staff were unobtainable. The evidence suggests that the overtime at Company X was 
largely systematic and a function of culture and local skill shortages; and, in any event, potential 
solutions were available for both these problems. 
Leaving aside Company X and returning to the general survey analysis, the revealed past trend in 
overtime levels was similar to that reported in the national statistics with no evidence that there has 
been any general or determined effort to reduce overtime. Indeed the past trend analysis 
Indicated that the majority of organisations had basically stable or rising overtime levels with only 
18% of manual and 14% of non-manual overtime actually falling. The reported future trend, by 
contrast, gave an entirely different picture with a low employer expectation of an increase In 
overtime working viz. 19% for manual and 10% for non-manual staff. Indeed, employers believed 
that overtime would fall: 'over the next 12 months' among only 13% of manual and 8% of non- 
manual employees. This again conflicted with the findings of the CBI (1989) report which stated 
that employers 'Intend to now make a determined effort to reduce overtime'. It seems clear, 
therefore, as we demonstrated earlier, that both our own survey findings and the predictions of 
bodies such as the CBI, can not be taken at face value, since expectations on overtime working 
have been most unreliable as indicators of future levels. 
6.2.2 Overtime Working Patterns 
Summarised details of when, during the week, overtime was scheduled are set out in Figure 6-5 
'Overtime Working Patterns', (more detailed tabulations are set out in Section 7). 
These results were consistent with previous research (White 1984), there being relatively little 
overtime worked on Friday afternoons, with only 18% stating that they often work overtime on 
Friday afternoons in contrast to the 46% who state that they often work overtime on the other 
weekdays. Many companies, particularly in manufacturing and construction, have reduced their 
working week to 39 hours or less, by reducing the length of Friday working (White 1984). One of 
the reasons for focussing the reduction of basic hours into Fridays is suggested by the TUC (1988) 
to be that Friday afternoon overtime is 'no longer an option'. The generality of that conclusion 
was supported by the survey results. 
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FIGURE 6-5 
OVERTIME WORKING PATTERNS.... (DAYS WHEN OVERTIME IS WORKED) 
Overtime Is 
Worked on: 
Percentage of Respondents Who Worked Overtime 
Always Often Little Never 
Weekday 33 46 20 1 
Friday pm 14 18 47 22 
Saturday am 24 44 25 7 
Saturday pm 4 18 52 26 
Sunday 2 18 52 28 
Holiday 3 11 42 44 
Nevertheless, it was clear that some establishments which finished normal work at Friday 
lunchtime, were organising Friday afternoon overtime In a systematic manner, for normal 
production activities, in much the same way as Saturday mornings have traditionally been set 
aside for overtime. Interestingly, 14% of organisations stated that they always worked overtime 
on Friday afternoons. This was thought to be an increasing trend, although no evidence of such a 
trend was provided by this research. 
There was a tendency to schedule overtime for specific 'slots' during the working week. Almost a 
quarter of organisations reported always working Saturday morning overtime and only one third 
said they rarely or never worked overtime on Saturday mornings. Interestingly, this result was 
often inconsistent with the corresponding replies to other questions covering the reasons for 
overtime and the use of systematic overtime. Organisations often cited 'unexpected demand' and 
similar variability based factors as the major reason for their overtime, and such reasons would 
conflict with the use of regularly scheduled overtime. This apparently capricious tendency is 
further addressed in the crosstabulation analysis. 
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6.2.3 The Remuneration of overtime working: 
Premiums, Time-Off-In-Lieu and Unpaid Overtime 
A summary analysis of the patterns and levels of compensation for overtime working is set out in 
Figure 6-6'Overtime Premiums Paid'. This has been structured to show manual and non-manual 
employees separately in order to demonstrate the highly significant differences which these 
groups exhibit; (more detailed tabulations are set out in Section 7 of this thesis). 
The use of time-off-in-lieu, TOIL, as an alternative to payment for overtime was most prevalent for 
holiday working. Non-manual employees were approximately three times more likely to receive 
TOIL than manual workers and, conspicuously, ten times more likely to be unpaid for their 
overtime work. Caution must be used in considering unpaid overtime since this was probably 
under-reported in this survey and also in the national statistics (White 1988). Many respondents 
may not have defined staying late, unpaid, as formal overtime and this matter was reviewed during 
the case study phase of the research. It was nevertheless remarkable to find that one third of 
non-manual employees work overtime without pay. 
The premium levels revealed by the survey are generally in line with those suggested by other 
researcher (NBPI 1970; White 1984; IDS 1984; Whiting 1985; CBI 1989) with mode levels being 
time and a half Monday to Saturday and double time for Sundays and holidays. However, these 
results present a much more detailed picture than had previously been available. About 15% of 
establishments have stepped agreements, for Instance, time and a third for the first two hours and 
time and a half thereafter, and these were fully accounted in the analysis of premiums. Weighted 
average analysis of these results indicate an overall average premium of 52.4% for all categories of 
worker, all times of the week and all types of organisation. An overall average premium had not 
previously been established for the U. K. economy. 
These results show not only that the non-manual worker was much more likely to be unpaid for 
overtime, but when payment was made, it was likely to be at a relatively low level, pitched on 
average at time and a third rather than the time and a half paid to manual workers. Section 3 
explains that there was a school of thought that low premiums discourage overtime by depressing 
demand (eg. Dawkins 1985). A conflicting and widely held theory asserts that overtime can best 
be reduced by increasing premiums and thereby depressing supply (the supply of overtime from 
the employer), though of course not the demand for overtime from the employee (eg. Ehrenberg 
1971). There was yet a third school of thought which held that almost whatever premium was 
levied, overtime would not be reduced because poor management would prevent the rational cost 
decision (eg. Best 1981), although there appears to be no research to support this assertion. The 
correlation between higher overtime levels and higher premium levels within this data was clear 
but it was not possible to infer a direct causal relationship between overtime premium and level of 
overtime working. Indeed a more plausible explanation of this relationship was the effects of the 
structural variables such as worker type, (manual or non-manual), and industry. 
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FIGURE 6-6 
OVERTIME PREMIUMS PAID 
Pattern 





Mean Mode S. D. 
Weekday 
Manual 3.2 3.2 47 50 24 
Non-manual 11 33 33 50 32 
Friday pm 
Manual 3.3 3.3 48 50 25 
Non-manual 11 33 33 50 33 
Saturday am 
Manual 3.3 2.0 54 50 25 
Non-manual 11 29 38 50 31 
Saturday pm 
Manual 3.3 2.8 66 50 34 
Non-manual 11 31 42 50 36 
Sunday 
Manual 2.8 4.3 92 100 35 
Non-manual 15 32 61 100 47 
Holiday 
Manual 14 6.3 98 100 51 
Non-manual 23 36 62 100 54 
117 
6.2.4 Employee Attitudes To Overtime 
Only 7% of workers were reported to resist overtime, while 68% readily accepted it and 25% 
wanted more. This result implied that there was considerable elasticity in demand for overtime 
from employees, as found by other researchers such as Ehrenberg (1971). Employee attitudes to 
overtime working were at this stage of the research taken purely as hearsay evidence, reported by 
the 'manager' respondents rather than by the workers themselves. Therefore caution must be 
used in interpreting the resulting statistic, (a limitation to be corrected in the case study section of 
this research). This result was, however, similar to those reported elsewhere in the literature 
(Whybrew 1968; Carby et a/ 1981; White 1984). 
6.3 REASONS FOR THE USE OF OVERTIME 
The reasons given by management for the use of overtime are analysed and presented In 
summarised form, in rank order, in Figure 6-7 'Reasons For The Use Of Overtime', (more detailed 
tabulations are set out in Section 7). The ranking system is based on the respondents' choice of 
major factors, using the secondary factors quotient as the tie breaker, rather than weighting the 
major and secondary factors together. This is acknowledged as somewhat arbitrary, although it 
was thought to be the most appropriate system available. 
As stated previously, the reader should be cautious in interpreting the results of survey data where 
the respondent could be motivated to be defensive, rather than to give objective, in answering 
inculpatory questions. The results obtained support this assertion. 
Plainly there is no simple answer to the question of why managers schedule overtime, although 
definite patterns do emerge from these results. The top three reasons, in rank order, are directly 
related to variability in demand and as such would be sound management reasons for scheduling 
overtime. The reasons were: i) unexpected demand; ii) emergency cover; iii) seasonal demand. 
These imply the efficient use of overtime and represent perhaps the more defensible 'flexibility' 
reasons. A number of alternative solutions exist for these particular demand problems and clearly 
overtime would be one of these. The review of these alternatives is not possible in depth within 
this research project, although alternatives are covered to some extent in Section 6.7 and the case 
study analysis section of this thesis. 
Organisations were encouraged to offer a variety of reasons for their use of overtime and the 
majority of organisations which claimed the 'flexibility' reasons also claimed 'normal demand' and 
other reasons which would imply the systematic use of overtime. There was a clear contradiction 
in this result and It was intended that this should be investigated this in the case study phase of the 
research. 
It would be prudent at this stage to offer a definition of 'systematic' overtime. Section 3.3.7 
outlines many of the various uses of the expression 'systematic overtime', and it was clear that a 
single definition would need to be very broad to cover all of these; even then some would 
denounce such a definition as Inadequate. Nevertheless, and difficult as it may be, it would be 
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FIGURE 6.7 
REASONS FOR THE USE OF OVERTIME (Frequency Table) 
(Percentage response) 
Rankt Reason I Major Secondary Not a 
Factor Factor Factor 
1 Unexpected Demand 58.1 24.0 17.9 
2 Emergency Cover 41.3 24.6 34.1 
3 Seasonal Demand 36.5 31.5 32.0 
4 Outlook Uncertain 36.5 27.5 36.0 
5 Normal Demand 33.1 29.2 37.6 
6 More Cost Effective 29.2 22.5 40.3 
7 Skill Shortages 23.6 20.2 56.2 
8 Regular Maintenance 17.4 21.9 60.7 
9 Increase Utilisation 16.3 16.9 66.9 
10 Custom and Practice 14.6 21.3 64.0 
11 Shift Patterns 11.8 12.4 75.8 
12 Absenteeism 11.2 33.7 55.1 
13 Holiday Cover 10.6 52.5 36.9 
14 Increase Low Pay 9.0 18.5 72.5 
15 Labour Shortages 5.6 16.9 77.5 
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helpful to establish a definition, for the purposes of this thesis. 
The term'systematic' overtime is used to describe: overtime which could have been foreseen. 
This implies that management would have had the opportunity to establish plans to meet the 
particular need, other than by the use of overtime, had they so wished. Therefore, 'systematic' 
overtime is defined as 'predictable' overtime. The time scale of predictability is, of course, 
central to this definition and this is taken to be that period which would have given professional 
management the opportunity to consider and plan for alternatives, if this was found to be 
appropriate. It is not suggested that this definition would be suitable for general application. 
This definition does not Imply that systematic overtime is necessarily bad practice, quite the 
contrary, It establishes that overtime Is one of the alternative means of matching capacity to 
volume, (or service levels). One difficulty with this definition is the degree of certainty which is 
assumed In the ability to predict the future. This would render the definition somewhat Ineffective 
for general use, but it covers the specific needs of this thesis. It is firmly believed that it would be 
possible to establish a formal definition, in both qualitive and quantitive terms, and this Is one of 
the specific jobs which it Is hoped can follow this research. 
Those reasons which are listed below in the rank order they were indicated by respondents, 
constitute the overtly systematic overtime. 
RANK ORDER REASON 
3 Seasonal Demand 
4 Outlook Uncertain 
5 Normal Demand 
6 More Cost Effective 
8 Regular Maintenance 
9 Increase Utilisation 
10 Custom and Practice 
11 Shift Patterns 
14 Increase Low Pay 
In addition, some proportion or elements of those reasons ranked: 2, (Emergency Cover); 12 
(Absenteeism) and 13 (Holiday Cover), could also fall within the systematic overtime classification. 
A high proportion of overtime, in the region of 75% on a weighted average basis, could therefore 
be classified as 'Systematic' in the colloquial sense of the term. It would, however, be incorrect to 
fix too high a reliance on this figure since it can not be rigorously tested from the results obtained. 
Two surprising results which appeared to contradict previous research findings were'Outlook 
Uncertainty' and 'Low Pay'. The former ranked unexpectedly high, at fourth out of fifteen; it was 
defined in the questionnaire as: 'long term demand uncertainty (ie overtime instead of hiring 
people'); and represented a measure of perceived 'corporate flexibility'. While the 'Low Pay' 
factor ranked very low at 14th out of 15, whilst, plainly, there was a strong perception that overtime 
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and low pay were closely associated (le. NBPI 1970; Blyton 1985; Sherman 1986). 
6.4 FACTORS INHIBITING THE REDUCTION OF OVERTIME 
Respondents were asked: 'what, if any, are the major factors inhibiting overtime reduction? ' in 
their establishment. The analysis of the replies is set out, in summarised form, in Figure 6-8 
'Reasons For Not Reducing Overtime', (more detailed tabulations are set out in Section 7). This 
question was the corollary to that of the reasons for overtime discussed above and was aimed 
essentially at discovering the key 'road blocks' to the reduction of overtime. The results showed 
that the primary factor inhibiting the reduction of overtime was the manager's perception that 
overtime helped to increase flexibility or to maintain productivity or service levels. In other words, 
the managers did not choose to reduce overtime in their establishments. 
FIGURE 6-8 
REASONS FOR NOT REDUCING OVERTIME (Frequency Table) 
(Percentage response) 






1 Impede productivity 58 11 31 
2 Give undue exposure to 22 18 60 
long term uncertainty 
3 Adversly affect low 14 l5 70 
paid workers 
4 Increase unit costs 10 25 65 
A secondary inhibiting factor was found to be that of 'corporate flexibility' which was defined as 
the tendency for managers to avoid the commitment of hiring new staff or changing working 
patterns because, as one respondent asked rhetorically: 'Over the next months who knows what 
will happen to demand? '. Managers seem generally to prefer the apparently easy route of taking 
the day to day 'decision' to work overtime which, ironically, was perceived as having no long term 
commitment. The 'overtime tomorrow' decision generally would avoid the need for managers to 
conduct any formal analysis, case presentation and formal commitment to higher levels in the 
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organisation. Perhaps the most telling quote from a line manager was: 'we work overtime every 
Tuesday and Thursday night and Saturday mornings, and have done for many years in order to 
meet unexpected demand'. 
The effects of overtime on low paid workers' earnings and on unit costs are, surprisingly, not 
indicated as significant inhibiting factors, although the 'cost effectiveness' of overtime ranked sixth 
out of fifteen in the analysis of reasons for its use. This would suggest that managers are using 
the 'cost-effectiveness' argument to support their overtime decisions, whilst not really believing 
this argument. The low ranking of the low pay factor, (70% said this was 'not a factor'), supported 
the similar finding on the reasons for overtime scheduling and contradicts the common wisdom. 
6.5 THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF OVERTIME 
The overtime decision process and the management and methods of control of that overtime 
which was worked, are set out, in summarised form, as Figure 6-9'Overtime Management 
Systems'. Many of the findings of this section of the questionnaire, which it is stressed were 
volunteered by the managers themselves, were quite remarkable. 
It Is reasonable to assert that general management should operate within an overall strategy or 
direction. It was therefore interesting to find that only one third of establishments had a formal 
policy regarding the overall management of overtime, 12% relied on collective agreements and 
54% did not formally hold any policy on overtime at the corporate level. Most managers, 
however, acknowledged the great Importance of overtime with respect to Issues such as financial 
performance, flexibility, Industrial relations, quality of product or service, employee welfare and, 
indeed, external employment issues. This was particularly so In establishments where 'people' 
represented the key resource, as Is the case throughout much of the U. K. economy. 
In defence of this somewhat perjorative finding, 93 organisations, (29% of the response), 
employed fewer than 25 staff and this would have a significant bearing on this statistic. The size 
of establishment was positively correlated to the use of the management functions and this aspect 
is covered In Section 7.4. 
Interestingly, In view of positions taken centrally, only one fifth of unions were perceived by 
respondents to have a national overtime policy and almost two thirds were said to have no policy 
at all. It Is stressed, however, that the survey provided only hearsay evidence on this Issue. 
Similarly, Hogan and Milton (1980) found, in Australia, that a majority of unions had no policies on 
overtime issues at the local level, even though overtime in Australia was of great importance both 
as an industrial relations and an employment Issue. 
Some 40% of overtime hours were supervised below the normal level or were entirely 
unsupervised. Overtime limits were set at less than nine hours per week in 10% of organisations 
and over 80% had no limits at all on the amount of overtime that an individual could work. 
'Mandatory overtime', where the employee could not refuse to stay late, was prevalent in 15% of 
organisations. This was a surprisingly high level of use in view of the propensity for mandatory 
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FIGURE 6-9 
OVERTIME MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (Frequency Table) 
(Percentage response) 
OVERTIME MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHIES 
How Is overtime controlled? 
Formal Collective Custom & No policy 
policy agreement practice established 
34.1 11.7 26.8 27.4 
Do your unions have a formal overtime policy? 
National Local No 
level level policy 
20 21.8 58.2 
What Is your supervision level during overtime hours? 
Above Normal Below Often 
normal level normal Unsupervised 
1.1 59.6 18.5 20.8 
ARE THE FOLLOWING OVERTIME CONTROLS APPLIED? 
Overtime limits (Hours per week allowed) 
Not 1-2 3-4 5-6 
used 
81.5 1.1 1.7 2.8 
Mandatory overtime 





Guaranteed overtime (Hours per week guaranteed) 
Not 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9 or more 
used 






FIGURE 6-9 (Continued) 
Exclusions on those paid for overtime (Applied by. ) 
Not Grade Supervision Salary 
used 
50.0 19.1 20.8 10.1 
Where salary was used to exclude employees from overtime the following 
statistics were reported: 
Range low Range High Mean Mode 
10,000 15,500 13,030 15,000 




Overtime forward scheduling (Time frame planned ahead) 
Not I week 4 weeks 12 weeks 
used 
69.8 22.3 6.1 1.7 
Overtime authorisation system (Mandatory authorisation level) 
Not Supervisor Manager Director 
used 
30.2 19.6 38.5 11.7 
Overtime allocation procedure (Allocation by: ) 
Not Volunteer Supervisor Union 
used or manager rep 
43.6 15.1 40,8 0.6 
Forward notice given to employees to work overtime 
Not Rarely Generally Always 
used used used used 
26.8 17.9 44.7 10.6 




Non-pay related overtime monitoring system (Frequency of reports) 
Not Weekly Monthly Quarterly 
used or longer 
55.9 26.8 15.1 2.2 
Overtime performance measurement (Type: ) 
Not Comparative Comparative Production 
used production quality & quality 
80.3 16.3 1.1 2.2 
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overtime to result In depressed productivity and poor Industrial relations (Hoilman 1980). 
The financial control of overtime appeared to be rather lax, with only a quarter of responding 
organisations actually having an overtime budget. This is remarkable In view of the high cost and 
financial Importance of overtime (discussed In Section 2). It was generally held that overtime 
premium should be a separate cost centre (Whiting 1985) and the premium element should be 
segregated as an overhead by the accounts department when subsequently analysing wages. 
Half the respondent organisations applied exclusions on who was paid for overtime working. This 
goes some way to explain both why overtime was often supervised below the normal level and the 
tendency for non-manual employees to work unpaid overtime. Of these exclusions, 38% were 
based on grade, 42% on supervision level and 20% on salary. In the latter event, the average 
salary used was £13,000, a surprisingly low level. The IRRR (1978) found that salary cut-offs and 
ceilings for non-manual staff were common to both the private and public sectors. 
A higher than expected number of organisations, 15°x, used an'overtime commitment scheme', 
(where employees undertook contractually to work a certain amount of overtime). Conversely, 
fewer organisations than expected, only 30%, formally planned ahead for overtime working and 
when this was planned, the time scale was short. This would tend to support either the 
'operational flexibility' hypothesis or, alternatively, the 'poor management' hypothesis. This also 
suggested an anomaly In that systematic overtime appeared from this response to be used less 
frequently than the 'reasons' for overtime indicated would be the case. There was indubitably a 
problem with the definition of the concept of 'formal planning'. 
About 30% of organisations remarkably, did not require any authorisation for overtime working 
and over 40% had no formal system for allocating overtime between workers. Only 25% of 
organisations did not give advanced notice of overtime to their workers and this statistic conflicted 
with the low number of organisations which claimed to plan ahead for overtime. Organisations 
can, in many circumstances, place a periodic embargo on all overtime and this can be a sound 
mechanism for controlling the systemisation of overtime and forcing a review of the overtime 
decision, although only 20% of establishments used this tool. 
Records of overtime working, other than for payment purposes, were kept by 44% of 
organisations, but only 20% actually measured performance during overtime hours for 
comparison with performance during normal hours. When this measurement was taken it was 
almost invariably for the level of productivity rather than quality. 
6.6 FINANCIAL FACTORS IN THE OVERTIME DECISION PROCESS 
The survey methodology was severely limited in collecting detailed information regarding the 
complex and detailed financial implications of the overtime decision and the comparison between 
overtime and the available alternatives. The opinion of managers, however, carries a 
considerable degree of relevance and therefore, was sought. Figure 6-10 sets out the responses. 
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FIGURE 6-10 
SELECTED FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF OVERTIME WORKING 
(Percentage response) 
Respondents were asked whether the following factors make overtime 
a lower cost option than hiring employees 
Financial factors Strongly Strongly Generally Generally 
agree Agree Unsure Disagree disagree Agree Disagree 
Training and 8.0 57.6 19.6 13.6 0.9 82 18 
Induction costs 
Fringe benefit costs 2.7 53.6 25.0 17.0 1.8 75 25 
(sick scheme, 
pensions, etc) 
Employer's 12.1 45.1 18.8 21.9 2.2 70 30 
NIC 
Lay-off costs or 3.2 41.4 29.3 23.9 2.3 62 38 
redundancy 
Four costs' were proposed In the questionnaire and respondents felt them all to mitigate In favour 
of the use of overtime. 'Training and Induction costs' were particularly felt to be Important, with 
82% of valid responses generally agreeing with the proposition. It was surprising that 25% of 
respondents generally disagreed that the costs of Employer's NIC favoured the use of overtime. 
Clearly the costs issue Is an area which is best considered during the case study phase of the 
research. 
6.7 ALTERNATIVES TO SCHEDULING OVERTIME 
There are many alternatives to scheduling overtime, but managers are often not aware of the 
range of possibilities. The results to the questions relating to these alternatives are set out in 
Figure 6-11. Managers were suspected of being defensive in making responses, (Section 5.2 qv), 
and the responses to these questions provided clear evidence on this matter. Only 6.7%, (15 
respondents), 'admitted' in the questionnaire to not being aware of the innovative Average Hours 
scheme and also the Annual Hours scheme: During the case studies, however, fewer than 10% of 
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FIGURE 6-11 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVES To OVERTIME WORKING 
(Percentage response) 
Respondents were asked If their establishment had used the following 
alternatives to overtime working. 
Akernatives to 
overtime 
Change of payment policy 
to Increase productivity 
Capital Investment 
Hired new staff 
New or changed shift 






Outworkers or homeworkers 
Staggered working hours 
Preventative maintenance 
Average hours scheme 
Annual hours scheme 
Flexible working schemes 
Job splitting/sharing 
May i am not 
No Yes consider aware of the 
In future technique 
67.6 18.0 12.2 2.3 
55.2 38.6 4.0 2.2 
31.1 65.8 3.2 0 
69.8 27.0 3.2 0 
52.0 42.6 5.4 0 
71.7 27.4 0.9 0 
69.5 28.7 1.3 0.4 
57.8 41.7 0.4 0 
84.3 15.7 0 0 
73.0 24.3 2.7 0 
70.9 24.9 0.9 3.3 
88.8 3.6 0.9 6.7 
90.6 2.7 0 6.7 
69.1 23.8 4.9 2.2 
89.7 5.4 3.1 1.8 
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managers were found to be aware of these schemes. This serves to highlight the defensive 
response and the care needed in using and interpreting general survey material in all research. 
The alternatives which had been most used were hiring new staff, the use of part-time workers or 
subcontractors and capital investment. A more detailed analysis of this issue is given in Section 7 
where the distributions are shown between the structural variables. 
In interpreting the likely future use of alternatives it is important to consider the declared previous 
use for that alternative. For example, only 3.2% of respondents thought themselves likely to 
consider, in the future, hiring additional staff as an alternative to overtime working; the reason for 
this would appear to be that the majority, (66%), had already used this means and presumably 
may consider using it again in the future. Changes to payment policy stood out as the most likely 
new initiative to be pursued in the future. This was followed by the use of part-time workers, 
flexible working schemes and capital investment. 
6.8 PERCEPTIONS OF OVERTIME-RELATED ISSUES 
The use of Individual respondent's perceptions of Issues, some of which were controversial, 
demanded great caution. It would not be prudent to attempt to analyse the results of this 
question based on the distribution across the structural variables such as SIC grouping. There 
would be little Inherent logic In such an analysis, since the perceptions 'belonged' to the 
respondent rather than the organisation. 
Nevertheless, since it was these respondents who largely controlled the overtime used, their views 
and perceptions were a valid area of concern. It was interesting to note where these views 
supported the previous literature, and where they did not. 68% of respondents to the survey felt 
that new technology would reduce the need for overtime, as did 60% for capital Investment. This 
supported the findings of Caulkin (1976) and Collons (1981) who both stated that technological 
progress and capital investment can remove the physical causes of overtime. Part of the 
fundamental rationale for this research, was that there would be significant change in the use of 
overtime In the coming years. This research was designed, in part, to provide the detailed 
Information needed to enable such change to progress in an orderly and controlled manner (see 
Section 1. ). 
The full set of results are set out in Figure 6-12 and the reader may wish to sift these for items of 
particular interest. Three such findings of those respondents making a choice, are given here as 
an example: 
f) 70% believed that unions would 'resist the reduction of overtime'; 
73% believed that'systematic overtime should be eliminated'; 











agree Agree Unsure Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Employees are dependent 83 24.6 51.3 8.5 12.1 3.6 
on overtime pay 
Unions would resist 70 13.3 41.4 21.2 19.2 4.9 
overtime reduction 
Employees manipulate 67 7.6 50.0 14.3 24.1 4.0 
productivity to secure overtime 
Supervisors overtime 71 8.2 49.5 19.1 17.7 5.5 
payments promote overtime 
Productivity In overtime Is 15 1.3 10.3 23.7 55.4 9.4 
higher than In normal time 
Overtime reduces 46 1.8 28.8 33.8 30.2 5.4 
productivity In normal time 
Overtime promotes or 50 4.9 34.1 21.5 33.2 6.3 
maintains unemployment 
Overtime is beneficial 38 2.7 20.3 39.2 29.7 8.1 
to the U. K. economy 
Capital investment would 60 5.8 31.3 37.9 23.7 1.3 
reduce future overtime levels 
New technology would reduce 68 8.0 42.9 25.4 22.8 0.9 
future overtime levels 
Increasing productivity would 74 6.3 50.0 24.1 19.2 0.4 
reduce future overtime levels 
Overtime helps recruitment, 66 4.9 46.0 21.4 24.6 3.1 
retention and motivation 
Overtime causes Industrial 1 44 5.9 28.1 23.1 37.1 5.9 
relations problems 
Systematic overtime 1 73 17.9 43.0 17.0 18.4 3.6 
should be eliminated 
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6.9 OVERTIME AND EMPLOYMENT 
The value of opinion in analysing the employment effects of the use or reduction of overtime is 
somewhat un-certain, and care Is needed In Interpreting these results. However, the respondents 
were generally the decision makers within the organisations surveyed. Therefore, their 
perceptions should be to some extent Indicative of their likely actions with regard to working time 
and employment decisions In the future. 
The issue of the worksharing impact of overtime working was addressed in the survey and again 
care is needed in using general perception and opinion as a basis for analysis. The question was 
nevertheless put and the results which were obtained are given below: 
QUESTION: In the event of worksharing, (ie. working hours reduction, Increased 
holidays, etc. ), what would be the effect on your overtime? 
FIGURE 6-13 
OVERTIME AND WORKSHARING 
Response: OVERTIME WOULD... (Percentage response) 
Increase Remain Decrease Unsure 
Stable 
In the Respondent's 
opinion, overtime would: 44.8 18.2 14.5 22.4 
Removing the unsure 
category, the valid 57.8 23.4 18.8 
percentage becomes: 
58% of respondents predicted that overtime would increase. Section 6.8 shows that 73% of 
respondents thought that 'systematic overtime should be eliminated'. Paradoxically, any 
Increase In overtime, as a result of worksharing measures, would be essentially systematic. The 
expectations of managers on matters such as these are central to the likely outcomes. It was 
these managers, after all, who would largely determine those outcomes. The so called overtime 
'leeching-effect' has been predicated and discussed in the literature (see Section 3.4.4) and on the 
evidence of this survey it remains a significant factor. The definition of 'overtime leeching' was 
given as: 'the proclivity for a reduction of basic hours to result in a smaller decrease In total hours 
due to a compensating increase In overtime'. 
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The worksharing question elicited the highest number of nil responses, in fact 60 respondents did 
not offer an answer, representing 26.7% of the returns. This was thought to be largely due to the 
fact that 20% of respondent organisations worked no overtime which rendered this particular 
question somewhat inapplicable to them. 
As the final survey question, the respondent was asked to choose between a range of responses 
to the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION: Overtime reduction on our establishment would result in Increased 
employment opportunities... (e. g., more full or part-time jobs, temporary workers, new 
shifts, etc. ). 
FIGURE 6-14 
OVERTIME AND EMPLOYMENT 
RESPONSE (Percentage response) 
Respondent's 
opinion: 
Summary of the 
Respondent's view 















There were 10 declined responses representing 4% of the returns. These nil responses were 
removed from the analysis in order to give a valid response. Again, there was little hope offered 
by this survey that managers believe there was any value in the use of overtime reduction as job 
creation measure. In fact, this response may have been subtly influenced by the 'defensive' 
stance which managers appear to adopt when faced with matters which could call into question 
their use of overtime. Managers with a social conscience would plainly not admit too freely that 
their policies and possible 'shortcuts' were adding to the unemployment problem. This matter 
can not be conclusively dealt with by the survey methodology; the case study phase should shed 
more light on the true mechanisms which were operating. 
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7 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY KEY STRUCTURAL VARIABLES 
7.1 CROSSTABULATION STATISTICS INTRODUCTION 
As with the previous section, the evidence below is presented in a rationally structured manner, to 
meet the database objectives. This evidence is subsequently gathered together, with the other 
evidence, under each specific issue, In Section 9 Further Analyses'. 
This section of the analysis draws upon only a small proportion of the many possible 
crosstabulations of the 150 variables. The Intention Is to illustrate some of the relationships, 
differences or lack of differences which have been discovered or Investigated. These statistics 
are presented In the Appendices and a selection of the tabulated findings are referred to In the 
relevant text. All variables were considered by reference to a predetermined set of Independent 
variables. These are referred to as the 'structural variables' and represent the factors used for the 
survey sample segmentation control. The lack of differences and associations, as well as the 
existence of these, can aid the understanding of a phenomenon or Issue and these are therefore 
occasionally highlighted In the analysis. 
Appendix 7-1 gives, for illustration, a sample of a single crosstabulation table showing 
establishment location, re-coded by North - South, as the Independent variable and the number of 
non-manual employees as the dependent variable. This example is intended to be illustrative of 
the range of statistics calculated for each of the separate crosstabulation values. Furthermore, it 
demonstrated an Important structural variable which affects the analysis of working time across 
the whole economy. 
A highly significant (p<0.01) difference was found between the number of non-manual employees 
in those regions defined 'North' from those defined 'South', with the South employing more non- 
manual staff as a proportion of the work force. This finding supported the published statistics 
regarding the regional structure of employment (NES 1989; Employment Gazette 1989). The NES 
(1988) indicated that the average non-manual employee worked only one quarter of the average 
manual worker's paid overtime. Thus there was an important structural difference in employment 
between the North and South. This qualification was given further weight by the highly significant 
(p<0.01) difference in level of normal hours worked between regions (see Appendix 7-2). This 
was again structurally based (NES 1988), in that non-manual staff tend to work longer hours in the 
South, (no significant regional differences were found in hours of work for manual employees). 
7.2. LOCATION RE-CODED NORTH - SOUTH 
The definition of the re-coded classes North and South Is given in Figure 6-1. It Is important to 
bring Into context the now common assertion of a'North - South divide'. The Conservative 
government, In the 1980s, rejected the Keynslan approach of a regional policy, of subsidies and 
strict planning constraints (in favour of the 'North'), and took the market based approach; 
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notwithstanding the problem that the 'market' was structurally imperfect, particularly the labour 
market (Smith 1989). Those regions defined South represented 38% of the land area, but 
account for 58% of the population and more than 62% of GDP. Estimates by Cambridge 
Econometrics indicated that, during the period 1979-88, economic growth rates in the South were 
well above those in the North (Smith 1989); viz: 
FIGURE 7-1 
REGIONAL GROWTH RATES 
Growth Rate 1979-88 (°. 6) 
South East (including Greater London) 23.3 
East Anglia 44.5 
South West 29.9 
East Midlands 25.5 
West Midlands 17.9 
Yorkshire & Humberside 20.0 
North 16.3 
North West 12.4 
Wales 15.9 
Scotland 17.5 
Northern Ireland 17.6 
Surveys have consistently shown the South to have the fastest growing and most prosperous 
towns In the U. K. (Smith 1989). The population was still moving, on balance, from the North, to 
the service-dominated economy of the South. The labour market had tightened to 1989, the 
middle phase of this research, and unemployment had fallen faster in the South than In the North. 
It was claimed that the key structural regional imbalances Include: skilled labour shortages; 
restrictive practices and labour Immobility (Smith 1989). 
There was, of course, an alternative argument which supported the monetarist approach to 
macro-economic management. In such an analysis, regional imbalances were accepted as the 
price of a more dynamic, responsive economy. In addition, the uneven distribution of income and 
rewards was thought to promote enterprise and initiative. The unemployment black-spots of the 
'North' were said to have enjoyed good growth over the last decade and were certainly better off 
than they had been previously (Smith 1989), even though the'gap' had become relatively wider. 
A sample of the crosstabulation results, by regional location, is set out in Appendix 7-2 A'North - 
South divide' clearly emerged from this analysis, with the bias tending towards greater prosperity 
In the South. For example, employee numbers were predicted to grow at a faster rate In the 
South and labour turnover was much higher, (indicating greater mobility, confidence and 
opportunity In the labour market). In further support of the bias towards greater Southern 
prosperity, shortages of both skilled (significance p=0.02) and unskilled labour (significance 
p=0.07) were more frequently Indicated in the South as reasons for overtime working. Moreover, 
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long-term demand uncertainty, 'outlook uncertain' (significance p=0.03) was much less significant 
in the South. 
The South had apparently greater manpower demands and difficulties, viz. greater levels of: labour 
turnover, higher future demand for staff and skill and labour shortages. Yet, paradoxically, less 
use was made in the South of formal manpower planning techniques. This may tend to increase 
dependency on overtime working as the proverbial 'permanent stop-gap measure'; rather than the 
sound and well thought-out management of capacity and demand. 
There was no discernible difference between the North and South in the unionisation of non- 
manual staff. However, the North appeared to be more unionised than the South for manual 
workers, although this difference was not significant (p=0.33). There was no regional difference 
In the trend towards Increasing or decreasing unionisation, for either manual or non-manual staff. 
Interestingly, there was also little regional difference reported In employee attitudes to overtime 
working with employee demand in the South reported at 28% as opposed to 23% for the North, 
(not significant, p=0.68). As was explained In Section 6.2.4, this was hearsay evidence and the 
case studies should be used to give a more powerful analysis of employee attitude. The weak 
but discernible difference was similar to that found for'low pay protection', with the South tending 
towards a more significant low pay syndrome. This would tend to support the difference found In 
employee attitude, and the greater proportion of low paid, service based female employment. 
There was a greater tendency to work'no overtime' in the North, (24% North, 11 % South; 
significance p=0.02), yet manual workers, who tended to work overtime more often, formed a 
greater proportion of the work force in the 'North' (NES 1988). This result was therefore 
extremely significant and challenged the common perception of overtime as a function of the 
Northern 'flat cap' culture. 
There were no significant regional differences, where overtime was worked, in the amount of 
overtime per employee, the pro-rata premiums paid to non-manuals or manuals and the various 
times of the week when overtime was worked. The examples given in Appendix 7-2 were typical 
of the whole range of results on patterns of overtime work and remuneration. There was however 
a clear and consistent, if somewhat weak difference between premiums paid in the North and 
those paid in the South the latter being generally greater. This would support the 'demand-pull' 
theory which associates the increased use of overtime with employee demand created by higher 
premiums. 
The regional differences of reasons for the use of overtime were only significant for'skill 
shortages' and 'outlook uncertainty' which are discussed above, and 'regular maintenance' which 
was less likely to be a reason for overtime working in the South (significance p=0.02), reflecting 
the structural difference in the type of industry. To a lesser extent, the 'reason' differences of 
'unskilled labour shortage' (significance p=0.07) and 'emergency cover' (significance p=0.10), 
were biased towards the South. There were no other significant differences in the reasons given 
for the use of overtime working. 
There were few notable regional differences in the specific control techniques adopted for 
overtime. It was again telling that, on the Issues of for management overall policy, perceived 
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union policy and level of supervision, the South fell well short of the standards achieved in the 
North. This may help to explain the greater use made of overtime In organisations in the South, in 
spite of their tendency to be biased towards the'lower-overtime' service industries compared to 
their Northern counterparts. 
On the question of keeping records of overtime working, other than for payment purposes, the 
North, with 48% of organisations maintaining records, were again higher achievers than the South, 
with only 38%. This lack of fundamental information at plant management level was also found, in 
a general sense, by White (1980), who discovered that the greater proportion of managers did not 
keep records of the amount and frequency of overtime worked by their staff. These managers 
had therefore to rely on their perceptions and judgement alone, in making overtime decisions 
(White 1980). 
Organisations In the South could plainly be seen to work more overtime and, where differences in 
controls existed, fewer formal management controls were used in the South. This seemed, at 
face value, to deny the hypothesis that 'overtime Is not associated with poor management'. 
However, one might Intuitively feel the structural Influence of the size of organisation, sector type 
and sex of worker and working hours, were in reality more important variables than that of 
'regional location' in this respect. 
There were no significant regional differences concerning the factors inhibiting the reduction of 
overtime. However, although not statistically significant, it was fascinating to note that longer 
term uncertainty was less significant as an inhibitor of overtime reduction in the South and it was 
comforting to note that this supported the finding reported earlier in this section, that 'outlook 
uncertainty' was less-often given in the South as a reason for overtime working. It was also 
Interesting to note that, in the South, more significance was placed on the protection of those on 
low pay, than in the North, although this was not statistically significant (p=0.47). 
7.3 INDUSTRIAL SECTOR RE-CODED SERVICE - NON-SERVICE 
The definition of the re-coded industrial sectors as service and non-service is set out in Figure 6-1. 
A sample of the crosstabulation results is set out In Appendix 7-3 and a few examples of these 
findings are discussed below. The service sector made less use of manpower planning 
(significance p<0.01). Ironically, the service sector, exhibited more positive employment trends, 
both over the past 5 years and anticipated for the future. Normal hours in the service industry 
tended to be lower than those in the non-service sector, particularly for manual workers, reflecting 
In part the structural differences of greater proportion of female and part-time workers. There was 
no difference In reported employee attitudes to overtime working, with only 7% in both sectors, 
likely to resist the opportunity to work longer hours. 
In the non-service industries only 9% of employees worked 'no overtime' at all, while 30% of 
employees worked more than ten hours per week. In the service sector the equivalent figures 
were 30% working 'no overtime' and only 16% working more than ten hours, these differences 
being highly significant (p<0.01). Likewise, there were significant differences In overtime 
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premiums with a tendency for higher rates to be paid in the service sector to both manual and 
non-manual employees, at all times of the working week. The examples given in Appendix 7-3 are 
typical of the range of results covering premiums, with the exception of manual overtime premium 
rates for Saturday afternoon, Sunday and holidays, which were lower In the service sector which 
was a function of its employment structure. These results superficially support Ehrenberg and 
Schumann's findings (1982) that penalty, (viz. high), premium rates reduce overtime levels, (ie. the 
employee'demand pull' theory), but this should not be taken as sound evidence in view of the 
structural differences between sectors. For Instance, there were more female and part-time 
workers in the service sector (White 1984) and these important independent variables clearly had 
a great influence. 
Another key difference was the anticipated effect of worksharing measures, (such as the 
introduction of a shorter working week or longer holidays); which appeared to be highly sector 
dependent. Some 66% of non-service establishments believed that overtime would increase in 
the event of worksharing, against only 47% of those establishments in the service sector 
(significance p<0.01). This was further evidence that overtime was to a large extent a function of 
culture and tradition, tending to become institutionalised and accepted custom and practice. 
The sectoral differences In reasons claimed for overtime working were very significant. The non- 
service sector more frequently cited: skill shortages; unskilled labour shortages; long term outlook 
uncertainty; maintenance; cost effectiveness; increased utilisation and emergency cover. There 
was, however, no sectoral difference in the use of overtime to meet normal demand or to Increase 
low basic pay to acceptable levels. In part support of this, low pay protection was given equal 
weighting by the sectors as a factor Inhibiting the potential reduction of overtime. in comparison, 
the service sector was significantly (p=0.01) less inhibited in the reduction of overtime by factors 
such as 'Impeding productivity or service levels' and 'increased costs'. 
There were few significant differences in the management and control of overtime but those 
differences which were apparent all pointed towards a less formal and less structured approach to 
overtime management in service industries. The only exception was the use of guaranteed 
overtime, which was used by 10% of service and only 3% of non-service establishments and while 
being superficially a'management tool' Is in many circumstances, highly questionable in 
application. 
7.4 SIZE OF ESTABLISHMENT RE-CODED BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 
Size of establishment was defined, (Figure 6-1 qv), by total number of employees and a sample of 
the crosstabulation result is set out in Appendix 7-4. The review of the existence and extent of 
differences, as a function of size, was necessary in order to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of overtime practices. Not surprisingly there were very important significant 
differences such as with smaller organisations which were predictably found to be less unionised 
and made less use of manpower plans. Employment trends show that larger organisations 
anticipated a lower increase in employment in the future. The analysis confirmed the common 
perception that absenteeism was significantly (p<0.01) lower In smaller organisations where 
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working hours were significantly (p<0.01) longer. Analysis of the anticipated effect of 
worksharing measures showed that it was perceived that it would cause overtime to increase 
more in medium sized establishments of 20 to 200 staff, than In either small or large organisations. 
There was no 'size' effect in employee attitudes to overtime working. 
The amount of overtime worked was associated with the size of organisation with smaller 
organisations more often working 'no overtime' and, when overtime was worked, medium sized 
establishments worked longer hours on average than either large of small organisations. The 
results clearly illustrated that the larger the organisation, the greater the overtime premium for all 
patterns of overtime working and for both manual and non-manual staff. 
There was a possibility, albeit at a low level, of Interplay on this statistic from other variables in that 
both the level of unionisation and non-service sector establishments tended also to be positively 
correlated to size. It was fascinating to note that this phenomenon has been found in other 
countries, Including Japan where the minimum overtime premium was set by statute at 25%, this 
was exceeded in 38.5% of large establishments compared with only 16.2% of medium sized and 
6.2% of small establishments. There appeared, however, to be no significant differences in 
overtime working patterns and the examples set out in Appendix 7-4 were typical of the whole 
range of results for both premiums and working patterns. 
Significant differences were found In the reasons given by management for overtime working. For 
example, regular maintenance, shift patterns and plant utilisation were, predictably, all cited 
progressively more as the size of establishment Increased. Interestingly, large organisations 
made significantly (p=0.01) more use of overtime for normal demand which was a function clearly 
associated with the systematic and inefficient use of overtime. Large establishments also made 
more use of overtime to Increase low basic pay to acceptable levels. Small organisations, which 
were shown to enjoy lower absenteeism levels, naturally made less use of overtime for that 
purpose. 
A number of predictable and highly significant differences in the management and control of 
overtime working were reported with smaller organisations making less use of budgets, overtime 
embargoes, exclusions on who was paid for overtime and the forward scheduling, authorisation 
and monitoring of overtime. Medium sized organisations made the greatest use of Mandatory 
overtime. The adoption of an overall management control policy for overtime, and the level of 
supervision during overtime were, intriguingly, no greater in large than in small organisations and 
medium sized establishments appeared to be less formal in both these respects. 
7.5 AMOUNT OF OVERTIME WORKED RE-CODED 
BY HOURS PER WEEK PER EMPLOYEE 
The average number of hours overtime per week per employee was analysed and a sample of the 
crosstabulation results Is set out in Appendix 7-5. The lack of manpower plans was significantly 
(p=0.01) linked to longer overtime hours. Unexpectedly, rising current demand did not 
significantly correlate with higher overtime and this reflected the extent to which overtime was 
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systematic within the economy. Increasing employee numbers In the past (significance p<0.01) 
was positively correlated with longer overtime hours, as might be expected. Ironically, 
unionisation appeared to be linked to longer hours of overtime which highlighted the TUC's 
overtime dichotomy of 'central resistance but local demand' and showed that local demand 
appeared still to be winning. 
The results of the worksharing questions were remarkable in that the longer the overtime hours the 
greater was the anticipated tendency for any cut in normal hours to result In yet further increases 
In overtime. This was the so called 'leeching effect' where the reduction of normal hours causes 
overtime to rise (see Section 3.4.4). This finding Indicated that overtime was largely systematic 
and tended to become embedded In culture and tradition. Intriguingly, the tendency for lower 
normal hours to be positively associated with lower overtime levels was highly significant for both 
manual and non-manual staff. This can not be taken as denying the Leeching effect since it was 
likely that organisations which made the more discriminating use of overtime were also those 
which were more progressive and therefore enjoyed better conditions of work and, it seems 
rational, higher hourly productivity rates. It could well be that the relationship was dichotomous 
and further research is necessary to establish this. 
There were few differences found between the size of the overtime premium and amount of 
overtime worked. There was, however, a significant, rational and predictable relationship 
between overtime working patterns and the amount of overtime. For instance, longer overtime 
hours correlated positively with the consistent use of specific times for overtime working, eg. 
Saturday mornings. No particular relationships were found between longer overtime hours and 
the reasons for overtime, the exceptions being: low pay protection and temporary or seasonal 
demand, which were positively correlated. 
An Important finding was that the use of overtime to meet normal demand, and the closely 
associated use of overtime as a more cost effective means of meeting normal demand, were both 
positively correlated with overtime hours. This further highlighted the systemisation of overtime 
and Indicated rejection of the hypothesis that 'overtime promotes operational flexibility'. 
The crosstabuiation results for the management of overtime broadly indicated that the use of 
controls such as budgets, embargoes, exclusions, forward scheduling and authorisation systems, 
correlate negatively with high overtime levels. This finding tended to support Intuitive logic and 
clearly Indicated that overtime was indeed associated with poor management. On the other 
hand, controls such as mandatory overtime (significance p=0.13) and overtime commitment 
schemes (significance p=0.22) were positively correlated to overtime levels, again was as 
expected, even though in these cases the correlation was rather weak. 
Surprisingly, however, the results showed that where limits on overtime levels were adopted, there 
was a clear tendency for overtime levels to be higher. This suggested that the management 
'control' either tended to be used more where overtime was already very high, or that the limits' 
acted as surrogate targets with tacit or implied authorisation. If the latter was found to be the 
case by ethnographic based research, this would add weight to the thesis that overtime is in such 
instances both systematic and associated with ineffective management. 
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g CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The overall 'Schedule of Case Studies' Is set out in Appendix 8-1. Eleven service sector 
organisations were studied in depth, covering 26 separate establishments, employing 9,550 staff. 
During the course of these studies, 261 interviews were conducted, covering all levels of 
management, all sub-categories of employee and employees' local representatives. 
A brief summary report for each of the case studies follows in this setcion. The reader will 
become aware that there is a need to compare these cases and to seek explanations for the 
phenomena and contrasts which were discovered. Such interpretation and comparative analysis 
is embodied in Section 9.2, this section presents the summarised findings for each individual case. 
The reader will also note that these are summary reports, a sample of more detailed case study 
reports are given as Appendices 8.2,8.3 and 8.4. The reader is urged to explore these fuller 
reports which give a clearer understanding of the extent and detailed methodology of the case 
studies. These appendices sample each of the major economic sectors which were reviewed, 
representing: 8-2 Case 1, Police Forces; 8-3 Case 5, Wholesale and Retail Distribution and 8- 
4 Case 10, Public Sector. 
The case study phase of the research was designed to assist in testing the research hypotheses 
and to uncover the more detailed information which could not be obtained from the general 
survey. These cases were selected to be representative of a range of applications of overtime, 
from its legitimate and efficient use, to its unnecessary and ineffective use. 
The general research objectives, given in Section 4.1, were interpreted as requiring, of the case  
study phase the following investigation: 
The discovery of detailed information regarding the use of overtime within certain 
industries; 
ii) The investigation of the management of overtime; 
Iii) A review of the implications of overtime for the employer and employee. 
The specific research questions and hypotheses are listed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 respectively and 
therefore are not repeated here. It must be stressed that each case offered evidence on a range 
of the questions and hypotheses, but did not necessarily cover all of these. The reports outline 
the essence of the case and include a listing of the key points which related directly to the 
research questions and hypotheses. This account of 'Points Arising' conforms to a standardised 
structure for ease of cross-reference, and this Is outlined below: 
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CASE STUDY POINTS ARISING: STANDARD STRUCTURE 
A The general strategy towards overtime; 
B The consequences of the strategy on: 
1 Corporate objectives; 
2 Employment; 
C The management of overtime, particularly the: 
1 Overtime decision, 
2 Overtime procedural and administrative control systems in use, 
3 Pragmatic work-place supervision of overtime, 
4 Management understanding of the 'real' processes involved; 
5 Consideration and implementation of alternatives to overtime; 
D The extent of systematic overtime; 
E The actual and perceived reasons for the use of overtime; 
F The effect of overtime on: 
1 Operational Flexibility; 
2 Corporate Flexibility; 
G Attitudes towards overtime: 
1 Management; 
2 Employees; 
H The levels of overtime premla and non-wage labour costs; 
1 The cost effectiveness of overtime; 
J Peripheral matters: 
1 TOIL; 
2 Unpaid overtime; 
3 Overtime pay for supervisors; 
4 Employee manipulation of overtime; 
5 The relationship between overtime and absenteeism; 
6 Overtime payments to supervisors; 
7 Positions taken by local employee representatives; 
8 Employee welfare; 
9 The extent of low-paid worker 'dependency' on overtime earnings. 
The data was gathered by means of semi-structured interviews with representatives of all levels of 
management and supervision, workers and official employee representatives, where this was 
possible. A common structure of questioning was used for all cases and types of Interviewee. 
However, significant differences developed depending on the particular areas of Interest which 
presented as the circumstances were unravelled. In addition, the time spent at each particular 
establishment, and the extent to which the researcher became ethnographically involved In the 
processes under Investigation, varied according to potential value of the information which was 
forthcoming. In the event, the case studies proved a necessary and valuable step in establishing 




CASE STUDY SUMMARY REPORTS 
Police Force A 
Type of Organisation 
Location 
Number of Employees 
Sector 
CASE NUMBER 1 
Police Force A 
South-East/Midlands 
1060 Police and 490 Civilians 
Public Administration, Police 
Service (SIC 1980,913) 
HEADLINE: 
An English Non-Metropolitan Police Force, which had reduced overtime by more than 
50%, essentially by the management decision to cut the overtime budget. 
SUMMARY 
This summary does not give all the detailed evidence supporting the 'Points Arising'. The reader 
is referred to the full account of this case which is included in this thesis as Appendix 8-2. 
In essence, this case illustrates that the primary requirement for overtime reduction, can simply be 
the senior management determination to achieve the reduction. Overtime in the Police Force is in 
some ways not relevant to overtime in other sectors, although there were a number of general 
lessons to be obtained from the police case studies. 
This and the other Police Force studies were focused on serving Police Officers rather than 
civilians who worked very little overtime. Force A had cut overtime from a level around 17% of 
basic salaries and NI In the early 1980s, to 7% last year. The overtime budget had been cut by 
26.5% In real terms over the previous three years. Detection rates had improved over the same 
period but there was no evidence to link corporate objective achievement with levels of overtime. 
The cut in overtime was achieved through a specific management initiative, promulgated by the 
Chief Constable, with the objective of providing funds to employ more officers. There was no 
clear evidence of any fundamental link between overtime hours and additional employment. 
Some officers believed that overtime should increase pro-rata with any manpower increases. It 
was argued that demand so outstripped the potential supply of man hours, and operational needs 
were so great, that each new officer would effectively bring with him his own overtime 'quota'. 
However, the Chief Constable did not entirely subscribe to this analysis and was continuing a 
policy of moving funds from the overtime budget in order to recruit more officers. 
The mechanism used to cut overtime was simply the decision to cut the overtime budget and to 
control overtime tightly to that budget. No other substantive changes, Cie. working methods, 
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training, working time structures, payment systems, etc. ), were made to facilitate the overtime 
reduction. Of course, the organisational means of communicating clearly this corporate intention, 
and the ability to measure and control the overtime at operational level, were well developed and 
greatly assisted the Chief Constable in his achievement of corporate intention. 
Middle management and the officers made efforts to resist the reduction of overtime, but had been 
unsuccessful in the face of senior management determination. All officers accepted overtime as 
part of their job. About two thirds of Police Officers would have liked more overtime to be 
available, the motivations for this being the extra pay and increased job satisfaction. Indeed, 
there were strong moves from officers and lower levels of management, for increased overtime 
opportunities. These were reported in the local press some time after the case study was 
completed. Many officers, however, found that their performance was denigrated by excessive 
hours and this matter is covered more fully in Appendix 8-2. Excessive sickness had become a 
problem and this was associated with Increasing stress In the job and the unsocial hours, and was 
exacerbated by overtime working. 
There was little general direct involvement in the use of overtime from the Police Federation, (in 
effect, *the Police 'trade union'). There was, however, a major exception to this laissez-faire 
attitude, the Superintendent's Association', (in effect, middle management), had attempted to 
resist any further reduction of overtime, principally by bringing formal pressure on the Chief 
Constable with respect to the policy on future overtime budgets. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS CASE 
A The corporate strategy of a clear, well communicated and determined decision to cut 
overtime, and to maintain pressure on budgets to hold overtime at the lower level was 
remarkably successful In this particular Force. 
B There was no evidence, either from the Force-level statistics, or at the level of the individual 
officer, that the recent reductions of overtime had in any way impeded the effectiveness of 
the organisation. 
As regards employment, there was no evidence of any fundamental link between overtime 
hours and staffing levels. Indeed, irrespective of the theoretical arguments, the clear 
pragmatic effect of the policy to reduce overtime was Increased employment. Paid 
overtime In Force A, after the recent reductions, was equivalent to 112 full time officers. 
Managers tended to consider paid overtime as the total overtime. However, total overtime 
was 43% higher than the paid overtime due to TOIL and unpaid overtime. 
The'overtime decision' at the corporate level was carefully and professionally considered. 
However, at the operational level, there was little understanding or consideration of the cost 
and consequences of overtime working, it was seen simply as a 'convenient tool'. Sound 
and properly applied management systems were established for the control of that overtime 
which was worked. Without those controls it would clearly have been more difficult to 
reduce overtime and to maintain the lower overtime levels. 
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There was considerable evidence regarding the quality and application of overtime 
management at the middle and lower levels. For example, the tendency for managers to 
mis-perceive the real reasons overtime was being used; the'use all we can get' philosophy 
of middle management; an inability to schedule ahead sufficiently to cover anticipated 
events; the fact that overtime tended to be budget, rather than operationally driven, etc. 
Indeed, with anything other than the most resolute corporate belief and direction, overtime 
would not have been cut and the additional jobs would not have been created. 
A number of alternatives to overtime working had been considered at corporate level. 
However, there was no fundamentally rigorous equation for the exchange of overtime hours 
with additional bought-in hours, in the particular circumstances of the Police Force. 
D About 75% of the overtime was systematic, in that it was predictable and often pre-planned 
and avoidable by various means, although the cost-effectiveness of the alternatives could 
not be estimated from this case study. 
E Overtime was largely used to deal with work which could be anticipated and controlled 
within normal hours, given professional scheduling and control of the workload and a more 
appropriate shift system; (it should be noted that the shift system was essentially a function 
of home office controlled Police Regulations and not in the control of local management). 
F About 25% of the overtime was used to give operational flexibility. The major proportion of 
overtime, however, did not enhance operational flexibility, or the flexibility could have been 
achieved in more appropriate ways. Overtime had no impact on corporate flexibility in the 
context Intended in hypothesis H7. 
G Lower and middle management resisted reductions In overtime levels and changes in 
practices such as the recent more rigorous formal control procedures. It was difficult to 
generalise about officer (worker) attitudes to overtime. About 60% wanted more, 20% were 
happy with the current levels and 20% resisted overtime. These attitudes followed the 
commonly perceived norms of younger male officers, with family responsibilities, tending to 
actively seek more overtime; while older and female officers tended to avoid overtime. 
However, there were a wide number of exceptions to this rule. For instance, a middle aged 
CID officer, sought very long hours, exclusively because he had no preferred use of his 
time; and an older, senior ranking officer, who'put in the hours' because he believed this 
would enable him to'do a better job'. 
H Overtime was more cost effective than increasing police strength. The balance between 
the fundamental variables was: 52% average premium cost of overtime hours; 66% non- 
wage labour cost of hiring new staff. The high NWLCs resulted from a pension of 30% and 
substantial rent allowances. 
Overtime often caused a fall in the effectiveness of individual officers, although this was not 
generally recognised by management. 
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J TOIL accounted for about 25 % of overtime, equivalent to 28 full time jobs In the Force. 
TOIL was often used by officers as a means of avoiding capture by the 'excessive paid 
overtime' control system. Women officers and older officers had a greater tendency to use 
TOIL, without the ulterior motive described above. A significant amount of unpaid overtime 
was worked, generally by higher ranking officers, but also by a small number of dedicated 
lower ranking officers, particularly in CID. Police Officers were able to, and on occasions 
did, 'create' overtime. 
Overtime was claimed by Individual officers to be a cause of casual absenteeism. 
However, the statistics showed absenteeism to have increased as overtime had declined. 
There was no set pattern at the individual level, with some high overtime workers exhibiting 
low absenteeism while others exhibit high absenteeism. Overtime working, along with the 
unsocial shift system, adversely affected the quality of life for Police Officers, in some 
instances, to a very significant degree. Welfare was an area of increasing concern in all 
Police Forces and it was clear that the quality of service offered was adversely affect by the 
use of excessive hours. The greater the notice given to the officer to work overtime, the 
less disruptive the impact of that overtime was on the officer's private life. 
Local Federation officials had not given any lead on the use of overtime, nor had the local 
officials received any guidance from their central organisation. The Superintendents' 
Association were actively resisting any further reduction of overtime. Pay levels were 
excellent. It was clear that only a very few, generally younger male officers with family 
responsibilities, relied on their overtime earnings for their fixed financial commitments, and 
this was usually a transitory phase. 
8.2.2 Police Force B CASE NUMBER 2 
Type of Organisation Police Force B 
Location North 
Number of Employees 2300 Police Officers, 750 Civilian Staff 
Sector Public Administration, Police 
Service (SIC 1980,913) 
HEADLINE: 
An English Non-Metropolitan Police Force, exercising excellent and innovative control of 
overtime for the benefit of both the organisation and the individual officer. An example 
of the association between controlled overtime and sound management practice. 
144 
SUMMARY 
Great pride was taken by this Force in the standards of management generally, and not least in 
their pro-active management of overtime. It was felt at the corporate level and, to a lesser degree, 
throughout the organisation, that tight control of overtime levels, within a specific policy of 
containment, helped both the individual officer and the Force. These attitudes were found to be 
justified. 
Civilian overtime was very low, accounting for only £130 per employee per year, therefore this 
study concentrated on police overtime. As in all Forces, manpower represented the greatest 
element of costs, standing at 83.4° of total Force B costs. The 'official' Force policy was that 
overtime should be used for operational policing only. 
In the early 1980s the systematic use of overtime, for conferences and paperwork, was stopped as 
part of the governing County Council policy to reduce overtime and create more jobs. In 
addition, there was a move towards the tighter control of overtime through the Initiative of a 
particular individual who joined the Force In 1983 and found overtime to be then 'out of control'. 
Overtime had since been reduced to below half the levels which existed In the early 1980s. This 
had been achieved by the establishment of firm and clear corporate leadership supported by a 
specific policy of moving money from the overtime budget to fund Increased manpower, and 
introducing new controls for remaining overtime. Overtime during the study represented 4.3%, 
(Non-metropolitan average 7.7%), of basic salaries (CIPFA Estimates 1989). 
There was no evidence that either the effectiveness of the Force had been adversely affected by 
the cut In overtime, or the Force achieved at a lower rate of 'success' than the Non-Metropolitan 
'average'. Overall, 37.8% of offences were detected in 1988, an improvement on the Force's 
achievement over recent years and reflecting a similar pattern of achievement in other Forces. 
Force B had for many years 'represented' a relatively high crime area, exhibiting known serious 
crime about two thirds higher than the Non-Metropolitan average. 
Overtime was classified within this Force by'reason', with so called 'pots' of overtime provision 
maintained separately. These'pots' comprised: 
i) Special services (eg. football, for which the 'client' may pay directly); 
ii) ACC's (Assistant Chief Constable's) major incidents account; 
Ili) Bank holidays; 
Iv) Court duties; ' 
v) General operational overtime (including absenteeism cover). 
General operational overtime accounted for about 45% of total overtime, while the ACC's pot 
accounted for about 25%. The amount of overtime in the bank holiday pot depended on the 
number of bank holidays to the financial year, which could vary from 8 to 12, depending on the 
date of Easter. When the ACC's overtime budget was likely to be under-spent, a policy decision 
was taken to switch funds between budgets before the year end, in order to find special initiatives. 
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Notwithstanding the above analysis, about a third of the Force's overtime was systematic, in that it 
was 'predictable'. Although this did not mean that the overtime was ineffective, on the contrary, 
the use of overtime to cover predictable events, particularly in the Police Force circumstances, 
could reflect sound management of resources. For instance, the use of overtime to staff bank 
holidays, special services and court duties could all be classified as avoidable to a degree. 
Overtime was allocated to divisions from the general operational 'pot' on a manpower-based 
formula. Within this formula, CID were allocated four times the pro-rata level of uniformed 
officers' overtime. There were moves to consider more sophisticated ways to allocate operational 
overtime. For instance, based on specific crime rates, rather than simply on manpower, where 
each officer attracted his 'quota' of overtime, irrespective of need. 
According to a number of senior officers, Police Regulations, which control working hours in all 
forces and were established by the Home Office, were too restrictive and enforced a great deal of 
systematic overtime. They prevented systems being developed which would enable'pianned 
policing' to deliver the manpower at times of peak demand In normal working hours. Officers 
stated that Regulations were often 'interpreted' in order to achieve better policing. 
Management systems for the control of overtime were relatively advanced and were rigorously 
and professionally Implemented. Prior authorisation needed to be obtained in all but the most 
exceptional circumstances. Allocation was strictly by volunteer or rota depending on the 
circumstances and mandatary overtime was quite rare. Budgets were strictly applied, right down 
to sub-divisional, Duty Inspector level, and, most unusually, were based on an assessment of the 
operational needs for the coming year, rather than on a negotiation based on the previous years 
levels. All officers had to complete an overtime claim form which recorded In some detail the 
circumstances and reasons for the overtime. These forms were analysed using a spread sheet 
programme and were actively used for control purposes. 
A senior officer told of 'howls of anguish' from line management officers when these new levels of 
accountability and control were introduced, he went onto say: 'but they have done a good job in 
bringing overtime down, reducing the abuses, making overtime more effective and saving officers 
'from themselves' and 'for their families'. These systems were now fully accepted and worked 
well. The report on overtime consumption was originally a financial report but was developing 
into a more useful management report, giving details of the reasons and circumstances of the 
overtime. 
Innovative systems had been developed to motivate line management to husband overtime 
resources more carefully. For instance, any overtime unspent, (saved), from the monthly budget 
was split 50% to the ACC's account, and 50% was retained by the department which had saved it. 
Officers at the operational level would have liked to have been able to retain more than 50%, but 
all agreed that the system genuinely motivated them to be more prudent and some used the 
scheme to keep overtime resources 'up their sleeve' in case of unexpected events. Prior to this 
system, under-spending the overtime budget was unknown. One sub-divisional commander 
stated that he 'now only gives out one sixth of his monthly total per week'. He stated that what 
ever he puts out would be seen as the 'target to be used' and would be quickly 'used up' by the 
Duty Inspectors, (line managers), who he said 'do not manage overtime properly'. In this way he 
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kept back an amount which he could use: 'to stay out of trouble if the unexpected happens'. In 
short, he was now actively managing his situation, using overtime as a tool to help him. 
The relationship of 'more men, less overtime' was seen as fatuous. Some officers put the case of 
the 'success trap', viz. the better the Police Officer, the more arrests and therefore the more 
operational and court-duty overtime needed by that officer. Others stated the arguments 
rehearsed in Case 1 regarding 'infinite' demand. 
There was a feeling within the lower to middle ranks that the Special Constabulary effectively 
'robbed' the uniformed officers of overtime opportunities. For Instance, at football matches and 
fetes, etc. This was Indicative of attitude towards overtime. Older members of the Force recalled 
that, up to the mid 1980s, there was an attitude among most officers that 'each must get his share 
of overtime'. This attitude had now disappeared and uniformed officers were altogether more 
relaxed about overtime. It appeared that the Officers' expectations of the availability of overtime 
had been adjusted to the policy of very restricted overtime opportunities and demand had fallen 
off as a direct consequence of this. Some Officers still sought overtime and took every 
opportunity to work the extra hours for the extra money. However, others were Increasingly 
putting a higher value on their family lives, and were resisting the Increasing 'job-stress' by 
reducing the time spent at work. One older officer told of how he'now looked back with sadness 
at twisted priorities', having missed his children growing up, due to long hours of work. 
Pay levels were excellent and this was said by some officers to have contributed to the reduction 
In their demand for overtime. Dependency on overtime pay was quite rare with only a few, 
generally younger officers falling into this trap. For instance, one officer was Interviewed who was 
25 year old, married with two children. He had a mortgage of £32,000 and earned £11,300 plus 
£212 per month rent allowance. He sought all the overtime he could obtain and specialised on 
working the Friday/Saturday night 'lates' with football duty on Saturday afternoons. He told of his 
tiredness during the week but said this was: 'the price to pay for getting on in the world'. 
It was widely acknowledged In this Force that long hours can adversely affect welfare, as one 
officer stated 'men get tired, quality drops off, they become wooden, I could not even conduct an 
intelligent conversation on Monday morning with... after his weekend overtime'. Indeed another 
officer related the story of Sgt Challenor of the London Metropolitan Force, who In the 1960s used 
excessive overtime as the prime reason causing his stress and Irrational acts, In order to escape a 
criminal prosecution. 
Interestingly, a welfare officer told of the use of overtime by some officers as a'social avoidance 
tool', in contrasted with the 'anti-social' effects that overtime had on other officers. In other 
words, some officers prefer work to the alternative uses of their time, similar to the Fishwick (1979) 
theory (described In Section 3.3.10). Officers were adversely affected by 'stop-go' overtime, 
where it was withdrawn for a period of a few months, generally due to budgetary constraints. 
There were many examples found of long hours causing serious domestic problems and even 
medical retirements, particularly In the past when overtime level were less controlled. 
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Any officer working more than 40 hours overtime In the month was automatically 'reviewed' by a 
senior officer. TOIL was used extensively, accounting for 25% of total overtime, and was seen as 
a means of officers circumventing the control procedures. There were moves to bring TOIL under 
more direct and rigorous control. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS CASE 
AA sound and well communicated corporate policy on overtime was established. The 
strategy was to constrain its use by tight budgetary controls and administrative procedures, 
and to focus its use on increasing operational flexibility and cost-effectively manning special 
situations within the constraints of Police Regulations. 
B Overtime generally helped this Force to attain its corporate objectives and the reduction of 
overtime did not appear to have denigrated performance of the force at the corporate level. 
Overtime reduction had resulted directly in increased employment. 
C The overtime decision was carefully considered at the corporate level and policy was 
formally reviewed annually. Overtime controls were innovative and professionally applied. 
Management were making efforts, with some success, to understand the real process and 
effects of overtime working. Moreover, alternatives to overtime working were actively being 
considered. 
D About 30% of overtime was systematic although this largely represented an effective use of 
the resource. The use of overtime was correctly understood by management at the more 
senior levels. The key reason for overtime being the achievement of greater operational 
flexibility, which was generally successful. 
G Senior management accepted the well established lower levels of overtime. Lower levels of 
management and the officers were, however, divided in attitude. About half the officers 
sought increased overtime, for reasons of money and job satisfaction; a quarter were happy 
with the current levels and the other quarter avoided extra hours, but were content to work 
these if they were unavoidable due to operational circumstances. 
H The average overtime premia was 53% of basic pay, while the non-wage labour costs 
amounted to 63% of basic. Overtime was, therefore, at the primary level of analysis, a 
cost-effective means of satisfying demand relative to the alternative of recruiting and 
training more officers. 
TOIL accounted for about 25% of total overtime. TOIL was more prevalent with older and 
women officers. However, TOIL was Increasingly being used to avoid the paid overtime 
control systems. Unpaid overtime was worked only by senior officers and a small number 
of other ranks, such as Community Affairs staff. Typically, a Chief Inspector told of usual 
levels of 12 hours per week, with some paperwork taken home, he said 'its expected of 
these ranks'. 
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Officer manipulation to obtain overtime was said by a number of the management team and 
officers to have been 'rife' In the early 1980s but was now believed to be a much less 
common occurrence. This was the result of the improved pay, the administrative controls 
and the budget pressures, all of which meant that overtime had become a much more 
scarce and therefore tightly controlled resource. 
There was no direct or clear link between overtime working and absenteeism, although a 
senior officer told of Instances when officers who had been allocated to overtime against 
their wishes had 'gone sick'; no evidence was, however, found that this was In any way a 
common occurrence. Employee welfare was adversely affected by long hours. 
Dependency on overtime pay was quite rare with only a few, generally younger officers 
falling Into this trap; Indeed, pay levels were excellent. The Police Federation and the 
Superintendents' Association held no particular policies towards overtime working. 
8.2.3 Police Force C 
Type of Organisation 
Location 
Number of Employees 
Sector 
CASE NUMBER 3 
Police Force C 
South West 
3000 Police Officers, 950 Civilians 
Public Administration, Police 
Service (SIC 1980,913) 
HEADLINE: 
An English Non-Metropolitan Police Force, which had allowed traditional relatively low 
overtime levels to increase and now sought to reduce them. An example of sound 
corporate policy, not effectively carried through to implementation. 
SUMMARY 
Overtime had been traditionally low in this Force, running at about half the English Non- 
Metropolitan Force average until about 1986. It then gradually increased to the average level. 
Over the last two years, it had been purposely brought back under greater control through budget 
reductions. A senior officer claimed that manpower had been purposely held below 
establishment, (by 75 head), during 1988, in order to provide funds for increased overtime. This 
virement practice was now disallowed by the governing County Council. 
In fact at the time of the study, overtime stood at 6.2% of basic pay, (English Non-Met. average: 
7.7%). The objective to reduce overtime had not been well communicated and was not perceived 
as being resolute. Middle management were often either not aware of this objective or were 
expecting to circumvent It. A Chief Inspector stated that the intention was to reduce overtime, 
'but', he said, 'this will not work In my area', although systematic overtime was to be found in his 
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area. Since this manager was responsible for overtime controls, it was not surprising to find that 
the Force was seriously over spending its overtime budget. Indeed, the current budget year of 
1989-90 was estimated to close overspent, notwithstanding the emergency controls applied by 
complete overtime withdrawals in the final periods of the year. 
There was evidence that the standard shift system, (Police Regulations), frustrated the need to 
match manpower to demand. For instance, a special task force had needed to be established 
which used a high level of overtime to deal with public order control, particularly Friday and 
Saturday nights. 
The specialist sections of mounted police and dog handlers were reviewed at some length. 
These sections appeared to be more vocationally based, officers doing these jobs appeared to 
gain greater job satisfaction than the norm. There was a clear understanding of responsibility to 
the animal on which the officer relied. There was also a feeling that the specific job was in many 
ways a privilege and that the demand for such positions was high within the Force. In addition, 
these divisions appeared to those within them to be somewhat vulnerable, in that the Force could 
choose to disband some of the activities. In these circumstances, the officers were collectively 
aware of the need not to book high levels of overtime, which might draw undue attention, and 
therefore to work such hours as necessary, but to moderate the booking of overtime hours. 
About 40% of the overtime worked was unpaid and unpaid overtime was common for all ranks in 
these areas, although it only amounted to about 2 to 4 hours per week for lower ranks. There was 
no 'long hours fatigue' syndrome and little stress generally in these areas, where perhaps the 
different type of work and attitudes, and possibly the animals, operated to reduce susceptibility to 
these factors. 
Overtime was used for much the same reasons as in the other Police Forces studied. It was 
claimed by a number of officers that the managers do not schedule accurately or in a timely 
manner for known events such as bank holidays. Many officers claimed that overtime was 
needed because the Force was 'undermanned', (as a result of Home Office restrictions). This 
was not found to be sustainable from an analysis of the uses to which the bulk of overtime was 
being put by the Force. 
A Detective Constable explained that he worked 10 hours overtime every week, working from 0700 
to 0800, 'to clear paperwork before the phone starts up' and the other five hours during the 
evenings. He took 5 hours as TOIL and the balance as paid overtime and this way he avoided 
being targeted as a 'high overtimer'. A chief Inspector explained that he claimed overtime if he 
was required for operational out-of-hours work, but did not claim any pay or TOIL for 
'administrative overtime', such as late meetings or paperwork taken home. He estimated this 
unpaid overtime to be about 10 hours per week. 
It appeared from the comments of officers, that a higher value was increasingly being placed on 
free time. There were a number of reasons put forward for this: i) the improved pay for Police 
Officers; li) the Increased stress In the job; Iii) the increased difficulty of obtaining overtime 
opportunities. Interestingly, however, one WPC, an unmarried lady in her mid twenties, explained 
that she enjoyed the job, obtained substantial job satisfaction and liked the company of fellow 
officers; she sought overtime at every opportunity. 
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Moreover, one young officer explained there was, for him, 'more to overtime than the pay', (which 
nevertheless he said was Important). He said he 'enjoyed the buzz of the Friday night Special- 
Squad... its great to go on a real job... the camaraderie of the squad had to be seen'. Another 
officer worked all the overtime he could obtain because, as he said: 'I'm getting married and I 
need the money'. There was, however, little evidence of any serious dependency on overtime 
pay for fixed financial commitments. 
Officers spoke of their frustration over the loss of overtime during the last few financial periods, 
when the budget'runs out'. This pointed to shortcomings in management controls and to the 
potentially inappropriate use of overtime. 
Absenteeism was considered by many officers to be directly associated with high levels of 
overtime. Levels of absenteeism had Increased to 50% above previous levels at the same time as 
overtime had increased. There was no detailed analysis of individual's absenteeism and overtime 
available, therefore cause and effect could not be established nor could any correlation between 
overtime workers and levels of sickness. 
Overtime was found to directly cause social and welfare problems. For example, the high divorce 
rate, particularly among the high overtime working plain clothes branch. It was widely stated that 
long hours 'sap judgement and reduce the effectiveness of the officer', particularly during the 
following shift. The periodic withdrawal of overtime caused frustration for management and 
officers alike, and was not conducive to operational flexibility or planned policing. Moreover, it 
was a source of worry for those few officers who had come to depend on their overtime earnings. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS CASE 
A Overtime had been recognised as growing out of control and a corporate strategy had 
been adopted to constrain this growth by strict budget limitation. This strategy was 
working to a degree, but was neither fully understood nor positively received by the whole 
of the management team. 
B Overtime enabled the organisation to meet Its corporate objectives, at least In part, viz. to 
staff for peak demands and special events. It was not clear, however, that this Force was 
achieving better corporate results, as a result of the use of overtime, than other Forces 
which used lower levels of overtime. There was a relationship between overtime and 
employment In that recruitment had been held back in order, specifically, to fund overtime. 
C The overtime decision had recently been given careful consideration at the corporate level, 
but not generally at the middle management level. The management and control of 
overtime now appeared to be somewhat outdated and ineffective. In essence it comprised 
of 'stop-go' budgetary control. Middle management were often not aware of the real 
processes of overtime and the use to which it was put. 
D About 75% of all overtime was systematic. Yet, according to management, all overtime 
was used to meet unexpected operational needs. Overtime improved operational flexibility 
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in that it facilitated staffing for peak demands, court duties and was used to meet so called 
unexpected demand, (which in fact was often predictable overtime such as staffing for 
Friday and Saturday night public order duties). These needs could have been met in other 
ways, but no consideration had been given to the alternatives. 
G About two thirds of the officers and the majority of middle and lower management sought 
increased overtime,. 
H Overtime premia averaged 53% of basic pay while non-wage labour costs averaged 63% of 
basic pay. Overtime was therefore cost-effective on this elementary basis. 
J Many officers perceived TOIL to be unpaid overtime. This thesis makes the distinction 
between unpaid overtime and overtime remunerated by TOIL or premium pay. Unpaid 
overtime was worked by the more senior officers and also by the specialist dog handling 
and mounted divisions. 
One officer stated: 'it would be naive in the extreme to believe that there was no Officer 
manipulation for overtime'. This view was generally accepted as fair and some officers 
explained various standard mechanisms used to achieve overtime. It was stated, however, 
that manipulation had been more common in the past. 
Absenteeism was considered to be exacerbated by high levels of overtime. This linked 
overtime to adverse welfare although not significantly. There was, however,. substantial 
evidence that long hours of work, linked to the unsocial Police Regulations shift system, 
denigrated employee welfare. One senior officer stated that his family were very 
understanding and supportive of his job, but that there had been 'many times of stress 
when relationships were sorely tested'. Another officer told of a period of high overtime 
when he began to feel 'a stranger in his own home'. Other officers told of becoming very 
tired after a period of long hours, particularly when the shift system prevented adequate 
recovery. Some officers, and a number of managers stated that they believed job 
performance fell due to the stress and tiredness brought on by the overtime. 
Younger officers, with family responsibilities, often found that overtime pay helped them to 
pay their mortgages, although this was not a major problem, the basic pay was excellent. 
The Police Federation and Superintendents' Association did not actively pursue any 
particular policies with regard to overtime. 
8.2.4 Chandler and Gas Bottler CASE NUMBER 4 
Type of Organisation Chandler and Gas Bottler 
Location South West 
Number of Employees 5 
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Sector Retail distribution 
Service (SIC 1980,648) 
HEADLINE: 
A small Chandlers using overtime to avoid hiring extra staff and to meet fluctuating 
demand levels. 
SUMMARY 
Five staff were employed, three non-manual and two manual. Overtime was worked for on 
average five hours per manual employee, and 10 hours per non-manual employee, per week. 
Wages were relatively low, In the third quartile for the type of work and locality (Reward 1989). 
Overtime premia was high given this was a small family based firm, being 50% standard with 
100% for Saturday afternoon and Sundays. Relatively frequent use was made of the higher 
premium rate. 
The proprietor used overtime primarily as a means of avoiding hiring another employee. There 
was an opportunity for casual or fixed term contract employment or the employment of two 
staggered time part time workers. Indeed, there were a number of possible alternatives to the use 
of overtime, but there was little awareness of these. 
This proprietor was very defensive regarding his use of overtime, even though the researcher took 
great pains to guide the process in a positive direction to avoid positions being taken. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS CASE 
A In this case, corporate strategy was simply the game plan of the individual proprietor. He 
was using overtime in order to avoid hiring additional staff and had consciously pursued 
this strategy. 
B The use of overtime enabled the business to satisfy fluctuating demand, but, it appeared, 
not In the most effective way. On balance, however, overtime was helping the business to 
achieve its objectives. This particular use of overtime was denying employment to another 
person. 
C The decision to use overtime had been addressed by the proprietor, but he had not 
contemplated any alternative other than that of hiring a new employee on the standard 
contract. He had conducted no formal or informal analysis and there was little or little 
appreciation of the financial consequences of the overtime or the alternative which had 
been considered. There was no need for overtime controls and records were kept only for 
payment purposes. 
D Almost all the overtime was systematic, in that it was predictable, and it generally could 
have been avoided by more effective organisation and staffing. In fact, the major use of the 
overtime was to smooth demand peaks and to avoid hiring an additional member of staff. 
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Moreover, the proprietor firmly believed that his use of overtime gave him operational 
flexibility, to meet 'unexpected' demand peaks and indeed it did, but it achieved this in an 
ineffective way. He also believed that the overtime gave his business increased corporate 
flexibility, in that it enabled him to respond more effectively to long term demand changes. 
In fact the overtime did achieve this end, although there were, apparently, other viable 
alternatives and it could be argued that corporate flexibility was not valid a concern in the 
circumstances. 
G The two manual employees sought as much overtime as they could get. The three non- 
manual employees worked higher levels of overtime and two were pleased to accept these 
levels. The third, a married lady with school-aged children, found the overtime an 
imposition on her family life and this was causing some difficulties with family relationships. 
Nevertheless, the job security was important to her. 
H Overtime premia averaged 60% of basic pay while non-wage labour costs averaged 22% of 
basic pay. The overtime appeared therefore not to be cost-effective when compared with 
the viable alternatives. In this case, the options would have included hiring an additional 
non-manual employee on a flexible contract and a small amount of industrial engineering in 
the gas bottling process. 
J TOIL and unpaid overtime were not encountered in this business, other than with the 
proprietor, who did not consider staying late as overtime, and did not vary his pay 
according to his hours of work. There was no obvious manipulation of overtime by 
employees, who were closely controlled by the proprietor. An apparent relationship 
existed between absenteeism and overtime working, with the 'third' non-manual employee 
taking Increasing levels of sickness, although the proprietor had not yet linked cause to 
effect on this matter. Indeed, overtime was adversely affecting welfare for this particular 
employee and this was having an adverse impact on her work, but was not an issue for with 
other workers. One of the non-manual employees depended on the normal levels of 
overtime to meet his fixed financial commitments. 
8.2.5 Mail Order Distribution 
Type of Organisation 
Location 
Number of Employees 
Sector 
CASE NUMBER 5 





Service (SIC 1980,653-656) 
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HEADLINE: 
A progressive company successfully managing variable demand and, at the same time, 
reducing overtime, in a tight local labour market. 
SUMMARY 
A full account of this case, with supporting detail, is given as Appendix 8-3, therefore this summary 
is brief and covers only the more general points. The Company had experienced turnover growth 
at 15% per year, annual seasonal demand peaks of 40% above average load. There was a high 
profile union presence at the operational level. Operational methods and technology were 
rapidly changing, in order to secure improved response times and accuracy, and to reduce unit 
costs. 
Overtime had been reduced in all areas from previous high levels. This had been achieved 
through a complex and wide ranging Innovative management programme. This process of 
overtime reduction Involved: Increasing productivity; the creation of new jobs, often using 
Innovative employment contracts, eg. new shift systems and temporary contracts; labour- 
displacing capital Investment; Industrial engineering and a concerted effort to Improve 
management controls. 
There remained, however, a number of departments where senior management considered 
overtime was still excessive and systematic. Moreover, management believed that there were 
latent pressures for overtime to increase in the future, in response to a tightening local labour 
market. 
The organisation continued to seek solutions to the problems of: demand variability; profit 
Improvement and tight labour market. They particularly wished to further control and reduce 
overtime levels. In addition to their current initiatives, management intended to consider 
innovative alternatives for the more effective supply of capacity, without resort to overtime. These 
Included: annual hours contracts; geographical relocation of some operations and new payment 
policies to secure improved recruitment, retention and motivation, and controlled unit costs. 
The reduction of overtime had been achieved against a difficult backcloth of rapidly changing and 
increasing demand, significant and increasing skill shortages at all levels and a well organised 
workforce in which the predominant pressure was to resist any reduction in overtime levels. 
The key to the success in reducing overtime lay in a management team, with a clear and well 
communicated objective and the courage to seek out and implement innovative solutions. The 
organisation was well developed and very effective in communicating policy down to the 
operational levels. Overtime had been addressed as a specific issue at main board level and a 
specific policy developed which was both well communicated and understood by all levels of 
management, even though some middle managers did not readily agree with it. There was no 
opportunity offered for the policy to slide in any way since great interest and care was taken, at the 
senior management levels, to execute the policy. Overtime was strategically managed using a 
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carefully constructed budget, and controlling tightly to that budget, at the same time as 
alternatives were developed and implemented to displace the overtime. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS CASE 
AA complex and innovative strategy for the structuring of working time and capital and 
industrial engineering investment had achieved a successful reduction of overtime. This 
success was based on a clear, determined and well communicated management policy, 
supported by sound systems for monitoring and controlling the overtime which remained. 
In addition, the innovative development of alternatives to overtime working enabled the 
organisation to replace the overtime. 
B The achievement of corporate objectives did not appear to have been adversely affected by 
the reduction of overtime. Increasing demand had been met each year and unit labour 
costs, as a percentage of turnover, had fallen from 15% to 13.5% over the relevant period. 
The reduction of overtime directly yielded new jobs, although it was not possible to 
accurately estimate the number of jobs created or the 'conversion rate'. 
C It was interesting to note that, even In this very healthy and professional organisation. no 
financial analysis of the overtime decision had apparently been conducted and senior 
managers were unaware or misinformed about of the actual costs of overtime working and 
the most obvious alternatives. The management of that overtime which remained was very 
sound, with established and rigorously applied procedures. The decision between 
overtime and the potential alternatives was professionally driven from the most senior 
management level, and controlled tightly within formal and professional manpower plans 
which were regularly maintained. Many alternatives to overtime working, some of them 
innovative, had been considered, developed and implemented with some success. 
D Notwithstanding the above positive comment, about half the remaining overtime was 
systematic. The same people tended to work overtime during the same time slots In the 
weekly cycle, although this cycle was interrupted during the annual seasons. Indeed, the 
overtime used to meet the high level of seasonal and campaign peak demands was 
systematic, In that It was readily predictable. This organisation gave an example of the 
effective use of systematic overtime In some of the circumstances. The reasons for the use 
of the remaining overtime were correctly perceived by management at all levels. The key 
reason being the seasonality of demand, which accounted for about 50% of the total 
overtime, other reasons Included meeting specific targets or dealing with demand pressure 
points, unexpected demand and a small amount of systematic overtime determined to 
some extent by the nature of the job, eg. cleaning. 
F Corporate dependence on overtime working had previously exposed the company to 
damaging industrial action and In this respect overtime had reduced 'corporate flexibility'. 
Indeed, higher and more secure levels of'corporate flexibility' had been achieved by the 
use of temporary contracts and fixed term (seasonal) part-time shift working to replace 
overtime. 
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G Senior managers were keen to continue to reduce overtime, which they saw as costly, 
difficult to control and giving exposure to industrial action, if production came to depend 
upon it, as in the past had been the case. The lower levels management were concerned 
to obtain more overtime which, they perceived, would make their jobs easier by increasing 
their flexibility to deal with day-to-day pressures and meeting worker demand. In the 
absence of the overtime, the onus was clearly on the management at all levels to avoid the 
problems in the first place, insofar as these were in their control. 
Workers generally wanted more overtime, but there were exceptions. Manual, male and 
younger employees generally sought out overtime opportunities. Non-manual female and 
older staff, tended more often to accept what overtime was offered, or to avoid It. The 
same ages, sex and general pay levels, exhibited different attitudes towards overtime, with 
manual staff seeking more overtime than their non-manual colleagues. The difference In 
attitudes, therefore, appeared to be partly cultural as well as structural. 
H The cost of overtime premia averaged 41% of total pay, a low figure because the bonus did 
not attract premia. The non-wage labour cost of employing additional staff represented 
31% of total pay. Both middle and senior management believed, quite incorrectly, that 
overtime was the cheaper of these options. 
High and regular overtime, both in the past and in some circumstances currently, 
depressed productivity and quality across all working hours. It was not possible to quantify 
this phenomena, but it was clear that overtime, through both this mechanism and the 
premla, actually Increased unit costs. 
J TOIL was not an option for the workforce, other than In some non-manual areas, where 
flexitime allowed some versatility In timekeeping. Management grades could Informally 
take TOIL by agreement with their own boss, but this did not happen to a significant degree. 
Unpaid overtime was only worked by management grades, and generally only the more 
senior grades. A vibrant 'management machismo' effect surrounded this phenomenon, 
which was based on organisational culture. There were strong feelings, and some hearsay 
evidence was found establishing that overtime payments to supervisors encouraged 
overtime, or would if the opportunity was allowed to develop. The evidence was, however, 
not confirmed by direct observations. 
Trade union influence at local level had, over the five years prior to the study, been minimal. 
There was no pressure to reduce overtime, but occasionally pressure to increase it and 
some discussion about its distribution. The unions had received no significant support or 
guidance, regarding overtime, from their central organisation over the last few years. ' 
However, as indicated above, they had, in the early 1980s, used the restriction of supply of 
overtime, upon which the Company critically depended, as a very powerful weapon against 
the Company. 
There was no evidence that welfare was adversely affected by the current'normal' levels of 
overtime, le. one or two evenings and Saturday morning on a number of occasions during 
the year. There was, however, evidence that high levels of overtime, regularly worked, 
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caused workers to suffer from fatigue. This was claimed by management to have affected 
both their normal hours work-performance and their general welfare and this was confirmed 
by the workers to be the case. Pay levels were relatively good at the lower end of the 
organisation's pay scales. Few employees were dependent on their overtime earnings for 
fixed financial commitments. Those who were identified, were generally younger male 
manual workers, with family commitments and the situation was likely to be temporary. 
8.2.6 Retail & Distribution Food and Drink 
Type of Organisation 
Location 
Number of Employees 
Sector 
CASE NUMBER 6 
Retail and Distribution 




Service (SIC 1980,641) 
HEADLINE: 
A small retail sales and distribution company which relied on overtime as an effective means 
of balancing capacity and demand. The proprietor hired new staff to avoid the extension of 
relatively expensive and `unnecessary' overtime on site. 
SUMMARY 
A small privately owned business concerned with direct sales and wholesale distribution of 
groceries. The business was expanding and employment, which stood at eleven, including the 
proprietor, was growing. An average of five hours overtime per week, per manual employee, was 
worked. There were four non-manual staff who do not work overtime. 
This company relied on overtime to carry out its work effectively. Long distance deliveries were 
undertaken, this took drivers outside their normal working hours and was the key reason for 
overtime. In addition, there was a small amount of 'on-site' overtime to meet random peaks in 
demand. Where higher levels of demand appeared more permanent, the proprietor decided 
specifically to avoid staff pressures for overtime, and hired additional staff. In this way he, he 
believed, he avoided high overtime premium costs and kept a firmer control on the workforce. 
The proprietor was aware of the potential for overtime to become 'worker controlled' he stated: 'I 
can remember when I controlled my overtime, to keep up my wages, I'm not letting that happen 
here'. The use of part-time and casual workers was under consideration. 
Wages were relatively good, standing at the median level for the type of work and locality (Reward 
1989). Untypical of many small companies, overtime was paid at the high rate of 50% premium 
for all hours except Saturday afternoons and Sundays, when the premium was 100%. There was 
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no unionisation. 
The manual staff liked their overtime very much. They were generally not directly under anyone's 
control while 'out on the road' and they were able to earn a good premium rate. There was no 
evidence that overtime affected their welfare in a negative way. The non-manual staff, with one 
exception, wanted the same opportunities as their manual colleagues to work overtime, but this 
was denied to them by the proprietor who, in view of the high cost of overtime, sought to meet 
demand by hiring new staff whenever this could be justified. The proprietor was not worried 
about the possibility of demand fall-off in the longer term. He stated, 'l manage the business for 
today, 1 run a tight ship and this gives me the best protection for the longer term'. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS CASE 
A The proprietor had a well considered policy of avoiding overtime by firm management of 
pace of work in normal hours and hiring additional staff to meet the increasing demand; 
while using overtime as necessary to meet the needs of the job as effectively as possible. 
B The achievement of corporate objectives was clearly assisted by the use of overtime. 
Further employment would not displace that overtime which was worked. Indeed, a 
decision had been made to hire additional staff Instead of working overtime, wherever this 
was possible. 
C Overtime had consistently been resisted for the on-site staff and new staff hired in order to 
meet increasing demand. In addition, the proprietor had kept reasonable pressure on the 
drivers to minimise their overtime. This formed a rational and calculated decision to avoid 
the relatively high cost of overtime. 
There was no need for complex systems of control within such a small organisation. The 
proprietor was aware that a certain amount of abuse of overtime did occur among some 
drivers, (although not among others). He tolerated this manipulation, at a low and 
controlled level, as part of the 'perks of the job', but kept a careful watch to ensure it did not 
get out of hand. It appeared that there were acceptable corridors of 'give and take' were 
tacitly accepted by the management and the workforce. The manual staff were not directly 
controlled during overtime since most overtime was 'on the road'. In these circumstances, 
none of the overtime was systematic, it was used to meet normal demand but was largely 
'job-driven'. 
F Overtime was the most effective means for the company to achieve the necessary 
operational flexibility. However, corporate flexibility was not gained from the use of 
overtime, on the contrary, the avoidance of overtime was seen as improving corporate 
prospects. 
G The proprietor rightly saw no alternative to overtime In the circumstances, but he applied a 
healthy degree of scepticism regarding its use. The manual staff liked the overtime, they 
sought to maximise their overtime and there was a constant, and not altogether unhealthy 
'pressure' between the drivers and the proprietor regarding the amount of overtime booked; 
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Indeed, this sometimes turned into a bartering session. The non-manual staff wanted the 
opportunity to work overtime at premium rates, but this was denied them by management. 
H Overtime premia averaged about 58% of basic pay, while non wage labour costs amounted 
to 19% . Overtime was therefore not cost-effective on the 
basis of this elementary 
comparison. However, given that there was no 'better' alternative available to the 
organisation, such as hiring additional staff to meet the particular demand, overtime was the 
most cost effective solution. 
J TOIL and unpaid overtime were not worked, although the proprietor worked very long 
hours. Employees did abuse the system a little by extending their time on the road, but 
was conducted within tacitly accepted corridors. There was a degree of dependency on 
overtime earnings among the manual workers, but at the 'soft' level In that if overtime was 
not available this would cause discomfort and not aff ect their ability to meet fixed financial 
commitments. 
8.2.7 Butchers Shop CASE NUMBER 7 
Type of Organisation 
Locations 







Service (SIC 1980,641) 
A small family run catering and retail butchers, using systematic overtime to avoid the need 
to employ an additional member of staff and to meet seasonal peaks in demand. 
SUMMARY 
This case highlighted the effective use of overtime, to meet seasonal demand peaks and large 
orders which arose randomly, without much notice. The ineffective use of overtime was also 
found in this case, in the working of systematic overtime every week, with no real benefit to the 
organisation, and at a higher cost than some of the alternatives such as hiring another employee, 
possibly on a complimentary shift. 
This firm was a small family run butchers shop, with stable employment and good staff 
relationships. The proprietor decided to use overtime to enable him to respond to seasonal 
peaks in demand and to give some flexibility across the year. In fact, overtime was 
institutionalised, with the same three employees working overtime on the same days every week. 
At key times during the year, such as Christmas and Easter, all employees worked extra hours. 
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Three members of staff worked eight hours overtime each per week and the proprietor worked 
long hours. Other members of staff worked overtime on an ad-hoc basis, In order to provide 
cover for absenteeism or unexpected events. All members of staff worked long hours during the 
butchery trade seasonal demand peaks. Occasionally, large catering orders resulted in longer 
overtime to satisfy the contract. In all, the non-seasonal weekly overtime amounted to about one 
additional member of staff, who could have worked on a slightly overlapping shift. The proprietor 
acknowledged that it would be relatively simple, and quite possible, to hire an additional employee 
to cover this regular demand. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS CASE 
A The management strategy was to use overtime to avoid the need to employ an additional 
member of staff and to meet seasonal peaks in demand. 
B Overtime enabled the business to meet its objectives to a degree, viz. to satisfy seasonal 
demand peaks and meet unexpected orders. However, the systematic weekly overtime 
was not a cost-effective means of meeting normal demand. Moreover, it suppressed the 
employment of an additional member of staff. 
C No decision to work overtime, or to review any alternatives had been considered. 
Overtime was simply 'the way the business had always been run'. About two thirds of the 
overtime was systematic and used to meet normal anticipated demand, the balance being 
used to meet seasonal demand and unexpected orders. 
F Operational flexibility was diminished by the current overtime patterns in that the proprietor 
had difficulty on some occasions in meeting unexpected demand from overtime, because 
his workers were already using the overtime which they wanted to work, for the normal 
demand. However, the proprietor did not perceive that this was so and claimed overtime 
to enhance his day to day operating flexibility. A key reason for the use of overtime was 
the proprietor's feeling that this would enable him to meet demand without commitment to 
another member of staff, and therefore give him corporate flexibility in the event of a down- 
turn in business. In effect, overtime was giving corporate flexibility in the proprietor's 
opinion, the need for and value of such 'protection' was, however, dubious. 
G The staff were very pleased with the extra money earned through overtime and were happy 
with the normal levels of overtime. 
H The overtime premium was 44% and non-wage labour costs amounted to about 20%. The 
systematic weekly overtime was not cost-effective compared to the simple and available 
alternative of hiring an additional member of staff and reorganising the normal working 
hours of some employees to overlap the demand peaks, although the proprietor had not 
considered any alternatives to overtime, other than hiring more staff on the normal contract. 
No TOIL or unpaid overtime were worked in this business other than by the proprietor. 
There was no manipulation of working hours by employees. No relationship was found 
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between absenteeism, (which was very low), and overtime. Moreover, employee welfare 
was not adversely affected by the overtime patterns apart from a very slight problem when 
workers were expected to work additional overtime to meet an unexpected large order. 
The employees sometimes found this to impinge on private lives, particularly when 
sufficient notice was not given, although, when the very high levels of overtime were needed 
for the anticipated seasonal butchery peaks, this caused no problems. There was no union 
involvement There was evidence of overtime pay dependency, affecting two of the 
employees who worked overtime systematically each week for a number of years. Pay 
levels were low relative to local 'skilled' industrial wages. 
8.2.8 Hotels A CASE NUMBER 8 
Type of Organisation 
Locations 






Hotels and catering 
Service (SIC 1980,66) 
A group of three dissimilar hotels within a large chain, anxious to update management 
systems In order to Improve competitiveness and customer service. Paid overtime had 
become minimal and was very effective and well managed. 
SUMMARY 
The essence of this case was that a considered and measured level of overtime, tightly controlled, 
can greatly assist an organisation to achieve its corporate objectives. 
A group of three hotels from a large chain were reviewed over a period of two months. The 
interview schedules covered 36 employees and 14 managers. There was no formal organised 
trade union presence. The hotels were situated in Greater London, one was an exclusive first 
class hotel in the city, the others being a middle ranking hotel and a budget level hotel. A 
remarkably healthy level of identification with corporate objectives and organisation structure was 
found and this helped with the effective control of overtime in that the staff knew and understood 
the corporate level policy regarding, for example, overtime and quality of service. 
Very little difference was found in the use of overtime across these hotels. There was a relatively 
small amount of systematic overtime In areas such as Concierge, Front of House and Food and 
Beverage, in order to facilitate the shift systems. There was relatively little casual, operationally 
driven overtime, and that which was worked was needed to provide cover for unexpected 
absenteeisms or emergencies. In fact, when an emergency arose the workers identified so 
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closely with the organisation and Its objectives that they were often observed to stay late with no 
expectation of pay of any kind. Neither was there any expectation of TOIL in return for the extra 
hours. The workers realised that they were very busy and 'tightly' staffed, and would not consider 
putting others under unnecessary pressure by taking extra time off. Indeed, there was a healthy 
team-working attitude within the staff, which was the consciously developed product of the very 
sound organisation. 
Overtime levels stood at 4.3% of basic hours, 6.1% of basic pay. Levels of staff turnover were 
very high for particular departments which was typical for the Industry. For example, front of 
house staff turnover stood at about 45% and chamber maids left on average after only 7 months. 
Even management grades of all levels exhibited a high rate of turnover. On the other hand, the 
more stable and highly prestigious concierge staff tended to stay in place for many years with very 
little turnover. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS CASE 
A The overall management strategy on overtime was to minimise its use in order to secure the 
corporate objectives of profit maximisation and Improved service to the customer. This 
appeared to be working well. This Corporate objective achievement was assisted by the 
excellent management controls which were established. There had been a clear increase 
In employment as a result of the policy of minimising overtime, although it was not possible 
to retrospectively quantify the employment Impact. 
C The central management team controlled overtime by rigid budgeting which effectively 
inhibited any management discretion. That overtime which was worked, was not tightly 
controlled, using authorisation and reporting systems. This was quite easy to achieve, 
since the function was essentially service driven. Senior management levels, in the 
organisation's central support services, had considered very carefully the alternatives to 
overtime and had developed a policy of meeting demand through carefully designed shift 
systems and appropriate manning levels. This enabled the organisation to concentrate on 
the key objectives of customer service, from which higher charge rates and occupancy 
rates could be supported and the corporate objectives of profit, excellence and viability 
could be accomplished. 
D Overtime was very little used, and the majority that was worked, was necessary for 
unpredictable emergencies and enhanced operational flexibility. About 25% of all overtime 
was systematic, this being essentially the shift in-fill overtime. Overtime was not used to aid 
corporate flexibility, there was no necessity to consider this issue in view of the high levels 
of staff turnover in most departments. 
G Higher and middle management were keen to minimise overtime. About half of the 
supervision and employees sought increased overtime opportunities, primarily as a means 
of increasing their pay. A quarter of the staff were happy with current levels and the 
remaining quarter would resist overtime. Three comments re-occurred from this latter 
group: I) 'the hourly rate is too low to justify the effort even with the premium'; ii) 'the work is 
very hard and I'd be too tired to work longer' and Iii) 'the shift hours are unsocial enough 
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without overtime as well'. Some of these reluctant staff were among the lowest paid In the 
hotels. It was Interesting to note that the demand seemed to reflect the availability and 
general supply of overtime. It was clear that staff had adjusted their expectations to the 
tight control and lack of supply of overtime. 
H Overtime premia averaged 48% of basic wages while non-wage labour costs stood at 39% 
of basic wages. This somewhat high level of NWLCs reflected the provision of 
accommodation for some staff and the generally very low basic pay. That overtime which 
was worked, was very cost effective due to the low relative cost of the overtime, the 
'service' nature of the work which effectively prevented 'pacing', the excellent direct 
management of the staff and the positive attitude of employees. Moreover, there were no 
obvious alternatives to that overtime which was used for truly unforeseen events. The one 
question mark lay with the use of systematic overtime for shift in-fill, which could possibly 
have been designed out, although this was not fully investigated within this project. 
J TOIL was not used, however, there were high levels of non-paid overtime, the culture in 
these hotels, particularly the two higher class hotels, being one of 'service'. Great pride 
was taken in caring for the guests and there were regularly occasions when staff remained 
late to finish administration work or to provide cover, with no thought of payment. The fact 
that some staff lived-in was only a small part of explanation for this phenomenon. 
There was no employee manipulation to obtain overtime, quite simply, overtime was not 
available and the effort would have been futile. Absenteeism gave rise to a small amount of 
ad-hoc overtime, and here the cause and effect were clearly that the absenteeism caused 
the overtime, since overtime levels were low and controlled. The shift workers, who 
worked overtime as part of their shift, took lower sickness time off than the average, largely 
due to fact that their jobs were the more stable. First line supervision staff would receive 
overtime payments, and were generally keen to take overtime opportunities in order to 
boost their own pay. There was some evidence that the shift systems made employees 
over tired, particularly on some busier shifts, where the employee was constantly facing the 
public and stress easily became a problem. Such high pressure situations were observed 
to prevail quite often, and overtime in these circumstances would clearly have been counter 
productive for both the employee and the organisation. Since overtime was not generally 
available, there was little dependency on overtime pay, even though pay levels were 
relatively low. In the case of the shift workers who worked shift-in-fill overtime every cycle, 
there was specific and clear dependency on the overtime element of their pay, for their fixed 
financial commitments. 
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8.2.9 Hotel B CASE NUMBER 9 
Type of Organisation 
Locations 





Hotels and catering 
Service (SIC 1980,66) 
HEADLINE: 
A privately owned hotel using high levels of systematic overtime, with little knowledge or 
control of the consequences. This organisation was in the grips of a `negative spiral', where 
the use of overtime as a solution was in fact exacerbating the problems. 
SUMMARY 
Overtime can help to solve operational difficulties but, if used without care, it can create even 
greater difficulties. This was an example of the latter process. This case very sharply contrasts 
with the previous one. 
Overtime levels were high with an average of 16 hours per week per employee, with some workers 
completing 24 hours every week. There was often little or no notice given to workers of the 
overtime requirement, particularly when this was occasioned by casual absenteeism. Employees, 
particularly those who lived in, often felt 'put upon' by management in having to work unexpected 
extra hours. Indeed, a few staff, eg. porters, front of house and housekeeping, resisted overtime 
on the basis that the rewards did not justify the extra effort and inconvenience involved. This was 
particularly so for those staff who lived off-site. These were Isolated individuals, representing 
about a third of the staff, all of whom shared one common feature, viz: they did not rely on their 
overtime earnings to meet their fixed financial commitments. These were generally either older, 
or very young, unmarried employees. 
Casual sickness and absenteeism was running at the very high level of 17%. Typically, three staff 
were off sick at any one time. The unreliability of staff was the focus of the energies of the whole 
hotel, rather than customer care. Very high staff turnover rates, over 100%, existed in most of the 
non-management areas. 
Employees worked under sufferance to a degree, feeling that the long hours and very low hourly 
rates of pay were to a degree, 'exploitation'. In fact the pay levels were within the lower quartile 
for the geographical region and type of work (Reward 1989). Moreover, the pay, particularly for 
the younger members of staff and the part-time workers, (there were six part-time workers), was 
below wage council minimum levels. It appeared that neither the employees nor the 
management were aware that statutory minimum wages existed. 
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The tendency for employees to resent their conditions of work and to use subtle but effective 
means to 'compensate' for their poor treatment was, In the circumstances, understandable. Staff 
attitude to the guest was rarely overtly negative, nevertheless, Inappropriate customer service was 
observed to be widespread and the general ambience was uncomfortable. A part of this overall 
syndrome was the staff attitude towards overtime the need for which was exaggerated In order 
that a felt-fair wage level might be achieved. The result was that the staff working long hours were 
ineffective and suffered from welfare problems and high absenteeism. This exacerbated the 
problems, which became self-fulfilling. 
There was no common staff identification with the corporate body. For example, front desk staff 
on the various shifts stayed late, with the tacit 'approval' of fellow workers, in order to boost their 
pay, even though there was no operational need for their extra hours, since the porter and shift 
supervisor could easily have handled the workload. In effect, they created the overtime in order 
to compensate for their otherwise poor pay levels. 
Senior management were over-sensitive and defensive about their use of overtime. They stated, 
In'defence' of overtime levels, that they believed that overtime was a means to reduce their 
exposure to any fall-off in future demand, in an industry which is known to suffer from periodic 
demand slumps. Of course, the high staff turnover rendered this rationale invalid. No formal 
analysis had been conducted on the use of overtime, it was simply'the way that the business had 
always been run'. After all, the proprietor had always worked long hours, and stated: 'long hours 
areaway of life in the hotel trade'. In many ways, there was a blind acceptance of traditional 
methods; this was the way it had always been done. 
There was no realisation or rationalisation, by management, of the negative spiral which saw the 
company using overtime to solve problems of high staff turnover and absenteeism, while the 
overtime itself exacerbated these factors and disguised the real structural problems of an under- 
developed organisation and management, a lack of direction and an inadequate payment 
structure. Nor was there any management awareness of the syndrome of the high levels of stress 
caused by long hours, where the customer and the staff both suffered, and the result was under 
achievement on two interconnected strategic business fronts. The first was that occupancy rates 
were relatively low, (a significant proportion of the business potential was 'professional' where 
'return visits' based on customer service rather than price are often a successful marketing 
strategy). The second was the relatively low room rates which management used, ineffectively, to 
address the poor competitive position. This was a syndrome of which the inappropriate use of 
overtime was one factor. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS CASE 
A No considered management strategy on overtime had been undertaken, other than to 
tolerate its use, it was simply accepted as the nature of the business. Indeed, overtime was 
thought by senior management to facilitate the achievement of corporate objectives, viz: 
profit and viability maximisation. While, in fact It appeared very clearly to be frustrating the 
achievement of those objectives. 
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B There was no doubt that overtime was, pragmatically, displacing employment, and 
management thought this to be a sound policy. 
C There was no analysis, or even formal decision, to work overtime, as the hotel director 
stated: 'simply, It Is used when necessary'. There was no specific overtime budget and no 
formal management controls for the overtime that was worked. Although this lack of 
management and administration of the overtime caused no problems in view of the nature 
of the service given, there would clearly be difficulty In bringing overtime under Improved 
controls without the help of such tools. The lack of sound management procedures also 
helped to disguise from senior management the true nature and effects of the use of 
overtime. 
D Almost all the overtime was systematic in that 40% was used to facilitate the shift system, 
the balance was used to meet 'unexpected' staff shortages according to management, 
although, in reality, these were quite regular and predictable and were to some extent self- 
generating. Overtime was in fact used for three main reasons: i) to meet normal workloads 
in the face of random staff shortages; ii) to avoid the need to hire additional staff, in order to 
give 'corporate flexibility' In the light of some nervousness about the future levels of 
demand; and Iii) and to maintain more acceptable take-home pay levels. In fact there is 
doubt that these objectives were indeed satisfied by the use made of overtime. 
F The effect of using high levels of systematic overtime was very clearly to inhibit operational 
flexibility. This was due to the inability to utilise unplanned overtime to meet unexpected 
needs. In addition, the depressive effect of high levels of absenteeism, reduced the whole 
organisation to a constant state of crisis management. Yet it was plain that the long hours 
were directly causing high absenteeism, much evidence of this phenomenon was revealed 
by analysis and from the statements of the staff themselves. Thus overtime depressed 
operational flexibility. Corporate flexibility was not in fact gained through the use of 
overtime, since, in the circumstances, there was little pragmatic opportunity to reduce the 
overtime levels without major structural change to the management philosophy. In any 
event, the high levels of labour turnover abrogated this argument. 
G Management simply used whatever overtime they considered was appropriate and found 
this to be a convenient arrangement which required little eff ort on their part. Employees 
did not like the long hours and found them to be a burden. But many workers actively 
sought as much overtime as they could obtain, they felt they had little choice due to their 
dependency on the 'extra' money and the need to secure their jobs. 
H Overtime premla was, on average, 39%, reflecting relatively low premium rates. Non-wage 
labour costs were high, averaging 36%, reflecting a number of living-in employees, although 
there were few fringe benefits for the employees. Management believed that overtime was 
most effective in that it helped to solve the problem of random staff shortages, was relatively 
inexpensive and avoided the corporate risk of establishing higher levels of employment. In 
fact overtime was not at all cost-effective in that much of it was contrived and unnecessary. 
Moreover, it depressed staff morale and quality of service and had become self-generating. 
Overtime was exacerbating the structural problems within the organisation, (eg. staff 
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turnover and absenteeism), and was one of the factors inhibiting the achievement of 
corporate objectives. 
J TOIL was not used and unpaid overtime was not generally worked, even by the 
management staff. Supervisors were paid for their overtime work at premium rates, but 
this was not observed to be the source of any manipulation. Employees manipulated their 
overtime working, Indeed, they could work almost as much as they liked, and they did. 
Overtime caused excessive absenteeism In that it caused employees to become stressed 
and fatigued, it lowered morale and caused institutionalised resentment and it gave 
employees the higher hourly earnings which enabled them to take a rest in straight time. 
The quality of the product, (service), indubitably suffered, directly as a result of the long 
hours of overtime. Added to all of these problems, about 12, (14%), of the employees 
relied on overtime pay to supplement their earnings. 
8.2.10 industrial Civilians CASE NUMBER 10 
Type of Organisation Ministry of Defence A 
Civilian Industrial Employees 
Locations South East & South West 
Number of Industrial Employees 760 
Sector Public Sector 
Service (SIC 1980,915) 
HEADLINE: 
An organisation under pressure to improve effectiveness, operating with poor wage 
competitiveness for some grades. Substantial systematic and ineffective overtime was 
worked, with little management control. No particular initiatives were in hand to review the 
use of overtime. 
SUMMARY 
A full account of this case is given as Appendix 8-4. The key message of this case was quite 
obvious, but worth noting since it appears that it can still be missed by a'defensive' management 
team operating under pressure, viz: unless overtime was actively and professionally managed, it 
became ineffective and damages the organisation. Increasing pressures were being brought to 
bear on this organisation to improve productivity, although there were no plans to bring overtime 
Into this general review. This management option had not been specifically excluded, it simply 
had not been considered. 
The organisation comprised a range of activities, about half the staff being employed in a service 
capacity, eg. transport, stores and distribution, and the other half being concerned with jobbing 
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type repair, test and very specialised manufacturing. About 10% of the employees were 
concerned with very sensitive processes and materials, and much of the work was classified. 
Staff turnover had been running at between 10% and 18% depending upon the area. Vacancies 
were running at up to 20% In some areas and a lack of wage competitiveness was claimed to be 
the key problem, particularly for the more qualified craft and technician grades. 
Overtime was worked by about 30% of employees, each averaging 8.4 hours per week, although 
some workers completed 20 hours overtime per week. The levels of overtime found during the 
study period had been static for a number of years. It appeared that the employees, rather than 
the managers, often exercised the real control of overtime working, within the overall budgetary 
constraints. Managers were, particularly at the higher levels, not generally aware of the costs and 
true reasons for the use of overtime within their areas, while middle management tended to be 
more informed, but reluctant to 'rack the boat' and sometimes very defensive. Indeed, overtime 
was found, during the ethnographic phases of the study, to be grossly ineffective and to depress 
the productivity of all hours. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS STUDY 
A No direction or strategies existed for the management control or reduction of overtime. 
B Overtime did not appear to assist In the achievement of corporate objectives, which in any 
event were quite unclear to most employees and managers. Indeed, the Inappropriate and 
unnecessary use of overtime actually added to the very real viability threat to the 
organisation. 
Cash was diverted, by specific management decision, within the organisation to fund 
overtime instead of additional employment, (eg. an overtime budget increase had been 
justified using skilled staff shortages). Therefore, In the negative sense, there was a clear 
relationship between overtime and potential new jobs. This was the pragmatic rather than 
theoretical consequence of the use of overtime, since, in many areas of the organisation, a 
high proportion of the overtime could be have been abolished with no increase in staffing 
due to the potential to dramatically improve productivity. Furthermore, it was clear that 
overtime was adding to the structural problems which were seriously threatening the 
viability of the organisation, and therefore the jobs sustained by it. 
C There was no evidence of any formal or even informal analysis of the overtime decision and 
managers appeared not to have considered any alternative means of balancing capacity 
and demand. The decision to fix an annual budget for the level of overtime appeared to be 
the only effective management control and the budget was fixed In reality by reference to 
previous years' overtime levels. Indeed, typically one or other of two phenomena operated 
at the various sites. Either the overtime budget, and consequently the overtime, would 
periodically dry-up, Irrespective of the needs of the organisation or the employee, or the 
overtime would be held back'for a rainy day' and at the end of the year, there would be a 
rush to use all the overtime budget In full, In order to prevent the budget being pared down 
the following year. No financial analysis had been made of the overtime 'decision', nor had 
the Impact of overtime on overall productivity levels been considered. 
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Employees exercised a high degree of control of overtime working, within the overall 
budget constraints. Formal administration systems, for plant-level overtime control, were 
found to be sound both procedurally and in application. However, they were applied 
without reasoning, it was of little consequence to find a rigorous authorisation and reporting 
system when, as appeared to be the case In this instant, the authorising manager did not 
addressed the question, 'is the overtime necessary'? but only'do we usually work overtime 
tonight and Is there sufficient budget left? '. 
The man-management of overtime work, physically during the actual event on the shop 
floor, was achieved through charge hands and supervisors and was found on occasions to 
be totally ineffective. This was the only instance where, in some departments, productivity 
in the actual hours of overtime was found to be relatively low. One of the reasons for this 
was that lower levels of management were found to identify more with the needs of the 
employees, than with those of the organisation. Some of the more senior managers were 
unaware of the true processes and uses involved in overtime working in their organisation 
and the true impact of overtime on unit costs. They were found to simply not know what 
really was going on. 
In addition, there were a number of managers who generally had risen through the ranks, 
who were quite aware of the ineffectiveness of overtime. These managers were 
surprisingly frank during the private interviews. They revealed a laissez-faire management 
style, within which they rationalised their position through a series of common assertions. 
For example, their workers needed the overtime earnings and would be otherwise under- 
paid, the overtime was used simply used as a mechanism to achieve a felt-fair level of 
earnings, as indeed,. to a degree, was the institutionalised bonus system. Overtime 
enabled them to maintain equilibrium industrial relations, meeting employee expectations, 
and avoiding damaging disputes; they saw'keeping the ship moving, almost at any speed', 
as a superior objective to that of efficiency. Moreover, these managers were also ultra- 
cynical about the ability, inclination and determination of the organisation to address 
restrictive practices such as unnecessary and ineffective overtime; they did not feel they 
would have the backing 'from above' to manage professionally; there was a strong union 
presence and little real executive human resource management power. In short, they felt 
impotent as managers. 
D More than 80% of the organisation's overtime could be defined as systematic, overtime 
being generally used for the normal workload, although managers did not state this to be so 
In the Initial Interviews; they most often stated that their use of overtime was for unexpected 
and emergency demand, although many dropped this pretence during the course of the 
study. 
F Overtime had an inhibiting effect on operational flexibility in that it was essentially 
systematic and therefore not available to deal with real unexpected events. Moreover, 
overtime was found to cause the depression of productivity across normal hours, due more 
to 'pacing' than to fatigue factors. 
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G Both managers and employees were generally found to want more overtime provision. 
H The cost of overtime premia represented 52% of basic pay, while the NWLCs of employing 
an additional worker amounted to an average of 35%, for those departments using 
overtime. Overtime was found to be generally either unnecessary or ineffective, and 
sometimes unproductive. 
J TOIL was not used and little or no unpaid overtime was worked other than by higher grade 
management staff, who worked on average about eight extra hours per week, without 
thought of extra remuneration. The local union officials pursued no particular policy on the 
use of overtime, nor had they received any direct guidance from their central organisation. 
The tendency was for local unions to seek to regulate the distribution of overtime. Indeed, 
it was pointed out on a number of occasions that the local union officials worked the 
longest overtime hours, it was implied, as a result of 'mutual assistance'. Overtime bans 
had been used in pursuit of industrial action, but not for some time. 
There was no evidence that normal levels of overtime caused employees any particular 
welfare problems or fatigue. However, where groups of employees worked very long 
hours, above 12 hours per week, problems of fatigue and stress were found. These 
became manifest primarily through sickness rates more than double the organisation's 
normal levels. Pay levels were relatively poor, particularly for the skilled craft and 
technician grades. It was therefore, not surprising that there was a degree of overtime 
earnings dependency at the lower pay levels. Such examples were not widespread and 
were limited to specific circumstances, such as younger male employees, with family 
responsibilities. 
8.2.11 Industrial Civilians CASE NUMBER 11 
Type of Organisation Ministry of Defence 
Locations 
Civilian Industrial Employees 
North West 
Number of Industrial Employees 400 
Sector Public Sector 
Service (SIC 1980,915) 
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HEADLINE: 
The organisation were unable to satisfy corporate objectives due primarily to two problems, 
lack of abilities among lower levels of management and the lack of wage competitiveness. 
High levels of systematic overtime were worked, and this strategy was adding to the 
problems. 
SUMMARY 
The key message of this case was that it is not effective, in the longer term, to use overtime as a 
substitute for a sound and competitive pay structure, either to reward the workforce, or to give 
adequate production cover. Overtime was not the cause of the problems, but the inappropriate 
use of overtime both exacerbated the problems and inhibited their solution. In such 
circumstances it was inappropriate to simply tackle the symptoms, a longer term view was needed 
to tackle the underlying causes of the problems. 
This organisation was'under pressure both to demonstrate to the central civil service 
administration that it was giving 'value for money', and to provide a highly technical and rapidly 
changing engineering and technological service. The fundamental corporate objective was to 
provide an effective, highly specialised repair, maintenance and jobbing manufacture service for 
the MOD. The focus of the effort, until about five years ago, was on the achievement of delivery 
performance. However, this focus had shifted since the mid 1980s, to the provision of a cost- 
effective, timely and high quality service. The reasons for this change were two-fold: i) the 
Ministry generally became more aware of the need to achieve higher efficiency and embarked on 
a'value for money' campaign; ii) satisfaction rates for delivery had improved considerably during 
the mid 1980s and this facilitated the change in emphasis. 
The staff were split between two separate sites, both of which were visited extensively over a 
period of six weeks. Interviews were completed with seventeen management grade staff, 
fourteen skilled craftsmen and technicians, five unskilled workers and four local trade union 
representatives. 
Levels of overtime were variable across the whole organisation, with average levels of about 6% of 
basic hours. This average disguised a the fact that some areas, particularly the administration 
functions, worked very little overtime, while others, for example, the craft shop floor areas, worked 
long hours of systematic overtime. Overtime working was geared to specific nights of the week 
and Saturday mornings. The patterns of overtime working were stable with some individual 
workers, seeking every possible opportunity to work additional hours while a few avoided 
overtime. Pay was uncompetitive for the skilled and technician grades. 
Staff were leaving the organisation for better pay and this was causing increasing difficulties in 
meeting production targets. Labour turnover had been increasing year on year, since 1984 and 
had reached 18% and even 28% In some of the more sensitive skilled areas. Unskilled staff 
exhibited normal industrial levels of turnover, their wages being much more competitive within the 
local labour market. Over the two years prior to the study, the personnel department conducted 
exit interviews. These showed that 65% of the core high-skilled employee turnover related to 
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wage competitiveness, while only 38% of un-skilled or semi-skilled turnover related to that cause. 
One area which served to highlight the problem was the apprentice training function. Each year 
about thirty new apprenticeships were commenced and about the same number of employees In 
their first few post-apprenticeship years left the organisation, generally for'better jobs with more 
pay'. One disillusioned manager stated 'the better the lad, the more likely he is to leave'. 
The age and length of service profiles were becoming increasingly top heavy and this was posing 
great sensitivity to the long term corporate viability of the organisation. The abilities and attitude 
profiles of the remaining staff were being diluted by the loss of the 'better' and more motivated 
employees. The wage competitiveness structural problems were at the time of the study starting 
to be addressed and the corporate intention was to totally review the payment structures. 
Sound and professional middle management skills existed, but were widely thought to be stifled 
by pay policies emanating from the central bureaucracy. In addition, there was little opportunity 
to exercise 'real' human resource management in the highly unionised environment, where all 
workers were civil servants, and with no proper sanctions, for instance, no ability to hire and fire, 
or even to undertake normal industrial discipline as necessary. 
Lower levels of management and supervision were, however, largely ineffective and tended to 
'isolate' workers from sound professional controls and to constrain communications, rather than 
to manage effectively. Indeed, worrying examples of supervision-led, (rather than simply 
tolerated), bad working practices were observed during the shop-floor phase of the study. For 
Instance, some supervisors were observed to systematically take formal 30 to 40 minute tea 
breaks In the afternoon, when tea breaks were not formally allowed. There was considerable 
pressure from lower levels of management and supervision, for an increased overtime budget. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS CASE 
A There was no overall considered corporate strategy regarding the use of overtime. The 
management strategy which tended to be adopted was to use overtime both as a means of 
recruitment, retention and motivation and as a means to increasing capacity to compensate 
for key skill shortages. 
B Overtime helped the organisation to continue to meet Its corporate objectives, but only in 
part; (viz. to satisfy demand, but not in the most cost-effective way). A purely academic 
relationship existed between overtime and employment; (viz. overtime was used Instead of 
hiring new staff, but recruitment was difficult due to the low wages). It could, however, be 
argued that if pay and training programmes were properly balanced, overtime could be 
reduced and more staff employed. It certainly appeared that the use of overtime alone was 
not an appropriate or cost-effective solution. 
C The balance between overtime and employment was carefully considered at the corporate 
level and the maintenance of a steady overtime budget was by formal decision, but related 
to past overtime levels rather than to future demand. Sound and properly applied 
procedures were used for the control of overtime. The supervision of overtime at the 
workplace was often casual and the true effects of working the overtime had not generally 
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been considered by management and were not known. The only alternative to overtime 
working which had been considered was that of hiring new staff. The organisation had 
recently commenced a review of the underlying problems of wage competitiveness and the 
quality of supervision and management. 
D Almost all the overtime worked was systematic in that it was planned and the demand could 
have been met by other means if management took the decision to do so. The key reason 
for overtime working was to supplement capacity for the losses due to high labour turnover. 
A secondary and connected reason was to allow workers to supplement their earnings and 
therefore to Improve retention. Indeed, overtime opportunities were cited as a benefit In 
recruitment advertisements and interviews. 
It was argued that overtime augmented operational flexibility in that it improved delivery 
performance. This was a mistaken thesis however, since overtime was not able to assist in 
dealing with emergency or unforeseen demand, because it was already systematically built 
into the working week and in this respect it clearly denigrated operational flexibility. 
Corporate flexibility was not enhanced by the use of overtime. This was partly because it 
would be dangerous from the industrial relations viewpoint, and difficult, to simply withdraw 
the established overtime, without other changes, in order to meet a fall-off in demand. 
Also, too many employees relied on their overtime earnings and labour turnover would be 
exacerbated. 
G Middle managers, supervisors, employees and their official representatives, with few 
exceptions, sought increased overtime. 
H The average overtime premia was 47% of total pay while the non-wage labour costs 
represented 32% of total pay. Managers believed overtime to be less expensive than the 
option of hiring additional staff. In this respect they were probably correct when 
considering the secondary associated costs which were very high in view of the 
considerable training and learning curve effects of the skilled tradesmen positions. There 
was, however, no means of conducting a detailed investigation of the secondary costs 
within this study. The effect of overtime on productivity was unclear. It appeared that 
overtime was as productive as work carried out in normal hours, and this was what 
management claimed and it certainly appeared that the managers were correct, although a 
full production study would be needed to establish this categorically. 
J TOIL was not used and there was little or no unpaid overtime other than by a few senior 
managers. Only minor employee manipulation of pace of work or priorities to obtain 
overtime was found. Indeed, manipulation to secure overtime was not necessary in the 
circumstances, with extensive overtime available almost on-call. There was, however, 
extensive and quite obvious employee manipulation of the bonus payment system. This 
was 'designed' to control the level of bonus, and the success of this employee strategy was 
demonstrated by the achievement of 10013S with a formal cut-off at 101 BS, (within a 5BS 
pay band structure), for almost every single pay period, for almost all pay groups, over the 
last eight years. Clearly, such a distribution could not have been achieved without 
considerable formal 'control'. This illustrates the abilities and level of sophistication of the 
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employees, collectively, to exercise subtle but effective control in the workplace. lt was 
widely believed that overtime pay to supervisors contributed to the institutionalisation of 
overtime although no direct evidence was found of this process. 
Local trade union representatives worked very high levels of overtime themselves and 
maintained pressure for the continuation of supply of overtime. There had been no 
guidance from the central union organisation on the policy towards overtime working. 
Overtime bans had been used by the unions as a sanction in taking industrial action in the 
early and mid 1980s, but not since that time. 
There was no evidence that overtime affected employee welfare, although a number of 
employees stated they would like to leave the organisation because they wanted more time 
with their families. Finally, there was evidence that about 15% of employees were 
dependent on their overtime earnings to meet their normal financial commitments. This 
was clearly the case, not only for the lower paid employees, but also for some of those with 
relatively good basic wages. 
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g FURTHER ANALYSIS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
Sections 6,7 and 8 present the research findings, the primary analysis of these and some degree 
of interpretation of the findings as they relate to the specific methodology which was used. This 
section draws together these findings, the analyses and the arguments, and takes these to their 
conclusions with regard to the specific research questions and hypotheses. In addition, the 
analysis of the literature review is weighed and contrasted in this section, alongside the research 
findings. A number of gaps in the literature base are explored, support is given to some of the 
themes previously developed, and, where necessary, issue is taken with previous assumptions 
and assertions made by other researchers. 
This section therefore relates directly to the issues under review, bringing all the findings and the 
initial analyses to bear as appropriate. In order to avoid repetition, only the major points of 
evidence, or those points which are needed to make establish new ground, are set out in this 
section. Where instances are quoted directly, these are intended to be indicative of the general 
situation that was found. 
The evidence relied upon in Section 9.2 was drawn from the results of the survey, Section 6, and 
the reports of the case studies, Section 8. Apart from Section 7.5, 'Analysis By Amount of 
Overtime', Section 7 is essentially used to test hypotheses Hi and H2 which are addressed in 
Section 9.3. The research in its entirety is used to test the remaining hypotheses. The intention 
was always to use cases to illustrate, not what generally takes place, although they may indeed do 
that, but what can take place in certain circumstances. 
9.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The specific management of overtime and the systems applied to this for each particular sector of 
the economy, and certainly across the economy as a whole, have not previously been fully 
addressed in the literature. The literature review, Section 3, revealed a range of assumptions and 
assertions about the management of overtime in the U. K. which were often unsupported by 
research. This project attempts to provide the evidence to fill these gaps. The principle research 
questions flowed from the literature review and are set out In Section 4.2. These questions and 
issues fell within particular groupings which are dealt with in the sub-sections below. 
It Is necessary to establish a number of definitions before embarking on the final sections of this 
thesis. 'Legitimate' overtime is Intended to distinguish between overtime which was found to be 
used for a 'real' need. A'phantom-demand' was either simply not present, or had been 
constructed to facilitate the additional overtime hours for some other purpose. This would include 
overtime used to meet a demand which could have been satisfied by the application of 
professional management. The remaining overtime, which was classified as'legitimate', could be 
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further classified as either effective or ineffective. Effective overtime was that which was 
considered to, on balance, best satisfy the corporate objectives of the organisation, given 
consideration and costing of all the available alternatives to the overtime. Ineffective overtime 
was legitimate overtime which could have been removed by cost-effective industrial engineering 
or O&M techniques. 
9.2.1 The Functions of Overtime 
One of the premise of this research was that the reasons for the use of overtime are central to the 
question of its effectiveness. It was found that a major component of the confusion surrounding 
the use and efficacy of overtime was the lack of management understanding of the real functions 
of Its use In the local context. Indeed, this was one of the key factors maintaining the excessive 
use of overtime within those establishments studied, and It seems appropriate to deduce, within 
the economy as a whole. The case studies revealed an association between the Ineffective use of 
overtime and management's mis-perception of its functions. This was hardly surprising since Its 
use was, to a great extent, counter-productive. Conversely, Cases 2,5,6,7 and 8 revealed a 
degree of association between the appropriate use of overtime and a more accurate management 
understanding and rationalisation of its functions. Again this finding seems quite obvious when 
stated thus, but does not appear to have been exercised In the literature previously. 
The concern that managers might give defensive, rather than objective, responses to survey 
questions such as: `why do you use overtime'? was discussed in Sections 5 and 6. That concern 
was found to be well placed. The survey revealed that the reasons for overtime most often given 
In the survey were those associated with the efficient and legitimate use of overtime, viz. 
unexpected demand; emergency cover and seasonal demand. While the reasons actually 
discovered In the case study phase indicated that the use of overtime was essentially systematic. 
The reasons for the use of overtime were rarely found to be straight forward and frequently 
comprised a range of inter-related causes and functions. As explained above, the survey saw the 
usual 'felt justified' stock reasons being paraded by the management respondents. The case 
study phase revealed that the managers involved at the overtime decision levels were generally 
mis-perceiving the uses to which that overtime was being put, sometimes defensively, sometimes 
because they simply did not know. Many of these managers appeared to perceive that they had 
weaknesses in their use of overtime. Some actually said so, others were simply unaware: out of 
touch with the reality of the operational areas of their organisations. 
As regards the actual reasons for using overtime, these are set out in rank order and discussed in 
Section 6.3. Bearing In mind the above qualification, a number of interesting features emerge. 
Outlook uncertainty was found to rank more highly in the survey responses, (4th out of 15), than 
had been anticipated or found elsewhere in the literature. This function of overtime was also 
found by the case studies, Section 8, to be an Important reason. It was, however, unusual to find 
this to be the prime reason In Itself, more often it was proffered In support of other reasons. It 
appeared that overtime was seen by management to be a source of capacity which could be 
increased or decreased with relatively little management effort. The case studies, however, 
illustrated how difficult it was to reduce established levels of overtime. 
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The use of overtime to support and Ineffective low-pay structure was found, but not to the extent 
Indicated in much of the literature. This was found to attache more to individual workers' 
characteristics than to the organisation's profile of structural variables. The one exception to this 
was, of course, the low-pay Industries, such as hotels, (eg. Case 9), which tended to suffer more 
under this conspicuous misuse of working time, but not exclusively so. Management, In seeking 
to 'protect' the overtime levels of workers such as those In Case 9, were grossly sub-optimising 
their position. Their action amounted to treating the symptoms of the structural problem of an 
Inappropriate payment system, In such a way that perpetuated the underlaying cause and 
exacerbated the resultant problems. Both the enterprise and workers suffered In the longer run. 
It was prima-facie Inadequate management practice and unacceptable employee welfare, to adopt 
overtime as a means of maintaining defective payment systems or shift systems, (eg. Cases 9,10 
and 11). 
Overtime was used because managers felt this gave operational flexibility, but this was found 
generally not to be so, particularly where the overtime levels were high and regular. Overtime 
was occasionally enforced by the nature of the work, as with the drivers in Case 6, but this 
accounted for a very small amount of the total overtime. 
The distribution of reasons for overtime across the economy were generally uniform, but with a 
few notable exceptions. More use was made of overtime to cover for 'skill shortages' In the South 
than in the North and in non-service sector than the service sector. Predictably, the use of 
overtime to give flexibility in the face of outlook uncertainty was more prevalent in the non-service 
than the service sector (significance p=0.05). The reader is referred to Section 7 and the 
supporting appendices where the many structural differences, or the lack of these, can be 
reviewed. 
Both the survey and case studies revealed a very wide variety of uses to which overtime was being 
put and little management understanding of these. This lack of understanding and variety made 
the control of overtime both complex and difficult, and would repress any attempt at macro-level 
controls. The problem lies in attempting to draw general conclusions from such a diverse range 
of functions. Any broad-brush approach to the solution of overtime abuse could yield a host of 
potential problems for individual organisations. Therefore any general macro-economic strategy, 
or statutory regulation, would need to be very carefully considered, particularly in view of the 
unexpected effect of overtime premla levels on levels of overtime which is discussed in Section 
9.2.4. below. That is not to say that macro-level controls should not be considered or would 
necessarily be entirely ineffective. 
9.2.2 The Management of Overtime 
In considering the competence of the management of overtime it is important to understand the 
processes which distinguish effective and professional management rather than inappropriate 
management. In this endeavour the classical model of management is used. This adduces that 
effective management operates within a consciously structured organisation, in order to achieve a 
framework of objectives. It involves planning and controlling to the plan, utilising the tools which 
178 
will best achieve that control. Where decisions are required, these will be based on a sound 
understanding and judicious analysis of the situation and the alternatives. It would be difficult for 
management to be effective without effective communications, innovation and man-management. 
It is not claimed that the above comments adequately define management, only that they serve to 
establish a basis on which the management of overtime can be considered in this thesis. 
Many of the research questions were concerned with the management of overtime and a 
considerable amount of evidence regarding the management process was uncovered. These 
questions related, in particular, to the: 
i) Corporate or overall policies and strategies; 
li) Decision processes for overtime working; 
iii) Consideration of alternatives to overtime; 
iv) Use of specific management controls; 
v) 'Ownership' of the real control of overtime at the workplace. 
These Issues are considered below and provide evidence on the fundamental question: 'is 
overtime associated with good or poor management? ' 
The case studies revealed strong evidence of overtime used successfully as a considered 
management tool, to enhance both operational flexibility and the achievement of corporate goals. 
For example, Case 2, Police Force B (North, 2300 Officers); Case 5, Distribution (Southwest, 1277 
staff); Case 6, a small retail company (North, 10 staff) and Case 8, a group of hotels (Greater 
London, 660 staff); all demonstrated the essentially 'legitimate' and 'effective' use of overtime. 
The wide sectoral, size and geographical spread of such examples illustrate that overtime can not 
be branded as bad practice per se. 
This evidence supported the findings of other researchers; eg. Atkinson and Meager (1986), who 
observed that, properly managed, overtime had a valid part to play in British industry. However, 
in these examples of the effective use of overtime, the levels worked were low compared to the 
average amounts for the particular industry and circumstances, and levels had often been 
previously reduced and 'brought under control' by specific management initiatives within the 
organisations concerned. Certainly this 'effective' overtime tended to be less systematic than that 
in the other organisations which were studied. The corollary was equally established. This 
suggested that high and systematic overtime was negatively associated with professional 
management practice. 
The survey results and analyses are presented In Section 6 and 7 in detail and can be sifted as 
necessary. No doubt the reader would wish to do this from their own particular perspective and 
Interests. These results are therefore not re-listed and reviewed In full In this section. However, it 
might be appropriate to give a simple example of the analyses which are available in those 
sections. Section 7 revealed interesting structural differences, and some lack of differences, in 
the use of management controls. For example, an overall 'corporate' management policy 
covering overtime, was less likely to be formally established in the South and in the service 
industries, than In the North and the non-service sector. This 'overtime policy' issue is shown 
below to be of pivotal importance in considering the 'legitimate' and 'effective' use of overtime. 
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The survey provides interesting but, by its nature, inconclusive evidence regarding the efficacy of 
the management of overtime and the association of overtime with good or poor management. 
The general application of formal corporate direction and policy regarding overtime was found to 
be generally lax within the U. K. Moreover, the controls of overtime appeared to be more rigorous, 
and levels of overtime tended to be lower, where a resolute overtime management policy was 
established at the corporate level. Case 2 gave a clear example of this process, particularly when 
compared to Case 3, where the lack of a well communicated policy had led to difficulties In 
controlling overtime. Section 6.5 and Figure 6-9 showed there to be an extensive lack of 
'corporate direction' of overtime working within the economy as a whole. Only 34% of 
organisations employed a formal management policy regarding overtime. In addition, the 
existence of the fundamental overtime management control tool of budgetary control was 
negatively correlated with high levels of overtime (significance p=0.01, non-manual staff and 
p=0.05, manual staff, Appendix 7.5), although the practical use of budgetary controls is 
questioned later in this section. 
It was interesting to note that any attempted restriction of overtime was usually accompanied by 
resistance from the lower levels of supervision and management and, in some instances, from 
middle management; eg. Cases 1,3,5 and 11. 
Management by objectives and the unequivocal mission statement are not new concepts for 
effective management. It will, therefore, come as no surprise that the case studies found clear 
and resolute corporate policy to be a prerequisite to the significant improvement in the use of 
overtime. In debating this point, the view was put to the author that by far the most Important 
factor In success was: 'well trained and motivated first-line management and supervision'. The 
evidence, however, unequivocally showed that this was not so. Of course, effective first-line 
management would be helpful and desirable in achieving corporate objectives, but the true 
catalyst for change was found to emanate from the corporate level. This issue, in essence, 
reduced to that of: 'who actually runs the show? '. 
The evidence, In short, comprised two facts. First, the research did not find any examples where 
overtime had been successfully reduced without resolute and clear policy direction from the top 
management level. Secondly, examples were found where overtime had been successfully 
reduced and rationalised as a result of senior management determination, against the overtly and 
actively expressed 'better Judgement' of lower and, on occasions, middle levels of management, 
(eg. Cases 1,2,3 and 5). 
The case study phase of the research yielded strong evidence on the overtime management issue. 
There could be no doubt that professional management and direction, at the corporate level, was 
one of the key factors supporting the legitimate and effective use of overtime. The corollary to 
this was the tendency for organisations, without a resolute, well communicated and understood 
policy on overtime, to drift into higher levels of inappropriate overtime, which actually inhibited 
their achievement of corporate goals (eg. Cases 3,9,10 and 11). There was also a tendency for 
organisations making heavy use of overtime, particularly where the overtime was ineffective, to 
have not undertaken a formal decision process leading to their use of overtime. 
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The lack of direction from higher levels of management has been found by other research (NBPI 
1970; Carby et ai 1981; White 1982). The Donovan Commission stated that it was not unusual for 
directors and senior managers to have little knowledge of the use of overtime In their 
organisations (NBPI 1970). It was clear that the bulk of overtime was scheduled almost 
by 
default. There was overwhelming evidence that formal analysis to support the decision to work 
overtime was not generally undertaken by managers who were either unable or unwilling to 
do the 
necessary work. Moreover, there was no evidence of any general holistic approach 
by managers 
to the structural problem of capacity-demand balancing. Overtime was treated as a single Issue 
without reference to the total organisation. The only stage where an actual considered 
management decision appeared regularly to be taken was found to be during the annual 
budgeting process. 
The use of overtime budgets was quite common and frequently the only real management control 
of the use of overtime. Operational managers often stated: 'I will use all the overtime I can get'. 
Frequently managers appeared simply to give-way to employee pressures for overtime. There 
was considerable evidence of overtime being'budget driven' rather than flowing from considered 
decisions based on operational needs at the time the overtime was required. Indeed, even the 
annual decisions taken in setting overtime budgets were questionable. In all the cases of the 
inappropriate use of overtime which were found, the overtime budget decisions, where they 
existed, had been based primarily on the previous year's overtime levels, possibly modified in a 
bargaining session, and unsupported by formal analysis of forward-load and human resource 
management. These 'horse-trading' sessions were characterised by Operational Management 
seeking more overtime, resisted by General and Financial Management. As Smith (1989) pointed 
out, 'the management of the human resource lags far behind the management of other resources'. 
Some managers tended to be over-sensitive, misinformed and defensive about their use of 
overtime. This was found, in the case studies, to be Indicative of the Inappropriate use of 
overtime, (eg. Cases 4,9 and 10), and indicated that managers were at least suspicious of the 
possible shortfalls In this policy. Clearly, many managers found overtime to be a ready solution to 
the problems which can and do arise. The use of overtime to cover for management foibles In 
planning and scheduling the work and material flows was found to be quite common; eg. Cases 1, 
3,10 and 11. Clearly, overtime, Insofar as It was used to cover for problems such as Ineffective 
logistics and poor man-management, tended to perpetuate such problems and therefore was 
Ineffective and Inappropriate. This supported the findings of many previous researchers, who 
have linked the use of overtime with poor management-planning and scheduling of work and 
materials flows (eg. Gibbons eta/ 1976; Landveter 1984). 
Carby et at (1981) stated that, traditionally, overtime in the U. K. Is controlled by first line 
management; this was supported by White (1984). This research project also found evidence to 
support that conclusion, but only in part. A subtle process appeared to operate, where senior 
management were somewhat disinterested and uninformed regarding the use of overtime in their 
organisations. Overtime appeared to them to be a banal and old fashioned operational matter, of 
little corporate importance. At most, their interest was confined to the financial impact of overtime 
in reviewing the accounts, but not usually embracing any comparison of alternative means of 
satisfying the demand. Added to this, lower levels of management can benefit through the use of 
overtime in more easily maintaining 'equilibrium' industrial relations and ostensibly dealing with, 
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(or'covering up'), the daily problems which certainly arise. 
It Is interesting to note that other nations manage quite successfully with much less overtime, often 
with lower unit labour costs than the U. K, and, presumably, with much the same logistics and 
man-management problems as occur In the U. K. (see Section 3.4.2). It Is therefore difficult to 
accept at face value the alleged greater need In the U. K. to use overtime for the logistics and 
emergency cover reasons which are often paraded by U. K. management. 
In fact, the true control of overtime was found in a number of the case studies to have been 
usurped by the workforce. Employee manipulation of working pace and work priorities appeared 
from the case studies to be common and was particularly associated with higher levels of 
systematic overtime and, therefore, with poor management; eg. Cases 3,9,10 and 11. Similarly, 
evidence was found that quality can be depressed by the use of overtime. This was found to be 
the case in the service industries such as the Police Force and the hotel trade, (Cases 1,2,3,8 
and 9), although there was not sufficient evidence to establish the general extent of this 
phenomenon. 
The survey, per se could not give definitive evidence on this matter, although it revealed that 67% 
of respondents believed that employees: 'manipulate productivity and priorities to secure 
overtime'. The case studies however, provided the evidence needed to establish the phenomena. 
Every type of organisation studied, including the Police Forces, revealed some form of employee 
manipulation. The proposition is that Insofar as overtime was associated with employee, rather 
than management control, it was prima-facia associated with ineffective management. 
Miller (1978) found that supervisors were paid overtime rates in order to maintain pay differentials, 
although it appeared a relatively simple matter to devise other means to achieve this in those 
organisations studied. The payment of overtime premium rates to supervisors was found to be 
associated with systematic and higher levels of overtime, although there was no direct association 
between this practice and poor management. The survey revealed that 71 % of respondents 
believed this practice to promote overtime, again this was of interest, but not conclusive. The 
case studies gave some additional evidence in support of the proposition for the larger 
organisations only. For example, Case 11 revealed the worst form of supervision negligence in 
the plant-level control of overtime working, although this was not promoted exclusively by the 
payment of premiums to those supervisors. Notwithstanding the above example, the substantive 
evidence of the case studies indicated that overtime premium payments to supervisors did not 
generally promote overtime working. 
A wide-spread lack of knowledge and understanding of the alternatives to overtime working was 
found in the case studies; while the survey revealed a coyness on the part of managers to admit 
this lack of knowledge. This again pointed to the dangers in relying uncritically on survey data. 
Middle management were often found to be simply unaware of the available alternative options, 
and senior management were often unaware and disinterested in the level and consequences of 
overtime within their organisations. Some senior managers, in organisations where the worst 
overtime abuses were found, were totally unaware of those abuses and often gave genuine, but 
nevertheless ingenuous, responses during the interviews, regarding their organisation's use of 
overtime (eg. Cases 9,10 and 11). Conversely, where senior management did understand the 
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use of overtime in their organisation, a great deal of effort and planning had been invested to 
optimise their use of overtime; for example, see Cases 1,2,5,6 and B. The reluctance of 
management generally to become involved in detail at this level, Is widely accepted, for example, 
Smith (1989), referring to payment systems, stated: 'management do not do enough to become 
Involved in the basic work of production and the events of the shop floor. 
Effective records and procedural controls were found to greatly help the reduction of overtime, as 
well as In maintaining it at the lower levels. As regards specific overtime control techniques, the 
survey revealed the distribution of the use of these, while the case studies gave details of their use 
in practice. Yet the use of 'controls', laudable as they may seem at first sight, needs to be 
considered critically. Limits for overtime working, for example, were discussed in Section 3.3.1 
and 6.5, where it was revealed that limits can act as surrogate targets with tacit approval, and in 
this event represent the antithesis to overtime control. 
The NBPI (1970) identified a lack of monitoring and records of overtime working. This was 
supported by the survey and case studies which revealed a serious shortfall in the availability of 
information on which to base decisions and controls. Interestingly, whilst 70% of organisations 
claimed In the survey to use a formal overtime authorisation system, the case studies revealed that 
this was in reality simply 'agreement' of the overtime and often took place 'after the event'. 
Moreover, the bulk of overtime, was worked regularly at certain times of the week. The only 
actual authorisation for this overtime was during the annual budget setting time and, presumably, 
when the overtime pattern had been first established, and this was often said to be 'years ago'. 
There was little evidence of any formal establishment of management review and 'authorisation' 
process at the point of delivery of the overtime. Thus, the so-called authorisation of overtime, as 
far as It Implied some kind of management decision, was another Instance where survey results 
which Indicated that most overtime was formally authorised could be misleading. The case 
studies revealed that authorisation was often no more than a simple check of the budgetary 
provision, (on the basis that if its in the budget, It must be authorised), and did not reflect the need 
and circumstances of the overtime. 
On a more general note regarding the management control of overtime, Carby et al (1981) 
suggested, that overtime was coming under 'greater control and falling' (Section 3.3.1 qv). This 
was not found to be so by this research. Similarly, and more recently, the CBI (1989) predicted 
that increased overtime controls were due to be Implemented In 1989. Again, no evidence was 
found, by this research, of any such perception among managers using overtime. Although, 
Interestingly it was found that, where overtime had come under greater control, and particularly 
when this control emanated from the corporate level, overtime had indeed fallen. 
In conclusion to this review of the management of overtime It Is appropriate to address the 
fundamental question of the overall quality of that management. Caulkin (1976), and others have 
asserted that the management of overtime was 'sloppy', lacked proper procedures for control and 
was unaware of its Implications for costs and profitability. This research provides specific 
evidence to support Caulkin's assertions. Section 3.3.5, 'Quality of Management'. reviews the 
literature with regard to the U. K. management of overtime and reveals great concern regarding 
this Issue. There was little In this research to suggest that this concern Is mis-placed. 
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Indeed, the strongest evidence regarding the association of poor management with the 
unnecessary, inefficient and systematic use of overtime, flows more clearly from the examination 
of the legitimate and efficient use of overtime, than from that of its inappropriate use. 
9.2.3 The Cost-Effectiveness of Overtime 
The first premise to be established was that, where overtime was not 'legitimate', (viz. 
unnecessary), In that it was not required to meet demand, It did not matter what the relative costs 
of the overtime hours were, the overtime was, by definition, not cost-effective. The problem was 
that overtime appeared to be used for more than simply capacity-demand balancing, although 
management were often not aware of this, particularly at the senior levels. It would therefore be 
appropriate to put a value on the alternative reason for the overtime, for example, equilibrium 
Industrial relations or Improved earnings, and weigh this 'benefit' in any analysis of cost- 
effectiveness. Such an analysis Is rejected in this thesis as fundamentally flawed, In that It rejects 
the classical management model. 
In the event, a significant proportion of the overtime reviewed in the case studies was found to be 
unnecessary, even though management initially claimed that it was used for specific, legitimate, 
reasons. It was not possible to calculate the level of this unnecessary overtime; although if 
pressed, an'Informed estimate' would be that between a quarter and a half of all overtime 
observed in the case studies was quite unnecessary for capacity-demand balancing, in that the 
work could readily have been organised without recourse to overtime hours. 
Case 10 revealed a clear example of the unnecessary use of overtime as well as the tendency to 
focus on the productivity of the overtime hours alone, (see Appendix 8-3). The Transport 
Manager stated that 'the only time the workers really earned their bread was during overtime' and 
this was his 'justification' for scheduling that overtime. Incidentally, the interview procedure did 
not provoke any justification, It was designed to reinforce and to avert the need for managers to 
become defensive. It was abundantly clear, however, that the overtime so scheduled was 
generally quite unnecessary. The transport workers were occupied for below 60% of their normal 
working hours and a simple reorganisation of work schedules and working practices, by sound 
man-management, could have achieved dramatic savings for the enterprise, without denigrating 
service levels In any way. The defensive stance of this manager was in fact quite rational in the 
circumstances. His use of overtime was serving no purpose except, possibly, to give increased 
earnings, although even so this overtime was Intrinsically demotivating to the staff. 
This leaves the question of the cost-effectiveness of that overtime for which a real 'demand' 
existed. The evidence suggested that the actual overtime hours worked were in fact relatively 
productive. It was also found that the majority of managers took a simplistic view, considering 
only the 'effectiveness' of the overtime hours themselves, rather than the holistic effect of overtime 
on the whole organisation and its objectives. Overtime was found to depress productivity and, on 
occasions, quality, of product or service, in most of the case studies. The exceptions to this 
were: Case 2, where overtime was very tightly controlled; Case 5 where the bonus scheme tightly 
controlled the productivity of the core productive tasks and Case 8, where overtime was low and 
infrequent and the nature of the'service' prevented any form of pacing. 
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An example of the potential effect of overtime on the productivity of normal hours, in the service 
Industry, was found In the Police Force. A police traffic crew gave the example that they had 
made a breathalyser arrest at the shift-end, the resulting overtime was most 'productive' in terms 
of their objectives (see Case 1). This illustrated that unit output and service levels could 
be higher 
in overtime hours than In normal hours. This, however, did not render the overtime necessarily 
effective. If, as was stated above In the case of the breathalyser arrest, the event was'selected' 
by the officers to be towards the end of the shift, In order to promote the overtime, and the earlier 
quest for an arrest had not been quite so energetic, then the resulting overtime would be arguably 
Ineffective, Irrespective of the cost of the overtime hours compared to the non wage labour costs, 
(NWLCs). It is, of course, much easier to argue, in a manufacturing rather than a service 
environment, the Ineffectiveness of overtime which is generated by worker manipulation of the 
timing of work priorities, or by Inhibiting productivity In normal hours. Indeed, the patterns of 
service level demands were often determined by extraneous factors. Irrespective of this, 
management are, of course, responsible for establishing patterns of normal work in sympathy with 
such factors. 
The survey revealed that only 11.6% of managers thought productivity was higher in overtime 
hours, while 64.8% disagreed with that assertion. As stated above, however, the case studies 
firmly illustrated that, on balance, the output resulting from overtime hours was better or equal to 
that achieved in the normal hours, particularly where the overtime was systematic or involved 
consistently long hours. The paradox of this unexpected survey response is clearly, a function of 
managers' general lack of knowledge of the use of overtime within their organisations and their 
tendency to fall back on 'common wisdom', when answering such questionnaires. This also 
reflected managers' lack of knowledge of the relative productivity of normal and overtime hours. 
Section 6.5 revealed that performance during overtime hours was measured in only 19.7% 
organisations. 
As with the uses to which overtime is put, there was a great deal of ignorance of the true costs of 
scheduling overtime and the costs of the alternatives to overtime. For example, Appendix 8-4, 
illustrated, with one particular manager, a total misunderstanding of the costing of overtime. The 
inappropriate use of overtime was generally associated with the mis-perception of the comparative 
cost of overtime working. Many managers believed, incorrectly, that overtime was cost-effective 
in their situation. This misunderstanding of the relative costs of overtime and the alternatives was 
particularly evident in the medium sized and larger firms. In the very small firms which were 
studied there was a very good understanding, by the principle, of the comparative costs. This 
was hardly surprising since the principle had a clear financial interest and controlled all the 
relevant costs personally. 
The case studies revealed that there was often a fall in performance associated with overtime, 
particularly where the overtime hours were long and recovery periods were not available to the 
individual workers. This did not, however, contradict the above analysis in that the most obvious 
lower performance standards were concentrated in the normal time both before and after the 
overtime as evidenced by the Police case studies. There were two process Involved. The first 
was a function of 'pacing' and manipulation, by the worker, before the event, in order to establish 
a need for the overtime, (eg. Cases 1,3,9,10 and 11). The second was simple fatigue, where the 
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performance (in terms of both quality and volume of work) fell-off after the event, (eg. Cases 
1,2,3,9 and 10). As can be seen, both these phenomena were on occasions observed In the 
same organisation, but not necessarily so. 
In Section 7.5 it was revealed that managers' perception of the 'cost-effectiveness' of overtime was 
positively correlated with the greater use of overtime, (significance p=0.01: manual and p=0.11: 
non-manual staff). The 'cost' reason was closely associated with that of overtime being used for 
'normal demand' and these were ranked 6th and 5th respectively, out of 15 reasons, attracting 
60% and 62% support at the combined primary and secondary levels. This indicated the extent of 
management's misunderstanding of the financial implications of their overtime 'decision'. Even 
where overtime was found to be very well managed, and innovative alternatives were being used, 
as in Case 5, there was little knowledge of the actual comparative costs of overtime and the 
alternatives, and apparently no formal analysis had ever been conducted. 
Where managers were pressed in the case study interviews to take a view of the costs of overtime, 
the only equation found to feature in their thinking was that of the fundamental comparison 
between overtime premium costs and the direct NWLCs. This was actually quite a reasonable, If 
rudimentary, comparison, (see Section 3.3.3). In all cases, except In the Police Forces, overtime 
was found to be substantially more expensive, on this basis, than the alternative of hiring 
additional staff. Indeed, the macro-economic level statistics revealed the extent to which this was 
true. The NWLCs amounted to, typically, 30% (Employment Gazette 1989), whilst the overall 
average premium cost of overtime was found from the survey to be 52.4%, (see Section 6.2.3). 
The difference was therefore significant, being of the order of 20% of basic pay. 
The overtime premium costs and NWLCs were dependent on the structural variables and the 
distributions of these are given in the appendices supporting Section 7. For example, larger 
organisations and those In the service sector, paid on average higher overtime premiums and 
encountered higher NWLCs. The average NWLCs for the case studies, excluding the Police 
Forces, amounted to 30%, whilst the average overtime premium found in the case studies was 
49%. These figures were, of course, not Intended to be Illustrative of the general averages, but 
simply to illustrate that the cases were not unrepresentative on these particular measures. 
9.2.4 The Patterns, Levels and Effects of Overtime Premia 
The survey results gave a unique picture of the patterns and distribution of overtime premia and 
these are discussed in Section 6.2.3 and Section 7. The key findings of these sections are that 
non-manual staff receive, on average, a third lower overtime premia and higher overtime premia 
are paid in the South, in larger establishments and in the service sector. The discussion here will 
be focussed on the paradox, which this thesis highlights, regarding the effects of overtime premla 
on levels of overtime. This debate is centred around two diametrically opposite arguments, which 
are developed in Section 3.3.4, viz: 
t) That high premia depress overtime levels, (by reducing the employer-supply of 
overtime by the price mechanism, eg. Ehrenberg 1971; Carr 1986; ILO 1986C). This 
rationale is by far the most widely adopted; 
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ii) That high premia promote higher overtime levels, (by increasing employee-demand, 
eg. Brittan 1979; Dawkins 1985). 
The substantive finding of this research was that lower overtime premia lead to lower levels of 
overtime, in the U. K. economy. The evidence leading to this conclusion is reviewed below. 
The first evidence to be considered was that of which group exercised the real control of overtime 
working. The analysis within this thesis illustrates that the workforce exercised a substantial 
degree of control, although this was not clear to many managers. Insofar as the pragmatic 
control of overtime was vested in the workforce, then the eff ect of premia on levels of overtime 
would certainly be a positive association, given that it Is established in this thesis that employees 
work overtime primarily for financial reasons. This strongly suggests that the higher the premia, 
the greater the demand for, and therefore the level of, overtime. 
The survey reflected this analysis in revealing a positive correlation between higher overtime 
levels and higher overtime premia. However, as discussed in Section 6.2.3, there was no 
evidence available from the survey to explain cause and effect. The survey result was therefore 
inconclusive. The case studies offered the opportunity to review and explain in more detail some 
of the processes involved. These revealed that managers generally had little understanding of the 
effects and potential uses of overtime premia. Premia were simply accepted as a'fact of life' and 
were not generally the subject of any detailed management consideration. 
The exception to this occurred when there were moves from the unions to increase overtime 
premia. (In this event, premia may enter local pay negotiations as a simple bargaining counter 
with little attention paid to any considerations, other than the rudimentary financial implications of 
the premia levels. Moreover, the key argument used by the unions tends to be that of 'typical' 
levels of premia paid elsewhere. Thus a ratchet effect seems to have operated within the 
economy, quietly but relentlessly lacking-up overtime premia levels over the years. ) This 
particular argument is conjecture based on the experiences of the author although there is no 
doubt that premia have increased over the same period as overtime levels have increased over 
recent times, (see Section 3.3.4). Unfortunately, no evidence on this matter was uncovered by 
this research project. The above conjecture has been included in this thesis for two reasons: 
This research establishes, for the first time, a base line of premla levels and patterns, 
and the distribution of these by the major structural variables, against which future 
levels of premia can be tracked. Thus the above speculative proposition can be 
tested in the future if necessary. 
ii) Attention is drawn to at least the possibility of this potentially damaging process, and 
the need for managers to look deeply at the consequences of overtime premla levels. 
There was no concern whatsoever found within management, in any of the case studies, about the 
level of overtime premia. Managers perceived that time-and-a-half and double-time were 
somehow sacrosanct and were generally unaware that these were historically and internationally 
high levels. The survey similarly revealed managers to be unconcerned or mis-informed about 
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levels of premia and the costs of overtime. There was, therefore, no evidence that the cost of 
overtime inhibited the scheduling of overtime, certainly not at the operational level, where the 
preeminent attitude of managers was found to be one of using all the overtime they could get, and 
sometimes more, since it was not uncommon for budgets to be found to be exceeded, (eg. Cases 
3,5). Many line managers appeared from the case studies to take the attitude that, if they had an 
overtime budget, it was incumbent upon them to use it. 
The case studies illustrated that employees were essentially, (although not exclusively), motivated 
to work overtime by financial considerations. It was interesting, however, to note the attitude of 
some hotel staff, outlined in Case 9, where low basic pay and low premiums acted directly to 
depress employee demand for overtime. This was particularly the case for those employees, 
generally older or young-single individuals, who were not dependent on overtime earnings to meet 
their fixed financial commitments. 
The cases studies Illustrated that, the greater the financial rewards for overtime working, the 
greater the demand for overtime from the employees. Most particularly, they demonstrated the 
high degree of control of overtime working which workers exercise. Operational managers were 
found, as a rule, to not consider the costs of scheduling overtime, either formally by analysis, or 
Informally. The conclusion that higher overtime premia promoted the use of overtime in the U. K. 
was inevitable. 
This finding was important In that It contradicted the underlying philosophy of the Internationally 
accepted macro-economic management of working time, that high premia inhibit overtime. This 
philosophy is widely accepted as common wisdom. In the US It Is the basis of the Fair Labour 
Standards Act, which has sought to inhibit the use of overtime within the U. S. economy since 1936 
(Carr 1986). Also, In Europe, It Is accepted almost without question, that higher overtime premia 
depress levels of overtime. The ILO (1986C) stated 'overtime is universally restricted Indirectly by 
means of a premium or penalty rate of wages. Conventions Nos. 1 and 30 provide that this 
premium shall not be less than 25%'. Although as Thurman (1988), of the ILO, theorised for 
Europe as a whole, the costs of overtime are not as effective a deterrent against overtime as 
statutory or organisationally based administrative hurdles. Clearly, there is a need to rethink this 
phenomena. 
9.2.5 The Patterns of Overtime Working 
The survey disclosed an Interesting and again unique picture of overtime working patterns for the 
whole economy. It was clear that the patterns of overtime working, in a general sense, disclosed 
something about the nature of the overtime. At least they were one of the signs that overtime 
may be systematic. Section 6.2.2 discusses the overall overtime patterns whilst Section 7 covers 
the implications of the distribution of those patterns between the structural variables. 
The case studies proved what had been suspected from the survey, that regularly scheduled 
overtime was generally systematic in nature, in that the need for overtime, where a need was 
substantiated. could generally have been anticipated and a range of alternatives were available for 
meeting that need. Moreover, the case studies showed that the timing of the overtime were to 
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some degree controlled by the workforce, to meet their convenience, rather than the demands of 
the work per se, (eg. Case 10 and 11). This was not necessarily an unhealthy situation for some 
types of overtime. For example, where the overtime was needed, in the short term, to meet 
annual fluctuations in demand or skill shortages, it was sensible to arrange that 'predictable' 
overtime to best meet employees' requirements. However, it is, of course, incumbent on 
managers to seek the most appropriate solution to problems such as fluctuating demand and skill 
shortages, and in the longer term, overtime would not necessarily be the only viable alternative, or 
the best solution. 
The most extreme example of workforce control of overtime working patterns was found in Case 
10. This revealed that overtime was worked on Sundays in order to meet the transportation and 
double-time premium desires of the workforce, and this pattern had been established and 
unquestioned for a number of years, (Appendix 8-4). In this Instance, the operational and senior 
management, revealingly stated unequivocally, before the shopfloor study, that this overtime was 
worked to meet'unexpected demand' and 'emergency situations'. 
9.2.6 The Extent of Systematic Overtime 
Systematic overtime, for the purposes of this thesis, was defined in Section 6.3 and discussed at 
length in Section 3.3.7. The survey revealed that about 75% of overtime may be defined as 
systematic. Similarly, the case studies showed that, on average, two thirds of overtime, in the 
enterprises reviewed, could be defined as systematic, although that statistic was not necessarily 
indicative of general levels. 
The analysis given In Section 7.5 revealed that rising current levels of demand did not correlate 
with higher levels of overtime, while the use of overtime for'normal demand', and for the closely 
related reason of its perceived 'cost-effectiveness', were both positively correlated with the greater 
use of overtime. Similarly, it was Interesting to find a positive correlation between longer overtime 
hours and the perception of management that any worksharing measures would result In yet 
further Increases in overtime. These findings all point to overtime being Intrinsically systematic. 
It did not follow that all systematic overtime was Ineffective, or that systematic overtime 
necessarily Implied negative overall consequences for the organisation. A number of examples of 
the appropriate use of systematic overtime were found, (eg. Case I and Case 8). 
Notwithstanding the above argument, where management exercised firm and rational control of 
overtime, the levels of systematic overtime were found to be lower. This was confirmed by Cases 
2,5 and 6. The contra argument was also found, in that where management were not in control of 
overtime working, higher levels of systematic overtime were invariably evident. Thus the extent of 
systematic overtime can act as a barometer for the general health of the management of working 
time and the effectiveness of capacity-volume balancing. However, this tool should be used as 
an indication of the need to look in more detail at the efficacy of the overtime, rather than as 
evidence-in-chief of it's ineffectiveness. 
189 
9.2.7 Attitudes Towards Overtime 
There was no doubt from the results of the survey, (see Section 6.2.4), and the case studies, that 
the majority of employees across all the sectors of the economy, wanted to maintain or Increase 
overtime levels. Many saw overtime as a means of controlling their own levels of pay and pace of 
work. There remained, however, a small section of the workforce which resisted overtime 
working, primarily because they placed a greater value on their free time than on the premium-pay 
earnings. These workers appeared to be grouped by their individual characteristics, rather than 
by any particular structural variables. 
The case studies revealed that employees were essentially, (although not exclusively), motivated 
to work overtime by financial considerations, (eg. Cases 2,3 and 8). A number of Interesting, if 
minor, sub groups were found In the case studies and It Is worth briefly reviewing these. The 
effect of taxation on attitudes was relatively small, but a few employees took the view that overtime 
earnings were relatively heavily taxed, due to the system of personal taxation allowances, and this 
militated against their working longer hours. Intriguingly, there were also a small number of 
workers, (see Case 9, hotel sector), who took the view that their hourly wages were so low, and 
overtime premia relatively low, that It was not worth the effort to work longer hours, therefore they 
avoided overtime where possible. This was a curious distortion of the low pay syndrome. It must 
be stressed that these groups were generally not associated with any of the structural variables. 
They tended to simply reflect the normal variability found in any group of people. The one 
exception being the low paid group which, of course, was associated, In these cases In the hotel 
trade, with the somewhat structurally based low paid work. 
Management attitude to overtime working, of course, is central to the issues. It was clear that 
lower levels of management sought to maintain the flexibility which they perceived overtime gave 
them to manage. In fact the case studies revealed that their use of overtime did not, on balance, 
improve flexibility. Overtime was found by the case studies to be pragmatically used, by lower 
levels of management and supervision, to achieve a number of objectives. These included 
exercising discretion to give'grace and favour' to individual employees, sometimes as a reward 
or punishment. Scheduling overtime was thought by some managers to'sweeten' industrial 
relations, and to avoided pressures from the workforce who wished to control their pay and pace 
and traditionally had used overtime to do so. Clearly, overtime was used to 'cover-up' 
management deficiencies in scheduling and controlling work and material flows. The use of 
overtime to avoid the need to accurately plan ahead and organise capacity to meet anticipated 
demand was conspicuous. This analysis may appear cynical, yet, on the basis of the case 
studies, it can scarcely be avoided. 
An obvious but Important phenomenon, well illustrated by the case studies, showed that the 
demand for overtime working from workers was found to be, In all cases, directly proportional to 
the general expectations of availability of overtime; eg. Cases 3,6,9 and 10. In short, the greater 
the availability of overtime, the greater the employee demand for the overtime. Conversely, where 
overtime had been restricted, and the workforce had become accustomed to this policy, the 
demand for overtime from the workforce, and from operational management, was much lower, eg. 
Cases 2 and 8. 
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Evidently, workers and lower levels of management tended to become 'addicted' to overtime 
working. Some more senior managers, (eg. Case 10), took the demand for overtime, from the 
shop floor and line management, as vindication of the need for that overtime. Clearly, this was a 
very dangerous assumption for them to make; Indeed, it might have been more prudent to take 
such demand as a warning sign that the overtime may be institutionalised and should be 
fundamentally reviewed, rather than simply accepting It as a self-fulfilling prophesy. 
It followed that, all workers, not just the low paid, were able to become dependent on overtime 
earnings when these were regular, Irrespective of their fixed financial commitments, and this 
syndrome was found In a number of cases, even in the relatively well paid Police Force. It was 
not only the low paid who would suffer the financial problems of overtime withdrawal In these 
circumstances. 
9.2.8 Employee Welfare and Absenteeism 
The primary evidence regarding employee welfare was obtained from the case study phase of the 
research. The studies unequivocally demonstrated that overtime could, and often did, militate 
against employee welfare, particularly when hours of work were relatively long or shift systems 
poorly designed from the welfare viewpoint. In Case 10, for example, employees working over 12 
hours per week were found to suffer from directly associated welfare problems, while those below 
that level exhibited no such problems. To quote from that case: 'overtime caused employees to 
become stressed and fatigued, it lowered morale and caused resentment'. 
The evidence clearly illustrated that, where employee welfare did suffer, this Invariably rebounded 
on the employer In that productivity and quality of product or service were put at risk. Two 
processes prevailed. First and most obvious, the effectiveness of the employee fell-off on the 
days following the excessive or Inappropriate hours. This was very clear from the reports of 
'wooden' Police Officers, following long hours of duty. Secondly. It was clear that employees 
exposed to welfare problems, quickly learnt to 'pace' themselves prior to and, to a lesser extent, 
during the overtime, in order to avoid the worst effects of the Inappropriate hours. it was 
surprising that employers appeared to be unaware of the consequences, for both their employee 
and their product, of long hours of work. 
Interestingly, employee welfare and long hours of work was an issue of increasing importance in 
the Police Force and this is discussed in Cases 1,2 and 3 in some detail. However, welfare was 
hardly recognised by management as an issue in the other industries covered by the case studies. 
There was, for example, little recognition from management that the notice given to an employee 
of the need to stay late was negatively correlated with welfare, in that the shorter the notice, the 
greater the disruptive affect of the overtime on the worker. 
The survey, as designed, could give very little direct evidence with regard to employee welfare. It 
did, however, reveal that mandatary overtime was more widespread than had previously been 
thought (Steele 1986). The ILO (1986 and 1988) identified mandatary overtime as an area of 
concern with regard to employee welfare, (see Section 3.3.10. ). In theory, mandatary overtime 
would clearly have an adverse impact on employee welfare. However, there was no evidence 
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found in practice to sustain this argument as far the U. K. economy was concerned. In the Police 
Forces, where mandatory overtime was prevalent, and working hours systems very poorly 
designed from the employee welfare viewpoint, mandatory overtime was totally accepted by the 
officers and the potential adverse consequences were usually avoided. Indeed, the lack of 
overtime opportunity was found to have a more important Influence on employees, and where 
employees wished to avoid overtime, they generally could do so with little difficulty. It would 
appear, therefore, that any general statute which gave workers the right to refuse to work overtime 
would not have a significant impact on employee welfare in the U. K. economy. On the other 
hand, there are particular jobs where such a statute would be incongruous; eg. In the Police 
Force. 
Workers felt that the consistent availability of overtime was an important factor, they found the 
stop-go implications of 'badly managed' annual overtime budgets, (where the overtime budget is 
exhausted and overtime is summarily withdrawn for a period), to be disruptive, both financially and 
socially. Workers were keen to maintain regular patterns of overtime, fixed on pre-determined 
days and times of the week. This was helpful for them In preserving and developing non-work 
relationships and activities. The establishment of fixed patterns of overtime, however, are clearly 
associated with its systematic, and possibly inappropriate, use. 
An ironic interpretation, therefore, was that the more effective use of overtime, diminished 
employee welfare, whilst employees found the ineffective use of overtime to be desirable and 
supportive. 
As regards absenteeism, the survey revealed that managers did not feel this to be an important 
cause of overtime, (Section 6.3). Neither were the case studies helpful since they gave 
conflicting evidence regarding the association between overtime and absenteeism. The literature 
review, (Section 3.3.6), accepts an association between overtime and absenteeism, but suggests 
a dichotomy as regards cause and effect, viz: 
i) Overtime causes absenteeism; 
ii) Absenteeism causes overtime. 
This controversy was not resolved by this research. 
There was clear evidence that excessive overtime can cause absenteeism. Such an example was 
uncovered In Case 10, (see Appendix 8-4), where one department exhibited absenteeism levels of 
16% (against an organisation norm of about 6%). This department was giving a 24 hour cover 
security service, using a poorly designed shift system which required each operator to work 18.25 
hours minimum shift In-fill overtime per week. Similarly, the inappropriate use of overtime, by the 
hotel In Case 9, caused high levels of absenteeism and, additionally, caused workers to become 
fatigued, and Institutionally disenfranchised. 
On a less dramatic scale, some Police Officers claimed that overtime was the cause of 
absenteeism, however, the detailed statistics showed that absenteeism had increased over the 
same period that overtime had been reduced, (see Appendix 8-2). Workers in other cases stated 
that they were able to 'afford' time off, after achieving higher earnings by working overtime. Case 
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4 revealed that a female worker, with children, was increasingly using absenteeism to avoid 
overtime; as were some Police Officers, although infrequently so. Other cases, however, 
revealed a lower propensity for overtime workers to be absent, (eg. Case 8, hotel shift workers). 
It was clear that overtime frequently caused absenteeism. This absenteeism in turn gave rise to 
more overtime as managers used It to solve their resulting capacity-demand balancing problems, 
(eg. Case 8). In this respect, it was Intrinsically the overtime which gave rise to the absenteeism. 
However, It Is not possible to be definitive on this Issue because of the number of exceptions 
which were found In the case study Interviews of workers. Nevertheless, Irrespective of the 
precise nature of cause and effect, absenteeism was found to be positively correlated with 
overtime. 
9.2.9 Time Off In Lieu For Overtime Working 
The use of TOIL for non-management employees was encountered only In the Police Force case 
studies, where the levels of TOIL, (actual overtime hours worked, not the premium hours earned), 
were found to be about 25% of the total overtime hours in each of the Forces. There were special 
reasons for this free choice of the Police Officers, Including: the Increasingly high relative value 
placed by Officers on free time; the excellent rates of basic pay and, significantly, the need for 
Individual Officers to avoid capture by the systems which were In place to control those individuals 
who worked excessive paid overtime. 
It would be dangerous to draw any conclusions from this research about the use of TOIL since it 
was not formally used In the private sector establishments which were studied. There appeared 
to be two reasons for this lack of use. Firstly, there was little knowledge of, or demand for, TOIL 
from the workforce. Secondly, most organisations would have had great difficulties In organising 
production and service levels, with the added uncertainty of random staff absences due to TOIL. 
An Informal kind of TOIL was used at senior management levels within about half the organisations 
studied. This gave senior managers some flexibility to take time-off according to their needs, in 
return for their freely giving time, 'out of hours', in response to the needs of the organisation. 
Records of TOIL were not usually kept in the private sector, and were kept only for local control in 
the Police Forces. 
Toil in the Police Force had been negotiated by the Police Federation and was calculated at the 
equivalent premium rate of paid overtime. However, where TOIL was used by managers and 
senior employees, in an ad-hoc manner, it was not based on a premium rate and did not generally 
reflect the far greater unpaid extra hours they worked. 
9.2.10 Unpaid overtime 
Unpaid overtime was often not viewed as overtime at all, by either the workers or the organisation. 
Records were not generally maintained and it was therefore difficult to establish firm statistics 
regarding the extent of the phenomenon. The only statistics available were the General 
Household Survey of 1980, when the question was put to male workers only. White (1984) 
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analysed this survey and stated: 'the conclusion Is that a large proportion of all supplementary 
hours are unpaid or unrecognised as overtime'. There has not been any attempt to quantify the 
extent of unpaid overtime within the economy as a whole, and It was not possible from this 
research. 
However, it was clear that the majority of unpaid overtime was worked by non-manual workers 
who were found by the survey to work ten times more unpaid overtime than their manual 
colleagues. Similarly, the case studies revealed that the majority of unpaid overtime was worked 
by management grade employees, and it was clear that the survey had probably seriously 
underestimated the extent of unpaid overtime, since many managers did not interpret 'taking work 
home', or 'staying late unpaid', as working overtime, which was one of the factors White alluded 
to above. 
There was a feeling in many organisations that unpaid extra hours were 'part of the job', eg. Case 
5, and the Police Force cases. An estimate of unpaid overtime in the Police Force Is available 
from the case studies. It was found that this amounted to between 3.5 and 4.3 million hours per 
year; (based on the number of 'management' grade officers, Inspectors and above, working an 
average of six to eight unpaid extra hours per week, which was found from the case studies to be 
a reasonable estimate). This equated to 2500 to 3000 full time job equivalents In the Police Force 
as a whole. Clearly, the extent of unpaid overtime was, therefore, seen to be a significant element 
within the labour market equation and worthy of specific further research. 
Unpaid overtime appeared to be a matter of culture, with some organisations embracing high 
levels and others experiencing little, even among senior employees. Appendix 8-3, Case 5, 
revealed the existence of a'matcho' factor in the use of unpaid overtime, where long hours 
became a matter of 'proof of status' or'club membership', enjoyed only by the chosen few. This 
attitudinal phenomenon was also noted in the Police Forces. 
Notwithstanding the purely cultural influences, the job satisfaction factor was also important and 
was illustrated In Case 8, where staff in that particular hotel derived great satisfaction from the 
quality of the service they gave. The reluctance of these staff to claim payment for overtime was 
again, however, more a matter of organisational culture than of individual predilection. 
9.2.11 Local Union Policies on Overtime 
It has been suggested that overtime is best controlled, from the union stand-point, at local level 
(White 1982; Evans and Palmer 1985). Local level trade unions, (and the Police Federation), had 
received little or no guidance from their central organisations, regarding the policy to be adopted 
on overtime working. This was a remarkable finding insofar as it confounded the annual TUC 
conference resolutions and debates regarding the need to bring overtime under greater control. 
Interestingly, management were not found to have attempted to exploit the Trade Unions' 
overtime schizophrenia as a means of bringing overtime under greater control. 
The local union 'policy' towards overtime was undeveloped and Informal. It was based essentially 
on supporting whatever demands the local workforce were making. In reality this meant that local 
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unions were primarily bringing pressure for more overtime and for more control over the 
conditions of overtime working. The local level officials, in the organisations 
In the case study 
programme, had not taken any Initiatives to constrain the use of overtime within their members' 
organisations. Indeed, the most likely contact with overtime working, for the 
Shop Stewards and 
Conveners In the establishments which were studied, was pursuing members' grievances 
regarding the distribution of overtime, or attempting to Increase the supply of overtime, or resisting 
employer's attempts to restrict supply. 
As predicted In Section 3.3.8, overtime bans were found to have been used by unions as a 
sanction in industrial disputes, for example, Cases 5.10 and 11. Indeed, the issue of the industrial 
relations vulnerability, which over-exposure to overtime can bring, was found to be of far greater 
importance than had been expected. Some organisations were putting a high value on the ability 
to avoid exposure from dependence on overtime hours. 
9.2.12 The Employment Effects of Overtime 
The substantive evidence relating to the employment effects of overtime arise from the case 
studies. However, the results of the survey were of some Interest and are dealt with in Section 
6.9, where the two complimentary factors of 'worksharing' and the'new jobs yield' from overtime 
reduction are discussed. The majority of respondents felt that working time reductions would 
result In overtime Increases. Since those respondents were the managers who would have a 
major input to the decision, their prophesy could well be self-fulfilling, and this Is a cause for deep 
concern. 
However, no evidence was found, either in the analysis of previous research findings, the analysis 
of the published statistics, or in the case studies, that would indicate any cardinal link between 
overtime and normal hours. Indeed, where hours of work had been reduced in the past, overtime 
levels had generally fallen rather than risen. Moreover, lower normal hours was positively 
correlated with lower overtime levels, (see Section 3.4.4), although this issue was not without 
controversy. For example, the Treasury stated that 40% of the potential loss in output, following a 
cut in normal hours, would be made up by additional overtime (Allen 1980), although they 
produced no evidence to support their'hunch'. 
Case 5 was interesting, not in providing evidence of what usually happens when normal hours are 
cut, but in giving an example of what can happen. Normal hours were cut for both manual and 
non-manual workers, over the mid 1980s, from 40 to around 36.5 hours per week. During the 
same period, overtime was cut by over 75%, unit labour productivity Increased, unit labour costs 
decreased and many new jobs were created. Moreover, the organisation considerably improved 
its overall corporate performance over the same period. It Is readily acknowledged that it would 
be difficult to separate out the specific overtime management initiatives from the compound 
effects of the other changes which had been made. There was no evidence, however, that the 
overtime reduction had been anything other than supportive in the achievement of corporate 
objectives and the creation of new jobs; this was the unequivocal view of senior management. 
The case studies showed very clearly, and somewhat surprisingly, that the potential employment 
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effects of the redistribution of overtime could be very significant Indeed. It has to be 
acknowledged that a substantial amount of the overtime reviewed in the case studies could have 
been removed, simply by more effective man-management and management of logistics, resulting 
in dramatic increases in the productivity of normal hours, eg. Cases 9,10 and 11. Nevertheless, 
there remained a considerable amount of genuine overtime which could be redirected into 
employment in some form or other. 
The Police Forces all showed that, irrespective of the validity of the theoretical arguments on this 
issue, viz. that each additional Officer would bring an Increased demand for overtime, and the 
demand massively outstrips the potential capacity; In practice, money had been shifted from the 
overtime budget, to directly create additional employment, Cases 1,2 and 3. Cases 4 and 7 
illustrated the corollary of the job creation argument, In that overtime was specifically used as a 
policy to circumvent the need to employ additional staff. Cases 5,6 and 8 all gave sound 
evidence of overtime reduction directly creating employment, similar to the Police Force case 
studies. Moreover, these organisations, perhaps, had created increased employment, Indirectly, 
by overtime reduction, In that the reduction had helped them to secure higher levels of viability 
and competitiveness, through lower unit labour costs. This would theoretically have the effect of 
creating increased demand which would result in even greater employment and Investment 
opportunities. No evidence of this secondary phenomenon was, however, available from this 
research. 
This research found that a higher than expected proportion of overtime could be readily converted 
into new jobs. One reason for this was the new flexibility of the labour market which continues to 
appear to be developing. Organisations, faced with the demographic changes and local labour 
market Imbalances, are increasingly open to innovative solutions, new forms of contracts and new 
structures of working time. Case 5 Illustrates a number of innovative solutions which have been 
successfully adopted. 
The age old road-block offered by the 'defenders' of current high levels of overtime, was that the 
nature of the work would prevent the overtime from being packaged into convenient 'job-sized 
units'. This research provides evidence which firmly rejects that assertion. The majority of the 
overtime observed In the case studies could easily have been either absorbed by more efficient 
working practices, more appropriate shift arrangements, or by extending employment in one form 
or another. Indeed, this research suggested that managers tended to be defeatist with regard to 
their ability to manage working time. 
9.3 THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Section 9.2, above, sets out the primary analysis of the issues, which itself derives from the 
fieldwork results and initial analyses which are set out in Sections 6,7 and 8. This sub-section 
gathers-up, briefly, the various findings and analyses as they relate to the specific hypotheses and 
presents, in summary form, the substantive findings which are used to test these hypotheses. 
The first two hypotheses Invited the researcher to establish a database setting out the details of a 
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wide range of overtime-related issues and statistics. In addition, it was necessary to demonstrate 
the relationships between the key structural variables and the identified overtime issues. The 
research was intended to establish if there were any significant differences or distributions, 
reducible to the structural variables. These hypotheses are given below: 
H1 The use of overtime is a function of the following variables: 
a) SIC group; 
b) Regional location; 
c) Size of establishment; 
d) Amount of overtime worked by the organisation; 
e) Type of employee, manual or non-manual; 
H2 The management of overtime is a function of the following variables: 
a) SIC group; 
b) Regional location; 
c) Size of establishment; 
d) Amount of overtime worked by the organisation; 
e) Type of employee, manual or non-manual; 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 were found proven for each variable. There was only one possible 
hesitation, viz: 'Regional Location', (Ht b and H2b), where the level of proof was somewhat lower 
than for the other variables, although a number of significant associations were established even 
In this field. It Is most Important for managers and researchers, especially when operating at the 
macro-economic level, to understand the particular functions and relationships of overtime In their 
areas of interest, and to be able to measure the extent of these and explain the nature of the 
association. This database provides a wide range of information to meet this need. It would be 
Impractical for the analysis of all the relationships found to be covered In this thesis, there being 
many thousand of these. 
The survey was the prime Instrument used to establish the relationships between the use and 
management of overtime, and the key structural variables as detailed above. The Figures set out 
In Section 6 give considerable data, much of it unique, relating to the use of overtime across the 
whole economy. In addition, a wide range of associations were identified within varying degrees 
of significance. These are given In the presentation of results, Section 7 and the supporting 
appendices. These appendices represent the database propositioned by H1 and H2. 
It scarcely needs stating that great care should be used In drawing inferences from any such data 
and statistical analyses. A degree of common sense and industrial relations knowledge must be 
applied in Interpreting the relationships and indicating where correlations are supported by 
intuitive or deductive logic, and where they are spurious. For example, It was clear that the 
greater need for overtime to cover skill shortages In the more prosperous South (significance 
p=0.02) was a sound correlation. Whereas the greater use of overtime to cover skill shortages in 
the non-service sector (significance p <0.01) was not so obviously a sound correlation and the 
greater use of overtime in large organisations, to cover skill shortages (not significant p=0.20) was 
at first sight not at all obvious, although It would be possible to argue that small organisations tend 
to be less skill based and more flexible, and therefore have less need for scarce irreplaceable skills 
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and therefore lower demand for overtime to replace such skills. 
No apology is offered for stating those associations which may be thought by the reader to be 
axiomatic. For example, the extent of unpaid overtime was found to be greater among non- 
manual workers, who were reported to work ten times the amount of unpaid overtime worked by 
their manual colleagues. This fact sits comfortably with the common perception of the 
phenomenon, and the charge that 'this was obvious' might well be made. Nevertheless, this was 
the first time to our knowledge that this statistic has been factually established or quantified in any 
way. Conversely, a number of relationships were found to be quite contrary to the common 
wisdom and this reinforces a basic premise of all research, viz. the validity of research does not 
rest entirely on the outcome. 
H3 The use of overtime promotes `operational flexibility'. 
'Operational flexibility', for the purposes of this hypothesis, was defined as'the ability to respond 
effectively to satisfy short-term and un-anticipated, day-to-day needs'. 
This hypothesis is generally rejected. There were instances where overtime did promote 
operational flexibility, but these were the exception rather than the rule. There Is no doubting that 
both the case studies and the survey revealed that overtime generally was not used to give 
operational flexibility. Indeed, about three quarters of all overtime was found to be systematic, in 
that it was predictable. Such overtime was the antithesis of operational flexibility. It is 
demonstrated by this research that systematic overtime could have only two effects on 
operational flexibility; it was either neutral, or, more likely, It actually reduced the establishment's 
ability to secure operational flexibility by choosing to use overtime in an unforeseen circumstance. 
H4 The use of overtime promotes `corporate flexibility'. 
'Corporate flexibility', for the purposes of this hypothesis, was defined as 'the ability of an 
organisation to respond efficiently to developing medium and longer term changes in the demand 
for labour, about which there is uncertainty in the short term'. 
There was no evidence to suggest that this hypothesis should be rejected. Indeed, it appeared 
from both the survey and the case studies that corporate flexibility was used as the primary reason 
for overtime working, much more than previous studies had assumed. Corporate flexibility could 
be seen to some extent as the use of overtime to avoid the need to establish higher levels of 
staffing. The use of overtime for this purpose could not be labelled as bad practice per se. 
Indeed, examples of the use of overtime for this reason were found to reflect rational management 
In some of the case studies. Irrespective of whether the practice was appropriate at plant level or 
not, it was open to severe criticism from the macro-economic perspective of labour market 
management. This matter remains, however, to be argued outside this PhD thesis. 
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H5 Overtime working is a more cost-effective means of meeting demand than the 
potential alternatives. 
This hypothesis is firmly rejected, based on the primary comparison between overtime premia and 
non-wage labour costs. There was, in addition, considerable evidence that a significant 
proportion of that overtime investigated in the case studies, was unnecessary, irrespective of the 
cost equation, and therefore was not cost-effective. Where overtime had been reduced in Case 5, 
unit labour costs had fallen, although it was accepted that many other changes may have also 
influenced those costs. In any event, it was clear that managers at all levels were generally quite 
ignorant of the various levels of cost attaching to their decisions between overtime and the 
alternatives and could therefore not effectively use comparative costs as a basis for their decision. 
The effects of the secondary costs of overtime working, and of the alternatives were not measured 
in detail in this research. There was no reason, however, to doubt that these were marginal 
compared to the primary costs and were, on average, fairly evenly balanced. In any event, such 
costs were highly variable, and associated more with individual establishments, than with any 
predictive structural variables. There was little opportunity, therefore, to make generalised 
statements regarding these. It was interesting to note that common perception was again 
challenged regarding two of the commonly supposed advantages of overtime working; viz. 
overtime used to maintain equilibrium industrial relations and overtime used as a recruitment and 
retention aid. The case studies strongly suggested that overtime was of potentially negative value 
to the organisation in respect of industrial relations, and dubious and variable value in respect of 
recruitment and retention. In any event, it would be difficult to measure, ceterls paribus, the 
effectlvoness of such phenomena. 
H6 The use of overtime is not associated with poor management practice. 
There was compelling evidence to establish that overtime can be used effectively, as a rational 
management tool, to achieve the aims of the organisation. Even systematic overtime was found, 
on occasions, to be a sensible use of capacity to meet demand. This rational use of overtime 
was, however, found to be the exception, rather than the rule. It was not predictable by any 
particular structural variables, but appeared to be a function of the Individual characteristics of the 
organisation and particularly its senior staff. 
The effective management of overtime was found invariably to be based on a resolute and well 
communicated corporate understanding and policy regarding the use of overtime, a so called 
'mission statement'. The overtime found in these circumstances was distinguished by being less 
systematic in nature, with fewer hours worked by individual employees, than the norms 
established for the equivalent type of organisation. 
Notwithstanding the above qualification, rejection is firmly indicated for H6. 
body of evidence can only lead to the conclusion that overtime was generally associated with 
poor management practice. The investigation of examples of the legitimate and effective use of 
overtime only served to underline this conclusion, by illustrating the differences between 
The overwhelming 
managements which used overtime effectively and those which did not. 
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H7 Workers depend on their overtime pay to meet their fixed financial commitments. 
lt came as no surprise that an unequivocal response to this hypothesis was not possible. 
However, in essence, H7 is rejected. The great majority of workers were not found to have fallen 
into this trap. The use of overtime to support an otherwise inadequate pay structure was found 
from the survey to be much lower than had been suggested by other research would be the case 
(see Section 3.4.5) Workers were found to generally take a very rational view of the uncertainty of 
overtime earnings and to avoid the trap of dependency. 
Nevertheless, a few notable examples of dependency were found. These were distinguished 
more by the individual workers' characteristics, than by any structural profile of the organisation. 
indeed, even the low-paid Industries did not act as a totally reliable predictor of this syndrome 
since relatively high paid workers, as well as low paid workers, were found to depend on their 
overtime earnings, for fixed financial commitments. 
Section 9 has attempted to blend together the research findings and analyses which were 




The conclusions flow from the results and analyses sections and relate to the specific research 
questions and hypotheses which were posed in Section 4. The survey yielded a general view of 
the economy as a whole and enabled overtime issues to be investigated in some detail with 
respect to the chosen structural variables. The case studies gave a more detailed understanding 
of the processes and motivations, particularly in small organisations and the service sector which, 
until now, had both remained somewhat obscure as far as the use and management of overtime 
were concerned. It was apparent that the use of overtime, in those service sectors reviewed, is 
very similar to the use of overtime in the manufacturing sector as reported in the literature. 
It would be Ingenuous to expect that a range of specific questions and hypotheses relating to a 
whole economic sector could be answered In simple definitive and generalised terms, without 
substantial qualification. Such a result would be simplistic and, whilst appealing In some ways, 
might in fact be unhelpful for considering the Individual organisation. This research project 
revealed the detailed complexities which had previously been hidden or glossed over In the 
literature. Moreover, a number of unequivocal explanations were discovered, some which 
reinforce the common wisdom, others which challenge it. 
The thesis was designed to take the reader through a'process', from the broad analysis of the 
literature, through data collection and fieldwork, to analysis and interpretation of the findings. 
Thus the total process offers an extension of the understanding of the use and management of 
overtime. The results are intended to augment the information and explanation concerning many 
of the overtime issues and phenomena, and to extend the understanding of the management of 
overtime. In addition, a unique, definitive and up-to-date database has been established. 
10.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions are given below, followed by the broad explanation which was indicated 
by the research and a brief summary of key points arising from the analysis. 
What overall strategies are adopted for the management of overtime and what are 
the pragmatic consequences of overtime working in terms of corporate objective 
achievement and employment? 
The use and distribution of strategic management options are set out in Table 6.9 and the 
appendices supporting Section 7. One of the many interesting examples of the findings of these 
data was that larger organisations do not adopt more formalised overtime management policies or 
strategies, than smaller firms. The case studies revealed that the 'legitimate' and 'effective' use of 
overtime, as defined in Section 9, was invariably characterised by the existence of three key 
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features: 
i) A firm and well communicated corporate policy regarding the levels and use of 
overtime, and resolute corporate determination to enforce that policy; 
iý A dear and accurate understanding of the reasons for the overtime within the 
organisation; 
Iii) Appropriate and rigorously applied overtime management systems and controls. 
It needs stating that the'intention' to reduce overtime, per se, did not appear to result In any 
actual change. It seemed that overtime could not be simply'talked down'; specific pragmatic 
management action was needed to secure change in an area where the Inertia of tradition was 
found to be substantial. This may appear an obvious finding, but it explains a syndrome, not 
previously expounded, but found to be widespread at both the macro-economic and individual 
plant levels. 
The legitimate use of overtime was found to aid the achievement of corporate objectives. The 
converse was also found to be true, and to be more prolific, viz: the ineffective use of overtime 
detracted from the achievement of corporate objectives. It Is worth emphasising, even though it 
may appear to be a logical tautology, that the two opposite phenomena were each clearly 
observed in separate case studies. However, the latter syndrome was generally not recognised 
by management at any level of the organisation. 
The impact of overtime on employment was found to be more obvious and substantial than the 
literature Indicated would be the case. Overtime reduction was found on occasions to have 
specifically and directly created new jobs. However, no definitive conclusions were possible, 
from this particular research project, regarding the generalisation of the proportion of total 
overtime which could be converted Into new jobs or, indeed, the'conversion rate' of overtime 
hours Into jobs. Further research In this area would appear Imperative. 
A substantial amount, between a quarter and a half, of the overtime observed in the case studies 
could have been absorbed simply by the adoption of more efficient working practices, or more 
appropriate arrangements of working time. This overtime was therefore not available to job 
creation In the direct sense, although any efficiency improvement would embrace the secondary 
effects which would clearly have a positive Impact on longer term employment prospects at both 
the micro and macro-economic levels. The bulk of the remaining overtime could have been 
readily converted Into suitable jobs, particularly given a degree of management Innovation such as 
was found In Case 5. Indeed, it was clear that the developing flexibility of the labour market and 
employment contracts was Increasing the potential to convert overtime Into new jobs. 
2 What types of management and control techniques are applied to the use of 
overtime, and what are their distributions across the economy? 
The required data, and their distribution across the economy, by the structural variables, are set 
out In the detailed tabulations within Section 6 and the appendices supporting Section 7 
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respectively. It was dear that the use of specific overtime management techniques was not 
generally widespread and, indeed, larger organisations did not tend to make greater use of the 
various overtime control techniques. This suggested, but did not conclusively prove, that the 
management of overtime was deficient. 
The key control used by larger organisations, (50 or more employees), was that of the overtime 
budget. Budgets, per se, were found to be a valuable management tool in the strategic 
management of overtime. However, the budgets were often set with little or no formal analysis of 
future capacity-demand balance, and often without regard to any alternatives to overtime 
scheduling, and thus were potentially inappropriate and misleading. Clearly, the misuse of this 
primary control of overtime was a central factor in its institutionalisation. 
3 Are managers aware of the range of alternatives to overtime working and are 
these fully and properly considered? 
Managers were not generally aware of the range of alternatives to overtime working or the need to 
innovate In seeking solutions to the capacity-demand balancing problem. Therefore alternatives 
were not adequately considered. Even where managers did have sufficient knowledge of the 
various alternatives, formal cost-benefit analysis of the overtime decision had invariably not been 
carried out. Uttle innovation was found, although where organisations had experimented with 
new contracts and capacity-demand balancing techniques, the results were evidently helpful. 
4 Why do employers schedule overtime, and are the reasons for overtime, as 
suggested by managers in the questionnaires and initial interviews, accurate? 
The case studies revealed that the incorrect perception of the use of overtime within an 
organisation was positively associated with the ineffective use of overtime. This conclusion may 
appear axiomatic, but it has not previously been stated In the literature. It was clearly established 
by this research, that one of the prerequisites to the effective use of overtime was a clear 
management understanding of the true functions of that overtime in their organisations. 
Each organisation was quite unique and had its own complex set of factors governing its use of 
overtime, reflecting its particular culture, management style and attitudes. It could be misleading 
to generalise statistically about the reasons for the use of overtime, although these are given In the 
analysis sections of this work. In any event, there were few important distribution distinctions, 
based on the structural variables for the reasons for overtime. Added to this, it was quite clear 
that managers did not generally correctly perceive the real uses and functions of the overtime in 
their organisations and this cast doubt on all the unqualified survey material which has previously 
been published. 
Nevertheless, 'unexpected demand' and 'emergency cover' were the top two reasons obtained 
from the survey. Moreover, the Initial interviews of management in the case study phase 
supported the survey result. However, the case study fieldwork showed the reasons given by 
managers to be most often Inaccurate and misleading, the majority of overtime was In fact 
systematic. Managers, either defensively or through Ignorance, misunderstood the use of 
overtime In their organisation. This finding establishes a need for the analysis and interpretation 
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of survey data to be circumspect. This is especially important in the analysis of overtime, since 
much of the previous research is based on survey data of one or other form, and a sound 
knowledge of the true functions of overtime in an organisation is the foundation upon which 
analysis and understanding are built. 
As regards the specific reasons for overtime working, there were no simple answers, the uses 
were many and varied. These included both the legitimate and unnecessary uses of overtime, 
(viz. whether or not it was needed in the first place), and both its effective and ineffective use, (viz. 
if it was really needed, whether the overtime was applied and controlled effectively or not, in the 
light of the alternatives and its management). A further complexity arose from the possibility that 
an effective use in one circumstance, might be quite inappropriate in another, even within a single 
organisation. 
A key finding was that the majority of overtime was systematic and used to meet normal demand. 
it was also important to understand that the first line control of overtime was often vested in the 
workforce, rather than the management. Managers were generally able to give reasons for the 
overtime they were scheduling 'that day', and these sometimes seemed to be compelling. It was 
essential to establish why the particular situation promoting the overtime had arisen, or been 
allowed to arise, In the first place and, taking the strategic view, if overtime was the best way for 
the organisation to balance capacity and demand. It was clear that these questions had not been 
addressed at any level of management, within those organisations studied. 
5 Is overtime a more cost-effective option? 
The plain answer was that it can be, but most often was not. 
This question is one of great complexity. In considering cost-effectiveness, It was obviously 
necessary to appreciate the total cost implications. Many managers took a simplistic view of 
overtime, considering only the 'effectiveness' of the overtime hours themselves. Indeed, the 
actual overtime hours worked were often more productive than the normal hours. This fact gave 
rise to considerable misunderstanding about the overall effectiveness of overtime and, indeed, did 
much to support Its Inappropriate use. Nevertheless, as discussed at length in the analysis 
sections, the productivity In normal time was often found to be depressed as a result of the 
overtime or its anticipation. The systematic and high use of overtime were found generally to 
depress overall productivity and service levels and, on occasions, the quality of the product or 
service. This was one of the key factors In the cost-effectiveness debate. 
The first premise to be established was, clearly, whether the overtime was genuinely necessary, 
'legitimate'. If It was not, as was the case with a substantial amount of the overtime reviewed in 
the case studies, then the comparative 'costs' of that overtime would be Irrelevant. In these 
circumstances the overtime would, prima facie, not be cost-effective. 
Where the overtime was found to be legitimate then management would need to establish which 
viable alternatives were available to meet that demand. One of these alternatives might be 
overtime, depending of course on the nature of the demand. All the alternatives could then be 
analysed, Including consideration of all the potential costs and benefits, and the solution chosen 
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to best meet the overall objectives of the organisation. This could be a composite solution and 
might Include overtime, although the decision would certainly need to be regularly reviewed in the 
light of changing circumstances. We found little evidence of any such structured or holistic 
approach to the capacity-demand balancing decision. 
The question of cost-effectiveness was posed partly to evoke a debate about the alternatives, and 
one objective of the survey was to discover how the options were perceived, (see Section 6.7). 
Where managers had In fact considered the alternatives to overtime working, this essentially 
comprised a simplistic comparison between overtime and hiring additional staff for the established 
shift patterns. The fundamental comparison in this event, was between the 'direct' costs only, viz. 
the overtime premium cost compared to the non-wage labour costs. Overtime was found by this 
research to be substantially more expensive, on this basis, than the alternative of hiring additional 
staff. The one exception was the Police Force, where the overtime premia cost was lower. 
Managers were, In any event, not generally aware of the primary costs of the overtime or the 
principle alternatives such as hiring more staff, and few had considered the secondary costs, (see 
Section 3.3.3). It must therefore be concluded that overtime is generally not cost effective and 
managers are not generally in a position to know what the comparative costs actually are. 
6 What are the patterns and levels of overtime premia and their effects on levels of 
overtime? 
Lower overtime premiums were associated with lower overtime levels In the U. K. economy. The 
converse of this also held true, viz. higher overtime premia were associated with higher levels of 
overtime in the U. K. Moreover, there was compelling evidence of cause and effect, that lower 
premiums actually brought about the lower levels of overtime. It is clear from this research, and 
from any logical interpretation, that, insofar as the pragmatic control of overtime was vested in the 
workforce, overtime premia would be positively correlated with overtime levels. This was, Indeed, 
found to be the case. 
The patterns, levels and distribution of overtime premia are set out in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 and in 
the appendices supporting Section 7. These figures give a unique set of data, of pivotal 
importance to the consideration of overtime. For example, it is revealed that non-manual staff 
receive, on average and when they are paid for overtime, a third lower premla than their manual 
colleagues. The average overtime premium, for all sections of the U. K. economy, types of 
worker, and working times and conditions, was found to be 52.4%. 
7 What use is made of Time Off In Lieu (TOIL)? 
TOIL was not generally used for non-management grades, with the exception of the Police Force 
where officers choose to take TOIL for about 25% of their total remunerated overtime. Only very 
limited and ad-hoc use was made of TOIL In the private sector, covering, essentially, management 
grade employees. 
There was little knowledge of, or demand for, TOIL from the U. K. workforce. Furthermore, most 
organisations would clearly have encountered difficulty in organising production or service levels 
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with the added uncertainty of random staff absences due to TOIL Any move towards TOIL would 
therefore tend to make overtime less attractive to employers, and the administration of overtime 
more difficult at plant level. There was no evidence that the use of TOIL would promote 
employment, as is claimed to be the case In some countries. 
TOIL In the Police Force was calculated, In time-off, at the equivalent premium rate of the other 
'remunerated-by-money' overtime. However, where TOIL was used casually by managers and 
senior employees across the economy, it was generally based on a'straight-time' rate and often 
did not reward the far greater, and otherwise un-remunerated, extra hours that had been worked. 
8 How extensive is unpaid overtime, what perceptions are held about it and why is 
It worked? 
It was impossible to estimate the extent of unpaid overtime, for the economy as a whole, from the 
studies carried out in this research. Records were generally not kept and there is no commonly 
accepted definition of the phenomenon. We were, however, able to shed some light on the 
matter. For example, non-manual staff were ten times more likely to work unpaid overtime than 
their manual colleagues, although it would be unwise, from this research, to attempt to quantify 
the hours involved at the macro-economic level. 
Unpaid overtime was generally worked by management grade staff and some professional and 
specialised technical staff, but not exclusively so. Some operating level staff occasionally choose 
to stay late without pay or TOIL, for reasons of job satisfaction, or due to the lack of a more 
attractive use of their free time. The key motivations leading to unpaid overtime among senior 
employees were firstly, job satisfaction, and secondly, the organisation's culturally based 
expectation that extra hours were part of the job. It was also often understood that relatively high 
senior staff salaries compensated for extra hours as necessary on a trust basis. 
9 Does absenteeism cause overtime, or is it the other way around? 
Absenteeism was found to be positively associated with overtime. The actual process of cause 
and effect was somewhat less clear and, indeed, was found to vary according to the 
circumstances. Nevertheless, it appeared that it was essentially the overtime which gave rise to 
the absenteeism In the U. K. In considering this issue, it is important to bear in mind that this 
particular 'cause and effect' association was a function of the relatively high U. K. overtime levels. 
Therefore this relationship is unlikely to translate across international boundaries where cause and 
effect conceivably flow In the opposite direction as the literature indicates. 
10 To what extent is overtime systematic, and what are the patterns of overtime 
working? 
There was no commonly adopted definition of the much used term 'systematic' overtime. It was 
defined for the purposes of this thesis as, quite simply, 'predictable' overtime. 
Three quarters of all overtime could be defined as systematic in these terms. It did not 
necessarily follow, however, that all such systematic overtime was either unnecessary of 
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Ineffective, or that such systematic overtime invariably implied negative overall consequences for 
the organisation. Nevertheless, the majority of systematic overtime was found to be ineffective 
and was not generally the product of professional management analysis and decision. Thus the 
extent of systematic overtime could act as an initial barometer for the general health of the 
management of working time in an organisation or sector. 
The patterns of overtime working, in a general sense, disclosed something about the nature of that 
overtime. At least they were one of the signs that the overtime could be systematic in that 
regularly scheduled overtime was systematic per se. The patterns are given in Section 6 and 
illustrate a tendency for overtime to be scheduled for specific predetermined times during each 
week. 
11 What are the effects of paying overtime rates to supervisors and managers? 
The substantive evidence of the case studies indicated that overtime premium payments to 
supervisors and managers did not appear to promote overtime working. 
12 What attitudes are generally held about overtime by the workforce? 
The majority of employees, across all sections of the economy, wanted to maintain or increase 
overtime levels. Workers found it desirable to control their own levels of pay and pace-of-work 
and they saw overtime as a means of achieving this. 
Employees were essentially, (although not exclusively), motivated to work overtime by financial 
considerations. There remained, however, a section of the workforce which resisted overtime 
because, primarily, they placed a greater value on their free time, than on premium-pay earnings. 
These workers were distinguished by their Individual characteristics, rather than by any particular 
structural variables. For example, older workers more often avoided overtime and nostalgically 
reminisced about their Irreplaceable loss of time with their family In their middle years. 
Workers' demand for overtime was directly proportional to their expectations of the availability of 
overtime; viz. the greater the availability of overtime, the greater the demand for the overtime from 
the workers. Conversely, where overtime had been restricted, and the workforce had become 
accustomed to this policy, the demand for overtime from the workforce and, Incidentally, from 
their operational management, was much lower, therefore the expectation was accommodated. 
To this extent, there appeared to be a self-generating aspect to overtime scheduling. 
13 Do the workforce exercise any control or manipulation of overtime working, or is 
overtime totally in the control of managers? 
It was clear that overtime was often 'controlled' by the workforce, rather than the management. 
Indubitably, this provocative conclusion will be challenged on the basis that some organisations 
apply strict budgetary control to overtime. However, macro-level budgetary provisions were 
found primarily to be fixed annually, by reference to previous levels of overtime. This, ironically, 
may link the essential 'control' back to the workforce, the management control being somewhat 
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illusionary. 
It was interesting to note that workers did not just control the extent of overtime working, but also 
had a significant degree of influence on when the overtime was worked. 
14 Is employee welfare affected by overtime working? 
Overtime was often harmful to employee welfare, particularly when associated with longer hours 
of work or poorly designed shift systems. Paradoxically, the legitimate and effective use of 
overtime, by its very random nature, tended to diminish employee welfare. On the other hand, 
employees found the generally more Ineffective, systematic use of overtime, to better meet their 
needs. It was found that the adverse Impact of overtime on employee welfare tended to rebound 
on the employer, In that the effectiveness, (productivity and quality of output or service), of the 
employee was diminished. This may appear a logical and obvious point, but it is one which Is not 
widely considered by management. 
It was established that excessive overtime does cause absenteeism and this evidence suggests 
that overtime causes unfavourable employee welfare. The shorter the notice given to an 
employee, of the need to stay late, the greater the disruptive effect of the overtime on the worker. 
Mandatary overtime, however, was not found in practice to significantly affect employee welfare. 
15 What are the unions doing about overtime at the local level? 
The union `local policy' on overtime was undeveloped and informal. It was based essentially on 
supporting whatever demands the particular workforce were making. This meant that, at local 
level, unions were usually seeking to maintain or increase overtime levels. In addition, they were, 
on occasions, seeking better conditions, for the workforce they represented, with regard to the 
distribution and timing of the overtime and the premium levels. 
Local level trade unions had received little or no guidance from their central union organisations 
regarding the policy and tactics to be adopted for overtime working. 
16 Is overtime associated with good or poor management practice? 
The simply answer is'with both', but most often the latter. 
Sound professional overtime management was associated with lower levels of overtime. A 
number of examples of the legitimate and effective use of overtime were found and these 
illustrated that overtime could not be branded as bad practice per se. Conversely, there was 
overwhelming evidence to show that higher and more systematic levels of overtime, most often 
resulted directly from low standards of overtime management. About three quarters of overtime 
was found to be systematic, and it therefore followed that overtime was generally associated with 
poor management. 
Insofar as overtime was associated with employee rather than management control, or found to 
be harmful to employee welfare, It was prima facie associated with ineffective management. 
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Similarly, it was found that a significant proportion of that overtime investigated in the case 
studies, was either totally superfluous or could have been easily removed by rudimentary 
industrial engineering. 
A wide range of management 'deficiencies' were found to be Inherent In the use of overtime. This 
thesis states that, Insofar as overtime was found to be associated with these deficiencies, It was 
prima facie associated with poor management practice. A selection of this evidence is 
summarised in this paragraph. A prerequisite to the sound management of overtime must be a 
sound understanding of the purposes the overtime served. This research showed that, 
particularly In the larger organisations, (50 or more employees), managers simply did not 
appreciate the real functions of the overtime used In their organisations. Indeed, this was one of 
the key factors maintaining the ineffective use of overtime. A lack of clear and resolute corporate 
policy regarding overtime was found, to be widespread throughout the economy and, in addition, 
to be positively associated with the inappropriate use of overtime. Given this lack of corporate 
direction, it was hardly surprising to find that management did not, as a rule, formally address the 
overtime decision. The alternatives to overtime working were rarely considered, and when they 
were considered, this most often only Involved the option of hiring additional staff, for the 
established shift. Added to all this, the costs of overtime, and of the potential alternatives, were 
neither used nor understood by management. In fact overtime was found not to be cost-effective 
on a macro-economic scale, except for the Police Force. Overtime controls were found to be 
little understood and not generally used, or indeed, were mis-used. Overtime was often found to 
be'budget driven', rather than to flow from considered decisions based on operational need at the 
time the requirement became known or was predicted. Limits on overtime working appeared to 
act as surrogate targets. A surprising number of organisations did not formally use overtime 
authorisation systems and those which did use them, often did so only superficially. As a final 
example of management deficiencies, the effects of overtime on productivity and quality were 
rarely monitored. 
In conclusion, overtime had not generally come under greater control over the last decade, as was 
predicted by Carby (1981). and following its widespread vilification In the literature, (see Section 
3.2.2). It was found that, in the exceptional cases where overtime had come under greater control 
and when this control emanated from the corporate level, the overtime had indeed been reduced 
and tended to be less systematic compared to the relevant norms. In this sense, the evidence of 
the 'legitimate' and 'effective' use of overtime supported the thesis that'overtime is associated 
with poor management'. 
10.3 THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Each of the research hypotheses are given below, followed by the appropriate response, based on 
the preceding analyses sections and conclusions to the research questions. 
H1 The use of overtime is a function of the following variables: 
a) SIC group; 
b) Regional location; 
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c) Size of establishment; 
d) Amount of overtime worked by the organisation; 
e) Type of employee, manual or non-manual; 
H2 The management of overtime is a function of the following variables: 
a) SIC group; 
b) Regional location; 
c) Size of establishment; 
d) Amount of overtime worked by the organisation; 
e) Type of employee, manual or non-manual; 
Hypotheses HI and H2 were found proven. A wide range of associations were identified within 
varying degrees of significance. These are discussed in the presentation of results in Section 7. 
The appendices supporting Section 7 represent the database propositioned by H1 and H2. In 
addition, the tables set out in Section 6 give considerable data, much of it unique, relating to the 
use of overtime across the economy as a whole. 
Variables Ht b and H2b, 'Regional Location', exhibited a slightly lower level of proof than the other 
variables, although a number of associations regarding regional location were found to be both 
statistically significant and logically rational. 
H3 The use of overtime promotes `operational flexibility'. 
This hypothesis was rejected. There were instances where overtime did promote operational 
flexibility, but these were the exception rather than the rule. 
All superfluous and ineffective overtime would, prima facie diminish operational flexibility. About 
three quarters of all overtime was found to be systematic, in that it was predictable and therefore 
the antithesis of operational flexibility. This inconsistency was somewhat ironic, since managers 
claimed 'improved flexibility', in one form or another, as the major reason for scheduling overtime. 
H4 The use of overtime promotes 'corporate flexibility'. 
The evidence suggesting that the hypothesis should test positive was rather weak. However, 
there was little evidence on which to reject this hypothesis. Corporate flexibility was found to be 
much more significant as a primary reason for overtime working than previous research had 
indicated would be the case. 
H5 Overtime working is a more cost-effective means of meeting demand than the 
potential alternatives. 
This hypothesis was firmly rejected, based on two key considerations. First, only legitimate 
overtime could be cost-effective; all unnecessary overtime would, by definition, not be cost- 
effective. Second, the costs of any legitimate overtime would need to be considered 
comparatively, in the light of the costs of all the alternative ways for capacity to be increased to 
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meet the demand. 
A significant proportion of the overtime investigated in the case studies was found to be 
unnecessary. Furthermore, a significant proportion of the balance of overtime was found to be 
ineffective. Therefore, irrespective of the cost equation, such overtime was not cost-effective. 
The main alternative to overtime was perceived by managers to be that of hiring additional staff. 
The primary costs comparison showed overtime premia to be almost double the non-wage labour 
costs, at the macro-economic level. The exception to this generalisation was the Police Force, 
where aggregate overtime premia were lower than total employment costs. 
H6 The use of overtime is not associated with poor management practice. 
There was compelling evidence to establish that overtime can be used effectively, as a rational 
and professional management tool, to achieve the aims of the organisation. Even systematic 
overtime was found, on occasions, to be a valid means of capacity-demand balancing. 
Notwithstanding the above qualification, the research uncompromisingly indicated rejection of this 
hypothesis, finding overtime to be generally associated with poor management in the U. K. 
H7 Workers depend on their overtime pay to meet their fixed financial commitments. 
An unequivocal response to this hypothesis was not possible. However, in essence rejection was 
Indicated since the low pay overtime dependency syndrome was found to be the exception rather 
than the rule. 
The use of overtime to support an otherwise inadequate pay structure was found to be less 
widespread than had been suggested by the previous research. Interestingly, employees who 
were relatively well paid were also susceptible to the financial problems of overtime earnings 
withdrawal. The overtime earnings dependency syndrome was found to be associated more with 
individual workers' characteristics, than with an organisation's 'structural' profile. 
Finally, it is perhaps dangerous to attempt a parting comment, yet it has been difficult for this 
research to avoid giving an adverse overall impression of the use of overtime in the U. K. economy. 
On the acid test of: 'what now maintains the use of overtime in the U. K.? '. the emerging answer is 
quite clear. There is no single reason for the use of overtime. Its application is governed by a 
diverse set of factors, even within a single organisation. Some of those factors were appropriate 
and rational, others were not. Nevertheless, irrespective of the exceptions, the use of overtime is 
clearly associated with ineffective management, particularly where overtime is systematic or levels 
are high. 
Looking back over the research, the experience was didactic and therefore, starting again, some 
things would undoubtedly be done differently. There remains, however, confidence that the 
research met a need, and the two primary objectives: the database provision and the analysis of 
key Issues were both achieved. 
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UNEMPLOYMENT ALLEVIATION TAXONOMY CLASSIFICATIONS 
I The fundamental generic classification: 
Worksharing; 
Job creation. 
2 The basic operating mechanisms of the measure: 
Expand demand; 
Restrict supply. 
3 The Instrument's primary operating level: 
Social, Socio-economic; 
Economic (micro or macro); 
Demographic; 





5 Degree of permanence of the measure: 
Permanent; 
Temporary. 




7 Selective or general application (targeting): 
Geographically (regional or general); 
Type of unemployed (length of time, age of person); 
Economic Sectors and Specific Industries. 
8 Attitudinal Implications (positive, neutral or negative): 
Government (Conservative or Socialist); 
Employers; 
Trade unions and Employees. 
9 Probable cost per job (created or 'saved'): 
Below £5,000; 
£5,000 to £11,999; 
Above £12,000. 
10 Significance (potential jobs created/saved/shared): 
Marginal (below 50,000); 
Moderate (50,000 to 150,000); 
Major (150,000 and above). 
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APPENDIX 2-1 
CURRENT OVERTIME STATISTICS 
All employees Employees working overtime 
Average Average Percentage Average Average 
Type weekly weekly of total weekly weekly 
of basic gross employees overtime overtime 
employee (hours) pay (£) (%) (hours) pay (£) 
MALES 
Manual 39.1 200.6 56.8 10.1 54.1 
Non-manual 372 294.1 21.1 6.2 47.5 
All 38.2 245.8 39.6 8.9 52.9 
FEMALES 
Manual 38.1 123.6 26.8 6.3 26.4 
Non-manual 36.3 175.5 18.1 3.5 21.2 
All 36.6 164.2 20.0 4.2 22.7 
(Source New Earnings Survey April 1988 Full-time employees on adult rates in G. B. all industries and services) 
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APPENDIX 3-1 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF OVERTIME REASONS 
Country Commentator Key reasons reviewed 
America Ehrenberg (1971) Cost effectiveness. 
Baird et al (1980) Emergency cover; normal demand. 
Industry Week (1979) Normal and unexpected demand; maintenance. 
Mollman (1980) Capital utilisation; cost effectiveness. 
Clarke (1982) Skill shortage; holiday cover; low pay make-up. 
Dills (1983) Normal demand 
Greis (1984) Cost effectiveness. 
Carr (1986) Seasonality; emergency cover; absenteeism; 
normal demand; skill shortages; corporate flexibility; 
Australia Dawkins (1985) Nature of work (i. e. shifts). 
ILO (1985) Seasonality; cost effectiveness; skill shortages. 
Canada Field (1985) Unexpected/temporary/seasonal demand. 
Czechoslovakia Karnakov (1984) Nature of job; emergency cover. 
Denmark Weissher Fluctuations in demand; unexpected demand. 
Germany FRG EIRR (1986) Fluctuations In demand; emergency cover; 
labour shortages 
Ireland Brennan and Absenteeism; operational flexibility; 
nature of job; normal production. 
Israel Kats et all (1982) More cost effective than hiring. 
Japan Yamada (1985) Normal demand; cost effectiveness; seasonality. 
New Zealand Sinclair (1983) Normal demand; seasonality; labour shortage; 
Poland Karnakov (1984) Nature of job; emergency cover. 
Sweden Axling (1983) Temporary or seasonal demand; unexpected 
demand; absenteeism; skill shortages. 
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APPENDIX 3-2 
NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS OF WORKING HOURS 
Normal Maximum Overtime 
Country Weekly Hours Allowed Notes 
Australia 38 - 40 No General Umits Regulated By Awards & Collective Agreements 
Austria 40 2 hrs/day Statutory Regulation 
50 maximum 10 hrs/week 
Belgium 40 2 hrs/day Statutory Regulation 
50 maximum 10 hrs/week Annualisation of working hours allows 
65 hrs/quarter limits to be exceeded without payment of 
overtime premia within max. 40 hrs/wk 
Bulgaria 42 (5 day week) 3 hrs day or 2 his night Statutory Regulation 
46 (6 day week) per 2 consecutive days Overtime generally prohibited 
6 hrs day or 4 hrs night 
per week 30 his day 
or 20 hrs night per month 
120 hrs per year 
Canada 1 40 -44 -48 8 hrs/week Statutory Regulation 
48 maximum 12 Provinces each regulate employment law 
Federal law Influences Inter-provincial law 
Czechoslovakia 42 8 hrs/week Statutory Regulation 
46 maximum 150 hrs/year 
Denmark 39 No General Umits Statutory Regulation 
Finland 40 20 his in any 2 weeks Statutory Regulation 
48 maximum 200 hrs/year Collective agreements may fix lower limits 
France 39 130 hrs/year Statutory Regulation 
Provisions facilitating annual hours apply 
GDR 43-45 4 hrs in any 2 days Statutory Regulation 
56 maximum 120 hrs/year 
FRG 48 * 2 hrs/day Statutory Regulation 
on 30 days per year * 10 his daily maximum 
Greece 40 * 60 hrs in any 6 months Statutory Regulation 
Statutory limit 48 hours per week 
* Central Collective Agreement 
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Normal Maximum Overtime 
Country Weekly Hours Allowed Notes 
Hungary 40 8 hrs/month Statutory Regulation 
36.40 * * Certain sectors 
Ireland 48 2 hrs/day Statutory Regulation 
60 maximum 12 hrs/week 
36 hrs/4 weeks 
240 hrs/year 
Italy 48 2 hrs/day Statutory Regulation 
12.. hrs/week Systematic overtime Is generally unlawful 
Japan 48 15 hrs/week Statutory Regulation 
28 hrs per 2 weeks Ministry of Labour guide-lines on 
39 hrs per 3 weeks overtime limits are not legally binding 
48 hrs per 4 weeks 
50 hrs per month 
Luxembourg 40 * 2 hrs/day Statutory Regulation 
* 10 hrs daily maximum 
Netherlands 48 12 hrs/week men Statutory Regulation 
6 hrs/week women 
New Zealand 40 No General Limits Statutory Regulation 
Norway 40 10 hrs/week Statutory Regulation 
25.. hrs/4 weeks 
200 hrs/year 
Poland 42 120 hrs/year Statutory Regulation 
Portugal 48 2 hrs/day Statutory Regulation 
160 hrs/year 
Romania 46 120 hrs/year Statutory Regulation 
44 * * Certain sectors 
Spain 40 * 80 hrs/year Statutory Regulation 
*9 hrs daily maximum 
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Normal Maximum Overtime 
Country Weekly Hours Allowed Notes 
Sweden 40 48 hrs/4 weeks Statutory Regulation 
50 hrs/mth 200 hrs/yr 
Switzerland 45 * 2 hrs/day Statutory Regulation 
50 ** 220 hrs/year * Industrial, Office, Technical etc Workers 
** Construction, Craft Trades, Small Retail 
Turkey 45 3 hrs/day Statutory Regulation 
90 hrs/year 
U. K. No General Umit No General Umits Collective agreements Contracts of 
Employment 
Wage Council Orders 
USA 40 No General Umits Federal Law 
State Laws also regulate overtime 
USSR 41 4 hrs over 2 days * Statutory Regulation 
120 hrs/year * (consecutive) 
Yugoslavia 42 No General Umits Statutory Regulation 
SOURCES: International Labour Office Geneva 'Conditions of Work Digest' (ILO Volume 5 No. 2 1986); Leonard JB The 
Regulation and Use of Overtime In the United States' (Unpublished ILO 1983); Reid F 'Overtime Work In Canada' 




THE HUMAN RESOURCE RESEARCH CENTRE 
SURVEY OF 
OVERTIME WORKING PRACTICES 
PREFACE 
This survey is part of a doctoral research programme into overtime working practices. 
It is hoped that the results will help: 
Managers to make the optimum decision between overtime and the alternatives; 
Plant level management to deal effectively with that overtime which is scheduled; 
Labour market management at the macro-economic level. 
You are assured of absolute confidentiality, no person or organisation will be identified in any way. If you wish, you 
may decline to enter your name. We do, however, need to know your type of business, (question 3), as you will 
surely understand. 
COMPLETION INSTRUCTIONS 
Please answer only for the establishment at the address to which this questionnaire was sent; ie for the employees 
who are paid from that location. 
Please tick the ONE box, or circle the ONE number which best describes your establishment or your views, unless 
otherwise instructed. If you wish to change an answer, please strike through and circle or tick another. 
If a question is inappropriate, eg if you have no manual workers, please use "NA" (not applicable). 
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SECTION ONE : GENERAL INFORMATION 
1 Please give the name of your establishment ........................................................................................................... 
2 Address ....................................................................................................................................................................... 
3 The main type of business ............. ».......................................................................................................................... 














........................................................................... ...................................................... .......................................... 
10 Is the current market demand for your Increasing? Stable? Decreasing? 
products or services generally.... []i [ ]2 [ ]a 
SECTION TWO : HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
These questions relate to the general personnel management function within your establishment. 
1 Does your establishment have Yes No 
a formal written manpower plan? [Ii [12 
Please give the following statistics The current trend Is... 
(If information is unavailable please give an estimate and label 'B') Increasing Stable Decreasing Unsure 
2 Have employee numbers increased or fallen 1 2 3 4 
over the past 5 years? 
3 Are employee numbers expected to increase 1 2 3 4 
or decrease over the next year? 
4 Annual labour turnover rate ............................. % 1 2 3 4 (Number of leaven divided by number of employees) 
5 Absenteeism ............................. % 1 2 3 4 (Sickness, etc, but not holidays) 
6-7 Basic working Manuals ........................... hrs 1 2 3 4 hours per 
week Non-manuals ....................... .. hrs 1 2 3 4 
8-9 Degree of Manuals ............................. % 1 2 3 4 
unionisation 
(Percentage) Non-manuals ............................. % 1 2 3 4 
1 
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SECTION THREE : OVERTIME STATISTICS 
Overtime is defined as work outside basic hours, for which a premium rate is paid. 
1-2 On average, how much overtime hours week Manual ................................. per 
is worked per employee? 
(if injormat on is unavailabk please giw an Non-manual ..... . ................. hours per week 
estimate and label 'B? ) 
3 If NO overtime Is worked In your establishment please tick box and [ ]i 
GO TO Section 5 Question 1. 
Increase Stable Decrease Unsure 
4-5 Has your overtime level Manual 12 34 
increased or decreased 
over the past 5 years? Non-manual 12 34 
6-7 What are likely to be the trends Manual 12 34 
in overtime working over the 
next 12 months? Non-manual 12 34 
8 In the event of worksharing (; e. working hours 
reduction, increased holidays, ea. ), what would be 12 34 
the effect on your overtime? 
Resistance Acceptance Would like more 
9 In your opinion, what attitude do 
your employees have to overtime? 1 23 
What are your overtime Overtime Is worked: Always Often Little Never 
working patterns? 
10 Weekday 1 2 3 4 
11 Friday pm 1 2 3 4 
12 Saturday am 1 2 3 4 
13 Saturday pm 1 2 3 4 
14 Sunday 1 2 3 4 
15 Holiday 1 2 3 4 
What are your overtime compensation patterns? 
16-27 Please state the % premium, eg. 25%, etc., and/or 'TOIL' (For Time Of[ In Lieu). 
Weekday Fri. pm. Sat. am. Sat. pm. Sunday Holiday 
16-21 Manual .... »... »......... % .................. . %.................... %.......... ......... %................... %............... .... % 
22-27 Non-manual 
.................... .............. ».............. ......... .................... .................... .................... 
2 
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SECTION THREE : OVERTIME STATISTICS continued 
Please indicate why overtime is used in your establishment:... Major Secondary Not a 
Factor Factor Factor 
28 Absenteeism (u, scheduk4 eg. sicus) 1 2 3 
29 Cover for holidays 1 2 3 
30 Shortage of skilled labour 1 2 3 
31 Shortage of unskilled labour 1 2 3 
32 Long term demand uncertainty (ie. overtime instead ojh&ing people) 1 2 3 
33 Overtime is more cost-effective (As a means ofproduction or service) 1 2 3 
34 Regular maintenance 1 2 3 
35 Overtime is used in order to meet unexpected demand 1 2 3 
36 Overtime is used to meet normal demand or is contractual 1 2 3 
37 Temporary or seasonal demand 1 2 3 
38 Custom and practice 1 2 3 
39 To increase low basic pay to acceptable levels 1 2 3 
40 Part of a regular shift pattern 1 2 3 
41 To increase plant utilisation 1 2 3 
42 Emergency cover (eg. boateneckr, shorwg4 9y orp gpro ) 1 2 3 
43 Others; 1 2 
please state: ............... . ......... . ...... ........................ . ....................... 
SECTION FOUR : OVERTIME MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
These questions relate to the possible use, in your establishment, of options for the management of overtime 
Formal Management collective custom & No policy 
1 How is overtime controlled Policy Agreement Practice Established 
in your establishment? 1 23 4 
National Local No Don't We Have 
2 Do your unions have a level level Policy Know No Unions 
formal overtime policy? 1 234 5 
3 What level of supervision do you 
Above Normal 
L 
Normal Below Normal Overtime Is Often 









SECTION FOUR : OVERTIME MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS continued 
Does your establishment generally Technique If the Technique Is Sometimes Used, 
make use of the following options Is Generally Please circle numbers as 
for the Management of Overtime? Not Used appropriate 
Number of hours per week allowed. - 
4 Limits on overtime hours per week 1-2 34 5-6 7-8 9 or more 
1 23456 
Technique is used 
5 Mandatory overtime 1 2 
(Employee cannot refuse to work overtime) 
Number of hours per week guaranteed.... 
6 Guaranteed overtime 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9 or more 
1 23456 
Technique is used 
7 Overtime budget 1 2 
By By Supervision By Salary 
8 Exclusions on those paid for overtime Grade Level (Please state tenet) 
1 234£................ yr 
Technique is used 
9 Overtime hours commitment scheme 1 2 
(Employees undertake contractually to work ovenime) 
Time frame planned ahead.... 
10 Overtime forward scheduling 1 Week 1 Month 3 Months or more 
1 234 
Lowest authorisation level.... 
11 Formal overtime authorisation system Supervisor Manager Director 
1 234 
Allocation by.... 
12 Formal overtime allocation procedure Volunteer Suprvsr/Mgr Unions 
1 234 
Always Generally Rarely 
13 Forward notice to employees to work 1 234 
overtime 
Technique is used 
14 Periodic overtime embargoes 1 2 
Frequency of formal reports.... 
15 Overtime monitoring system Weekly Monthly Quarterly or longer 
( fi ords other than forp ºupwposes) 1 234 
Comparative Comparative 
16 Measurement of overtime performance for Productivity Quality 
comparison with basic time performance 1 23 
;, 4 
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SECTION FIVE : OVERTIME AND EMPLOYMENT 
Has your establishment used any of the (Please circle as many numbers as appropriate) 
following alternatives to overtime working May I am not 
or changes In overtime working? No Yes consider aware of 
in future technique 
1 Productivity increase by changing payment policy 12 3 4 
2 Capital investment 12 3 4 
3 Hired new employees 12 3 4 
4 Changed shift patterns or introduced 
shift working, (including twilight shifts) 12 3 4 
5 Employed part-time workers 12 3 4 
6 Agency temps 12 3 4 
7 Temporary or fixed term employment contracts 12 3 4 
8 Sub-contractors 12 3 4 
9 Outworkers or homeworkers 12 3 4 
10 Staggered working hours 12 3 4 
11 Implemented preventative maintenance, (ifapptcahk) 12 3 4 
12 Average hours schemes 12 3 4 
13 Annual hours contracts 12 3 4 
14 Flexible working systems 12 3 4 
15 Job splitting or sharing schemes 12 3 4 
What, if any, are the major factors inhibiting Major Secondary Not a 
overtime reduction in your establishment? Factor Factor Factor 
The reduction of overtime In this establishment would.... 
16 Impede day to day productivity/service levels 1 2 3 
17 Increase unit costs 1 2 3 
18 Increase exposure to longer term demand change 1 2 3 
(e& passibility of f uture layoffs inhibits thing neu' people) 
19 Adversely affect low paid workers' earnings 1 2 3 
20 Any other major reasons for not 
reducing overtime; please state.... 
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SECTION SIX : OVERTIME RELATED ISSUES 
Please Indicate your views on Strongly Agree Unsure Disagree Strongly 
the nineteen propositions below : agree disagree 
1 Some employees are dependent on overtime 
earnings to meet their financial commitments. 12345 
2 Unions would resist the reduction of overtime. 12345 
3 Employees may try to manipulate their work 
output & priorities to secure overtime. 12345 
4 Overtime payments to some managers or supervisors 
encourage or promote overtime working. 12345 
5 Productivity during overtime hours is higher 
than in normal hours. 12345 
6 Overtime work reduces productivity in normal hours. 12345 
7 Overtime promotes or maintains unemployment. 12345 
8 Established overtime practices are beneficial 
to the UK economy. 12345 
9 Capital investment will reduce future overtime levels. 12345 
10 New technology will reduce future overtime levels. 12345 
11 Increasing productivity, (output per man-hour), 
will reduce future overtime levels. 12345 
12 Overtime helps recruitment, retention and motivation. 12345 
13 Overtime causes industrial relations problems. 12345 
14 Systematic overtime should be eliminated. 12345 
The following factors make overtime a 
lower cost option than hiring new employees 
15 Training and induction costs 12345 
16 Fringe benefit costs (Sicwuss schem4 Pensions Etc. ) 12345 
17 Employers' N. I. C. costs 12345 
18 Lay-off or redundancy costs 12345 
19 Overtime reduction in our establishment would result 
in increased employment opportunities 
(eg. ewre fua o. parr-dme%bs, mmpo oy worker; new shr f is etc. ) 12345 




Thank you for your assistance with my Doctoral research. Please return 
this questionnaire to me at the address below, 
in the freepost envelope provided. 
R. M. SPINK 
THE HUMAN RESOURCE RESEARCH CENTRE 









STRATEGY & TACTICS 




Trade & Employee Organisation 
























THE MACRO OVERT 
Output objectives Financial Analysis 
Analysis of alternatives Local collective agreements Micro reward systems 
Alternative Means 
0/i ? 











SKELETON PROGRAMME (CASE STUDY INVESTIGATION GUIDE) 
ENDOGENOUS PHASE 









1 Senior managers - preliminary interviews schedule 
a) Operations or Personnel Director yes 
b) Senior Operations Manager yes 
c) Personnel Manager yes 
d) Financial Controller yes 
e) Unions Senior Steward (possibly) yes 
Obj ectives of these Interviews 
a) Establish the researcher's credibility 
b) Establish sound relationships 
c) Determine key subjects for detailed Interview 
d) Construct & agree the detailed plan of action 
for the study 
e) Gauge broad attitudes to key issues 
2 Background Information collection Including 
documentary, attitudinal & perceptual data on: yes yes 
a) Nature of business and structure of total 
organisation 
b) Establishment level organisational structure 
c) Employee profile: numbers, status, gender, etc. 
d) Corporate plans and objectives 
e) Products markets & customers 
f) Profitability and prospects for future expansion 
g) Local labour market 
h) Union representation 
i) Change: past and planned for working time 
structures 
j) Broad perceptions of overtime levels & Issues 
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APPENDIX 5-3 (Continued) 










1 Collection of documentary evidence 
a) Working time statistics & historical data yes 
(5 years or more if possible) 
b) Pay statistics & historical data yes 
c) Agreements, minutes, plans, papers etc yes 
2 In depth interview schedule (key subjects) 
a) Director responsible for Operations or Personnel yes 
b) Managers responsible for the overtime decision yes 
c) Managers responsible for controlling overtime yes 
d) Personnel or Industrial Relations Manager yes 
e) Senior Employee Representative, le Steward etc. yes 
Ethnographic Activities 
1 Observation and detailed investigations yes yes 
a) Attend site and observe overtime decisions & control 
b) Observe & evaluate the actual processes in operation 
c) Review availability and analysis of alternative 
working structures 
2 Discussions with Workers Reps. In order to discover: yes 
a) Guidance from the center 
b) Local policy 
c) Local pressures 
d) Perceptions of the local overtime issues eg: why, is 
it properly & fairly controlled, reward systems, etc. 
e) Perceptions of national overtime Issues 
3 Discussions with workers in order to discover: yes 
a) Worker's motivations to work overtime 
b) Alternative uses of time 
c) Pay dependency 
d) Alternatives to overtime le: moon-lighting, Increase 
straight wages, change job, etc. 
e) Welfare le: health, quality of life, home environment 
f) Quality of work Implications 
g) Future aspirations 
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APPENDIX 7-1 
CROSSTABULATION OF LOCATION BY NUMBER OF NON-MANUAL EMPLOYEES 





Defined Row Pct 
South Col Pct 
Tot Pct 
<20 20-49 50-199 200+ 
Row 
1234 Total 
32 24 12 7 
42.7 32.0 16.0 9.3 
23.7 48.0 42.9 58.3 
14.2 10.7 5.3 3.1 
2 Count 103 26 16 5 
Defined Row Pct 68.7 17.3 10.7 3.3 
North Col Pct 76.3 52.0 57.1 41.7 
Tot Pct 45.8 11.6 7.1 2.2 
Column 135 50 28 12 







Chi-Square Value DF Significance 
Pearson's r. 14.99119 3 . 00182 
Minimum Expected Frequency 4 
Cells with Exptd Frqcy <5 1 of 8 (12.5%) 
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Significance Degrees of 
Freedom 
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
Manpower Plans exist 
plan 15 27 4.168 0.04 1 
Current product Demand increasing 
demand 60 64 1.089 0.58 2 2 
Employee numbers Numbers Increasing 
Past trend 57 67 1.790 0.41 2 2 
Future trend 40 56 5.210 0.072 2 
Labour 10 % and above 
turn-over 45 64 8.597 0.04 3 
Absenteeism 5% and above 
51 56 1.936 0.592 3 
Normal hours Below 37 hours per week 
(Manual staff) 22 23 2.109 0.352 2 
(Non-manual staff) 43 24 15.868 0.00 2 
Unionisation Union present 
(Manual staff) 40 33 0.945 0.332 1 
(Non-manual staff) 22 21 0.013 0.91 2 1 
Trend over the next year Unionisation is decreasin g 
(Manual staff) 54 0.550 0.762 2 
(Non-manual staff) 53 0.472 0.492 1 
Employee attitude Would like more overtime 
to overtime 23 28 0.782 0.682 2 
Effect of Overtime would Increase 
worksharing 54 66 1.839 0.402 2 
Effect of Jobs would be created 
overtime reduction 31 31 2.894 0.58 2 4 
Jobs would not be created 




APPENDIX 7-2 (Continued 2 of 8) 
Independent Variable Statistic I 
North South Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
OVERTIME DETAILS 
Levels of overtime 
No overtime (Manual and non-manual staff combined) 
24 11 5.650 0.02 1 
Manual employees only Overtime per week 
No overtime 22 21 3.597 0.31 2 3 
0.1 to 5 hours 27 17 3.597 0.312 3 
5 to 9.9 hours 26 27 3.597 0.31 2 3 
Over 10 hours 25 26 3.597 0.312 3 
Overtime premiums 
Manual employees: 50% and above 
Weekdays 69 69 0.003 0.962 
Saturday AM 88 91 0.370 0.51 2 
Sundays 93 96 0.435 0.512 
Non-manual employees: 50% and above 
Weekdays 52 48 0.183 0.672 
Saturday AM 65 71 0.380 0.542 1 
Sundays 68 74 0.462 0.502 1 
Overtime working patterns 
All employees: Little or no overtime worked 
Weekday 22 20 2.076 0.562 3 
All employees: Overtime is always or often worked 




APPENDIX 7-2 (Continued 3 of 8) 
Independent Variable Statistic 
North South Chi-Square 
%% Pearson's r. 
Significance Degrees of 
Freedom 
OVERTIME REASONS 
Skill shortage A major reason 
17 35 7.896 0.02 2 
Not a reason 
61 48 7.896 0.02 2 
Unskilled A major reason 
labour shortage 3 11 5.446 0.072 2 
Outlook uncertain A major reason 
42 28 6.756 0.03 2 
Regular maintenance Not a reason 
54 72 8.098 0.02 2 
Unexpected demand A major reason 
59 56 0.211 0.902 2 
Emergency cover A major reason 
36 50 4.577 0.102 2 
Seasonal demand A major reason 
34 42 1.322 0.522 2 
Normal demand A major reason 
34 32 0.040 0.982 2 
Custom and practice A major reason 
14 15 0.286 0.872 2 
Low Pay Not a reason 
76 66 3.369 0.19 2 2 
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APPENDIX 7-2 (Continued 4 of 8) 
Dependent Independent Variable Statistic 
1 
Variable 
North South Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
OVERTIME MANAGEMENT 
Overall control No formal policy 
of overtime 51 60 1.310 0.25 
21 
Union policy on overtime No formal policy 
53 73 1.946 0.16 ` 
Supervision level Supervision or below normal level or no supervision 
during overtime 33 50 5.008 0.03 
Overtime limits Not used 
82 80 0.145 0.702 
Mandatory overtime Not used 
85 85 0.000 0.98 21 
Guarantied overtime Not used 
94 96 0.215 0.642 1 
Overtime budget Not used 
73 76 0.140 0.72 21 
Exclusions on No exclusions adopted 
paid overtime 54 44 8.626 0.03 3 
Commitment scheme Not used 
84 88 0.487 0.492 
Forward scheduling Not used 
68 73 0.416 0.522 
Authorisation system Not used 
32 27 0.415 0.522 
Periodic embargoes Not used 
84 75 2.015 (). 162 1 
Records maintained Do not keep overtime records 
48 38 7.66 0.02 1 
Productivity and quality No comparative measurement betwee n normal and overtime hours 




APPENDIX 7-2 (Continued 5 of 8) 
Independent Variable Statistic 1 
North South Chi-Square 
%% Pearson's r. 
Significance Degrees of 
Freedom 
FACTORS INHIBITING THE REDUCTION OF OVERTIME 
This was not a factor... 
Impeded productivity 34 26 1.163 0.56 2 2 
or service levels 
Increased costs 66 64 0.633 0.732 2 
Longer term 58 64 0.836 0.662 2 
uncertainty 





APPENDIX 7-2 (Continued 6 of 8) 
Independent Variable Statistic 1 
North South Chi-Square 
%% Pearson's r. 
Significance Degrees of 
Freedom 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO OVERTIME WORKING 
This alternative has been used In the followi ng proportion of organisations... 
Payment policy change to 22 19 0.160 0.692 
Increase productivity 
Capital Investment 42 39 0.232 0.632 
Hired new staff 65 74 1.616 0.202 
New or changed shift 26 31 0.565 0.452 
patterns (incl. twilight) 
Part-time workers 45 46 0.020 0.892 
Agency temps. 18 47 19.23 0.00 
Temporary/fixed-term 27 34 1.123 0.292 
employment contracts 
Sub-contractors 40 45 0.551 0.462 
Outworkers or homeworkers 13 21 2.715 0.102 
Staggered working hours 24 27 0.338 0.562 
Preventative maintenance 28 21 1.148 0.282 
Flexible working schemes 24 28 0.395 0.532 
Job splittlng/sharing 6 4 0.412 0.522 1 
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APPENDIX 7-2 (Continued 7 of 8) 
Dependent Independent Variable Statistic 
1 
Variable 
North South Chi-Square 
%% Pearson's r. 
Significance Degrees of 
Freedom 
PERCEPTIONS OF OVERTIME RELATED ISSUES 
The Respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the following proposition 
Some employees are dependent on overtime pay... 
75 77 0.814 0.942 4 
Unions would resist overtime reduction 
53 59 4.507 0.342 4 
Employees manipulate productivity or priorities to secure overtime 
63 47 5.755 0.222 4 
Overtime payments to supervisors promote overtime 
60 52 5.417 0.25 2 4 
Productivity In overtime Is higher than In normal time 
11 12 2.717 0.612 4 
Overtime reduces productivity In normal time 
34 25 7.567 0.112 4 
Overtime promotes or maintains unemployment 
43 31 7.632 0.112 4 
Overtime Is beneficial to the U. K. economy 
24 20 5.857 0.212 4 
Capital Investment would reduce future overtime levels 
37 38 6.030 0.20 2 4 
New technology would reduce future overtime levels 
54 42 7.024 0.132 4 
Increasing productivity would reduce future overtime levels 
58 53 2.494 0.65 2 4 
Overtime helps recruitment, retention and motivation 
51 50 5.242 0.262 4 
Overtime causes Industrial relations problems 
36 29 11.822 0.02 4 
Systematic overtime should be eliminated 
63 58 4.618 0.332 4 
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Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
Pearson"s r. Freedom 
SELECTED FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF OVERTIME WORKING 
In the Respondent's opinion, the following factors make overtime 
a lower cost option than hiring new employees. 
Training and 68 65 
Induction costs 
Fringe benefit costs 51 59 
(sick scheme, pensions, etc. ) 
Employer's NIC 55 58 
Lay-off costs or 43 45 
redundancy 
4.804 0.31 24 
2.942 . 57 
24 
0.807 0.94 24 
3.163 0.532 4 
Notes 
I These statistics are drawn from joint distribution tables and give the test of correlation 
for the whole table, not just the key result which is intended to give the essence of the table. 
2 No statistically significant difference was found at the p <0.05 level 
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APPENDIX 7-3 
CROSSTABULATION KEY RESULTS BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR (SERVICE NON SERVICE) 
Dependent Independent Variable Statisticl 
Variable 
Non- Service Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
service %% Pearson's r. Freedom 
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
Manpower 
plan 
Size Of Organisation 
Below 20 
20 to 49 
50 to 199 
200 & Above 
Below 20 
20 to 49 
50 to 199 
200 & Above 




10% and above 







Formal plans exist 
25 14 3.657 
(By number and type of employees) 
Manual Employees 
41 68 16.543 
24 12 16.543 
27 13 16.543 
87 16.543 
Non-Manual Employees 
58 61 0.444 
24 21 0.444 
13 12 0.444 
56 0.444 
Numbers decreasing 






Below 37 hours per week 
11 35 
35 40 























3.216 0.36 2 3 
13.075 0.00 2 
4.174 0.24 2 3 
20.261 0.00 2 
4.746 0.092 2 
20.261 0.00 2 
4.746 (). 092 2 
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Significance Degrees of 
Freedom 
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION (Continued) 
Union present In the 
establishment 
Manual staff 41 35 0.742 0.392 1 
Non-manual 23 21 0.205 0.652 1 
Employee attitude Resistance to working overtime 
to overtime 77 2.778 0.252 2 
Effect of worksharing Overtime would Increase 
66 47 18.824 0.00 2 
Effect of Jobs would be created 
overtime reduction 37 24 5.5054 0.282 4 
Jobs would not be created 
45 55 5.5054 0.282 4 
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APPENDIX 7.3 (Continued 3 of 8) 
Dependent Independent Variable Statistic1 
Variable 
Non- Service Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
service %% Pearson's r. Freedom 
OVERTIME DETAILS 
Level of overtime Overtime per week per employee 
Manual staff 
No overtime 10 36 23.048 0.00 3 
Below 5 hours 26 20 23.048 0.00 3 
5 to 9.9 hours 31 28 23.048 0.00 3 
10 hours & above 34 16 23.048 0.00 3 
Non-manual 
No overtime 33 51 7.187 0.06 2 3 
Below 5 hours 33 22 7.187 0. ()62 3 
5 to 9.9 hours 20 16 7.187 0.062 3 
10 hours & above 14 10 7.187 0.062 3 
Level of overtime trends Past 5 years trend: level Increasing 
Manual staff 43 40 0.869 0.652 2 
Non-manual 27 18 1.685 0.432 2 
Future 12 months trend: level Increasing 
Manual staff 19 18 2.739 0.252 2 
Non-manual 12 6 2.241 0.332 2 
Overtime premium Manual employees: below 50% 
Weekdays 35 23 2.674 0.102 1 
Saturday am 12 11 0.026 0.87 ,2 1 
Sunday 4 10 2.083 0.15 2 1 
Non-manual employees: below 50% 
Weekdays 59 37 6.282 0.01 1 
Saturday am 37 26 1.727 0.182 1 
Sunday 38 17 5.440 0.02 1 
Overtime working Always work weekday evenings 
patterns 33 33 1.886 0.60 2 3 
Always work Saturday mornings 
31 14 15.955 0.00 3 
Never work Sundays 
23 34 4.860 0.182 3 
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APPENDIX 7-3 (Continued 4 of 8) 
Dependent Independent Variable Statistlc1 
Variable 
Non- Service Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
service %% Pearson's r. Freedom 
OVERTIME REASONS 
A major or secondary reason for overtime scheduling... 
Absenteeism 43 48 0.379 0.542 
Holiday cover 68 58 1.889 0.172 
Skill shortage 53 31 7.953 0.00 
Unskilled 28 15 4.028 0.04 
labour shortage 
Outlook uncertain 70 56 3.681 0.05 
Regular maintenance 47 28 6.040 0.01 
Overtime Is more 58 42 3.981 0.05 
cost effective 
Increase plant 44 16 15.039 0.00 
utilisation 
Unexpected demand 86 77 2.366 0.12 2 
Emergency cover 76 52 11.226 0.00 
Temporary or seasonal 69 66 0.238 0.632 
demand 
Normal demand 63 62 0.013 0.91 2 
Shift pattern support 25 23 0.068 0.792 
Custom and practice 38 34 0.197 0.662 
Increase low pay 28 26 0.075 0.782 
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APPENDIX 7-3 (Continued 5 of 8) 
Dependent Independent Variable Statistic' 
Variable 
Non- Service Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
service %% Pearson's r. Freedom 
FACTORS INHIBITING OVERTIME REDUCTION 
A major or secondary factor Inhibiting overtime scheduling.,. 
Impede productivity 76 60 6.380 0.01 1 
or service levels 
Increased costs 44 24 9.401 0.00 1 
Long term 49 28 11.020 0.00 2 
uncertainty 
Low pay protection 30 28 1.172 0.682 1 
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APPENDIX 7-3 (Continued 6 of 8) 
Dependent Independent Variable Statistic1 
Variable 
Now Service Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
service %% Pearson's r. Freedom 
OVERTIME MANAGEMENT 
Overall control No formal policy 
of overtime 51 60 1.259 0.262 
Union policy Formal policy is perceived to exist 
on overtime 50 25 3.260 0.072 
Supervision level No supervision or below normal level 
during overtime 38 42 0.292 0.592 
Omits on overtime 20 15 0.760 0.382 
hours are used 
Mandatory overtime 12 19 1.546 0.21 2 
Is used 
Guarantied 3 10 3.680 0.05 
overtime Is used 
Exclusion made on who 52 48 0.271 0.602 
receives paid overtime 
Forward 35 23 2.910 0.082 1 
scheduling used 
Authorisation system 74 63 2.589 0.112 1 
Is used 
Notice to work 71 49 9.120 0.03 3 
overtime used 
Periodic overtime 23 14 2.214 0.14 2 3 
embargoes are used 
Monitoring of 51 36 3.852 0.05 1 
overtime used 
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APPENDIX 7-3 (Continued 7 of 8) 
Dependent Independent Variable Statistic' 
Variable 
Non- Service Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
service %% Pearson's r. Freedom 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO OVERTIME WORKING 
This alternative has been used In the following proportion of organisations... 
Payment policy change to 23 20 0.273 0.602 1 
Increase productivity 
Capital investment 55 28 15.491 0.00 1 
Hired new staff 76 60 5.712 0.02 1 
New or changed shift 5 21 5.361 0.02 1 
patterns (Incl. twilight) 
Part-time workers 44 47 0.305 0.582 1 
Agency temps. 24 32 1.996 0.162 1 
Temporary/fixed-term 40 18 11.809 0.00 1 
employment contracts 
Sub-contractors 53 30 12.103 0.00 1 
Outworkers or homeworkers 21 11 4.192 0.04 1 
Staggered working hours 21 29 2.148 0.142 1 
Preventative maintenance 36 16 10.924 0.00 1 
Flexible working schemes 26 25 0.023 0.882 1 
Job splitting/sharing 6 4 0.428 0.51 2 1 
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APPENDIX 7-3 (Continued 8 of 8) 
Dependent Independent Variable Statistic1 
Variable 
Non- Service Chl-Square Significance Degrees of 
service %% Pearson's r. Freedom 
SELECTED FINANCIAL IMPUCATIONS OF OVERTIME WORKING 
In the Respondent's opinion, the following factors make overtime 
a lower cost option than hiring new employees 
Training and 68 63 7.779 0.102 4 
Induction costs 
Fringe benefit costs 55 57 3.246 0.512 4 
(sick scheme, pensions, etc. ) 
Employ. r's NIC 53 61 10.439 0.03 4 
Lay-off costs or 52 36 8.481 0.072 4 
redundancy 
Notes 
1 These statistics are drawn from joint distribution tables and give the test of correlation for the whole table, 
not just the key result which Is Intended to give the essence of the table. 
2 No statistically significant difference was found. 
General note: lt Is essential to refer to the exact terms of the question asked in interpreting 
the responses, the questionnaire Is given as Appendix 5.2. 
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APPENDIX 7-4 
CROSSTABULATION KEY RESULTS BY SIZE OF ORGANISATION 
Dependent Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Variable 
Size of Organisation 
<20 20-49 50-199 200+ Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
%%%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
Manpower plan Plans exist 
6 12 29 50 31.567 0.00 3 
Current product Demand Increasing 
demand 63 70 57 48 8.836 0.182 6 
Employee numbers Numbers increasing 
Past trend 53 70 66 55 9.276 0.16 2 6 
Future trend 43 58 42 33 19.979 0.002 6 
Labour 5% and above 
turn-over 67 Be 84 74 11.935 0.222 9 
Future trend: Increasing 
38 12 27 13.840 0.03 6 
Absenteeism Below 3% 
48 27 30 16 28.832 0.00 9 
Normal hours Above 40 hours per week 
manual staff 49 41 32 7 36.470 0.00 6 
non-manual 36 27 18 3 25.377 0.00 6 
Unlonlsation Unions present 
manual staff 20 25 58 71 39.423 0.00 3 
non-manual 10 11 28 61 40.494 0.00 3 
Employee attitude Resistance to working overtime 
to overtime 8 10 4 4 6.105 0.412 6 
Would like more overtime 
18 21 30 37 6.105 0.412 6 
Effect of Overtime would Increase 
worksharing 41 73 64 45 11.998 0. ()62 6 
Effect of Jobs would be created 
overtime reduction 24 41 44 59 10.036 0.02 3 
Jobs would not be created 




APPENDIX 7-4 (Continued 2 of 7) 
Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Size of Organisation 
<20 20-49 50-199 200+ Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
%%%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
OVERTIME DETAILS 
Level of overtime 
No overtime 
Over 5 hours 
No overtime 
Over 5 hours 
















Overtime per week per manual employee 
40 20 77 47.384 0.00 
39 64 66 56 47.384 0.00 
Overtime per week per non-manual employee 
60 39 32 18 40.770 0.00 
25 43 28 25 40.770 0.00 
Past 5 years trend: level Increasing 
36 38 48 42 7.009 0.322 
19 18 23 40 9.402 0.152 
Future 12 months trend: level Increasing 
21 17 17 19 4.430 0.62 2 
9 11 10 8 6.941 0.33 2 
Manual employees: above 50% 
57 80 70 69 5.377 0.15 2 
71 90 96 100 19.137 0.002 
81 94 100 100 15.412 0.002 
73 94 100 100 20.614 0.00 2 
Non-manual employees: above 50% 
43 67 38 58 7.189 0.072 
55 67 63 88 7.532 0.05 
57 68 70 88 6.157 0.102 
44 74 73 91 13.512 0.00 
Always work Saturday mornings 
27 19 28 19 12.950 0.16' 
Often work Saturday mornings 
35 56 44 37 12.950 0.16' 
Seldom or never work on Sundays 
87 75 76 81 9.504 0.39 
7.189 0.07 2 
7.532 0.05 
6.157 0.10 2 
13.512 0.00 
12.950 0.16 2 






















APPENDIX 7-4 (Continued 3 of 7) 
Dependent Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Variable 
Size of Organisation 
<20 20-49 50-199 200+ Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
%%%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
OVERTIME REASONS 
A major or secondary reason... 
Absenteeism 20 40 56 77 28.630 0.00 6 
Holiday cover 49 67 71 67 6.048 0.11 2 3 
Skill shortage 35 40 49 58 4.660 0.202 3 
Unskilled 16 23 20 39 5.076 0.172 3 
labour shortage 
Outlook uncertain 57 69 64 69 1.783 0.622 3 
Overtime Is more 51 54 55 42 1.223 0.75 2 3 
cost effective 
Regular maintenance 25 40 44 58 8.625 0.03 3 
Normal demand 43 69 67 77 11.690 0.01 3 
Unexpected demand 80 77 87 85 8.291 0.222 6 
Low pay protection 16 31 29 39 5.040 0.172 3 
Temporary or 71 71 64 65 1.004 0.802 3 
seasonal demand 
Custom and practice 29 33 40 46 2.869 0.41 2 3 
Shift patterns 10 25 31 35 8.146 0.04 3 
Increase plant utilisation 22 40 33 42 4.417 0.222 3 
Emergency cover 53 67 73 74 10.980 0.092 6 
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Dependent Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Variable 
Size of Organisation 
<20 20-49 50-199 200+ Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
%%%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
FACTORS INHIBITING OVERTIME REDUCTION 
A major or secondary reason... 
Impede productivity 




50 75 89 70 23.547 0.00 3 
29 30 47 37 5.236 0.16 2 3 
36 43 42 41 0.750 0.862 3 
Low pay protection 19 38 31 40 7.820 0.05 3 
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Dependent Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Variable 
Size of Organisation 
<20 20-49 50-199 200+ Chl-Square Significance Degrees of 
%%%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
OVERTIME MANAGEMENT 
Overall control No formal policy 
of overtime 62 51 46 63 
Supervision level No supervision or below normal level 
during overtime 46 35 33 48 
The following controls were used by % of organisations: 
Overtime limits 27 13 
Mandatory overtime 12 27 
Guarantied overtime 6 6 
Overtime budget 8 13 
Overtime embargoes 17 6 
Exclusions on those paid 29 45 
Forward scheduling 16 25 
Authorisation 45 65 
Allocation 35 50 
Forward notice 57 69 
to employees 
Monitoring of overtime 18 48 
(other than for payment purposes) 
12.613 0.18 29 
3.033 0.39 29 
20 11 19.111 0.212 15 
13 4 8.673 0.03 3 
7 nil 18.291 0.25 2 15 
36 59 31.095 0.00 3 
26 33 10.290 0.02 3 
56 85 32.545 0.00 9 
42 41 10.041 0.02 3 
89 85 35.590 0.00 9 
74 70 24.568 0.00 9 
89 78 16.842 0.05 9 
56 59 19.315 0.00 3 
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APPENDIX 7-4 (Continued 6 of 7) 
Dependent Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Variable 
Size of Organisation 
<20 20-49 50-199 200+ Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
%%%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO OVERTIME WORKING 
This alternative has been used In the following proportion of organisations 
Payment policy change to 12 18 29 37 9.446 0.02 3 
Increase productivity 
Capital investment 26 35 62 55 19.391 0.00 3 
Hired new staff 54 67 87 68 15.991 0.00 3 
New or changed shift 13 31 38 42 14.023 0.00 3 
patterns (Incl. twilight) 
Part-time workers 44 46 45 43 0.090 0.99 2 3 
Agency temps. 15 21 36 55 20.780 0.00 3 
Temporary/fixed-term 17 20 40 58 23.763 0.00 3 
employment contracts 
Sub-contractors 32 34 57 55 12.351 0.01 3 
Outworkers or homeworkers 11 21 14 19 2.984 0.392 3 
Staggered working hours 26 31 23 16 2.448 0.482 3 
Preventative maintenance 10 25 40 43 19.730 0.00 3 
Average hours scheme 4 10 0 0 8.604 0.042 3 
Annual hours scheme 3 4 0 7 3.341 0.34 3 
Flexible working schemes 34 25 20 14 5.865 0.122 3 
Job splitting/sharing 6 12 2 0 6.594 0.09 2 3 
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APPENDIX 7-4 (Continued 7 of 7) 
Independent Variable Statistic 1 
" Ol I.... 
Size of Organisation 






Significance Degrees of 
Freedom 
SELECTED FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF OVERTIME WORKING 
In the Respondent's opinion, the following factors make overtime 
a lower cost option than hiring new employees... 
Training and 70 54 71 67 18.884 0.09 12 
Induction costs 
Fringe benefit costs 55 48 60 68 16.635 0.16 12 
(sick scheme, pensions, etc. ) 
Employer's NIC 57 55 54 64 20.192 0.06 12 
Lay-off costs or 52 40 38 45 20.572 0.06 12 
redundancy 
Notes 
1 These statistics are drawn from joint distribution tables and give the test of correlation for the whole table, 
not just the key result which is Intended to give the essence of the table. 
2 No statistically significant difference was found. 
General note: lt Is essential to refer to the exact terms of the question asked in Interpreting 




CROSSTABULATION KEY RESULTS BY AMOUNT OF OVERTIME WORKED 
BY MANUAL AND NON-MANUAL EMPLOYEES 
Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Dependent Amount Of Overtime 
Variable Nil <5 5-9.9 10+ Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
%%%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
Current demand Demand is increasing 
Manual 47 60 68 65 6.812 0.342 6 
Non-manual 57 60 64 69 5.226 0.512 6 
Employee numbers Past trend: Numbers Increasing 
Manual 37 64 65 69 15.885 0.01 6 
Non-manual 53 60 72 65 6.342 0.392 6 
Future trend: Numbers Increasing 
Manual 30 46 48 50 6.955 0.332 6 
Non-manual 43 48 61 28 9.930 0.132 6 
Normal hours Below 37 hours per week 
Manual 53 15 3 2 71.578 0.00 6 
Non-manual 47 29 23 19 22.418 0.00 6 
Labour turn-over 10% and above 
Manual 47 48 50 65 15.767 0.07 2 9 
Non-manual 45 54 62 62 23.577 0.01 9 
Absenteeism Above 5% 
Manual 44 54 53 52 16.975 0.052 9 
Non-manual 47 56 62 46 9.951 0.35 2 9 
Normal hours Below 37 hours per week 
manual staff 53 15 3 2 71.578 0.00 6 
non-manual 47 29 23 19 22.418 0.00 6 
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APPENDIX 7-5 (Continued 2 of 10) 
Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Dependent Amount Of Overtime 
Variable Nil <5 5-9.9 10+ Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
%%%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION (Continued) 
Unionisation 
manual staff 18 33 48 37 10.650 0.012 3 
non-manual 11 31 18 19 8.663 0.03 3 
Effect of 
worksharing Overtime would increase 
Manual 29 49 57 77 12.890 0.042 6 
Non-manual 58 58 70 58 1.855 0.932 6 
Effect of overtime reduction... 
By Amount of Overtime Worked by Manual Employees 
Jobs would be created 
25 39 45 45 3.992 0.26 3 
By Amount of Overtime Worked by Non-manual Employees 
Jobs would be created 
35 42 36 42 0.751 0.86 3 
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APPENDIX 7-5 (Continued 3 of 10) 
Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Dependent Amount Of Overtime 
Variable Nil <5 5-9.9 10+ Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
%%%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
OVERTIME DETAILS 
Level of overtime trends Past 5 years trend: level decreasing 
Manual staff 20 20 19 14 10.347 0.112 6 
Non-manual 27 15 9 14 6.326 0.392 6 
Future 12 months trend: level d ecreasing 
Manual staff nil 13 14 14 10.527 0.102 6 
Non-manual 18 7 9 6 4.371 0.632 6 
Overtime premium paid Manual employees: above 50% (manual overtime) 
Weekdays 50 77 59 77 6.234 (). 102 3 
Saturday am 50 96 85 90 9.249 0.03 3 
Sunday 100 98 89 96 3.731 0.292 3 
Holidays 100 94 88 93 1.590 0.662 3 
Non-manual employees: above 50% (non-manual overtime) 
Weekdays 35 51 43 71 6.060 0.112 3 
Saturday am 56 76 50 76 8.216 0.04 3 
Sunday 62 77 57 76 4.337 0.222 3 
Holidays 62 74 61 80 2.826 0.422 3 
Overtime working By Manual employee overtime Always or often work overtime 
patterns 
Weekdays 70 67 81 84 34.310 0.00 9 
Saturday am 40 49 76 90 33.512 0.00 9 
Sunday 10 13 29 11 15.027 0.09 2 9 
By Non-manual employee overtime Always or often work ove rtime 
Weekdays 77 80 79 80 7.435 0.592 9 
Saturday am 63 70 67 80 7.877 0.552 9 
Sunday 20 23 11 28 15.024 0.092 9 
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APPENDIX 7-5 (Continued 4 of 10) 
Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Dependent Amount Of Overtime 
Variable Nil <5 5-9.9 10+ Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
%%%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
REASONS FOR THE USE OF OVERTIME 
A major or secondary reason 
Low pay protection 17 42 28 10.561 0.01 3 
A major or secondary reason (Non-manual overtime) 
Absenteeism 61 41 35 8.216 0.04 3 
Temporary/seasonal 59 85 73 8.681 0.03 3 
demand 
A major or secondary reason (Manual overtime) 
Normal demand - 50 64 73 6.092 0.112 3 
Overtime is more - 41 56 62 4.341 0.182 3 
cost effective 
FACTORS INHIBITING OVERTIME REDUCTION 
A major or secondary reason based on manual overtime... 
Impede productivity 34 77 83 79 31.239 0.00 3 
service levels 
Increased costs 21 46 40 40 5.980 0.112 3 
Long term 16 47 50 48 13.470 0.00 3 
uncertainty 





Amount Of Overtime 
Nil <5 
%% 
APPENDIX 7-5 (Continued 5 of 10) 
Statistic 1 
5-9.9 10+ Chi-Square 
%% Pearson's r. 
Significance Degrees of 
Freedom 
OVERTIME MANAGEMENT 
The following controls were used by % of organisa tions Non-manual employee overtime ... 
Mandatory overtime -9 13 23 5.721 0.132 3 
Overtime budget - 40 15 11 10.706 0.01 3 
Mandatory overtime -9 3 23 5.721 0.12 2 3 
Overtime 10 18 27 4.374 (). 222 3 
commitment scheme 
Overtime embargoes 24 21 19 3.116 0.372 3 
Exclusions on - 62 56 50 10.148 0.02 3 
those paid 
Forward scheduling - 41 21 19 6.331 0.102 3 
Authorlsatlon - 81 69 61 5.405 0.14 2 3 
Umits per week - 15 20 26 4.287 0.232 3 
Guarantied overtime -4 3 12 4.745 0.192 3 
The following controls were used by % of organisations Manual employee overtime... 
Overtime budget - 42 24 22 7.708 0.05 3 
Forward scheduling 40 40 18 10.163 0.02 3 
Authorisation - 73 78 61 11.425 0.01 3 
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APPENDIX 7-5 (Continued 6 of 10) 
Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Dependent Amount Of Overtime 
Variable Nil <5 5-9.9 10+ Chi-Square Significance Degrees of 
%%%% Pearson's r. Freedom 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO OVERTIME WORKING 
This alternative has been used In the following proportion 
of organisations based on manual overtime... 
Payment policy change to 10 25 24 27 4.278 0.23 3 
Increase productivity 
Capital Investment 18 52 47 45 12.628 0.01 3 
Hired new staff 37 78 78 76 25.293 0.00 3 
New or changed shift 7 37 30 39 13.725 0.00 3 
patterns (incl. twilight) 
Part-time workers 42 52 38 42 2.286 0.52 3 
Agency temps. 21 21 34 27 3.017 0.39 3 
Temporary/fixed-term 14 36 35 29 6.699 0.08 3 
employment contracts 
Sub-contractors 12 40 53 63 28.108 0.00 3 
Outworkers/homeworkers 12 23 20 10 4.543 0.21 3 
Staggered working hours 23 26 22 29 0.903 0.83 3 
Preventative maintenance 8 36 35 28 10.704 0.01 3 
Average hours schemes 0 2 7 4 3.518 0.32 3 
Annual hours schemes 5 2 4 0 2.474 0.48 3 
Flexible working schemes 36 24 17 25 4.532 0.21 3 
Job splitting/sharing 7 4 7 6 0.441 0.93 3 
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Significance Degrees of 
Freedom 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO OVERTIME WORKING 
This alternative has been us ed In the following proportion of organisations 
based on Non-manual overtime... 
Payment policy change to 15 26 18 40 6.800 0.08 3 
Increase productivity 
Capital investment 32 48 42 42 3.750 0.29 3 
Hired new staff 57 78 74 68 7.976 0.05 3 
New or changed shift 15 38 38 36 11.863 0.01 3 
patterns (incl. twilight) 
Part-time workers 39 46 51 50 2.045 0.56 3 
Agency temps. 17 36 47 19 14.328 0.00 3 
Temporary/fixed-term 18 40 43 27 11.404 0.01 3 
employment contracts 
Sub-contractors 22 54 58 65 27.710 0.00 3 
Outworkers/homeworkers 16 15 15 15 0.023 0.99 3 
Staggered working hours 22 25 29 28 0.753 0.86 3 
Preventative maintenance 19 37 27 20 5.727 0.13 3 
Average hours schemes 4 4 5 4 0.211 0.98 3 
Annual hours schemes 4 2 3 0 1.213 0.75 3 
Flexible working schemes 27 16 31 38 5.570 0.13 3 
Job splitting/sharing 7 2 3 16 17.162 0.07 3 
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Independent Variable 
APPENDIX 7-5 (Continued 8 of 10) 
Statistic 1 
Dependent Amount Of Overtime 






Significance Degrees of 
Freedom 
PERCEPTIONS OF OVERTIME RELATED ISSUES 
BY AMOUNT OF OVERTIME WORKED BY MANUAL EMPLOYEES' OVERTIME 
The Respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the following proposition... 
Some employees are dependent on overtime pay 
67 73 80 79 13.799 0.31 12 
Unions would resist overtime reduction 
79 42 46 49 24.956 0.02 12 
Employees manipulate productivity or priorities to secure ove rtime 
62 54 54 54 3.747 0.99 12 
Overtime payments to supervisors promote overtime 
71 57 49 53 15.142 0.23 12 
Productivity In overtime Is higher than In normal time 
17 4 10 12 21.776 0.04 12 
Overtime reduces productivity In normal time 
38 34 22 25 27.319 0.01 12 
Overtime promotes or maintains unemployment 
50 33 34 38 12.119 0.44 12 
Overtime is beneficial to the U. K. economy 
16 19 27 28 7.622 0.81 12 
Capital Investment would reduce future overtime levels 
33 38 42 31 17.631 0.13 12 
New technology would reduce future overtime levels 
56 54 51 40 17.847 0.12 12 
Increasing productivity would reduce future overtime levels 
56 67 58 46 10.514 0.57 12 
Overtime helps recruitment, retention and motivation 
40 44 56 69 19.092 0.09 12 
Overtime causes Industrial relations problems 
47 32 27 29 21.625 0.04 12 
Systematic overtime should be eliminated 
76 65 62 42 29.579 0.00 12 
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APPENDIX 7-5 (Continued 9 of 10) 
Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Dependent Amount Of Overtime 
Variable Nil <5 5-9.9 10+ Chi-Square 
%%%% Pearson's r. 
Significance Degrees of 
Freedom 
PERCEPTIONS OF OVERTIME RELATED ISSUES 
By Amount of Overtime Worked By Non-Manual Employees 
The Respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the following proposition... 
Some employees are dependent on overtime pay 
74 85 74 73 6.688 0.88 12 
Unions would resist overtime reduction 
63 59 44 36 15.848 0.20 12 
Employees manipulate productivity or priorities to secure ove rtime 
64 53 49 62 15.236 0.23 12 
Overtime payments to supervisors promote overtime 
61 60 46 58 22.787 0.03 12 
Productivity In overtime is higher than in normal time 
15 5 13 12 13.986 0.30 12 
Overtime reduces productivity in normal time 
41 24 21 23 18.043 0.11 12 
Overtime promotes or maintains unemployment 
46 69 31 35 11.840 0.46 12 
Overtime Is beneficial to the U. K. economy 
15 26 28 31 12.178 0.43 12 
Capital Investment would reduce future overtime levels 
36 46 36 19 22.339 0.03 12 
New technology would reduce future overtime levels 
56 56 46 19 41.671 0.00 12 
Increasing productivity would reduce future overtime levels 
61 59 49 38 21.235 0.05 12 
Overtime helps recruitment, retention and motivation 
45 54 54 58 17.898 0.12 12 
Overtime causes Industrial relations problems 
45 39 15 8 25.625 0.01 12 
Systematic overtime should be eliminated 
69 64 36 57 28.026 0.01 12 
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APPENDIX 7-5 (Continued 10 of 10) 
Independent Variable Statistic 1 
Dependent Amount Of Overtime 
Variable Nil <5 5-9.9 10+ Chi-Square 
%%%% Pearson's r. 
Significance Degrees of 
Freedom 
SELECTED FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF OVERTIME WORKING 
Respondent's agreed or strongly agreed that the following factors make overtime a lower 
cost option than hiring new employees, based on Manual overtime... 
Training and 60 73 59 65 15.129 0.232 12 
Induction costs 
Fringe benefit costs 47 58 53 60 18.072 0.112 12 
(sick scheme, pensions, etc. ) 
Employer's NIC 56 50 56 67 18.294 0.112 12 
Lay-off costs or 38 49 39 55 19.440 (). 082 12 
redundancy 
Notes 
1 These statistics are drawn from joint distribution tables and give the test of correlation for the whole table, 
not just the key result which is intended to give the essence of the table. 
2 No statistically significant difference was found. 
General note: It Is essential to refer to the exact terms of the question asked In interpreting 
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APPENDIX 8-2 
CASE NUMBER 1 
Type of Organisation Police Force A 
Location South-East/Midlands 
Number of Employees 1060 Police and 490 Civilians 
Sector Public Administration, Police 
Service (SIC 1980,913) 
OUTLINE: 
An English Non-Metropolitan Police Force, which has reduced overtime by more than 
50%, simply by the management decision to cut the overtime budget. 
SUMMARY 
The essence of this case was that the primary requirement for overtime reduction, may simply be 
senior management determination to achieve the reduction. Overtime in the Police Force is in 
many ways not relevant to overtime in other sectors. Nevertheless, there area number of general 
lessons to be obtained from the police case studies. 
This and the other Police Force studies were focused on serving Police Officers rather than 
civilians who work very little overtime. Force A has cut overtime from a level around 17% of basic 
salaries and NI in the early 1980s, to 7% last year. the overtime budget has been cut by 26.5% in 
real terms over the last three years. Detection rates have improved over the same period but 
there is no evidence to link corporate objective achievement with levels of overtime. 
The cut in overtime was achieved through a specific management initiative, promulgated by the 
Chief Constable, with the objective of providing funds to employ more officers. 
The mechanism used to cut overtime was simply the decision to cut the overtime budget and to 
control overtime tightly to that budget. No other substantive changes, (le. working methods, 
training, working time structures, payment systems, etc. ), were made to facilitate the overtime 
reduction. 
Middle management and the workforce made efforts to resist the reduction of overtime, but have 
been unsuccessful In the face of senior management determination. 
All officers accept overtime as part of their job. About two thirds of Police Officers would like 
more overtime to be available, the motivations for this being the extra pay and increased job 
satisfaction. 
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Many officers, however, find that their performance is denigrated by excessive hours. There is a 
problem of excessive sickness which is associated with increasing stress in the job and the 
unsocial hours, and is exacerbated by overtime working. 
There was little general direct involvement in the use of overtime from the Police Federation, (in 
effect, the Police 'trade union'). There was, however, a major exception to this, the 
Superintendent's Association', On effect, middle management), had attempted to resist any further 
reduction of overtime. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS CASE 
A* The corporate strategy of a clear and determined decision to cut overtime and to maintain 
pressure on budgets to hold overtime at the lower level was remarkably successful. 
B* There Is no evidence, either from the Force-level statistics, or at the level of the individual 
officer, that the reduction of overtime has in any way impeded the effectiveness of the 
organisation. 
* There Is no clear evidence of any fundamental link between overtime hours and staffing 
levels. Some officers believe that overtime should increase pro-rata with any manpower 
Increases. It Is argued that demand so outstrips the potential supply of man hours, and 
operational needs are so great, that each new officer would effectively bring with him his 
own overtime 'quota'. However, the Chief Constable does not entirely subscribe to this 
analysis and is continuing a policy of moving funds from the overtime budget to recruit 
more officers. Irrespective of the theoretical arguments, the clear pragmatic effect of this 
policy is'less overtime, more employment'. 
* Paid overtime in Force A, after the recent reductions, remains equivalent to 112 full time 
officers. Managers tend to consider paid overtime as the total overtime. However, total 
overtime is 43% higher than the paid overtime. 
C* The 'overtime decision' at the corporate level was carefully and professionally considered. 
However, at the operational level, there was little understanding or consideration of the 
cost and consequences of overtime working, it was seen simply as a convenient tool. 
* There were sound and properly applied management systems in place for the control of 
that overtime which is worked. Without these controls it would have been more difficult 
to reduce overtime and to maintain the lower overtime levels. 
* There is considerable evidence that the use of overtime is associated with poor 
management, for instance the tendency to mis-perceive the real reasons overtime is being 
used; the 'use all we can get' philosophy; an inability to schedule ahead sufficiently to 
cover anticipated events; the fact that overtime tends to be budget, rather than 
operationally driven, etc. 
*A number of alternatives to overtime working have been considered at corporate level. 
However, there is no simple equation for the exchange of overtime hours with additional 
bought-in hours, in the particular circumstances of the Police Force. 
D* About 75% of the overtime was systematic, In that it was predictable and often pre- 
planned and avoidable, given the necessary resources. 
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E* Overtime was largely used to deal with work which could be anticipated and controlled 
within normal hours, given professional scheduling and control of the workload. 
Managers within the Force mis-perceived the real uses (reasons) for overtime. 
F* About 25% of overtime was used to give operational flexibility. The major proportion of 
overtime, however, does not enhance operational flexibility. 
* Overtime had no impact on corporate flexibility in the context intended In hypothesis H7. 
G* Lower and middle management resisted reductions in overtime levels and changes in 
practices such as the recent more rigorous formal control procedures. 
* It Is difficult to generalise about officer attitudes to overtime working. About 50% would 
like more, 30% are happy with current levels and 20% resist overtime. These attitudes 
follow the commonly perceived norms of younger male officers, with family 
responsibilities, tending to actively seek more overtime; while older and female officers 
tend to avoid overtime. However, there are a wide number of exceptions to this rule. 
For Instance, a middle aged CID officer, seeking long hours, but not for financial reasons; 
or an older, senior ranking officer, who'puts In the hours' because he believes this will 
enable him to do a better job. 
H* Overtime Is correctly perceived by officers and management ranks as more cost effective 
than Increasing police strength. The balance between the fundamental variables is: 52% 
to 64% of basic pay; premium cost of overtime hours to the non-wage labour cost of 
hiring new staff respectively. 
* Overtime often causes a fall In the effectiveness of Individual officers, although this is not 
generally recognised by management. 
* TOIL accounts for about 25 % of overtime, equivalent to 28 full time jobs In the Force. 
TOIL was often used by officers as a means of avoiding capture by the'excessive paid 
overtime' control system. Women officers and older officers have a greater tendency to 
use TOIL, without the ulterior motive described above. 
* There is a significant amount of unpaid overtime, generally worked by the higher ranking 
officers, but with some also worked by dedicated officers, particularly in CID. 
* Police Officers are able to, and on occasions do, 'create' overtime. 
* Overtime is claimed by individual officers to be a cause of casual absenteeism. However, 
the statistics show absenteeism to have increased as overtime has declined. There was 
no set pattern, at the individual level, with some high overtime workers exhibiting low 
absenteeism while others exhibit high absenteeism. 
* Local Federation officials have not given any lead on the use of overtime, nor have the 
local officials received any guidance from their central organisation. 
* The Superintendents' Association are actively resisting any further reduction of overtime. 
* Overtime working, along with the unsocial hours of the shift system, adversely affect the 
quality of life for Police Officers, in some cases, to a very great degree. Welfare is an area 
of Increasing concern In all Police Forces. It was clear that the less the notice to work 
overtime, the greater Its disruptive effect on the individual's private life. 
* Pay levels were excellent. It was clear that only a very few, generally younger male 
officers with family responsibilities, relied on their overtime earnings for their fixed financial 
commitments, and this was usually a transitory phase. 
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BRIEF METHODOLOGY 
Twenty nine serving officers were Interviewed, covering a representative range of: ranks, (from 
Chief Constable to probationer), both men and women officers, urban and rural posts and the key 
functional areas of patrol, CID, traffic, etc. In addition, 4 civilian staff were interviewed, covering 
the administration and welfare administration functions. A wide range of documentary evidence 
was collected and analysed, much of which was confidential In nature, and therefore is referred to 
only in general terms in this thesis. 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE & STATISTICS 
Force A employs about 1060 Police Officers within 5 divisions and 490 civilians and Traffic 
Wardens. Staff costs represent 83% of the total force expenditure. The establishment has 
increased by about 3% per year over recent years, but was static during the mid 1980s. The 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, (CIPFA Police Statistics Estimates 1989), 
give the statistics below. 
Interestingly, Force A had the lowest level of staffing, relative to authorised establishment, of all 
Forces, with a 97.9% actual strength. This is one of the factors which has led the Chief Constable 
to adopt a policy of reducing overtime, in order to release funds to employ more staff, and In 
future years, to obtain capital equipment and increase training. 
The civilian staff, as In other forces, work very little overtime, amounting to only £8350 during the 
last year. It has been recognised that the relative cost of employing civilians Is only about half 
that of employing a Police Officer for the same duties (Department of the Environment Audit 
Inspectorate 1983). It has been the policy of this force, therefore, to civilianise as many jobs as 
possible, In order to Improve efficiency, recruit specialist skills, (for Instance computer 
programming), and to release more officers for operational duties. Civilian staff over the three 
years to 1989 grew from 437 to 477. 
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The Non-Metropolitan Force's 
Category Force Average Position Out 
Of 35 
Overtime: 
(£ per Police Officer) 962 1006 19th 
(£ per 1000 population) 1867 2048 20th 
Training: 
(£ per Police Officer) 193 491 31st 
(£ per 1000 population) 375 1026 31st 
The basis of the statistics below i s: per 1000 population 
Net total expenditure 26,686 27,697 11th 
Road accidents (injury) 4.6 4.2 Jnt 7th 
Traffic offences 50.7 41.6 5th 
Persons proceeded against 
(non-indictable offences) 35.1 27.4 3rd 
Fixed penalty tickets 103.6 70.1 3rd 
Breath tests 2.2 5.2 jnt 30th 
Reported offences 75.3 59.8 4th 
Police overtime has been reduced, over the last decade, from relatively high levels to average 

















































1176 15.3 - 8.0 
1057 17.0 - 8.8 
802 17.3 25379 9.1 
It is difficult to establish any viable measure of corporate success for the organisation. Recorded 
crime has been Increasing at about 4% per year over the last decade. There Is no correlation 
whatsoever between levels of overtime and either recorded crime rates, or detection rates. The 
detection rate for recorded crime has Improved over the last three years, from 28.6% to 38.5%, but 
this Is still historically low compared to the 47.3% achieved ten years ago. 
In addition to the regular force, there is a small Special Constabulary which comprised 137 officers 
In 1988. The strength of the Specials has been falling over recent years. The Specials give 
support to the Regular Force by carrying out street patrols, duties at fetes and shows, shopping 
centre patrols and assisting with football match crowd control. 
DEMAND PATTERNS 
There Is a steady weekly demand pattern which sees peaks of 'demand' for police cover at 
predictable times such as 10pm Fridays to 2am Saturday mornings. There are also fairly 
predictable event-driven peaks, such as fetes, football matches, VIP visits. In addition, there are 
planned police Initiatives. Of course, there are unpredictable events which give peaks of demand. 
For Instance, serious public order events such as acid-house parties, major incidents. It Is difficult 
to estimate the 'size' of these various predictable and unpredictable events in relation to the 
underlying workload, but they are estimated to be In the region of 10% for the predictable peaks 
and 3% for the unpredictable peaks. 
LABOUR MARKET 
There are no current difficulties in recruiting suitable constables to Force A. It is anticipated, 
however, that the fall in school leavers up to 1995 (DOE 1988A) will make recruitment more 
difficult in the future. 
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HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Formal manpower plans exist and are used to drive the recruitment, training and development of 
Police Officers. A Force Welfare Officer is responsible for giving support and practical assistance 
to serving officers. 
Officers up to the rank of Chief Inspector are represented by the Police Federation, who are 
actively involved in all aspects of conditions of service. A number of senior officers believe that 
the Federation pursue a policy of resisting police overtime, but this was not found to be the case. 
The Federation, from the centre, have over the last five years given no guidance regarding the use 
of overtime and, according to their full time officials, do not promote any particular policy 
regarding the use of overtime. The local Federation Secretary was not aware of any publication 
or notice relating to the use of overtime, emanating from the Federation. The Federation 'manual' 
gives only the Police Regulations regarding the use of overtime. Clearly the Federation were 
happy to leave the control of overtime to the Police Authority. 
The age and service profiles, as at January 1989, are set out below and include supernumerary 
posts. 
AGE PROFILE SERVICE PROFILE 
Age (years) Total Staff Service (years) Total Staff 
18.5-25 177 0-2 126 
26-30 236 2-5 109 
31-35 189 5-10 256 
36-40 158 10 -15 235 
41-45 165 15 - 20 123 
46-50 85 20 - 25 114 
over 50 39 25 - 30 80 
over 30 6 
Days lost through sickness have been Increasing over a number of years and at any one time, 
there are now, on average, 60 officers absent from duty through sickness; the statistics are set out 
below. Given the age profile, Industrial comparisons and the high level of medical retirements, 
this level of sickness is rather high. There are Incidents of injuries received during the course of 
duty, but these are Insignificant in relation to the overall level of sickness. For Instance, in 1988 
only 408 days were lost due to assaults on Police, representing 2.7% of total sickness. 
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DAYS LOST THROUGH SICKNESS 
Year Establishment Days lost Days lost 
per officer 
1980 917 7883 8.6 
1981 957 7581 7.9 
1982 969 9131 10.6 
1983 980 11200 11.4 
1984 1000 11369 11.4 
1985 1000 13192 13.2 
1986 1000 14507 14.5 
1987 1000 12334 12.3 
1988 1030 14814 14.4 
Pay levels are very good compared to the labour market in general and this results to a great 
extent from the Edmund Davies Enquiry which improved conditions of service for Police Officers 
and effectively'Indexed' police pay. Gross weekly earnings were on average £297.40 (April 1988) 
for ranks below superintendent (NES 1989). Overtime pay, as a percentage of gross weekly 
earnings, for those officers who worked overtime during the pay period, was on average 16.1 % of 
gross pay, for all UK Police Forces. 
The Federation, at their 1979 conference, adopted a resolution to reduce the working week to 36 
hours. No progress had been made and no action Is currently being taken In Force A on this 
matter. The Federation do act, from time to time, to deal with overtime related matters, but these 
Incidents are Infrequent and most often relate to officers wanting to secure more overtime. 
The Superintendent's Association, which essentially represents the 'middle management' of the 
Police Force, did not hold any formal views or policies regarding the use of overtime in the Force 
up to 1988, although some senior officers felt they would like a free hand to use more overtime in 
order to Improve operational use this as a management tool to flexibility and make their job easier. 
Many middle and lower level managers also feel they need to motivate their officers and find it 
easier to 'give way' to pressures than to resist them, and the major pressure was still for more 
overtime. In August 1988 the Association wrote to the Chief Constable In the following terms: 
'There was unanimous agreement that you be advised that the Association does not support any 
further Increase in regular or civilian establishments at the cost of a reduction in the overtime 
budget. ' 
STRUCTURE OF WORKING TIME 
Working hours and pay are strictly controlled by Police Regulations (1979) which govern all 
Forces. Police Officers normally work a standard 3 shift system: 6-2,2-10 and 10-6am. 
A number of regular events and demand peaks are, by design, covered by overtime. For 
instance, football crowd control and Friday and Saturday night Operational Support Units (OSUs), 
which comprise a sergeant and 3 or 4 PCs on overtime from 1 0pm to 2 or 3am. 
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OVERTIME LEVELS AND TOIL 
The levels of overtime working discussed below are restricted to hours paid at premium rates only. 
Notwithstanding this, a substantial amount of hours are taken as time off In lieu, (TOIL), and also 
as unpaid overtime. Average paid overtime across Force A stood at about 5% of basic hours, 
representing about 7% of basic pay. This statistic, however, disguises the unequal distribution of 
overtime, with some sections and some officers working very long hours while others work little or 
no overtime. The distribution of overtime hours is given below for a number of typical months 
across the year. 
HOURS OVERTIME WORKED 
DIVISION Mar'89 Feb'89 Oct'88 Sept'88 Aug'88 May'88 
A 1627 1048 348 400 560 662 
B 1800 1914 1531 1814 1776 2048 
C 6846 4158 4630 3647 3759 4352 
D 4461 3543 3283 2556 2110 3827 
E 3044 2359 1109 1696 1905 2140 
TOTALS 17778 13022 10901 10113 10110 13029 
Analysis of the overtime records by individual officer within 'B' Division, covering the first half of 
1989, revealed a number of interesting points which are covered below. 
THE USE OF OVERTIME IN ONE DIVISION 
Area 
CID 
All uniformed officers12.4 
Women officers 
'B' Division overall ave. 14.4 
24.2 
8.3 
CID worked on average almost double the overtime worked by uniformed officers. It was also 
found that women Police Officers worked less overtime than their male counterparts. 
Average monthly 
overtime (hours) 
These averages concealed a great degree of variability between individual officers. The same 
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Individuals, in the same departments, meeting the same operational requirements, tended to work 
consistently longer overtime hours each month. For instance, some officers averaged 45 hours 
per month, while others worked only 4 hours per month, over the period covered. 
Records of levels of TOIL and unpaid overtime were not formally reported and analysed. Thus the 
following estimates are based on evidence gathered from Interviews rather than documentary 
evidence. About a quarter of total overtime was taken as TOIL and about 5% of overtime Is 
estimated to be unpaid, 'working late'. Thus 70% of overtime Is remunerated premium rates of 
pay. Total overtime levels are therefore 43% above the total hours officially recorded as paid 
overtime In Force A. 
Some groups tend to take TOIL more often, and some never take TOIL, preferring the money. 
Interestingly, the interviews revealed that WPCs and older officers tend to use TOIL more than the 
average, and younger married officers prefer to be paid for their overtime. 
Typical examples Included one PC in his late 40s, with a keen interest in the countryside, always 
took overtime as TOIL, In order to pursue his interests. While another PC, in his mid 20's, married 
with children, always took the money and actually sought overtime, in order to help with his 
mortgage. A WPC stated that she avoided overtime and always took TOIL, (apart from bank 
holiday overtime which attracts a double-time premium), because: 'the tax man gets most of the 
extra money' and her husband worries that she gets 'really tired and Irritable after long hours of 
work'. A probationer WPC stated that she had joined Force A'with her eyes open' regarding 
overtime, but had resolved to take it 'on the card' (viz. as TOIL) so that she could continue'enjoy a 
social life'. 
OVERTIME PREMIA AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Overtime Is governed by Police Regulations and must be remunerated by either premia or TOIL 
All Police Officers up to the rank of chief Inspector are entitled to overtime pay. The individual 
officer can, within certain limitations, elect for either pay or TOIL There Is some evidence that the 
regulations are 'Interpreted' In that officers are sometimes 'required' by senior officers to take 
overtime as TOIL or not at all when, for Instance, 'the budget Is running tight'. 
Overtime premia is time-and-a-third for extended duty overtime, time-and-a-half for rest day 
working and double-time for public holidays and holiday working. There are, however, 
exceptions to these rates. For Instance, certain notice periods must be observed, and where 
these are not. additional premla; (and, possibly, TOIL as well) must be given. 
Where TOIL Is taken, the standard premium rates equate to the time off earned, I. e. TOIL taken for 
public holiday working would be at the rate of two days for each day worked. 
OVERTIME MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Formal overtime management systems were to place and rigorously applied as is usually the case 
In public bodies. These were based on a structured budgeting system, covering not only 
divisions, but departments within divisions. Budgets are monitored on a weekly basis. Sub 
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divisions are expected to manage their overtime within their budget provisions. There was 
certainly a tendency for each area to 'use-up' their allocated overtime. If an area overspends its 
overtime budget, there is pressure for that area to claw-back the overspend In subsequent 
periods, In order to'balance-the-books' for the end of year accounts. Indeed, the lack of overtime 
at the end of the year causes great frustration to officers, who cause dislike the unpredictability of 
the periodic withdrawal of overtime. 
Many senior officers stated that if they could get more overtime, they would find a use for it. In 
other areas, where overtime has been well husbanded over the year, overtime hours are released 
in the final two months and special jobs can be undertaken to'mop-up' the overtime before the 
new budget year. For instance, a car park surveillance exercise was funded in this way in 1988-9. 
The senior officer who gave this example went on to describe the problems he had in weaning his 
officers back off the higher levels of overtime in the new financial year. Thus there is ample 
evidence that overtime is, to some degree, 'budget driven' rather driven by operational need. 
The overall overtime budgetary provision is decided annually and this Is allocated to the divisions 
and an amount is retained at the centre for 'special incidents' at the start of the financial year. 
Each Division makes bids for the 'special incidents' overtime provision as needs arise. For 
instance, an acid house party, necessitating a large number of officers at short notice, qualified for 
300 hours overtime from this provision. 
Overtime is authorised at specified management levels and there are well developed formal 
overtime usage reporting procedures which culminate in a monthly report to the Chief Constable. 
Overtime Is allocated through a volunteer system and, if necessary, can be enforced by 
management. Mandatary overtime is, however, infrequently applied, but is a necessary 
management facility and Is achieved generally by drawing names from a hat. All the Police 
Officers Interviewed accepted this as part of their job. An officer who Is asked to work overtime 
but wishes to avoid this can generally arrange for a colleague to take the duty. 
Overtime records are regularly reviewed and high overtime claims are passed to a senior officer 
for investigation. This leads to high overtime levels being queried and Investigated and 'offending' 
officers being subjected to 'extra supervisory attention In the Immediate future'. This activity does 
not cover the incidence of TOIL A review of the memos regarding this control revealed that the 
same names were regularly coming forward for'excessive overtime claims'. 
The single key element which has enabled overtime to be reduced from 17% to 7% of basic pay is 
recognised by the Chief constable and all officers as the simple management decision to cut it by 
cutting the overtime budget. There have been no fundamental changes in working time systems 
or methods of working. 
UNPAID OVERTIME 
There is a considerable amount of unpaid overtime among officers of the rank of superintendent 
and above. Indeed the lack of unpaid overtime would be quite unusual. There Is little In the 
lower ranks, with the exception of the Drugs Squad which Is said to be particularly dedicated and 
Is estimated to claim only 60% of their extra hours. This results from the culture of long hours 
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which officers previously experienced and the pride which is taken in this particular job. 
REASONS FOR OVERTIME 
The reason given by interviewees for overtime was overwhelmingly that of operational necessity or 
flexibility. This assertion was, however, not supported by the evidence. There was a clear link 
between budget availability and overtime. It was clear that overtime would expand to absorb the 
budget provision available. That is not to say that the overtime did not enable a more work to be 
carried out. There was no evidence, based on the macro level statistics, that reducing overtime 
has reduced the effectiveness of Force A In any way. 
The evidence of the same officers always working high overtime, while others always work little or 
no overtime, at best indicates that overtime was systematic. 
There is a tendency for overtime to be used in a systematic manner, to provide cover for 
predictable events. For instance, bank holidays and the Friday and Saturday night OSUs are 
manned on an overtime basis as, to some extent, are prisoner escort duties, football matches and 
fetes. This is known as'planned overtime'. Another arguably systematic use of overtime is to 
cover manpower shortages which are to a great degree, predictable. For instance, to provide 
cover for officers on training courses, sickness or leave, in which event overtime is used to 
maintain minimum manning levels. Some officers made reference to overtime resulting from 'very 
poor scheduling' of such events, which would associate overtime with poor management. 
There is, of course, a proportion of overtime which is needed for unprogrammed operational 
requirements. There will always be incidents where, due to the nature of the job, overtime is 
unavoidable. The classic 'extended duty' or operational overtime requirement arises when an 
arrest Is made near the end of the shift. (The officers' ability to 'control' this ostensibly 
'operational' overtime is discussed later in this case report. ) This gives rise to the need for the 
officer to process the suspect in overtime hours. Some officers believe that the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act has increased the need for this kind of overtime, since suspects can not be 
left in the cells to be processed during the next shift. It would also often be a false economy to 
hand-over a suspect to another officer for processing. This might require two officers to attend 
court with the consequential 'knock-on' effects on overtime requirements for the court duty. 
Indeed, overtime is frequently used to facilitate officer attendance at court, particularly the Crown 
Court, which, it was claimed, was less sensitive to the police's overtime budget than the 
Magistrates Court, In fixing times for officer's court appearances. It is interesting to note that, of 
the appearances analysed, the officers were, in the event, 'not required', on half the occasions 
they attended County Court and the notice given for officers to attend Crown Court was often only 
a few days, therefore incurring high overtime or TOIL payments. Over the period January to July 
1989 the following statistics were recorded, for CID officers only, which clearly Illustrates the 
significance of court appearances on overtime working: 
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OVERTIME HOURS 
Type of overtime Crown Court Magistrates Court Total 
Extended duty 188.5 71.0 259.5 
Rest day working 239.5 25.5 265.0 
Total 428.0 96.5 524.5 
Analysis showed that overtime was used in the following circumstances: 29% major'special' 
incidents; 23% public holidays and 48% for normal operational flexibility. Overtime was greater 
among CID officers and they tended to work most overtime during Saturdays, since, as one said 
'this is the time I am off work, but most often needed at work'. 
Overtime budget overspending tends to be focused on the CID and perhaps the following 
example will explain the reasons for both this and the operational requirement for'some' overtime 
in the Police Force. A Detective Inspector explained how he had worked '50 or 60' hours 
overtime per month over the last few months. On the 22 May 1989 he was called from his bed at 
3am to attend a murder enquiry at the scene of an armed robbery. He 'put In 17 hours overtime 
on the first day alone'. 
This raises questions about the effectiveness of the time spent on subsequent days when this 
middle-aged officer stated that he became 'very tired'. Particularly since most murders are solved 
in the Initial three days of the Investigation. This officer 'takes care to balance' his claims between 
paid overtime and TOIL, In order to avoid coming under scrutiny for excessive overtime; (records 
of TOIL are not monitored in the same way as paid overtime), TOIL was generally taken as'golfing 
days'. Interestingly, this officer was used by some colleagues as an exemplar of the dedicated 
officer who had to be 'shoved out of the office and told to go home', and by other colleagues as 
the archetypal 'overtime glutton'. It was clear from the Interview that this officer was totally 
dedicated to his job. 
QUALITY OF LIFE AND WELFARE 
Long hours are part of the culture of police life. As one senior officer put It: 'there are many 
officers who genuinely enjoy the work, it Is their preferred way of life, and not just a job, 
particularly those working In CID'. Many officers, however, believed that this was becoming 'old 
fashioned' and that Increased job stress was changing attitudes. Welfare Is seen by many senior 
officers as an area of Increasing Importance in the Force. 
Long hours of work were seen by most officers as destructive towards family life and personal 
relationships. Most were able to give specific examples of difficulties caused in this respect and 
three officers quoted overtime as the key cause of marriage break-ups, one senior officer stated 
that 'overtime' had been specifically cited in his wife's divorce petition. However, the most 
common irritant was simply that of unexpectedly missing prepared meals. All interviewees 
thought that the less the notice for overtime, the more disruptive its effect on their personal lives. 
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Overtime was also said by some officers to cause a fall-off in their performance, particular when 
the overtime followed a late shift, to be followed by early shifts, an event which often occurred due 
to the shift patterns. One officer, a WPC, stated how she was at a very 'low ebb' following a 
period of long hours over a weekend, and how she was aware that she achieved very little of value 
for a few days following such extended hours. Eight interviewees gave specific examples, for 
themselves and their colleagues, of how unsocial hours, long hours and uncertain hours, against 
the backdrop of increasing stress in the job, induce casual sickness. A number of accounts were 
heard of early retirement, Induced by this syndrome. 
Undoubtedly the key factor which depresses the quality of 'non-work' life for the Police Officer is 
the shift system. The Chief Constable is looking at ways to change this system for the benefit of 
his officers and also to improve the match between capacity to demand. The German system of 
'contact policeman', established in a community to patrol and maintain contact, on a trust basis 
with no fixed hours, was also highlighted for possible consideration, as was the 'Ottowa' shift 
system. 
ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS 
One senior officer referred graphically to 'overtime gluttons', another to 'overtime grabbers'. The 
former officer went on to describe such individuals as: 'cute, perfectly laudable and well managed, 
but strange how they always manage to make an arrest at the end of their is shift', and to say it 
was: 'strange how Its always the same officers who book the high levels of overtime'. 
This was a theme which ran through many of the interviews. About 55% of officers want more 
overtime, 35% are happy with current levels and only 10% would prefer to curtail overtime. Most 
senior officers, and middle managers, want more overtime to enhance operational flexibility. Only 
3 of the interviewees thought overtime should be further reduced, even though seven 
management interviewees had thought that overtime should not have been reduced previously, 
but had come to accept the efficacy of the reduction and now wanted overtime to remain at the 
new lower levels. Many senior officers were unaware that the Chief Constable intended to further 
reduce overtime over the next year. On the contrary, some were hopeful that overtime would be 
increased, (see also the Superintendent's Association letter, mentioned earlier in this case, calling 
'unanimously' for overtime protection). 
The Federation do not meet problems of complaint about too much overtime, but do from time to 
time meet difficulties of officers wanting more overtime. These incidents are, however, becoming 
less frequent, the Federation believe, for three reasons, viz: 
i) Because officers are becoming accustomed to the lower overtime levels; 
ii) Pay has continuously improved, due to the Edmund Davies Enquiry; 
III) Increasing stress in the Job is depressing the demand for additional hours. 
Most staff, particularly at the lower levels, supported the simplistic link between more staff/less 
overtime and a shorter working week/more overtime. Most officers felt that the Federation would 
resist the reduction of overtime on their behalf, although management perceived the Federation as 
resisting overtime. 
311 
MORE OFFICERS, LESS OVERTIME? 
The question of more overtime/less officers or more officers/less overtime, Is not at all clear. 
Many senior officers believe that, with only about half of the total crime being reported, low clear- 
up rates and an apparent expansion of crime almost year on year, there is effectively an endless 
demand. The Chief Constable stated that overtime would not be eradicated, even if he had 
'unlimited manpower'. As one senior officer theorised, if the establishment were to be Increased 
by, for Instance, 25% overnight, the new Police Officers would each bring with them their own 
overtime needs. Thus Increasing the workforce would have the effect of increasing the overtime 
requirement, not reducing it. Indeed, senior managers In this force explained that they have in the 
past increased overtime budgetary allowances pro-rata with Increasing staff. 
The Chief Constable, however, does not subscribe to this analysis and has pursued a3 year 
corporate plan to reduce the overtime budget, and tighten budgetary and overtime controls, in 
order to release funds to take on more recruits. The Chief Constable is indeed supported by the 
local Federation officials in this initiative. This Is the reason why overtime has fallen In Force A 
over recent years. Many of the senior and middle ranking officers had been sceptical about this 
move, but all now agreed that overtime levels have been cut in half with no fundamental problems, 
if a few minor irritations. 
There is a considerable risk that, without constant management pressure to secure the lower 
overtime levels, these would creep up again; indeed, divisions are often 'pushing the system' by 
overspending the monthly overtime budgetary limits. 
Equivalent manpower is usually taken as 1522 hours per year for overtime conversion 
(Department of the Environment Audit Inspectorate 1983). Thus the current levels of paid 
overtime in this force equate to 112 full time officer equivalents and overtime taken as TOIL Is 
equivalent to 28 full time officer equivalents. It would be inappropriate to attempt to totally 
eradicate overtime In the Police Force, in current circumstances. However, there is potential for 
further reductions In overtime in this force, judging from case studies conducted in other forces, 
where overtime has typically been only 50% of the level currently within this force. Such a 
reduction would release hours for 70 additional officers and funds for an increase of almost 80 
officers. 
The financial analysis of the overtime vs. additional officers is extremely complex. Factors such 
as: training; holiday, sickness and absenteeism and fringe benefit costs, all mitigate in favour of 
overtime. On the other hand, costs which fall against the use of overtime include: overtime 
premium rates; improved efficiency of working fewer hours, (including the avoidance of overtime 
manipulation by officers). Moreover, since society has to meet the cost of the Police Force, as 
well as social security, the net benefits of reduced unemployment must count in full against the 
decision to work overtime In this public service. 
Many senior officers firmly believe that overtime is more cost effective than employing additional 
Police Officers. For Instance, one comment has been'it costs much less to employ Police 
Officers at overtime rates than at basic rates because rent allowance, pension costs, etc, relate 
only to basic pay'. Indeed, the hourly cost of police overtime Is effectively lower than that 
indicated by the premium since the fringe benefits only relate to the basic pay element. The fringe 
312 
costs amount to 65% of total basic pay, while overtime premiums, on average, amount to 52.7% of 
basic pay. There is also the effect of TOIL which, in so far as it gives a positive impact on 
flexibility and efficiency, falls in favour of the use of overtime. 
MANIPULATION OF WORKING HOURS 
Most officers felt that, given the opportunity, some officers manipulate their work in order to 
generate overtime. It was thought, however, that the recent initiatives to reduce and tightly 
control overtime to budget were curtailing this manipulation. Most officers were able to relate 
various means by which'an officer' could generate overtime, and some of the means were much 
more subtle than the 'classic' timing of an arrest. 
A typical example of manipulation was given as a traffic crew which purposely sets out to make a 
breathalyser arrest just before the end of their shift, and thereby secure overtime, (incidentally, on 
pre-agreed times and days during the shift cycle). Nine of those interviewed admitted having 
generated overtime at some time during their careers In the police, six stated they had not, others 
declined to comment or were not asked. 
LOW PAY DEPENDENCY 
Police Officers now enjoy a relatively good salary and with the provision of police houses or rent 
allowance, few fall victim to the overtime pay dependency syndrome. During the study period, 
average gross weekly pay for Police Officers below the rank of superintendent was £276, against 
the average of £218 for all Industries and services. Indeed, the Police were second only to the 
newspaper printing and electronic data processing trades In this respect (NES 1988). 
Nevertheless, the overtime pay dependency syndrome is not unknown In the Police Force. For 
instance, one PC, 24 years old and married with a6 month old baby, explained he had a mortgage 
of £480 per month and a flat rate take home pay of £780 per month. This take-home wage was 
normally boosted to £950 through overtime working. He did not take TOIL and he actively sought 
out overtime by volunteering for extra duties, for instance, Saturday football control and OSU 
duties on Friday and Saturday nights. There was an association between overtime and lower 
levels of pay In that younger officers, who need the extra money, tend to 'seek out' overtime. 
It Is not unknown for an officer to fall into financial difficulties and this is one of the major reasons 
for police welfare Involvement. It was claimed that younger officers sometimes 'moonlight', (hold 
second jobs), In order to obtain more money. Jobs such as ice cream selling, bar work, taxi 
driving, driving Instructing and lorry driving were quoted and specific examples were cited. 
However, although some interviewees had previously 'moonlighted', none of the Interviewees 
were currently Involved in moonlighting. 
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APPENDIX 8-3 
CASE NUMBER 5 
Type of Organisation Mail order books and 
computer software 
Location West Midlands 
Number of Employees 1277 
Sector Retail distribution 
Service (SIC 1980,653-656) 
OUTLINE: 
A progressive company successfully seeking to manage variable demand and, at the 
same time, to reduce and control overtime, in a tight local labour market. 
SUMMARY 
The Company has experienced turnover growth at 15% per year, annual seasonal demand peaks 
of 40% above average load. There Is a high profile union presence at the operational level, and a 
rapid change in operational methods and technology. In order to Improve response time and 
accuracy, and to reduce unit costs. 
Overtime has been reduced in all areas, from high levels, to now stand well below the industry 
average. This has been achieved through a complex and wide ranging innovative management 
programme. The processes involved include: increasing productivity; new shift systems; 
temporary contracts; labour-displacing capital investment; Industrial engineering; and a concerted 
effort to improve management controls. 
There remain, however, a number of departments where senior management consider overtime is 
still excessive and systematic. Moreover, management believe that there are latent pressures for 
overtime to increase in the future, In response to a tightening local labour market. 
The organisation continue to seek solutions for the problems of: demand variability; profit 
Improvement and tight labour market. They particularly wish to further control and reduce 
overtime levels. In addition to their current initiatives, management Intend to consider Innovative 
alternatives for the more effective supply of capacity, without resort to overtime. These include: 
annual hours contracts; geographical relocation of some operations and new payment policies to 
secure Improved recruitment, retention and motivation, and controlled unit costs. 
The reduction of overtime has been achieved against a difficult backcloth of rapidly changing and 
increasing demand, significant and increasing skill shortages at all levels and a well organised 
workforce in which the predominant pressure was to resist any reduction in overtime levels. 
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The key to the success in reducing overtime lies in a management team, with a clear and well 
communicated objective, and the courage to seek out and implement innovative solutions. The 
main evidence from this case study regarding the research questions and hypotheses is 
summarised below. 
POINTS ARISING FROM THIS CASE 
A*A complex and Innovative strategy for the structuring of working time and capital and 
Industrial engineering investment has achieved a successful reduction of overtime. The 
support of a clear, determined and well communicated management policy has facilitated 
this success. 
B* The achievement of corporate objectives does not appear to have been adversely 
affected by the reduction of overtime. Increasing demand has been met and unit labour 
cost, as a percentage of turnover, has fallen from 15% to 13.5%. 
* The reduction of overtime has had a direct job creation impact, although it is not possible 
to accurately estimate the number of jobs created or the 'conversion rate'. 
C* No financial analysis of the overtime decision had been conducted and senior managers 
were unaware of the actual cost of overtime working. 
* The management of that overtime which was worked was sound, with established and 
rigorously applied procedures. The decision between overtime and the potential 
alternatives was professionally driven from the most senior management level, and 
controlled tightly within formal and professional manpower plans. 
* Many alternatives to overtime working, some of them innovative, have been considered, 
developed and Implemented with some success. 
D* About half of the overtime was systematic. The same people tend to work overtime 
during the same time slots In the weekly cycle, although this cycle was interrupted during 
the annual seasons. 
E* The reasons for the use of that overtime which was worked were correctly perceived by 
management at all levels. The key reason being seasonality of demand, which accounts 
for about 50% of the total overtime. The balance was split equally between systematic 
overtime and overtime designed to meet specific targets or to deal demand pressure 
points or unexpected demand. 
F* Insofar as dependence on overtime working had previously exposed this company to 
damaging Industrial action, overtime had reduced 'corporate flexibility'. Indeed, higher 
and more secure levels of 'corporate flexibility' have been achieved by use of temporary 
contracts and fixed term (seasonal) part-time shift working to replace overtime. 
G* Senior managers were keen to continue to reduce overtime, which they saw as costly, 
difficult to control and carrying risks from industrial action if production came to depend 
upon it, as in the past. 
* The lower level management were concerned to get more overtime, which they perceived, 
would make their job easier by increasing their flexibility to deal with day to day pressures 
and meeting worker demand. 
* Workers generally want more overtime, but there were exceptions. Manual, male and 
younger employees generally seek out overtime opportunities. Non-manual female and 
older staff, tend more often to accept what overtime is offered, or to avoid it. The same 
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ages, sex and general pay levels, exhibited different attitudes towards overtime, with 
manual staff seeking more overtime than their non-manual colleagues. The difference in 
attitude therefore, appeared to be partly cultural as well as structural. 
H* The cost of overtime premla averaged 41 % of total pay, a low figure because bonus does 
not attract premia. The non-wage labour cost of employing additional staff represents 
31% of total pay. Both middle and senior management believed, quite Incorrectly, that 
overtime was the cheaper of these options. 
* High and regular overtime, both In the past and in some circumstances currently, 
depresses productivity and quality across all working hours. It was not possible to 
quantify this phenomena, but it was clear that overtime, through this mechanism, 
Increased unit costs. 
J* TOIL was not an option for the workforce, other than in some non-manual areas, where 
flexitime allowed some flexibility in timekeeping. Management grades can Informally take 
TOIL by agreement with their own boss, but this does not happen to a significant degree. 
* Unpaid overtime was only worked by management grades, and generally only the more 
senior grades. There was a strong 'management machismo' effect In this practice. 
* There were strong feelings, and some direct evidence was found establishing that 
overtime payments to supervisors encourage overtime, or would If the opportunity were 
allowed to develop. 
* Trade union Influence at local level has, over the last five years, been minimal. There was 
no pressure to reduce overtime, but occasionally pressure to Increase It. The unions 
receive little significant support or guidance regarding overtime, from their central 
organisation. The local union organisation, some time ago, used the supply of overtime, 
upon which the Company critically depended, as a very powerful weapon against the 
Company. 
* There was no evidence that welfare was adversely affected by the current'normal' levels 
of overtime, le. one or two evenings and Saturday morning on a number of occasions 
during the year. There was, however, evidence that high levels of overtime, regularly 
worked, cause workers to suffer from fatigue which affects both their normal hours work 
and their general welfare. 
* Pay levels were relatively good at the lower end of earnings. There were few employees 
dependent on their overtime pay for fixed financial commitments. Those that were 
Identified were younger male manual workers, with family commitments and the situation 
was likely to be temporary. 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
CORPORATE STRUCTURE 
All establishments of the Company were visited over a period of three months and twenty four 
interviews were conducted, covering all levels of the management structure. 
The turnover, which now stands at £t00M, had been increasing at approximately 15% per annum, 
yielding a 10% net profit before tax and distribution. The wage bill represents 14% of turnover. 
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TOTAL WAGE WAGE BILL TEMPS INCLUDED 
YEAR TURNOVER BILL AS % OF IN WAGE BILL 
£000 £000 TURNOVER £000 
1985 62502 9125.7 14.6 177.7 
1986 71620 10840.5 15.1 256.7 
1987 76771 11401.1 14.9 287.7 
1988 87791 13321.8 15.2 430.4 
1989 103229 13970.4 13.5 579.0 
In early 1988, the Company was divested from a major U. K. retail group. Since that structural 
change there has been a high level of senior management turnover. Management structures 
were conventional, hierarchically based and essentially follow functional lines, although there was 
some product orientation at the lower levels and some matrix structuring at the highest level. 
The Company employ 1277 staff of which 850 were full time, 217 were part time and 210 have 
temporary contracts which were frequently renewed or converted to permanent contracts at term. 
These staff divide Into 1047 monthly paid and 230 weekly paid and approximately 307, (24%), 
were manual staff, being employed essentially In the warehouses. The operations were 
structured under the following three functions, employing 660,290 and 327 staff respectively: 
i) Administration of Sales and Distribution, 
(85.9% female and 5% manual staff); 
ii) Warehouse and Distribution, 
(56.5% female and 5% manual staff); 
Iii) Support Services, 
(58.1 % female and 5% manual staff). 
There were 5 sites, one being the administrative centre employing 731 staff, one the strategy and 
marketing development centre employing 176 staff, the other three comprising the main 
warehouse and despatch depot, with 257 staff, and two satellite warehouse depots employing 74 
and 39 staff. All the sites were based on the southern borders of the West Midlands, within the M4 
basin, with the exception of the marketing centre which was based in central London. 
DEMAND PATTERNS 
One measure of corporate activity level was the number of packets or parcels despatched each 
month, (subject to average contents), and this is now approaching 1 million, 98% of which were 
destined for the U. K. Demand variability was to some extent controlled by marketing initiatives 
but typically sees peaks of 1.1 million parcels pre-Christmas, with around 700,000 in the spring 
and summer slumps. 
Whilst there were times of the year when there was only very limited control of levels of demand, 
there were other times when considerable control, through the timing of marketing initiatives, was 
available to the organisation. There remains, however, an underlying seasonal pattern of 
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demand, linked to the pro Christmas period and the summer slump. The total number of parcels 
handled over recent years is set out below. 


















































The local labour market was tight across all employee grades, but particularly so within the higher 
skilled, technical -and professional grades. Salaries and wages within the Company were paid 
generally between the median and upper quartile of the local market, for the white collar and 
clerical grades and the unskilled and craft skills, including bonus (Reward 1989). The Company 
were therefore generally able to recruit and retain these grades. There is, however, some 
difficulty In lack of local competitiveness for the higher technical and professional grades. These 
were paid In the third quartile relative to local conditions (Reward 1989). Irrespective of the 
competitive position of the pay structures, there was a shortage of potential employees on the 
labour market, at all skill levels, but particularly so at the higher skill and professional levels. This 
was due to the economically and technologically buoyant nature of the M4 corridor. 
The age-profile of the staff was biased towards younger employees, particularly in the 
administration sections, reflecting the rapid growth of the Company over the last decade and the 
nature of the work. There was concern among senior managers about the Company's ability to 
recruit, retain and motivate staff, at affordable salary levels, in the future context of: further growth 
of the Company; further tightening of the labour market and the falling number of young people 
entering the market up to 1995 (DOE 1988A). Management believe that these factors will affect 
the Company in the years leading up to and following 1995, when these people would have 
presented as potential or experienced clerical employees. 
HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
Formal written manpower plans exist and were professionally maintained. SOGAT were very 
active locally and represent 100% of the manual staff within their traditional 'chapel' union 
structure. The non-manual staff were less unionised with only about 4% membership, although 
there have been recent moves from the unions to increase membership in response to what were 
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seen as threatening changes in the Company pension scheme and the senior management 
turnover. 
Staff turnover rate was running at a high level with non-manual employees at 21 % (London 30%, 
support services 16% and warehouse 8%) and manual employees at an underlying rate of about 
15% but much higher gross levels, as a result of temporary staff layoffs for capacity balancing. 
These high staff turnover rates reflect the competitive labour market where alternative jobs were 
readily available. 
Pay levels were good relative to national averages. For instance, the unskilled warehouse 
operator can expect to earn £185.86 including approximately £50.00 bonus per 36.25 hour week. 
Absenteeism levels were a little below the industry norm, standing at about 5%, reflecting the 
linkage of the substantial bonus payments to attendance. Working conditions were relatively 
good for both the warehouse and office environments. Separate rest areas were provided and 
workplaces were generally ergonomically sound. There has, however, been a history of 
tenosinovitus, (repetitive strain injury, arm tendons and wrists), within the manual packaging 
operation. There was no substantive evidence that overtime had any effect on this syndrome, 
although it was claimed, and it is reasonable to adduce, that longer hours would exacerbate the 
condition. 
STRUCTURE OF WORKING TIME 
Normal working hours had been reduced during the mid 1980s from about 40, to generally, 36.25, 
non-manual staff and 36.67, manual staff; the normal working week finishes at Friday lunchtime. 
Non-manual staff mostly operate within a flexitime system. There were local variations and 
controls but normal hours were generally 7.25 per day and core hours were 10-1200 and 14-1600 
hours with limits of 0730 to 1830. Lunch was between 30 and 120 minutes and tea breaks were 
for 15 minutes with management control for capacity-cover management. Hours worked were 
calculated over a4 week period and a maximum of 10 hours credit or debit can be carried 
forward. 
Hours of work for manual staff were gradually reduced over the period 1980 to 1987 and during 
this evolutionary period, overtime Increased. In 1987, management made a positive decision to 
reduce overtime and introduced a number of initiatives to achieve this. This organisation is 
relatively young and has enjoyed an energetic period of growth In a labour market where outside 
opportunities were available to staff. In these circumstances there tends to be less of the 
resistance to change which is often a function of tradition and culture. 
Temporary staff, which the Company had used extensively, came to be considered 'expensive' 
due to the learning curve effects, recruitment difficulties and their inherent unreliability. 
Management considered the high levels of overtime, in 1987, to be Ineffective in that productivity 
and quality levels were found to be poor for those individuals who worked excessive hours. 
Moreover, the Company had suffered a crippling overtime ban in the early 1980s and wished to 
avoid the adverse IR Implications of over-dependence on overtime. The avoidance of this 
concrete risk mitigates against the use of overtime in the full costs equation and, also, on the 
'corporate flexibility' argument, hypothesis H4. 
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Therefore a variety of shift systems were developed and introduced in order to reduce 
dependence on overtime. These systems have been successful In tapping the local tertiary 
workforce. In designing the various shift systems, the Company have targeted certain areas of 
the potential labour market which, due to family and other commitments, would find the more 
usual hours of work and length of working week inappropriate. Care was taken to keep the 
contractual hours for these various shifts below the threshold levels for pension fund membership 
which then existed. For Instance, a split-shift for clerical workers was introduced in 1985 with 40 
staff employed on each shift, 0800-1200 and 1200-1655. 
These shifts therefore split 40 full-time jobs between 80 part-time employees and thus represent a 
job-sharing scheme. An agreement exists for each of these employees to provide cover for their 
'partner' on the other shift and to work longer hours during the two or three months of peak 
demand each year. This 'obligation' was non-contractual but was within the offer of employment 
letter. In addition, a split-shift system, 0800-1200 and 1200-1655 hours, was implemented at the 
warehouse for manual staff, creating 12 jobs, (6 full time job equivalents). This split-shift has now 
been increased to 30 staff and it was planned to be further increased to 50-70 staff, depending on 
sales, by the end of the 1989. 
An evening shift for clerical staff in the administration centre, 1715-2215 hours, Monday to 
Thursday, which had been introduced In the late 1970s, was extended in the mid 1980s. Also, key 
production areas at the warehouse, (viz. storage, picking and packing), established permanent 
twilight shifts operating 1655-2200, staffed by permanent part-time employees and a temporary 
twilight shift system, (1710-2110), is now operated during the times of peak demand. This shift is 
partly manned by existing employees, on a second job (moonlighting) basis and partly by 
temporary workers. Moonlighters were paid overtime rates for the whole of the extra shift while 
the temporary workers were paid flat day rates. This system satisfies the moonlighter's need for 
additional funds and the firm's need to recruit staff In a tight market and to avoid staff training and 
the learning curve phenomenon. 
Supervisors and Human Resource Management are, however, now coming to the view that this 
can be unsatisfactory in that fatigue becomes apparent in the moonlighting employees and some 
of the advantages were lost due to the effects of this fatigue. 
Clearly, a large number of jobs, albeit temporary, have been created by these measures which 
were designed to displace overtime. It is not possible to establish how many of the created jobs 
can be directly attributed to the overtime reduction, or at what overtime-hour for new-job-hour 
conversion rate any replacement took place. All managers, however, accept and the evidence 
strongly suggests, that the reduction of overtime has created some new jobs, as well as resulted 
In increased productivity levels. 
OVERTIME WORKING NON-MANUAL WORKERS 
Levels of overtime have fallen from 8 to below 2 hours per week over the last 5 years as a result of 
the shiftworking and job sharing initiatives, capital investment and, quite simply, the management 
determination to reduce it. Moreover, changes have been made over the late 1980s, by industrial 
engineering, to improve work methods, factory layout, materials handling and production 
equipment. Higher levels of productivity have been secured. These initiatives were considered 
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by management to have been largely successful in reducing overtime, although it is not possible 
to retrospectively attribute specific levels of overtime reduction to each initiative. In the clerical 
areas considerable capital investment has been made in order to improve accuracy and speed, to 
reduce costs and alleviate manpower resourcing problems such as recruitment and overtime 
working. For Instance, in the Members' Correspondence section, the move from word 
processors to main frame computing, to deal with members' correspondence, enabled staff to be 
cut from 100 to 70 and a reduction of overtime by 75%. 
A flexitime system was in operation in the clerical areas. Overtime was agreed with the 
departmental manager in advance, recorded on the clock and paid at the premium rates of 150% 
and 200% for Sundays and bank holidays. In these areas two thirds of overtime was taken as 
flexitime leave, reflecting the preponderance of women employees in these areas. 
Overtime at the London site was remunerated in a novel manner. The departmental manager and 
Individual employee negotiate a fixed sum for the overtime work required. This sum was often 
based on NUJ copy writing rates and will generally include the appropriate overtime premium rate. 
The employee carries out the work, often at home, and the cash sum was paid as an adjustment 
to the Individual's monthly salary under the heading overtime'. 
OVERTIME WORKING MANUAL WORKERS 
Manual workers' overtime levels have fallen, on average, from 8 to 4 hours per week over the last 
five years as a result of management Initiatives. Nevertheless, some manual staff still work regular 
overtime, with each depot and department having Its own particular patterns. There are, 
however, many points of general applicability. For instance, a number of novel and interesting 
overtime practices had In the past endured under SOGAT systems agreements and practices and 
these have been largely removed, through management initiatives, over the early to middle 1980s. 
Examples of these Include a Temporary Worker Agreement' where the employment of any 
temporary worker on a site gave an automatic right for all permanent employees on that site to be 
offered 4.5 hours minimum overtime, (representing a Saturday morning), irrespective of the 
demand for capacity during that week. Another such agreement was for all workers to be offered 
overtime, if one worker was called to work overtime, whether the capacity was needed or not. A 
number of overtime-associated agreements still apply, including one covering the 'notice to work 
overtime' which provides for workers to be advised before 1200 noon if they were required to work 
overtime. In the event of this overtime not subsequently being required, the worker was still paid 
in full for the unworked overtime, although this would be an exceptional occurrence. Also, 
Saturday morning overtime is still paid, at premium rate, for 5 hours even though only 4.5 hours 
were clocked. Agreements such as those mentioned above were generally viewed as regressive 
and restrictive. 
SOGAT employ no overall policy for the control or restriction of overtime in this company. 
Indeed, the local union approach towards overtime was fragmented, In a climate where 
operational workers essentially would like more overtime and, in the opinion of management, 
would try to manipulate their working pace and priorities to achieve this. However, the bonus 
scheme effectively prevents the manipulation of productivity levels for overtime generation. The 
unions applied strict regulations to overtime working some 5 years ago, but this control was 
eroded by a dedicated management effort. 
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There was no record of industrial relations problems arising out of the use or regulation of 
overtime. However, overtime has been used by workers as an industrial action weapon. For 
instance, a damaging overtime ban was enforced in 1980 and again in 1982. The question of 
overtime availability was raised by local union representatives from time to time but only from the 
view point of increasing its supply. 
In the early 1980s, SOGAT amalgamated with NATSOPA to become SOGAT 82 and the Company 
lost Its resident Branch Secretary at about that time. These changes were thought by 
management to have facilitated the removal of the restrictive practices regarding overtime. 
OVERTIME LEVELS 
Recent levels of overtime are shown below as a percentage of basic salary. 
ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT SERVICES WAREHOUSES 
MONTH BASIC O/TIME % BASIC O/TIME 
1988 
Sept 358155 22713 6.3 221167 2464 1.1 
Oct 376777 18890 5.0 219424 2647 1.3 
Nov 383371 50558 13.2 213514 2681 1.3 
Dec 378913 24702 11.3 211556 2073 1.0 
1989 
Jan 379056 21813 5.8 208081 950 0.5 
Feb 382905 27179 7.1 216090 1073 0.5 
Mar 388766 30076 7.7 218357 2937 1.3 
Apr 394532 24362 6.2 220316 1653 0.8 
May 395647 22510 5.7 264737 2562 1.0 
Jun 396761 16341 4.1 240113 2420 1.0 
Jul 429858 25370 5.9 246950 2248 0.9 
Aug 431634 24700 5.7 241881 3741 1.5 
Sept 423426 25618 6.1 236700 4173 1.8 
Oct 426010 33625 7.9 243537 2988 1.2 
Nov 452369 31651 7.0 237187 2400 1.0 
BASIC O/TIME % 
102414 15836 15.5 
131592 22461 17.1 
116948 25553 21.8 
116295 21319 18.3 
113316 21366 18.9 
117351 13690 11.7 
117966 11596 9.8 
116820 13608 11.6 
183136 10308 5.6 
133200 10957 8.2 
149482 16028 10.7 
165920 16816 10.1 
158946 20975 13.2 
160142 20406 12.7 
157208 33697 21.4 
These figures do not reflect the 'moonlighting' wages paid to dual job holders on the twilight shift. 
This schedule illustrates a number of well rehearsed points, viz: 
1) Overtime was much higher at the warehouses where employees tend to be manual 
and there were fewer female workers; 
There was very little paid overtime among the London based non-manual staff; 
iii) Overtime does not appear to be falling over the period covered; 
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IV) About 50% of the overtime in the warehouses reflects the seasonal swings in demand. 
The balance, which amounts to about 10% of the basic wages, appears to be fairly 
constant; 
v) The bulk of overtime in the administration and support functions does not vary with 
demand. 
These observations suggest that overtime, even in this progressive organisation, is still 
institutionalised to a degree. 
OVERTIME PREMIA 
Premia were standardised throughout the organisation at 50% for all times except Sundays and 
holidays, which attract 100%. Premia were always paid on basic wages or salary and do not 
cover additions such as bonus. Weighted average analysis Indicates that the premium paid 
throughout the organisation was equivalent to 41% of the hourly wage rate, Including bonus. This 
figure was lower than would be expected due to the high levels of productivity bonus. The direct 
cost of working overtime, 41% of total pay, was one third more expensive than non-wage-labour- 
costs, NWLCs, which average 31% of total pay. Thus the overtime option was not as cost 
effective as that of hiring new staff, taking the comparison between the options' primary costs 
only. 
It must be stressed, however, that there were many other considerations in the overtime decision 
which may or may not over-ride this primary cost comparison. For Instance, in this particular 
case the following considerations would be relevant: 
Availability of suitable workers; 
Service levels (speed of response to customers' demands); 
Corporate flexibility of the organisation; (viz. the ability to 
reduce staff levels In line with demand In the future); 
Utiisatlon of expensive capital plant; 
Training costs and learning curve; 
Fatigue and quality Implications, etc. 
Nevertheless, both senior and middle management believed, quite incorrectly, that the overtime 
decision was cheaper than hiring more staff, (based on the perception of average overtime 
premium and NWLCs). Moreover, it was found that no financial analysis of the overtime decision 
had been formally conducted, either at the primary or more detailed level. 
OVERTIME WORKING PATTERNS 
Overtime was typically worked in 2 hour slots on one, two or three evenings per week, and usually 
the same evenings from week-to-week, and a 4.5 hour Saturday morning slot, (paid as 5 hours). 
In addition, overtime is now often scheduled for a3 hour Friday afternoon slot. 
UNPAID OVERTIME 
It was quite usual, within the organisation, for managers and some professional staff, (although to 
a lesser degree), to work additional hours without any overtime pay, and often without TOIL For 
Instance, hours for the senior manager at the Warehouse were, generally, Sam to 7pm Monday to 
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Thursday and Sam to 5pm Friday, with no weekend working, giving 14 hours per week unpaid 
overtime. More typical examples of unpaid overtime at the warehouse, among the middle 
management, were from 2 to 6 unpaid extra hours per week with an average for those Interviewed 
of approximately 3 hours per week. In addition, lunch breaks and tea breaks were often taken 
working. It was estimated that this organisation benefited, on average, by about 8% additional 
unpaid hours among middle managers, and 18% from the more senior managers. 
The Company were sensitive to this phenomenon and allowed some flexibility In timekeeping and 
attendance in compensation. However, very little actual TOIL was in the event taken by these 
managers; a typical comment was: 'I'm always too busy to take time off. There was a strong 
'machismo' mechanism within the management hierarchy regarding the late working syndrome, 
with many of the middle managers feeling it necessary to stay late In order to demonstrate their 
commitment to the Company. This was reinforced by the obvious high level of visibility given by 
senior managers to their 'late hours'. 
OVERTIME MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Overtime management systems were well developed within the Company. Overtime hours were 
generally supervised and overtime budgets were operated In all areas. Most management and 
professional grades were excluded from paid overtime, although some lower level 'managers' and 
supervisors, who benefit from overtime pay, can authorise overtime working within the budget and 
this was seen by some as a weakness. 
The question of productivity during overtime hours, and the more Interesting problem of 
productivity during normal hours within an overtime regime, were not of concern In this 
organisation since the bonus scheme was very effective In controlling productivity levels. 
Overtime is, in many areas, scheduled In advance by up to 2 weeks. The allocation of overtime in 
about 30% of areas was the responsibility of the supervisor, who takes account of employee 
wishes. In the remaining areas, allocation was achieved by a formal rota system. There was 
some evidence that the gift of overtime was used by supervisors, covertly, as a reward and 
punishment mechanism, particularly among white collar staff, reflecting the much weaker union 
representation in these areas. 
Supervisors receive overtime premium pay for staying late. They often press for overtime for their 
staff, and hence for themselves, In order to meet day to day production targets. For instance, one 
supervisor stated he often had to'battle for overtime to clear backlogs in work-flows caused by 
other managers' Inadequate planning'. He said he was not 'adverse to earning a little extra by 
working overtime' himself. In addition, some lower management jobs carry guarantied overtime 
fixed at, for Instance, 2.5 hours per week, In order to provide cover for shift change-over. 
Supervisors' bonus was based to some degree on overtime levels In that it was geared to the cost 
per standard hour which was adversely affected by overtime. However, supervisors were paid for 
overtime at premium rates and this was felt to provide a weighty counterbalance in both 
'directness' and financial' impact to the relatively minor potential effect on bonus. 
REASONS FOR OVERTIME 
There was a clear and common understanding of the reasons for the use of overtime and these 
were, to a degree, consistent with the evidence found. The primary reason was the need to meet 
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'seasonal' demand peaks and about 50% of overtime fluctuated in sympathy with the number of 
parcels dispatched each week. Secondary reasons were found to be: 
Increased utilisation of expensive capital plant such as the £1.0 million high-rise 
store investment; 
Output boosting in certain key areas, (for instance 'New Members' where the 
highest service levels must be achieved); 
Shortages of skilled personnel, (such as FLT operators); 
Cleaning and maintenance outside normal working hours. 
There was also a small amount of 'custom-and-practice' overtime geared more at the needs of the 
employee than the organisation, although this was at a lower level than was typical in the industry. 
The only overtime that was not In some way found to be systematic was that used in response to 
real emergencies such as those caused by shortages, breakdowns or external influences such as 
the postal strike. The bulk of overtime, more than 75%, could be classified as predictable and 
replaceable, in that the demand could be met by alternative means such as employing additional 
staff, training, new shifts, temporary contracts, etc. 
ATTITUDES AND PERCEPTIONS 
Manual employees would generally like more opportunity to work overtime, whilst their non- 
manual colleagues were generally happy with current levels of overtime. This reflects the 
structural difference found elsewhere viz. 80% of non-manual workers were female and found to 
be more often second wage earners. This does not, however, account for all the difference, there 
was certainly a traditional or cultural difference In expectations, with manual workers exhibiting a 
higher demand for overtime than workers who, In terms of sex, age profile and grade, were alike 
apart from being non-manual. Another interesting phenomenon was found to be the fall-off In 
demand for overtime as the employee passed the age of about 45 years. This was explained by 
one employee by reference to the changing balance between the need for cash, (mortgages were 
particularly mentioned), and the value of spare time (the family was particularly mentioned and 
some employees felt that they had lost the most valuable time when their children were young, 
because of overtime working). 
On the question of the effect of cuts in working hours and other worksharing mechanisms, 
management opinion was split equally between those who felt that overtime would remain 
constant and those who felt it would increase pro-rata. Those who felt it would not increase were 
mostly of the opinion that the demand could be satisfied by further increases in productivity. A 
typical comment was: 'we have gone a long way over recent years but there is still more 
opportunity to maximise output from the current resource'. 
Perceptions on general overtime issues were consistent across the organisation with only minor 
variations in the degree of agreement. On the question of employee manipulation to secure 
overtime it was stated that this had been common in the past and still would take place if It were 
possible, but management controls, and the bonus scheme, effectively prevented it. It was 
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strongly felt, even among some supervisors, that overtime payments to supervisors promoted 
overtime working. It was felt that overtime working promoted industrial relations irritation, but this 
was not a significant problem; one comment was: 'it is a source for much sabre-rattling, but no 
actual industrial action'. The existence of overtime opportunities was thought to be a good 
recruitment factor. Most Interviewees felt that the best ways to reduce overtime were through 
management determination, (mentioned most often) and both capital Investment and training. Ail 
the interviewees felt that there was some potential, within the economy as a whole, to increase 
employment through the reduction of overtime, some felt that this potential remained In their own 
area even now, after the considerable efforts of the last 5 years. 
LOW PAY DEPENDENCY 
The consensus was that employees will always want to increase their income, but that the 
Company's relatively good existing levels of pay make this a desirable option, rather than a matter 
of fundamental need, for all but a few of the primary wage earners with mortgages, usually men 
aged 25 to 40. Two or three examples of individuals who critically depend on their overtime pay 
were found at each site, but these were the exception rather than the rule. 
THE LARGER SATELLITE DEPOT 
Of the 74 staff at this depot 50 were female and 24 were male. Only eighteen months ago there 
was still considerable systematic overtime worked at this establishment. Typically 9 to 12 hours 
per week per employee was worked during one or two nightly 2 hour slots a Friday afternoon 3 
hour slot and a5 hour Saturday morning slot. The situation has since changed, with typical levels 
now standing at about 6 to 8 hours per week during the 3 or 4 months of peak demand. There 
was also a small but constant use of overtime all year round, covering housekeeping and cleaning 
which management claims needs to be conducted outside normal hours, in order to avoid 
Interference and dust during operating time, although this was not an obvious problem and 
alternatives were available. This requirement was met by two men on overtime, on two 2 hour 
evening slots each week. 
The reduction of overtime was achieved by the introduction of new labour-displacing capital plant, 
such as envelope Insertion machinery, the Introduction of new and novel shift systems and by a 
concerted management effort to Improve scheduling and resist worker pressures for overtime. 
This Initiative was stimulated by the crippling overtime ban in the early 1980s. There was some 
concern among managers that considerable pressure exits from the workforce to Increase 
overtime and this would need careful management in the future. 
THE SMALLER SATELLITE DEPOT 
In the smaller of the satellite depots, overtime was little used, with an average of 1 hour per week 
during the non-peak months. This reflects to some extent the structure of employment therein, 
with 35 female and only 4 male workers. Overtime levels stood typically at 13 hours per week In 
1987 and since that time there has been an increase in volume of work. This dramatic reduction 
In overtime has been achieved through industrial engineering improvements and an increase in 
building size where capital plant investment; plant layout and work flows were designed to 
Improve materials handling. In addition, there has been a concerted management effort to 
improve scheduling and work-flows more and to resist worker pressure for overtime. The result 
has been an improvement in productivity and reduction of overtime within this small depot. 
326 
APPENDIX 8-4 
CASE NUMBER 10 
Type of Organisation 
Locations 
Ministry of Defence A 
Civilian Industrial Employees 
South East & South West 




Service (SIC 1980,915) 
An organisation under pressure to improve effectiveness, operating with poor wage 
competitiveness for some grades. Substantial systematic and ineffective overtime was 
worked, with little management control. No particular initiatives were in hand to review the 
use of overtime. 
SUMMARY 
The key message of this case is quite obvious, but worth noting since it appears that it can still be 
missed by a'defensive' management team operating under pressure, viz: unless overtime is 
actively and professionally managed, it becomes ineffective and damages the organisation. 
Increasing pressures were being brought to bear on this organisation to improve productivity, 
although there were no plans to bring overtime into this general review. 
Staff turnover had been running at between 10% and 18% depending upon the area. Vacancies 
were running at up to 20% in some areas and a lack of wage competitiveness was claimed to be 
the key problem, particularly for the more qualified craft and technician grades. 
Overtime was worked by about 30% of employees, each averaging 8.4 hours per week, although 
some workers complete 20 hours overtime per week. Current levels of overtime had been static 
for a number of years. 
It appeared that the employees, rather than the managers, often exercised the real control of 
overtime working, within the overall budgetary constraints. Managers generally were not aware of 
the costs and true reasons for the use of overtime within their areas. Indeed, overtime was found, 
during the ethnographic phases of the study, to be grossly Ineffective and to depress the 
productivity of all hours. 
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POINTS ARISING FROM THIS STUDY 
A* There were no strategies for the management control or reduction of overtime. 
B* Overtime did not appear to assist in the achievement of corporate objectives and this 
added to the very real viability threat to the organisation. 
* Cash was diverted within the organisation to fund overtime Instead of additional 
employment, (le. an overtime budget increase had been justified using skilled staff 
shortages). Therefore, in the negative sense, there was a clear relationship between 
overtime and potential new jobs. Notwithstanding that in many areas of this organisation, 
overtime could be largely abolished with no Increase in staffing due to the potential to 
dramatically improve productivity. It was clear that overtime was adding to the structural 
problems which were seriously threatening the viability of the organisation and therefore 
the jobs sustained by it. 
C* There was no evidence of any formal or even informal analysis of the decision to work 
overtime and managers appeared not to have considered alternatives to using overtime. 
The decision to fix an annual budget for the level of overtime appeared to be the only 
effective management control. No financial analysis had been made of the overtime 
'decision', nor had the impact of overtime on overall productivity been considered. 
* The employees exercised a great degree of control of overtime working, within the overall 
budget constraints. 
* Formal administration systems for plant-level overtime control were found to be sound 
both procedurally and In application. However, the actual control of overtime on the 
'shop floor' was achieved through charge hands and supervisors and was found, on many 
occasions, to be Ineffective. The lower levels of management were found to Identify more 
with the needs of the employees than with those of the organisation. 
* Managers were unaware of the true processes involved in overtime working in their 
organisation. They mis-perceived the real use to which overtime was being put and the 
Impact of their use of overtime on unit costs. 
D* More than 80% of the organisation's overtime could be defined as systematic. 
E* Overtime was used generally for the normal workload, although managers did not 
perceive this to be so. 
F* Overtime had an Inhibiting effect on operational flexibility in that it was systematic and 
therefore not available to deal with unexpected events. Overtime also caused the 
depression of productivity across normal hours due to 'pacing' and fatigue factors. 
G* Both managers and employees were generally found to want more overtime provision. 
H* The cost of overtime premia represented 52% of basic pay. The non-wage labour cost of 
employing an additional worker amounted to an average of 35% for those departments 
using overtime. 
I* Overtime was found to be often Ineffective and unproductive. 
J* TOIL was not used and little or no unpaid overtime was worked other than by higher 
grade management staff, who worked on average about eight extra hours per week, 
without thought of extra remuneration. 
* The local union officials pursued no particular policy on the use of overtime, nor had they 
received any direct guidance from their central organisation. 
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* There was no evidence that normal levels of overtime caused employees any particular 
welfare problems or fatigue. However, where groups of employees worked very long 
hours, above 12 hours per week, problems of fatigue and stress were found. These 
became manifest primarily through sickness rates more than double the organisation's 
normal levels. 
* Pay levels were relatively poor, particularly for the skilled craft and technician grades. 
There was a degree of dependency at the lower pay levels, but these were not general 
and were limited to specific circumstances, such as younger male employees, with family 
responsibilities. 
BRIEF METHODOLOGY 
The organisation consisted of 4 separate establishments, three of which, employing 96% of the 
staff, were visited. Some 16 managers and supervisors and 29 employees were interviewed and 
working practices were observed. All time spent on site was accompanied due to the security 
requirements, although this did not significantly impede the study or affect the results. 
BRIEF ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
BACKGROUND 
Increasing pressures were being brought to bear In order to improve productivity. A new post of 
Productivity Officer had been established during the previous year. The possibility of 
contractorisation was present for some of the less sensitive areas. There was a high level of 
union representation, predominantly through the AUE, EETPU and T&G. Work study and 
production engineering techniques were not used and output was measured only In terms of 
delivery performance, with no consideration of the resource or cost implications of the output. 
The Activity was geared to providing a service to the essentially scientific objectives of the 
establishment. The staff were split almost equally between craft and non-craft employees. 
Among the non-craft employees, about 120 were non-manual, the rest being manual staff. An 
excellent forward work-load existed for most areas, the key problem being that of meeting the 
important delivery schedules. The employees were not generally aware of the healthy forward 
load situation and tended to be defensive in 'spreading' their current work-in-progress across their 
working time. 
In short, the employees exercised an unhealthy degree of control over their pace of work. The 
exception to this was a group of about 120 employees in one department, essentially craftsmen, 
who were tightly controlled and were observed to achieve a rate equivalent to 94BS, (BS 0-100), 
well above the day-rate plus 12% pay they were receiving. 
Staff turnover had been running at between 10% and 18% within the various areas. Vacancies 
during the last year had been running at up to 20% in some areas and a lack of wage 
competitiveness was claimed to be the key problem, particularly for the more qualified craft and 
technician grades. A special pay allowance of £25 had recently been granted to all 
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establishments in the organisation, in order to improve recruitment and retention. This allowance 
was made In response to the lack of wage competitiveness and was supported by anecdotal 
evidence, labour turnover analysis and local job advertisements, there was no formal analysis of 
pay statistics and the outer London and South coast areas were treated alike. However, a review 
of published statistics, undertaken as part of this project, generally supported the organisation's 
conclusions (Reward 1989). It was too early to determine if this increase in pay was having any 
effect on morale or staff turnover. 
THE USE OF OVERTIME 
Overtime was systematically worked on the same specific days and times, by essentially the same 
employees. For Instance, In one area employing 73 craftsmen and 8 non-craft staff, 8 hours 
overtime was worked every alternative Sunday, in addition to systematic overtime at other times of 
the week. Overtime was worked by about 30% of employees, each averaging 8.4 hours per 
week, although some workers worked 20 hours overtime per week. This level of overtime had 
been static for a number of years. An estimate, based on observations during the study, revealed 
that over 80% of total overtime was systematic in that the demand could have been anticipated 
and met In alternative ways, or the overtime was, In fact, a function of 'employee demand' rather 
than operational need. 
The remuneration for overtime was exclusively by premium payment and the average premium 
equated to 52% of basic pay. Non-wage labour costs, for those employee groups working 
overtime, equated to 34% of basic. Approximately £12 of the average pay was an unconsolidated 
'productivity' payment, although there was no Incentive element whatsoever In that now 
'Institutionalised' payment. 
The management of overtime and the amount of overtime worked were governed primarily by the 
availability of departmental level budgetary provision. Indeed, most managers simply divided 
their overtime allocation Into twelve equal monthly proportions and that was the extent of their 
control. There were no other systems for overtime corporate-level overtime control or attempts to 
measure the impact of overtime on unit productivity, either during overtime or in normal hours. 
Management were Intending to budget, for the coming year, for the same amount of overtime as 
the previous year. There was no attempt to justify the macro-level overtime budget through the 
evaluation of manpower plans and forward load forecasts. If managers could secure more 
overtime provision, they said they would have 'gladly' used that provision. 
Formal administrative systems of authorisation and recording overtime were found to be sound 
both procedurally and in application. However, the control of overtime on the 'shop floor' was 
achieved through charge hands and supervisors and was found, on some occasions, to be totally 
ineffective. Lower levels of management identified more with the needs of the employees than 
with those of the organisation. There had been no attempt to evaluate the cost of overtime 
working, or to investigate alternatives to overtime working. Although there were moves to review 
productivity in order to make the organisation more viable, overtime was not planned to be a 
specific part of that review. 
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Managers generally considered that overtime was cost-effective and thought overtime to be 
cheaper than hiring new staff. Indeed, one particular manager stated that overtime was worked 
on Sundays in order to'spread the overhead costs', and on this basis was 'cost-effective', in spite 
of the double-time premium. Investigations revealed that Sunday overtime, as would be 
expected, added to, rather than diluted the overhead costs. In fact the Sunday overtime was 
found to be worked in response to employee preferences. Three reasons for this preference were 
given: I) travelling to work convenience, (employees were 'bussed' to the site from town and 
overtime required them to bring their own transport); ii) to achieve the higher premium rates; and 
iii) to retain Saturdays for family, shopping or sports activities.. 
There was general pressure from both managers and employees to increase the availability of 
overtime, although some staff, generally the older employees, said they would resist overtime, 
were they offered it. In fact, overtime was distributed on a purely voluntary basis. It was claimed 
by senior managers that overtime pay to supervisors, who schedule and control overtime, tends to 
'institutionalise' the use of overtime. No abuse of this nature was found during the study periods. 
Managers proclaimed three major uses for the use of overtime In their establishments, viz: q to 
give operational flexibility, particularly to deal with peak work loads and to meet unforeseen 
demand; Ii) to substitute for shortages of skilled employees; Iii) to a lesser extent, Increase wages 
of key staff. The evidence on the 'shop-floor' did not support these views. It was Interesting to 
note that managers, when asked, claimed these reasons for the regular Sunday morning overtime. 
There was no confirmation whatsoever that overtime was used to meet unforeseen or emergency 
demand to a significant degree. Overtime, In one area, was found to be used for ordinary 
scheduled work, when it had been claimed It was only used for emergency and unexpected 
demand. The manager, when Interviewed a second time after the shop-floor study, claimed that 
overtime used for standard work would release his men, in normal hours, to undertake emergency 
work should this be necessary and that was why the overtime work was in fact geared to his 
'standard' scheduled workload. There was no evidence that this process had operated and this 
explanation illustrates both the defensive attitudes taken by management and the mis-perception 
of the reasons for the use of overtime. 
In one area it was found that long standing vacancies for skilled craftsmen had been used, 
successfully, as justification for an Increase in overtime budget. In this respect overtime was 
displacing potential additional employment, although that presupposes that skilled workers were 
available at the wages offered. Indeed, overtime was used systematically as a staff retention 
mechanism and many employees have come to depend on the overtime element of their wages to 
meet their fixed financial commitments. This dependency was a function of two key factors: i) the 
relatively low levels of pay, and ii) the regular nature of the overtime. 
Overtime was ineffectively used In many of the areas. For Instance, overtime was used In the 
transport department, which employed 39 drivers, to enable drivers to prepare vehicles on a 
Saturday morning for the following week. The transport department manager spoke with pride 
about his effective use of overtime which he felt was his one way to secure a degree of value for 
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money from the workforce. He stated: 'when they are on overtime, that is the only time when they 
really earn their bread'. The drivers were observed to be less than 60% occupied during normal 
working hours, and the overtime work could easily have been scheduled in normal hours. A 
second example, in a craft trade area, a number of employees were observed to be working for 
less than 50% of their normal hours. They were observed on a second afternoon tea break 30 
minutes before the end of normal time. They did this, they said, because they were working 
overtime that night. However, this tea break was still in progress, in the rest room, some 25 
minutes after the start of the overtime period, at which point the study was curtailed by the 
embarrassed escort. 
In some areas, overtime was used to carry out 'special' jobs. For Instance, a stores area had 
come, by tradition, to use overtime every Saturday morning to burn redundant explosives and 
detonators, there was no operational reason for this system and there appeared to be 
considerable capacity available to organise this work in normal hours. Interestingly, the 
expression: 'this is how we've always done It', was used to explain why the work took place in 
overtime. 
There was no evidence of long hours resulting in the undue fatigue of workers. One manager did 
observe that there was a catch 22 situation In that, In a systematic overtime regime, workers would 
either become fatigued, or would 'pace' themselves to avoid fatigue. In either event the 'regular' 
overtime would be Ineffective from the organisation's viewpoint since overall productivity per hour 
would fall. 
High levels of sickness, (16%), were found In an area which worked a 24 hour simple three shift 
system, on a basis of 39 conditioned hours per week, with a systematic shift-fill of 18.25 hours per 
week overtime plus additional overtime on occasions. The personnel department and local 
management claimed that the long hours of work were a major cause of the absenteeism 
problem. There were no plans to investigate new shift systems which would provide a more 
effective match of manning levels to demand and be more acceptable to the workforce. The 
workers generally claimed to like the shift system and some gave the high levels of overtime as a 
reason for this. This was, however, taken as a superficial response in that the workers were 
worried that change might affect them financially or Impose more discipline on their activity during 
their long hours of overtime. 
Within the overall budgetary constraints, it appeared that the employees, rather than the managers 
often were exercising the real control of overtime working. Certainly the employees claimed that 
this was so and the evidence supported their claim. 
